The Naked Communist

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by Willard Cleon Skousen


  Responsible Cubans such as Dr. Marquez Sterling made contact with Castro in his mountain retreat and pleaded with the revolutionary leader to stop the bloodshed and allow the elections. Castro arrogantly turned him down. There would be no elections.

  During the emotional white heat of the revolution many Americans missed the highly significant overtures which Batista was making. As it turned out, these might have made the difference in saving Cuba from the Communist conquest which Castro was planning.

  Earlier, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Gardner had been removed because he urged support of Batista until Cuba’s Problems could be settled at the polls. He was replaced by Ambassador Earl Smith who soon received a horrified State Department stare when he tried to put over the point that Castro was obviously leading Cuba and the United States into a Soviet-built Communist trap.

  These shocked State Department “experts” reflected their complete disdain for their Ambassador’s advice by deliberately engineering a tight arms embargo against Batista. Then they went further. To completely assure Batista’s defeat they promoted an agreement among the Central and South American republics that they would not sell arms to Batista either. The results were inevitable.

  In desperation, Batista tried to buy 15 unarmed training planes from the United States. It was finally agreed that this would be satisfactory. Batista paid for them in advance. Then Castro ordered Raul to launch a project specifically designed to intimidate and humiliate the United States. Raul kidnapped 30 U.S. Marines and sailors, 17 American civilians and 3 Canadians. Threats against the lives of these hostages were used to force the United States to cancel the shipment of training planes to Batista. The experts in the State Department meekly capitulated!

  Some American citizens were bold enough to suggest that if Teddy Roosevelt had been alive he would have taken the U.S. Marine Corps and landed in the middle of Castro’s mountain retreat with such an earthshaking velocity that the Cuban tyrant would have gladly released the Americans—and without any price.

  The Castro Coup D’état

  When Batista first took over in 1952, Fidel Castro had immediately projected himself into the front lines of opposition. As indicated previously, Castro had been working behind the facade of the Orthodox Party, but after the Batista Coup he insisted that this organization include the Communist Party and set up a “popular front” against Batista. The Orthodox Party leaders refused to do this. Castro promptly bolted the party and said he would form his own movement.

  It was only a short time after this—July 26, 1953—that he made his disastrous attack on the Army barracks at Santiago. This turned into a real tragedy for the men in the barracks hospital (who were cut to pieces by Castro’s raiders) and also for Castro’s men. They were met with overwhelming odds and captured or killed. Survivors were subjected to torture and eventual death in retaliation for their attack on the wards in the hospital. Thus the “26th of July Movement” was born.

  Castro had managed to assign himself to a less dangerous post in the 26th of July attack and when he saw the assault was failing he fled, shouting, “Every man for himself!” His brother Raul also escaped. Later both of the Castro brothers were captured and sentenced to prison. Fidel was sentenced to 15 years and Raul to 13. However, both of them served only 22 months because after Batista had put down the attempted insurrection he commuted their sentences.

  For this gesture of political generosity by Batista, the Castro brothers displayed only contempt. During July, 1955, they left Cuba declaring that they would organize an invasion force and soon return to pull down Batista and “liberate” Cuba.

  The headquarters for this invasion movement was established near Mexico City. All kinds of people flocked there to support Castro’s so-called liberation of Cuba. Some were political enemies of Batista, some were opportunists, and many were sincere liberals. But just as with Lumumba in Africa, sinister hard-core Communist personalities immediately moved in close to provide the “guiding hand.”

  Castro’s chief of staff turned out to be Dr. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentinian Communist assigned to work with Castro by the Soviet apparatus called “Asistencia Tecnica.” Raul Castro had received considerable training during a recent trip to Prague, Moscow and Red China. He was therefore made commander of Castro’s army. Other trained Communists moved deftly into every phase of the program.

  But in spite of all the training, intrigue and planning, the famous “Invasion of Cuba” by Castro’s forces turned out to be a real fiasco. Castro’s total strength was a mere handful of only 82 men who clambored aboard a leaky yacht on November 19, 1956 and set out to sea. The Captain of the yacht was Hipolito Castillo, well known strategist of the Soviet organization for the subversion of Latin America. The sluggish yacht was slow in reaching Cuba and when the men waded ashore to make their heroic invasion they were cut to pieces with gun-fire. Most of them were captured or killed.

  Castro managed to escape into the hills and eventually work his way up into the 8,000 foot heights of the Sierra Maestra. He arrived there with only a handful of his original force. “Che” Guevara took over and began using propaganda and tactical strategy to dominate the immediate area and gradually rally others to the cause—especially young Cubans “full of life, ideals and faith.” Thus the strange forces of revolutionary fire began to be built and soon civil war was reaching out across Cuba.

  Two major factors led to the final success of Castro’s revolution. One was centered in the Soviet Union and the other was centered in the United States.

  Raul Castro who had previously been behind the Iron Curtain made several trips to Russia and Czechoslovakia to negotiate for arms and finances. The arms arrived by submarine, the money came through by couriers. During the last months of the revolution, observers were amazed at the quantities of Czech and Russian equipment being used by the Castro forces. They were equally surprised at the vast supplies of money which Castro had available—money for wages, food, equipment, liquor, bribery and favors.

  Batista, on the other hand, suddenly found himself at the other end of the horn. Because of his pro-U.S. policies he had assumed that when the struggle for Cuba became critical he would be able to rely on the United States to sell him arms and supplies. To his amazement he discovered that his request for permission to buy arms in the U.S. fell on deaf ears. What he had not realized was that Herbert Matthews, Edward Murrow, Ed Sullivan, Ruby Phillips, Jules Dubois and a multitude of other writers and opinion makers had been eulogizing Castro and castigating Batista. In Congress, Senator Wayne Morse, Representative Charles O. Porter and Representative Adam Clayton Powell had thrown their combined weight behind the Castro cause. All this “Robin Hood” propaganda definitely had its effect.

  At the same time Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and Caribbean Director William Wieland—the two persons who were supposed to know what was going on—blandly assured all inquirers that Fidel Castro was the hope of Cuba and had no Communist taint whatever. As late as June, 1959 (and that was extremely late), Congressman Porter was assuring his colleagues: “No one in the State Department believes Castro is a Communist, or a Communist sympathizer, nor does any other responsible person who wants get his facts straight.”{116}

  Of course, as time marched on toward Cuba’s inexorable doom, the course of history embarrassed the Congressman and also the State Department. In the closing months of the conflict American policies followed blind alleys which authorities have since attributed to either “stupidity, incompetence, or worse.”

  The Communist Take-Over

  It was January 1, 1959, that Fidel Castro became the political steward of a dazed, war-weary Cuba. Batista had fled. All opposition was crushed. In many circles of American liberals and confused newspaper readers there was a great huzza as though liberty and constitutional government had come to Cuba at last.

  But many students of international problems saw ominous signs that the suffering and blood-letting for Cuba had barely begun. The first warnings w
ere exultant boasts from the Communist press that “they” had won. In Moscow, Pravda pointed out that from the very beginning of the Castro movement “our party considered it its first duty to aid the rebels, giving them the correct orientation and the support the popular masses. The party headed the battles for land and thereby increased its authority among peasantry. Our party… appealed to the popular masses Fidel Castro in every way….”{117}

  The Communist Party of Cuba also came out in the open to boast that they had provided an important part of the revolutionary action “to overthrow the bloody tyranny of Batista which served as the instrument of imperialistic interests and was supported by imperialism.”{118}

  If General Batista read this statement he may have wondered where this “imperialistic” support was supposed to have come from. He knew that if the Communists were accusing him of enjoying U.S. support they were really confused.

  As soon as Castro took over he used his revolutionary courts of mob justice to send over 600 persons to the firing squads. American liberals described the punishment as “harsh, but deserved.” Then he reached out and began a “reform” movement of typical Communist dimensions:

  • Confiscation of land and settling Cuban workers on what turned out to be large, Soviet-type collectivized farms.

  • Confiscation of more than a billion dollars worth of American industry which Castro had neither the technicians nor finances to operate.

  • Breaking up of Cuban family life and placing medium-aged children in special farm communes so “the children will be under the influence of teachers and not their families.”

  • Reorganization of the schools to serve as propaganda transmission belts to dispense Communist doctrine and the “Hate Yankee” line.

  • Suspension of civil liberties and other constitutional guarantees.

  • Elimination of free elections.

  • Capture of all press, TV and radio for government propaganda purposes.

  • Termination of all cultural, political and economic ties with the United States.

  • Alliances with Russia.

  • Recognition of Red China.

  • Trade with the Communist bloc.

  While all of this Communist machinery was being put into operation during 1959 and early 1960, many American apologists for Castro continued to insist that he was neither Communist nor dictatorial, just “misunderstood.” They snatched at every hopeful atom of news from Cuba indicating that Castro might be “getting more reasonable now,” or “Castro is changing.”

  But all of these dreams of hopeful illusion were smashed by Castro himself when he dutifully answered the call of Nikita Khrushchev in the summer of 1960 and went to the United Nations as part of the Red Bloc “show of strength.” At Castro’s Harlem headquarters the two dictators warmly embraced each other. They were brothers and comrades.

  Now that the Iron Curtain has come rumbling down on little Cuba perhaps some Americans occasionally reflect on the glowing description of Castro which Herbert Matthews wrote for the New York Times in 1957: “Castro,” he said, “has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections.”

  Other Americans who chose the wrong side have since said, “It is all so unfortunate. Perhaps it was inevitable.”

  This last statement has a familiar ring. This is precisely the theme which Dean Acheson put in his White Paper when he tried to explain why we lost China. He excused it as “inevitable.” But the Wedemeyer Report revealed that China was also lost because of stupidity, incompetence or worse. China was lost when the State Department promoted an arms embargo against this long-standing U.S. ally at a time when she was fighting for her very existence. The same kind of thinking put the arms embargo on Batista. Both were lost. Both were casualties of Communism.

  All of this led former Ambassador Gardner to remark sadly:

  “We could have prevented it all and we didn’t. If we’d carried out normal relations with Batista, just carried out our contracts, he (Batista) would have got out as scheduled, come to live in Florida, and been replaced by an ideal candidate.”

  “A pro-Batista man?” Gardner was asked.

  “No, Marquez Sterling, a doctor, whom everybody loved, was Batista’s opponent. Ironically, although against Batista, he had to flee Cuba because of Castro.”{119}

  Events during 1961 demonstrated that the United States was still not giving the Cuban situation sufficient attention. None of the tragic errors of the past were any worse than the fatal blunder which occurred on April 17, 1961, when an abortive invasion of Cuba was attempted at the Bay of Pigs under circumstances which doomed it to failure before the attack was even launched.

  Badly organized, poorly equipped, and carrying the sagging prestige of the United States with it, a little band of less than 1400 Cubans landed from antiquated ships to spark an “uprising against Castro.” Castro was waiting for them with Soviet tanks, jet planes and Soviet guns. When the shooting was over the “invaders” were captured in a body. Communist propaganda machinery all over the world went into hysteria of screaming headlines against American imperialism. “A first-class disaster for U.S. prestige” wailed the free world press.

  In the panic atmosphere which followed, Castro facetiously said he might trade tractors for the prisoners. Immediately misguided U.S. liberals began collecting money for tractors to pay off Castro’s blackmail demand. Castro was so pleased to see citizens from the most powerful nation in the world cowering at his feet that he gleefully tantalized the negotiators by boosting his demands. As should have been expected, the negotiations came to nothing.

  Responsible Americans began to demand a halt to all this ridiculous pampering of a Soviet puppet. Serious political leaders began to set down the plans for a long-range strategy which would eventually liberate the beleaguered people of Cuba.

  CHAPTER TWELVE

  The Future Task

  In this study we have made no attempt to cover up the blunders of the past which free men have made in dealing with Communism. In fact, all of these mistakes may be counted a benefit if we have learned a lesson from each of them. Nevertheless, we certainly would be guilty of the “decadent stupidity” which the Communists attribute to us if we allowed ourselves to repeat these mistakes in the future.

  In this chapter we shall deal with the task at hand. To appreciate the problem we shall first discuss the progress which the Communists have made under their Timetable of Conquest. Then we shall deal with the current line of Communist strategy. Finally we shall describe some of the most important things which must be done to win.

  The Communist Timetable of Conquest

  To head off an enemy it is first necessary to know where the enemy wants to go. The Communists have made no secret about this. Their plan first of all is to take Asia, then Africa, next Europe and finally America. Although this plan of conquest has been in Communist literature for several decades, it was vigorously restated in 1953 when Red leaders decided to set up a timetable of conquest for the entire world and then take it continent by continent. Total conquest is to be completed by around 1973. Fortunately American military intelligence captured this timetable at the close of the Korean War and Senator William Knowland placed it in the Congressional Record under date of April 29, 1954, page 5708.

  Although the timetable is too lengthy to quote in its entirety, selected statements are being presented with comments so the student may know what progress the Communists have made in their plans to take over the world.

  “We have to; until we are certain of victory, take a course which will not lead to war.”

  Official Communist strategy is to press for advantages on all fronts but to back down in the face of major military resistance. This will continue to be their policy unless they could be certain of sudden victory by a sneak attack which would wipe out all U.S. capacity to retaliate. U.S. success during 1960 in launching a Polaris missile from a submerged submarine made Soviet sneak attack plans obs
olete. A Red attack would bring devastating retaliation from these constantly moving missile bases which now will be roaming the seas. For the present, Red policy will therefore have to be “a course which will not lead to war.”

  “Britain must be placated by being convinced that… the Communists and the capitalist countries can live in peace.”

  Peaceful coexistence was not only sold to the people of Britain but to Americans as well. Coexistence means to accept Communism as a permanent fixture in the earth; to write off as past history the conquest of the satellite nations; to placate Communist demands so as to avoid crises and international tensions.

  “Opportunities for trade will have a great influence on the British mind.”

  This worked even better than the Red leaders planned. Today not only Britain but the U.S. and 37 other members of the Western bloc have succumbed to the lure of trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

  “In the case of France… she must be made to feel a greater security in cooperating with us.”

  After World War II, Red forces in France made the Communist party the largest in the country. Before DeGaulle’s seizure of power in 1958, Red influence had helped to carry France to the brink of bankruptcy, anarchy and civil war.

  “Japan must be convinced that rearmament endangers national security and that… the American forces distributed all over the world cannot spare sufficient strength for the defense of Japan.”

  This was the kind of Communist agitation which produced the 1960 Japanese riots and prevented President Eisenhower from visiting Japan.

 

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