The U.S. also had two major naval anti-submarine bases in the area – one in Pensacola and another in Key West, Florida. Helicopters equipped with sonar buoy detection devices were on Gulf stand-by and regular anti-sub patrols were increased. The air recognizance patrols were designed to cover areas not covered by the SOSUS detection system. Apparently these systems failed to pick up the Russian submarine, perhaps because it got so close to the Mississippi coast line.
At this time the U.S. strongly suspected, but did not have confirming proof, that missile parts and other weapons were being transported to Cuba under the disguise of humanitarian food and agricultural equipment as part of new Soviet-Cuban relations.
The Pentagon, Naval Intelligence, the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI were all active in operations involving Cuba, and President Kennedy was being briefed on a daily and sometimes hourly basis.
A critical intelligence question for the Prowfish incident was how the Soviet submarine came so close to the U. S. Coastline without being detected. Another obvious question was what was the submarine doing there. The incident also occurred shortly after the Soviets shot down the Gary Powers intelligence flight over Russian territory. The Soviets contended that they were just sending food and agricultural equipment to Cuba on a purely humanitarian basis. This posture would be severely undermined if a Russian sub were discovered off the coast of Mississippi.
Marks’ and Simon’s meeting with the captain in the forward torpedo room had several agenda items. One was getting printouts of Captain Hodges’ sonar readings and picking Hodges’ brain. His extensive knowledge on sonar signatures would give credibility to his interpretation of those readings.
To get ready for the meeting, Hodges had bunk racks tied back and a table top brought in to create more room to meet and to lay out printouts of sonar readings and maps.
Since he was Naval Intelligence and in charge of the team, Marks did most of the talking. Simon was more of the silent type and chimed in selectively. Neither of the two men had met Hodges before, although both had heard of him and had read most of Hodges’ intelligence memos and profiles before they arrived.
Marks wanted to ensure that Hodges didn’t see the meeting as a witch hunt. To establish rapport, Marks began by talking about some areas of the Navy they had both worked in. Hodges became comfortable and began to brief the two intelligence officers. They first went over Hodges’ detailed printout of sonar readings and charts, showing exactly where the readings took place.
Hodges explained the Prowfish’s advanced electronic systems and both Marks and Simon were impressed with his knowledge. They also spoke about the strange illness that had broken out, the symptoms, and who was affected. Marks wanted to know the onshore medical officer assigned to the problem. Hodges assured them that he had confidence in the scrubbing procedures being used, the food replacement provisions, and the various inspections carried out.
Hopefully another breakout would not occur. He explained he was shorthanded with the crew, but he thought they would be all right. Marks wanted a list of all personnel and replacement personnel, and Hodges said he would forward the list as soon as they had the complete roster.
Hodges laid out a printout of his sonar, radar, infrared and thermal image readings, along with charts plotting where each sonar hit had occurred. Each chart was discussed in detail. Marks and Simon asked lots of questions and listened attentively as Hodges went through his explanations.
Questions were asked in such a way that Hodges did not feel they were questioning his decisions. They needed information, and Hodges was a good teacher. Long and short range sonar readings of the Russian submarine profile showed it by shape to be Hunter-Killer class type and not one of the Soviet’s missile carrying subs. The Russians refer to this class of submarine as Project 613 submarines. NATO classifies this type of Russian sub as a Whiskey class sub, although a number of unusual sonar signature readings brought this classification into question.
The sonar images of the prop cavitations profile were not those of a Whiskey class. The props were estimated by Hodges to be seven or eight-blade props and gave off a different signal than conventional submarine props, more common to Russian nuclear submarines. Other profile characteristics seemed to suggest that it was not a nuclear submarine. There was no reactor heat signature, nor was there the typical noise from the cooling pumps which is always telltale signs of a nuclear submarine. However, the side view underwater sonar profile of the hull seemed to be smaller and more rounded than a Whiskey class sub’s, suggesting it had nuclear sub design, minus the reactor. Hodges looking at the cavitations profile and again suggested that this was definitely a seven or eight-blade profile – a lower profile, more difficult to track when it was increasing or decreasing speed.
The Russians did have a modified electric diesel Whiskey class submarine that carried one or two missiles located in parallel on its deck. These were bulky and inefficient to operate, and the Russians ceased production of them shortly after they began. This submarine’s sonar profile didn’t indicate any missile compartment showing on deck. Captain Hodges explained that the Russian sub did not assume aggressive posture or positioning once it had been detected, even when they approached close torpedo range.
Marks asked, “Are you sure he spotted your boat?”
Hodges replied, “Because of opposing sonar clicks, I believe the sub had detected us, but I can’t be absolutely sure.” He showed them his approach patters and distances data.
Hodges further explained, “Our target used both a straight zigzag and lazy S pattern to avoid detection. I plotted both patterns, when they made their turns, and how they varied their patterns at regular intervals. It was a pattern within a pattern, which I found interesting. The target was able to increase speed at a faster rate than I had estimated.” Hodges’ facial expression indicated that this troubled him. He continued, “In that regard, the target acted like a nuclear sub, but there was no radioactive or cooling signature, which is standard for determining nuclear presence.”
“I can’t assume it’s not nuclear based on its performance. I was unable to confirm either that it definitely was or was not nuclear. My orders from CNO were to consider it nuclear, and I proceeded according to that protocol.”
Marks and Simon both agreed that intelligence suggested that the Russians would not likely launch missiles from the more unstable sub platform when they were so close to having more stable and accurate land-based missiles installed in Cuba.
Marks thought it was possible that they were using a conventional or nuclear missile sub to back up land installations, but he thought that a submarine launch was unlikely. If underwater missiles were detected in the area, the U.S. would immediately react. Marks speculated, “The Russians have intercontinental ballistic missiles they can launch from inside Russia to hit U.S. targets, so why would they risk the less accurate and less reliable submarine strike? There are some puzzles here. We thought we knew within a few square nautical miles where every Russian submarine was deployed. Apparently, we missed this one, and we’re not sure how, but we’ve got ground and Navy Intelligence people all over the question.”
Marks shared his opinion that this sub was probably on an intelligence and surveillance mission. It was possible that the Russian sub was a new one that came from the Baltic region – one that somehow got past U.S. detection.
Simon contributed some additional information. “We’re running ops on Castro sympathizers and pro-Castro organizations that are Russian-supported. We tracked three agents we believe came ashore on shrimp boats out of Biloxi and Gulfport at precisely the time you spotted your target. It seems that Russian trained Latin American operatives for the last five months have been coming ashore at night on shrimp boats. They’re making their way to Miami on Greyhound and Trailways buses using different schedules.”
“We have operatives in those organizations and are tracking the agents who came ashore two nights before you spotted your submarine target. There are two shrimp bo
ats we believe are involved, ‘The Carla Rae’ and ‘Miss Janice.’ Both are older vessels, but equipped with night rigging.”
Hodges asked, “Why do you suspect those two boats?”
Simon responded, “These shrimp boats have been in the same local family for years, until eight months ago when they both suddenly changed hands. One was purchased by a shell company out of Panama by the name of Caribbean Seafood, and the other is owned by a wealthy Columbian who has supported several failed attempts to overthrow the current political regime. The captains and crew of these vessels are employees of the offshore operations and are unknown to the local fisherman.”
“We’re monitoring their fuel consumption and catch records. Their records are not consistent with other fishing and fuel records we have. Before we move in, we want to know all the links in the chain. It wouldn’t surprise me if you find either of these two shrimp boats near your target submarine. If you see either of these boats on your patrol or near the target, immediately let us know.”
Hodges nodded and said, “Of course”.
Marks and Simon took copies of Hodges’ sonar readings and charting records. Marks indicated they were working other intelligence sources on the identification of the Russian sub. They went over Hodges’ orders and confirmed he was to regain contact of the Russian sub and continue pursuit but not engage unless fired upon. He had an around-the-clock hotline team working on sub activity, which was also being coordinated with Pensacola and Key West.
Marks indicated, “At this time, we do not want to raise suspicion or force hostile contact. Depending on how this works out, we may want to force this Russian submarine to the surface. Pensacola may be your best help in that regard. They have increased their buoy pattern and airborne patrols. It won’t be long before we find the bastard. We just need other intelligence information to tie the whole thing together.”
Marks had some words especially for Hodges. “A longtime friend of yours, Larry Jessup, says hello and sends his regards. Larry was heading up the intelligence group that he and Simon coordinated with. Larry said to tell you he has your back.”
Hodges smiled and immediately felt more confident about his mission, knowing that someone he knew at the top was looking at his decisions. The troublesome thought had crossed his mind that his mission could be a decoy to provoke an incident with the Russians that could be deadly. But now he was reassured. Because of his longstanding relationship with Larry, dating back to the Naval Academy, Hodges doubted that Larry would knowingly allow that to happen.
24
Commander John G. Hodges had been captain of the Prowfish for over two years. Hodges was an experienced naval officer and submariner and a graduate of the Naval Academy in electrical engineering. After graduation, he immediately applied for sea duty and spent a year on a destroyer before being granted permission to apply and attend graduate school at Princeton. He first became interested in sonar electronics while at Princeton, where he received his master’s degree in electrical engineering.
While in graduate school, he had the chance to work with several private electronics companies on sonar ideas he had developed, including General Electric and Raytheon. He also worked with private research companies, doing work with underwater mammals and their communication methods.
Hodges was very interested in how certain species of whales with long migratory patterns could vary the range of their echo soundings greatly by internally changing the frequency of their sound patterns. The whales did this by contracting muscles around their sound chambers. This capability gave the migratory pod the ability to locate members who became separated and to identify certain prey activity well beyond the whale’s normal range. Hodges plotted these signals and believed he could recreate this capability electronically by changing the sonar sound wave patterns and frequencies.
During his research, Hodges developed sonar and radar display screens with much higher resolution than anything preceding them. His software and algorithms, applied to his refined screen display, allowed electronic signals to be broken down into much finer detail. Hodges briefed the Navy on his sonar screen and software technology, and he attracted interest at the highest level at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He was able to take the sound recordings of a ship’s propeller made in the water as it turned, called the ship’s cavitations signature, and break that signature into seventeen distinct signals using his new screen, signal analyzer, and the algorithms he had developed. He could identify not only the ship, but the ship’s power plant and propulsion system, estimated speed, and several other characteristics not previously possible.
In several presentations to CNO, Hodges also showed how submarines equipped with his system would be way ahead of the Soviets. The presentations Hodges made brought attention to the new technology, which the Navy began employing almost immediately. Many members at CNO’s office respected Hodges’ electronic and sonar expertise. Some felt that Hodges should remain in scientific research, but Hodges had rejected any suggestions to pursue a research career. He had instead wanted to be at sea, using his sonar and electronics expertise in tactical warfare situations.
By the time Hodges was given command of the Prowfish, he had spent sixteen years commanding ships, mostly submarines. He first heard of the Prowfish while the boat was still being rehabilitated at Norfolk Naval Shipyard. He immediately began positioning himself to modify the conversion plans so that they were more to his liking, and to ultimately be given command of the Prowfish.
By leaning on a friend in command, he was able to get himself appointed as consultant to the Chief Engineer in charge of electronic conversion of the Prowfish. Hodges was able to persuade the Chief Engineer and others overseeing the project that certain specifications of the electronic conversion should be changed. He argued that the current conversion was following an outdated protocol that would make the vessel obsolete before the conversion was complete. He argued that new electronic and sonar systems were available and should be used, offering a complete redesign of the electronic sonar system conversion.
It so happened that the new design included Hodges’ own electronics, as well as other state-of-the-art electronics systems that he liked. His argument was accepted, over the mild objection of the Chief Engineer who didn’t understand much of the new technology. Hodges was able to get his preferred electronic conversion on the boat he wanted to command
The victory in this electronics battle set Hodges in good position for the next internal foray, which was getting command of the vessel. Hodges argued there was no better way to prove the reliability of the equipment than for Hodges, who best understood the equipment, to take command of the boat.
Command of this vessel had already been promised to another highly qualified commander. Hodges used his contacts at the Pentagon and Naval Intelligence, arguing that he was the best qualified to manage the new electronics. He finally won that battle and was assigned the role of captain of the Prowfish just before modifications were completed. The Prowfish was Hodges’ pride and joy, and he was determined to demonstrate that she was the best and most electronically advanced conventional submarine in the fleet.
Hodges was a stickler for detail, and precision was particularly important when it came to electronics and sonar gear. Under Hodges’ orders, his operators were constantly calibrating equipment and adjusting screen resolution and algorithm profiles. Every watch seem to be a training session until Hodges knew the operator had the skill level to meet his demands. During one of the shakedown cruises after leaving Norfolk, the boat came across a pod of whales. For training, Hodges had the boat follow the pod based on his operator’s signals from the whale pod. Hodges not only required the operators to pick up overall signals of the pod, but to identify individual members of the pod. He would surface the boat ahead of the pod and have his operators serve as lookouts, counting pod members and calves and comparing those to the sonar readings. He was testing the equipment as well as the crew, and he proudly confirmed he
had some of the best electronics in the Navy.
Hodges was able to get his preferred executive officer, Lt. Commander Charles Benson, who also had an electronics background but was very good with navigation, propulsion, and weapons systems as well. Hodges and Benson were old friends and served together on many deployments Benson had been Hodges’ exec for the past twelve years. Hodges relied heavily on Benson to handle day-to-day running of the ship.
For electronics and sonar operators, Hodges hand picked men by interviewing them and reviewing their records. He preferred to take a young operator who was very good with the basics and teach him everything he wanted him to know about his way of doing things. Hodges was a very good teacher and was patient with his students. His operators admired his capabilities and gave him the highest ratings because they learned so much when serving under his command.
In some sense, Hodges’ strength was also his weakness. During his sixteen years of submarine duty, he came to understand all aspects of the submarine and weapons systems, but he left much of the non-electronic systems onboard to Benson and officers under him. Hodges believed that the greatest weapon on any submarine was its “ears,” which included all aspects of electronics. He believed the ability to know more about your opponent than they knew about you was the key to survival and success in the undersea theater.
Hodges was definitely on an electronic roll with his target advisory until he was thrown a curve when the crewmembers illness broke out. If his temporary replacement crew from New Orleans didn’t work out, he was committed to operating the equipment himself. At unexpected times during the mission he would have to do precisely that.
Silent Sanction: A Novel Page 16
