Brig. Gen. Adley H. Gladden
Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman
Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee
Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson
Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson
Col. George Maney
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston
Col. John S. Marmaduke
Col. John C. Moore
Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk
Col. John H. Morgan
Col. William Preston
Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles
Brig. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
Col. Preston Smith
Lieut. Col. Otho F. Strahl
Col. Alfred J. Vaughan, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Jones M. Withers
Col. John A. Wharton
Brig. Gen. Sterling A.M. Wood
Chapter 4
General Halleck Intervenes
WHILE GENERAL U. S. GRANT battled the Southerners for Fort Donelson, General Henry W. Halleck remained in St. Louis, anxiously worrying over his subordinate and frantically trying to scrounge up some help for him. To aid Grant, Halleck appealed to General Don Carlos Buell for some kind of demonstration against Bowling Green to divert the Southerners’ attention from Fort Donelson. To General George McClellan Halleck sent an urgent plea for reinforcements.1 But on February 16, General Halleck’s worries changed to joy as he received word that Fort Donelson had fallen.2 The Union elements in St. Louis went mad with joy at the news, and Halleck, for getting his lawyer’s dignity, joined right in.
Puffing vigorously on a cigar, Halleck ordered a clerk to distribute two dozen baskets of champagne for the crowd that gathered outside his headquarters at the Planter’s House. The general told the clerk to “give public notice that I shall suspect the loyalty of any male resident of St. Louis who can be found sober enough to walk or speak within the next half hour.”3
With his military ability publicly vindicated by the victories in Tennessee, Halleck launched a strong onslaught for a promotion. “Make Buell, Grant and Pope major-generals of volunteers,” he wrote to General McClellan, “and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson.”4 Although General McClellan failed to grant Halleck’s re quest for sole command in the West, Halleck was not discouraged, and he began preparations for new offensive moves in his theater. On February 18, Halleck began corresponding with his subordinate, General John Pope, about the feasibility of an offensive down the Mississippi River. Within a few days the somewhat out spoken Pope was moving south ward with a strong army-navy force, investing the Confederate strong hold of New Madrid, Missouri, on March 1.5
For several days after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Grant was busy with the usual post-battle loose ends. There were wounded to be taken care of and prisoners to be moved northward.
Promoted to major general of volunteers for his victory, Grant busily managed affairs at Henry and Donelson while endeavoring to persuade Halleck to launch some sort of new offensive in the direction of Clarksville and Nashville, Tennessee. Grant seemed to think that Halleck was warmly in favor of a vigorous push southward,6 but actually, though unknown to himself, relations with headquarters at St. Louis were slowly deteriorating. Grant began discussing the question of an offensive with the wounded naval officer, Foote. The naval commander was all for pushing on to Nashville, and actually began making preparations with his subordinate officers when General Halleck telegraphed Grant not to let the gun boats advance be yond Clarksville.7
On Sunday, February 23, General Halleck suddenly changed his mind and decided to let Foote and Grant go on up the Cumberland River to Nashville, possibly as a means of aiding General Buell, or perhaps to deprive the latter of all the credit for taking the city.8What ever his motives were, Halleck changed his mind again on Tuesday upon learning that Buell was al most in the city.9
Unfortunately for the cause of Union high echelon unity, there was a bad communications foul-up between Grant and Halleck, because of the great distance involved and the comparative inexperience of their respective staffs. On Monday, Grant had directed Brigadier General William Nelson’s division (of Buell’s army, but ordered to reinforce Grant for the Donelson campaign) to proceed by transport and occupy Nashville.10 Buell, who had reached Edgefield, on the opposite side of the river from Nashville, was furious at General Nelson’s arrival, fearing that General Albert Sidney Johnston might wheel around from Murfreesboro and assault the isolated division before the rest of the army could be ferried over. Buell requested Brigadier General C. F. Smith’s division to come to Nashville at once as insurance against an at tack by Johnston, and Grant, who had not yet received Halleck’s Tuesday order rescinding the Sunday Cumberland advance order, sent Smith to Nashville on the 26th, and then went there himself to confer with Buell.11
Back in St. Louis Halleck was becoming increasingly frustrated over a persistent lack of information from Tennessee. He demanded of General George Cullum, commanding at Cairo, as to “who sent Smith’s division to Nashville?” He continued:
I ordered them across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. What is the reason that no one down there can obey my orders? Send all spare transports to General Grant up the Tennessee.12
Cullum forwarded Halleck’s message to Grant, who immediately ordered most of his troops back to Fort Henry.13 On March 3, Halleck learned from Cullum that Grant had “just re turned from Nashville,” on February 28.14
Halleck promptly blew up, writing McClellan that he had had no communications with Grant for more than a week. Charging that Grant had absented himself from his command without authority, going on a pertinacious trip to Nashville, Halleck, from the vantage point of his comfortable headquarters in St. Louis, claimed that Grant’s army “seems to be as much de moralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run.”15
Halleck went on to make his famous stab in the back:
It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, nor reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn-out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the urgency.16
Receiving Halleck’s bitter missive, Grant’s old comrade from Regular Army days, McClellan,17 re plied to Halleck:
The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant’s should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C.F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way.18
By the following morning, March 4, Halleck had another bee for McClellan’s ears. He informed his superior that a rumor had reached headquarters to the effect that General Grant was drinking heavily, and that this accounted for “his neglect of my often repeated orders.”19 Going on to ex plain that he did not consider it advisable to arrest Grant just yet, Halleck wound up by saying he had placed General C. F. Smith in charge of the proposed expedition up the Tennessee.20
Confused by the whole matter, Grant wrote to Halleck in a desperate attempt to find out what was wrong. He could not understand why he was under a black cloud. For several days the ink flowed freely between the two men, with Grant increasingly convinced that he had enemies on Halleck’s staff who were trying to sabotage him.21
Halleck, either satisfied that Grant was repentant or innocent, finally shelved the whole matter, although Grant did not immediately resume command of the Tennessee River expedition. The plan for the project started on March 1, when Halleck ordered Grant to send Smith up the river and wreck Confederate communications at Eastport and Corinth, Mississippi, and Jackson and Humboldt, Tennessee. The expedition was more in the form of a raid than an invasion, and Grant was directed not to pick a fight with anything he could not handle.22
Five days later General Halleck changed the directive for the expedition slightly, saying the army should “encamp at Savannah [Tennessee] unless threatened by superior numbers.”23
On March 6, Brigadier General William T. Sherman, in command at Paducah, Kentucky, notified Halleck that he had learned of the presence of a “large force of rebels … collected at Eastport … and also at Corinth.” Sherman went on to tell Halleck that the Confederate force was “estimated at 20,000; engaged fortifying at both places.”24 On the basis of this information Halleck decided that Sherman’s command should link up with General Smith’s column for the Tennessee expedition.25
The expeditionary force formed up in the vicinity of Fort Henry. There were to be five divisions: Sherman’s, McClernand’s, Lew Wallace’s, C. F. Smith’s, and a brand new one under Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut.
A political appointee, the South Carolina-born Hurlbut had been President Lincoln’s special emissary to Charleston during the crisis at that place the year before.26 Forty-six years old, Hurlbut was the son of a Massachusetts-born Unitarian minister who married a Charleston girl and made his home at that place. As a youth Hurlbut studied law and was admitted to the bar. During one of the in terminable Seminole up risings in Florida he served as adjutant of a South Carolina regiment of volunteers. In 1845, he immigrated to Belvidere, Illinois, where he eventually joined the Re publican Party. Serving as a member of the state legislature when the war broke out, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers on June 14, 1861. A rather corrupt man, Hurlbut also had a deep fondness for the whiskey bottle, which does not seem how ever to have handicapped his military duties.27 Of about average height, Hurlbut had dark gray eyes, a short nose, a florid complexion, and close cropped chest nut hair.28
Of the five divisional commanders, General Sherman and General C. F. Smith were the only professional soldiers, but the other three possessed at least a little military experience, if only at the company grade level. Brigadier General Lew Wallace was the son of West Point graduate and one-time governor of Indiana, David Wallace. Even as a child Lew showed particular interest in military affairs and, at the age of fifteen, entered a militia company in Indianapolis, Indiana. At the start of the Mexican War, the nineteen year old militiaman joined the First Indiana Volunteers, rising to the rank of first lieutenant, although unable to participate in any combat activities, much to his disappointment. A jack of all trades, Wallace left the army to study politics, history, and law, finally entering the state senate in 1856. The future author of Ben-Hur started his varied Civil War career as state adjutant general under Indiana’s famous war governor, Oliver Morton. Later commissioned colonel of the Eleventh Indiana Volunteers, the thirty-three year old Wallace took part in operations in western Virginia in the latter part of the year. He was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers on September 3, 1861, and was advanced to the rank of major general on March 21, 1862, because of his services at Fort Donelson.29
Brigadier General John Alexander McClernand was born in Kentucky in 1812, but grew up in Illinois. Largely self-educated, he was admitted to the bar in 1832, but took time off from his legal duties to participate in the Black Hawk War. A good party Democrat, McClernand rose rapidly in the ranks of the state organization and in 1860 was an unsuccessful candidate for the speakership of the House of Representatives. To rally Democratic support for the war effort, President Lincoln appointed McClernand a brigadier general of volunteers, ranking from May 1861. A veteran of Belmont and Fort Donelson, the Illinoisan possessed the most combat experience of any of Grant’s officers; unfortunately he also possessed the greatest amount of conceit.30
With this choice collection of generals Grant set to work with Smith to fit out the proposed river expedition. As things worked out, Sherman’s division, now numbered the Fifth, was the first to head for the heart of enemy territory. The division was embarked on its transports on March 6, 7, and 8. The First Brigade, the Fortieth Illinois and the Forty-sixth Ohio, did not bother to wait for the rest of the expedition, but departed on their own loaded on the river boats Sallie List, Golden Gate, J. B. Adams, and the Lexington.31 The brigade, under Colonel S. G. Hicks, reached Savannah on March 8 and 9 after a speedy and quiet passage. The rest of the division, which was just then loading up, only arrived in Savannah late on March 11 and early March 12. Sherman castigated Colonel Hicks and Colonel Thomas Worthington of the Forty-sixth Ohio for going off on their own; but at least they had arrived safely.32
The passage of Sherman’s Second, Third, and Fourth brigades were fairly uneventful, but they did, however, get a baptism of fire. A Confederate bushwhacker fired a musket shot at the Forty-eighth Ohio’s steamer, and although the ball missed, there was a good deal of excitement.33
On March 12, General Smith arrived in Savannah with the advance elements of the rest of his army.34 Their pas sage had been little more exciting than that of Sherman’s division, although there were a few eventful moments. Three members of the Forty-sixth Illinois fell overboard from their steamer and were drowned in the swollen river before anyone could help them.35 One member of the Thirteenth Iowa fell overboard from the Hiawatha and sank be fore anyone could rescue him. The Eighth Iowa’s steamer was bushwhacked a short distance from Savannah, and one soldier was killed and another wounded.36 On board the steamer Argyle, the Fifty-seventh Illinois had one man wounded in the arm by a Southern partisan.37
The Fourteenth Iowa, on board the Autocrat, had a particularly trying experience. The soldiers heard a tremendous sound in the rear of their boat and confusion reigned for a moment, for the soldiers believed they were under fire. But finally the Iowans discovered that the commotion was caused by their paddle wheel be coming entangled with a tree. It took a great deal of chopping, and an even larger amount of swearing, be fore the civilian crew and the soldiers finally cut the tree loose.38
The Eighty-first Ohio shipped on board the steamer Meteor, one of the largest of the Mississippi River packets. A carnival atmosphere reigned on board the ship, for Governor Yates of Illinois was on board, besides numerous ladies belonging to the officers. There were horses and mules tied up on the main deck, and boxes of army supplies and fuel for the ship’s engines took up the extra space. The enlisted men dined on hardtack and raw pork, drinking Tennessee River water dipped up in buckets with ropes attached. Some of the privates broke open cases packed near the bow of the ship and found they contained crackers, cheese, bologna, and other eatables, property of an army sutler. The Eighty-first had one exhilarating moment when Confederate guerrillas opened fire on the boat immediately behind them, the Black Warrior. No one was killed, but several enlisted men were wounded, and the Federals retaliated by spraying the banks of the Tennessee with musket balls.39
On board the steamer Continental, the Twenty-fifth Missouri had a particularly bad time, although it failed to dampen their spirits. Sparks from the ship’s funnels burned the soldiers’ clothing, their blankets, and even their faces and hands. Their only rations were hard bread and hog jowls, plus a little coffee made from the rather muddy and frequently polluted Tennessee River water. The diet worked havoc with their intestines, but morale remained high and these soldiers made the river ring with strains of music, “We’ll hang Jeff Davis on a sour apple tree” and other patriotic ditties.40
By regiments, brigades, and divisions, the Army of the Tennessee gradually assembled at Savannah, and on the morning of March 14, General Smith ordered Sherman to take his command up to Eastport, Mississippi, for the purpose of destroying the railroad there. As Sherman’s transports moved up the river, about eight miles from Savannah, perhaps the general’s eyes noticed a burned building atop a bluff about eight miles from his destination; and if he consulted his map, he learned the place was called Pittsburg Landing. The ruined structure was the remaining evidence of a sharp skirmish that occurred at Pittsburg about two weeks earlier on March 1. This engagement was brought on by Lieutenant William Gwin, commanding a small patrol force compose
d of his own gunboat, the Tyler, and Lieutenant James Shirk of the Lexington.41
Having learned that the Confederates were fortifying Pittsburg, Gwin decided to launch an attack on that place, and about noon, March 1, steamed up to Pittsburg. One or more Confederate field pieces commenced firing, but the two gunboats opened up with their 32-pounders and 8-inchers; and being heavily outweighed by the gunboats’ superior fire power, the Southerners soon broke off the action. For some reason Gwin decided to destroy a house on the hill near where the Confederates had fired from.42
Sailors and members of Company K, Thirty-second Illinois Volunteers, were quickly on board the gunboats’ launches. Rowing over to the Landing, the Illinoisans quickly landed and moved out and up to the top of the bluff, where they ran into a detachment from the Eighteenth Louisiana Infantry Regiment. Gwin’s sailors speedily went to work setting fire to the house, while the crew of the biggest launch opened up with shrapnel from their 12-pound boat howitzer. The gunboats continued using their big tubes to keep the Louisianans at bay, away from their landing party. Despite the artillery fire, the Louisiana soldiers swarmed over the bluff, raking the demolition party with heavy blasts of musketry. In danger of being overwhelmed, the landing party finally took to the boats and rowed vigorously back to the Lexington and Tyler. The Confederates peppered the two gunboats with strong blasts of musketry for some minutes before withdrawing. Federal losses for the brief engagement were two killed, six wounded, and three missing. Gwin established the Louisianans’ losses at twenty killed and one hundred wounded, although no Confederate account of the action mentions any Southern losses.43
Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 Page 9
