set off divergent histories, drifting progressively further away from what might have happened otherwise. Changing history is a theme of time-travel stories, and the two issues come together in those stories called `worlds of if.
We have the strongest feeling that what we do, even what we decide, does change history. If I decide, now, not to go and meet Auntie Janie at the train station even though she's expecting me because I told her I would ... the universe will take a different path from the one it would have taken if I had done the expected. But we've just seen that even saving Abraham Lincoln from the assassin would have the tiniest, most local, of effects. Neighbours such as the gas-bag aliens on Jupiter wouldn't notice Lincoln's survival at all, or at least not for a very long time. After all, we haven't yet noticed them.[1]
In fact, how will they, or we, notice? How will we be able to say, `Just a minute, this newspaper shouldn't be called the Daily Echo ... There must have been a time traveller interfering, so that we're now in the wrong leg of the Trousers of Time'?
Auntie Janie making her own way from the station won't topple empires - unless you believe, with Francis Thompson's The Mistress of Vision, that
All things by immortal power Near or far
Hiddenly
To each other linked are
That thou canst not stir a flower Without troubling of a star.
That is, all contingent chaos butterflies are responsible in some sense for all important events like hurricanes and typhoons - and
[1] Well, there might be ...
newspaper titles. When a typhoon, or a newspaper tycoon, topples an empire, that event is caused by everything, all those butterflies, that preceded it. Because change in any one - or perhaps just in one of a very large number - can derail the important event.
So everything must be caused by everything before it, not just by a thin string of causality.
We think about causality as a thin string, a linear chain of events, link following link following link ... probably because that's the only way we can hold any kind of causal sequence in our minds. As we'll see, that's how we deal with our own memories and intentions, but none of this means that the universe can isolate such a causal string antecedent to any event at all, important or not. And surely 'important' or `trivial' is usually human judgement, unless the universe really does `smear out' most small changes (whatever that means), and major events are those whose singular influence can be distinguished at later times.
Because they are stories, committed to the way our minds work and not to the way the universe works its own causality, most timetravel stories assume that a big (localised) change is needed to have a big effect - kill Napoleon, invade China ... or save Lincoln. And time travel stories have another convention, another `conceit', because they are stories, nearer fee-fi-fo-fum than physics. This is the remembered timeline of the traveller. Usually the plot depends on it being unique to him. When he comes back to his present he remembers stepping on the butterfly, or killing his grandfather, or telling Leonardo about submarines. .. but no one else is conscious of anything other than their `altered' present.
Let's move from large events, large or small causes, to how we influence the apparent causality in our own lives. We have invented a very strange oxymoron to describe this: `free will'. These words appear prominently on the label of the can of worms called `determinism'. In Figments of Reality we titled the free will chapter: `We wanted to have a chapter on free will, but we decided not to, so here it is' in order to expose the paradoxical nature of the whole idea. Dennett's recent book Freedom Evolves is a very powerful treatment of the same topic. He shows that in regard to `free will' it doesn't matter whether the universe, including humans, is deterministic. Even if we can do only what we must, there are ways to make the inevitable evitable. Even if it is all butterflies, if tiny differences chaotically determine large historical trends, nevertheless creatures as evolved as us can have `the only free will worth having', according to Dennett. He writes of dodging a baseball coming for his face, and this being perhaps a culmination of a causal chain going right back to the Big Bang - yet if it will help his team, he might let it hit his face.
But then, what decides it is: will it help his team? That's not a free choice.
Inevitable, evitable.
Dennett's best example is more ancient: Odysseus's ship approaching the Sirens. Inevitably, if his men hear the Sirens' song, they will steer the ship on to the rocks. But the steersman must be able to hear the surf, so there seems no way to avoid their lure. Odysseus has himself lashed to the mast, while all his sailors plug their ears with wax so they cannot hear the Sirens. The vital issue for Dennett is that humans, and on this planet probably only humans, have evolved several stages beyond the observing-and-reacting that even quite advanced animals do. We observed ourselves and others observing, so got more context to embed our behaviour in - including our prospective behaviour. Then we developed a tactic of labelling good and bad imaginary outcomes, just as we labelled our memories with emotional tags. We, and some other apes - perhaps also dolphins, perhaps even some parrots - developed a `theory of mind', a way to imagine ourselves or others in invented scenarios and to anticipate the associated feelings and responses. Then we learned to run more
than one scenario: `But on the other hand, if we did so-and-so, the lion couldn't get us anyway...', and that trick soon became a major part of our survival strategy. So with Odysseus ... and fiction ... and particularly that dissection of hypothetical alternatives that we call a time-travel story.
In our minds, we can hold many possible histories, just as Mead showed that every discovery about today implies a different past leading up to it. But whether there is any sense in which the universe has several possible pasts (or futures) is a much more difficult question. We've argued that popularisations of quantum indeterminacy, particularly the many-worlds model, have got confused about this. They tell us that the universe branches at every decision point, whereas we think that people have to invent a different mental causal path, a different explanatory history, for each possible present or future.
Antonio Damasio has written three books: Looking for Spinoza, Descartes' Error, and The Feeling of What Happens. These are popular accounts of what we know about the important attributes of our minds. He has documented our discoveries, now that we can use various experimental techniques to `watch the brain thinking' and see how the different parts of the brain are involved in what we feel about the things we think. We tend to forget that our brains are continually interacting with our bodies, which supply the brain with stance-determining hormones for longer-term behaviour, and moodchanging emotion-provoking chemicals for short-term modulation of our intentions and feelings, directing our thoughts.
According to these books, the result of having lived with a brain which we think we direct using a kind of tiller, but which actually is continually affected by cross-winds, occasional storms, rain and warm sun that provokes us into lazy days, is that we have evolved a series of memories with different flavours. Or, the result of having lived
with a brain that we think we direct using a kind of automobile steering wheel and foot controls, but whose route is actually continually affected by long-term goals that change (`Let's go to a hotel, not to Auntie Janie's again'), short-term road signs and other traffic, is that we have evolved a series of memories with different flavours. Or, each of us has a personal history which we explain internally by feelings attached to emotional memories, so we have evolved a series of memories with different flavours.
Damasio has imported emotional biasing into how we think about our own intentions, choices, other people, memories, and prospective plans. He claims that this is what emotion is `for', and most psychologists now agree that emotionally labelled memories are the effect of having a brain whose interaction with its body paints emotions on to memories and intentions.
We habitually assume that real physical history, and particularly social history, works the same way a
s our own personal histories, with events labelled `good' or `bad' . . . but it doesn't. It's misleading to think of the Big Bang, for example, as an explosion like a bomb or a firework, seen from outside. The whole point of the Big Bang metaphor is that at the moment the universe was bom, there was no outside. More subtly, perhaps, we tend to think of the birth of the universe in the same way that we think of our own birth, or even our conception.
Real history, post whatever the Big Bang `really' was, relies on the accumulation of countless tiny sequences of cause-and-effect. As soon as we begin to think about what any of these sequences looks like, taking it out of the context that drives it, we lose its causality. This seething sea of processes and appearances and disappearances, where no causality can be isolated, is sometimes called `Ant Country'. The name reflects three features: the seething, apparently purposeless activity of ants, which, in aggregate, makes ant colonies work; the metaphorical Aunt Hillary in Douglas Hofstadter's Godel, Fscber, Bach, who was a sentient anthill and recognised the approach of her friend the anteater because some of her constituent ants panicked; and Langton's Ant, a simple cellular automaton, which shows that even if we know all the rules that govern a system, its behaviour cannot be predicted except by running the rules and seeing what happens. Which in most people's book is not `prediction' at all.
For similar reasons, it is impossible to forecast the weather accurately, even a few weeks ahead. Yet, despite this apparent absence of causality at the micro-levels of weather, the impossibility of isolating causality in the swirling butterflies ... despite the chaotic nature of meteorology in both the large and the small, weather makes sense. So does a stone tumbling downhill. So does a lot of physics, engineering, and aeronautics: we can build a Boeing 747 that flies reliably. Nevertheless, all of our physical models are rooted in brains that get most of their perceptions wrong.
Shouting at the monkeys in the next tree. That's what brains evolved to do. Not mathematics and physics.
We get ecology and evolution mostly right, but often wrong, for the same reasons. The scenarios we build don't work, they're as false to fact as `weather'. But we can't help building them, and they're useful sufficiently often to be `good enough for government work'.
To underline this point, here's an important evolutionary example. Think of the first land vertebrate, that fish that came out of the water. We have the strongest feeling that if we took a time machine back to the Devonian, when that first important fish was emerging from the sea, there ought to be a moment that we could isolate: `Look, by wriggling out on to the mud that female has escaped that predator, so she's lived to lay her eggs, and some of them will become our ancestors ... If she hadn't got those leggy fins, she wouldn't quite have made it, and we wouldn't be here.'
Grandfather paradox again? Not quite, but we can illuminate the grandfather paradox neatly with this example. Ask yourself what would happen if you killed that fish. Would humanity never have happened? Not at all. By isolating a single event, we have tried mentally to make history follow a thin thread of causality. But we made the Adam-and-Eve mistake: ancestors don't get fewer as you go back, they multiply. You have two parents, four grandparents, maybe only seven great-grand parents, because cousin marriages were commoner then. By the time you've gone back a couple of dozen generations, a significant proportion of all the breeders of that period were your ancestors. That's why everyone finds some famous ancestors when they look - and the fact that famous people were rich and powerful and sexually successful helps too, so that they are reproductively better represented in that generation's descendants.
Note that we said `breeders' and `many'. Nearly all sexually produced creatures don't breed, including humans of most previous generations. Not only are most of the people alive at that previous generation young children who won't survive to breed; many of the apparently successful breeders contribute to lineages that die out before they get to the present day, because they are excluded from the limited ecosystem by more successful lineages as the generations pass.
So when we look at those Devonian fishes, there simply isn't just one that was our ancestor. All of the breeders, a very unsystematic small proportion of the fish population, contributed to the recombining and mutating mix of genes that passed down from those fishes that left the water, through generations of amphibians and mammallike reptiles, into the early mammals, were newly selected to characterise the early primates, and eventually ended up in us. There wasn't a single grandfather fish, or one grandfather primate, no thin line of descent, just as there isn't a thin line of causality leading from a butterfly's wing flap to a hurricane. Nearly any fish you went back and killed would make virtually no difference to history. We'd still be here, but history would have taken a slightly different route to
get to us.
But that doesn't mean that history has no important accomplishments.
Some physicists, especially, have argued from this indeterminacy and chaotic influences at all the micro-levels that there is no pattern to history, that Heisenberg uncertainty rules. Wrong. Just because we cannot predict the weather more than about a week ahead, with the best and biggest computers, doesn't mean that there isn't such a thing as weather. Our thin-causal-thread evolutionary scenarios for the emergence of those fishes on to the land don't work, but that doesn't mean we must throw away all ideas of causality in evolution. Any event, when looked at in detail, seems not to have a clear cause, but that just means that our Damasio-minds are not suited to that way of analysing history.
We are much better at totally disregarding all the micro stuff, and making big guesses: I guess it'll be sunny again tomorrow; or I guess that among all those fishes eating each other on the Devonian mudflats, some will escape on to the land. We're confirmed in that guess by finding climbing perch, mudskippers and lots of other separate fish lineages doing exactly that on mudflats today.
The great evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould got this point wrong in Wonderful Life: if evolution ran again, he stated, we would not get people, because of all the tiny chaotic butterflies that determined evolutionary outcomes, so there were no thin causal threads. We disagree: we might not, almost surely would not, get the same primate coming down from the trees, but equivalent major innovations would occur in the new and different lineages. People are good at finding high-level groupings, making analogies and metaphors, arguing from what Aunt Janie does today to what she'll do tomorrow, or did twenty years ago. But we oversimplify when we try to disentangle the maze of tiny causalities that lies behind any historical event, because we can't handle that kind of complexity.
So, even though all of the causality happens at the micro-level, and we can't analyse it except in terms of tens of particles interacting when it's really billions, this isn't what it's about. It's like the early twentieth-century physicists telling us that the dining-room table wasn't really there, it was nearly all empty space, and that concepts like `hard' and `brown' had no place in the physicist's view of the world. So much the worse for the physicist. Did he really not eat his dinner off just such a hard, brown table? And was not his brain designed to do really clever things with abstractions useful in his daily life, like hard and brown, rather than the very peculiarly unuseful concepts of atoms, nuclei, and so on?
On the contrary, our brains are excellent at all the higher-level judgements they're called on to make, especially in a world that is full of hard, brown tables, doors, houses, trees to make them out of, and other people to help us or compete with us. But nearly all human brains are poor when it comes to the physics of atoms and the micro-world.
Back to history. We `make sense' of large movements like the Enlightenment, democracy in ancient Athens, the Tudors; but we know that if we were to look at all the small-scale interactions, they would make little sense against the comprehensible backdrop. That is precisely why historical novels can be so fascinating, and why The Three Musketeers didn't really affect Cardinal Richelieu and all the important people in seventeenth-century
France. Nevertheless, we greatly enjoy the fiction that makes sense of the great movements by tying them down to the motives and nobility of a few people like D'Artagnan, with whom we can identify. The sequels Ten Years After and Twenty Years Later intrigued some of us, as Dumas found that he was on to a good thing and turned out more of the same. Some of us, at least, then found that Athos's nobility rang increasingly false, and Porthos's good humour was boring, while Aramis's religiosity wore very thin as the years rushed by. The initial idea wedged into the history we knew, it was consistent and provided colourful
incident. But the later money-spinners were increasingly at odds with how we knew history worked.
There is an excellent example of the converse of this, which makes that point even better than Dumas. Wells's The Time Machine, as we've said, was the absolute classic time travelogue, showing us the large picture from prehistory to the social consequences of the capitalism that the socialist Wells wanted to criticise. Then the cooling Sun, the great crabs on a post-diluvian beach ... lovely. But Stephen Baxter's modern sequel The Time Ships shows us how clever the Morlocks will be, how the Traveller is really a little bit prurient about the little girl from the future - a resonance with Lewis Carrol's Alice - who is innocent and a bit stupid.
It's like a historical novel that puts all the little sexy and despicable bits into the great tapestry of history. Such literary exercises add colour and flavour to history, just as Damasio has shown that we do with our own personal memories. The pleasure this exercise gives us shows how our human minds read history: in the large without flavour, in the small with the kind of colour that we paint on to our own small reminiscences. So historical romance is just that: romantic painting of the little, interesting items, whose causality might affect the big picture, but doesn't.
Darwin's Watch Page 22
