20. Rand would never have characterized perception as “objective.” This is a point which needed clarification since there was a time when Peikoff himself committed the error of applying the objective-subjective-intrinsic trichotomy to the realm of perception. Peikoff was corrected by Rand in later presentations for this misapplication of her theory. Peikoff 1987bT, questions, period 1. Peikoff (1991b, 112, 117) argues that normative terms such as “objectivity” cannot be applied to automatic processes such as perception. Since perception is nonvolitional, it cannot be characterized as “objective” or “intrinsic” or “subjective.” Perception “cannot depart from reality.” “Objectivity,” is volitional adherence to reality “by following certain rules of method based on facts and appropriate to man’s form of cognition.”
21. Smith 1979, 155, 159. Smith acknowledges that his discussion of perception owes much to Objectivist sources. On the issue of hallucinations and illusions, see Kelley 1986, 131–38. On hallucinations, compare Lossky 1957, 42.
22. Kelley 1984a, 15. This applies equally to the analysis of linguistic, grammatical, and idiomatic differences. Though there are many optional methods of application, certain grammatical distinctions are present in some form in every language. And even though an idiom cannot be translated by looking at each of its individual linguistic constituents, its meaning can still be grasped by an equivalent descriptive expression. Linguistic differences—like cross-cultural variations in perceptual classification—are not arbitrary. If we could not grasp different idioms and classifications, people would be condemned eternally to a Tower of Babel. Peikoff 1982aT, Lectures 1 and 7.
23. Objectivists recognize that we are unable to get inside the animal’s faculty of awareness. It is entirely possible that certain higher animals have the ability for rudimentary choice. None of this disqualifies Rand’s belief that self-consciousness and volition are the essential, defining characteristics of human conscious awareness. “Appendix,” 161–62, 246, 255–56.
24. Atlas Shrugged, 1012. In keeping with Rand’s injunction against the dogmatizing of scientific theories, she recognizes volition as a philosophic axiom. Even if natural selection can explain volition as a product of evolution, even if science can trace the neurochemical impulses at the base of volitional cognitive processes, volition remains philosophically, a causal primary. A scientific explanation does not eliminate the reality it explains. See Kelley 1985cT, Lecture 2, and 1988, 183, on the issue of evolutionary epistemology.
25. Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 6; N. Branden (January 1964), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in Objectivist Newsletter 3:3. O’Neill ([1971] 1977) argues that Rand’s choice to think is similar to Sartre’s original choice. Peikoff (1991b, 469 n. 21) disputes this contention.
26. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 41; Peikoff 1991b, 56–57, and 1990–91T, Lecture 4. Peikoff claims that his is the first Objectivist discussion of “focus” in print. But Branden examined the concept of “focus” as early as April 1964 in The Objectivist Newsletter, and in N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 5. Branden’s discussion in The Psychology of Self-Esteem (a work published after his 1968 split from Rand) is an exact duplicate of these previous articles and lectures. However, N. Branden (1983b, 24n) claims that Rand identified the choice to focus exclusively with the choice to think. He claims that his own view is “considerably broader.” I strongly suggest that Rand’s own concept is as expansive as Branden’s.
27. N. Branden 1983b, 21. Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 7) agrees that daydreaming is a valid activity of focusing. There is much that can be gained in observing the actions of the free subconscious.
28. N. Branden (April 1964), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in Objectivist Newsletter 3:15; N. Branden 1983a, 56.
29. Binswanger (1991), “Volition as cognitive self-regulation,” in Locke 1991, 168–70.
30. Peikoff 1991b, 56–57. In Chapter 7 I discuss the subject of habitual methods of awareness.
31. For this observation, thanks to Cox (18 October 1993C).
32. Rand (August-December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 221.
33. Nathaniel Branden, Allan Blumenthal, Edwin Locke, and other Rand-influenced theorists, have argued further that a full understanding of human cognition requires a more complete grasp of genetic, biological, developmental, environmental, and subconscious factors. As the next chapter documents, some of these theorists have gone beyond Rand’s initial formulations, and have aimed for a more complex model that is entirely within the Objectivist framework. See N. Branden 1983b, Locke 1991T, and Blumenthal 1992T.
34. Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1984), “Life, teleology, and eudaimonia in the ethics of Ayn Rand,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 69; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1993, 122–25. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 4) argues that Rand’s assimilation of will (volition) to reason is one of her most distinctive contributions.
35. Rand (8 March 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 5.2.6–7.
36. Rand (15 May 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.7.
37. Barnes (1967) fails to grasp Rand’s contextual view of concepts and definitions, which I examine in the following sections.
38. Dipert 1987, 69. On this topic, see Rasmussen 1992, in which the author integrates Aristotelian, Hayekian, and Randian insights to examine the role that “phronesis” (or “practical reason”) plays in capitalism.
39. In contrast to Dipert, Hollinger (“Ayn Rand’s epistemolngy in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 54–55) argues that Rand’s view of reason, volition, and knowledge is compatible with certain pragmatist and empiricist conceptions of reason as practical activity, as put forth by Quine anil Dewey. Objectivism shares with these perspectives the view that “knowledge is routed [sic] in praxis; knowledge is contextual and not judged by reference to a context-free absolute standard.”
40. Rand once called such associational thinking, “back-seat driving.” N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 6; B. Branden 1962T, Lecture 2.
41. Rand [1945] 1986, 3.
42. This explanation of a “concept” incorporates two different definitions that Rand proposes in two distinct contexts. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 20, and Introduction, 10.
43. N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 5; B. Branden in N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 6.
44. In Rand’s view, words (i.e., language) are the handmaiden of concept formation. Concepts and language are primarily tools of cognition, rather than communication. One cannot even think without language; and one cannot communicate without thinking. Introduction, 69. Peikoff (1982aT, Lectures 1 and 7) presents an Objectivist view of grammar which steers clear of classicism (“intrinsicism”) and the modern (“social/subjective”) view. I do not discuss Rand’s view of language in the current study.
45. Introduction, 10; “Appendix,” 153.
46. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 3) praises Hegel for this emphasis on the moment of integration.
47. This principle has become known as “Rand’s razor.” Peikoff 1991b, 139, and 1976T, Lecture 5; “Appendix,” 251. Peikoff’s course “Objective Communication” (1980T) provides valuable insights on how dialectical thinkers can present highly integrated ideas in a simple manner. He focuses specifically on the moment of exposition.
48. Peikoff 1982aT, Lecture 3; 1987bT, Lecture 1.
49. The mathematical element in cognition is recognized in Rand’s view of the concept formation process within this more specific context: “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted.” Introduction, 13.
50. Rand (“Appendix,” 189) argued that it is a scientific question whether or not such standards of measure are “ultimately translatable” or “reducible” to one another.
51. Rand (Introduction, 15) referred to the basic commensurable characteristic as
a “Conceptual Common Denominator.”
52. Peikoff 1991b, 85–86, 111; 1990–91T, Lecture 5. In keeping with the Objectivist rejection of reductionism and epiphenomenalism, Kelley (1984a) writes: “Someday, perhaps, we will have a neurological explanation of the capacity for omitting measurements, and perhaps also an evolutionary explanation for our coming to have it. But I see no way to decompose it further into cognitive steps” (356).
53. Kelley (1991) argues that Objectivism provides an empirical foundationalism that incorporates integration and system, and rejects reliabilism and rationalistic coherence.
54. See Peikoff 1991b, 131, and 1974T, Lecture 10. Peikoff observes that the theories of Newton and Einstein do not contradict one another. Each identifies laws within a specific context. Newton could not take into account those issues which preoccupied Einstein, because certain facts had not yet been discovered. An alteration of context does not mean that a more primitive definition is contradicted by a more advanced one.
55. Rand (February 1965), “Who is the final authority in ethics?” in Voice of Reason, 18. I do not discuss the Objectivist theory of truth in this book. See Peikoff 1991b, 174–79. Rand (in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 6) opposed the coherence theory of truth, but she also remarked that the traditional correspondence theory is invalid if it depends on mystical, “perfect” correspondence between reality and cognition. Such “perfection” implies non-contextual omniscience. See also Jetton 1993, 96–99.
CHAPTER 7. REASON AND EMOTION
1. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 13) remarks that in 1951, Rand told him that an animal’s purely physical pleasures become primarily spiritual pleasures for people, because they are filtered through human consciousness.
2. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 27. This description does not include an evaluation of what is beneficial or harmful to people. I discuss what a person should value in Chapter 9.
3. Rand (9 April 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 44.2.
4. Rand (9 May 1934), in Binswanger 4.4.4. In Rand (15 May 1934), in Binswanger 4.4.7, she used “instinct” and “emotion” somewhat interchangeably. For instance, although she called emotion “a form of undeveloped reason,” she described instinct as “a form of unrealized reason.” Conversely, she saw reason as “instincts made conscious,” which suggests that “the study of psychology” makes possible the articulation of largely tacit “instincts” and “emotions.” From a very early point in her intellectual development, Rand saw such introspective articulation as “the base of the reconciliation of reason and emotions.”
5. N. Branden (1982T) provides a similar view of the historical context that influenced Rand’s attitudes toward mysticism and emotions.
6. Rand (30 April 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Schwartz 6.1.3.
7. On the thinking-activity relationship, there are additional parallels between Rand and such American naturalists as Dewey. These are noted by Hollinger, “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 54–55, 58, n. 24, 58 n. 25.
8. Interestingly, Rand shared with Marx a view of reason as internally related to material production. She noted a reciprocal conjunction between the need to eat and the ability to think. But she opted out of any vicious circularity by arguing that people must think first in order to commence the process of production.
9. Rand (6 March 1974), “Philosophy; Who needs it,” in Philosophy, 20–21.
10. N. Branden [1969| 1979, 68–69. This material from The Psychology of Self-Esteem appeared first in The Objectivist Newsletter and The Objectivist. Though I reference the post-1968 book, it is clear that Rand and other Objectivists fully accept these principles. For instance, both Peikoff and Packer, orthodox Objectivists, recognize that each emotion presupposes a sequence of perception, identification, evaluation, and emotional response. Both argue that the cycle is automatized, experienced as a movement from perception to emotional response. The Peikoff-Packer position is almost indistinguishable from that enunciated by Branden in the early Objectivist publications. In fact, orthodox Objectivist thinkers, in writing about most psychological topics, have not diverged significantly from the original formulations of Rand and Branden. On the emotive sequence, see Packer (December 1985), “The art of introspection,” in Binswanger 6.6.2, and Peikoff I976T, Lecture 1.
11. On “content” and “intensity,” see Introduction, 31.
12. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 71–73, 76. Just because an emotion implies action, that does not mean that we must act on it. Rational action must be assessed within a broader context, which includes the application of reason. Branden’s view of the nature of emotions has remained relatively unchanged throughout his writings. N. Branden 1980, 62; 1983b, 146. He characterizes his system as “biocentric.” Like Rand’s metaethics, it emphasizes biologically oriented, life-centered methods and principles. N. Branden [1969] 1979, ix.
13. “Appendix,” 227. B, Branden (1986, 242) observes that this attitude toward introspection had some unfortunate consequences. For Rand, “behind every statement stood an enormous breadth and complexity of thought and integration.” This made some of Rand’s associates feel as if they were on psychological trial with every utterance.
14. N. Branden 1983b, 51. Today, Branden (21 June 1993C) prefers terms such as “self-awareness” or “self-examination” since “‘introspection’ has a certain intellectual connotation that does not capture the reality of what goes on when we learn to pay attention to our own internal processes.”
15. N. Branden (January 1962), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in Objectivist Newsletter 1:3.
16. N. Branden (1962), “Objectivism and psychology,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 73–74.
17. Rand (18 April 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 4.6.2.
18. Rand (29 June 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 4.6.8–9.
19. However, Rand’s characters do grow intellectually. For instance, in The Fountainhead, Roark experiences growth in his knowledge and application of certain principles.
20. N. Branden 1971b, 18. Merrill (1991, 79–84) responds to Branden’s critique.
21. N. Branden (1962), “Objectivism and psychology,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 78.
22. Despite these similarities, Branden and Ellis have vastly different approaches to psychology and politics.
23. Mack (1984), “The fundamental moral elements of Rand’s theory of rights,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 146–48.
24. N. Branden ([I971] 1978, 86) argues precisely this point: the characterization of thoughts or feelings as moral or immoral is akin to thinking of them as virtuous or sinful, a religious view inappropriate to Objectivism.
25. Rand (8 March 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 5.2.7.
26. Rand (August-December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 193–94.
27. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 25.
28. Packer (February 1985), “Understanding the subconscious,” in Binswanger 6.1.1. Packer links her concept of “core evaluations” to Rand’s concept of “sense of life.” Core evaluations are “basic conclusions, bottom-line evaluations, that we all hold subconsciously.”
29. Rand (22 Novemher–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 250–51.
30. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 31.
31. N. Branden 1980, 103. Branden’s discussion is a direct outgrowth of Rand’s discussion in “Philosophy and sense of life” (see note 30).
32. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 30; Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11, and 1991b, 427.
33. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 2) argues that
Rand’s psychologizing is appropriate in this context, but it is independent of the truth or falsity of the philosopher’s viewpoint, which can only be assessed by rational argument.
34. N. Branden (1971b, 12) does not disagree with Rand’s insights into the fallacy of “psychologizing.” But he believed that she was being “hypocritical,” since she often moralized about other peoples’ psychologies. B. Branden (1990, 76) observes too that Rand frequently engaged in such psychologizing, and that anything in her writings “that impinges on psychology is really a disaster.” In a private correspondence (28 June 1993C), however, Barbara Branden qualifies this sweeping statement: “Much of what Ayn considered to be psychological syndromes were in fact philosophical syndromes, conscious or subconscious errors of thinking about wide general issues. They therefore gave no guidance to the altering of deep-seated errors held only in emotional form.”
35. Rand (March 1971), “The psychology of psychologizing,” in Voice of Reason, 23–24.
36. In the authorized course on Objectivism, one in which Rand participated, Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 4) argues that emotions as such are not moral or immoral. Morality applies only to volitional issues. We have no choice over what we feel, even if we can alter, over time, the basic premises of our feelings.
37. Rand (March 1971), “The psychology of psychologizing,” in Voice of Reason, 29; Peikoff 1989T, Lecture 1, and 1991b, 280.
38. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 29.
39. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.3–4. It is noted that the journal entry was written “probably in the 1950s.”
40. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 29–30.
41. Packer 1990T; N. Branden 1983b, 180–81.
42. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in Romantic Manifesto, 34.
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