by James Laxer
On his arrival, Major General Van Rensselaer found a rather a wretched force of troops — only 691 were fit for duty, out of a force of about 1,600 men — badly equipped and clamouring for pay. Many of them had no shoes. In the camp, there was not one heavy cannon, and no artillery men were available to fire the few small cannon on site. The medical department lacked equipment and supplies. Few tents were on hand. The mood among the militia men was surly and insubordinate; the grumpy soldiers were loath to follow orders.3
While Van Rensselaer was under pressure from his superiors to mount an attack on the British forces at the earliest opportunity, Brock was en route from his triumph at Detroit. He sailed from Amherstburg on August 17 but, held up by contrary winds, he did not reach Fort Erie for six days. Many of Van Rensselaer’s men actually saw Brock across the river, as well as the dispiriting spectacle of the U.S. prisoners from Detroit being marched past Queenston en route to Montreal.4
A few days before Brock reached the Niagara Frontier, Major General Roger Hale Sheaffe, who was in command during his absence, negotiated an armistice with Van Rensselaer. The armistice initiative went back to Prevost’s hope that an end to the war might be possible, since Britain had repealed the Orders in Council. On August 21, Sheaffe and Van Rensselaer agreed to “a cessation of all acts of hostility between the troops and vessels of all descriptions under our command, until we shall receive further orders; and the party who shall first receive orders for the renewal of hostilities, shall give four days’ notice, computing twenty-four hours to each day, before any offensive operation shall take place.” They further agreed not to take advantage of the temporary armistice to bring forward men or supplies of ammunition.5 Sheaffe did have the advantage of knowing about the British victory at Detroit a few days earlier, while his American counterpart was unaware of the disaster. But Van Rensselaer did manage to get the best of Sheaffe by ensuring that the U.S. forces could be supplied by water. During the hiatus in fighting, the Americans shipped heavy guns to Niagara from Oswego, at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.6
Van Rensselaer received orders from General Dearborn, who commanded U.S. forces in the Northeast, to end the armistice. In light of these instructions, Van Rensselaer sent a letter to Brock on September 4, informing him that “having now received orders to terminate the armistice . . . I have the honour to transmit you this notice, that the armistice will be terminated at twelve o’clock, at noon, on Tuesday, the eighth day of September, inst.”7 The U.S. commander was scrupulous in living up to the four days’ notice embodied in the armistice agreement.
With the armistice over and the Americans committed to taking the offensive, Van Rensselaer received reinforcements. Troops from the 5th, 12th, 13th, and 14th U.S. Infantry Regiments and from the 2nd U.S. Artillery vastly increased the number of troops available to the Americans on the Niagara Frontier. By September 29, when a new senior officer reached the camp to share command with General Van Rensselaer, the United States had six thousand soldiers available. A regular army officer, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, was under instructions from the War Department to place his own units at the disposal of Van Rensselaer. A forty-seven-year-old former lawyer, Smyth had opted for a military career in 1808, when he took command of a newly formed U.S. rifle regiment. Although lacking real military experience himself, the headstrong Smyth took an instant dislike to Van Rensselaer, whom he regarded as a political general. Smyth refused to attend the senior officers’ meetings that Van Rensselaer held on a regular basis.8 This forced Van Rensselaer to go ahead with his own planning, not knowing whether Smyth would coordinate an attack with his own forces when the time came.
In a book that recorded the bickering between the two senior officers, Solomon Van Rensselaer, the major general’s cousin, charged Smyth with a general unwillingness to act in concert with his superior. “It is plain that his second in command [Smyth] had no cordial disposition to act in concert with him [Van Rensselaer]. And in . . . confirmation of the fact, is his letter reporting his arrival from Buffalo, dated 29th Sept.; in this, although an entire stranger to the country, he goes out of the way to obtrude his advice upon his commanding officer, touching movements and localities of which he knew nothing . . . All who were aware of his conduct, and many, among whom I was one, were of opinion that coercive measures should be resorted to, to bring him to a sense of duty.” If Solomon Van Rensselaer had any criticism of his cousin Stephen, it is that he chose not to bring matters to a head with Smyth.9
Despite the lack of cohesion in the American camp, Van Rensselaer pushed ahead with his plans for an attack. His soldiers at Lewiston outnumbered Brock’s, who were spread out along the opposite shore. Counting on that advantage, Van Rensselaer planned to seize a foothold in Upper Canada before the onset of winter. Hot on his back were his superiors, pressing for action. In a letter to Van Rensselaer on September 26, General Dearborn wrote, “The enemy may be induced to delay an attack until you will be able to meet him, and carry the war into Canada. At all events, we must calculate on possessing Upper Canada before winter sets in.”10
Brock did not know when and where an American blow might fall. He deployed his main forces at Fort Erie, located at the southern junction of the Niagara River and Lake Erie, and at Chippawa, just upstream from the Falls. At Queenston, where a crossing would be more difficult, he positioned only the flank companies of the 49th Regiment and an equivalent number of militia.11
At Lewiston, the Americans had about 2,300 regular soldiers and 4,000 militia. Brock’s force numbered 1,200 British army regulars and 800 Canadian militia. In addition, he had on hand a force of five or six hundred warriors from the Six Nations settlement at Grand River (near present-day Brantford, Ontario), along with Mississaugas, Delawares, and Ojibwas. Brock deployed the native warriors as a fast-moving light force, which he dispatched across the Niagara River to Grand Island to scout the enemy and skirmish with them.12
Prior to the war, Brock had regarded the Grand River warriors as a potentially important source of military strength to shore up border defences in the vulnerable Niagara sector. But his initial efforts to raise a force there had been met with a very cool response. When the war did break out, most of the Iroquois chose to remain neutral or to quietly back the Americans. Brock also had to cope with the fact that Iroquois from New York State were actively pressing the Six Nations on the Grand River to decline invitations to rally to the British side. In early June 1812, before the United States declaration of war, a council on the Grand River considered the options. Those who favoured neutrality left the meeting, allowing the pro-British Mohawks to prevail.13 It was from the pro-British elements that Brock drew his present complement of warriors.
Van Rensselaer decided to move. On October 10, he ordered Smyth to march his force at once to Lewiston. He issued unequivocal instructions: “Immediately on the receipt of this you will please give orders to all the United States troops under your command to strike their tents, and march, with every possible despatch, to this place.”14 The next day Van Rensselaer again wrote to Smyth, informing him that the failure of the latter’s troops to arrive swiftly meant that an opportunity to attack the British batteries at Queenston had lapsed. “In the interim,” he wrote, “the United States troops under your command will remain at their encampment near Buffalo.”15
To this Smyth replied a day later that “the badness of the weather and roads” had “harassed” the progress of his troops. They would now have to spend the next day washing themselves and their clothing, and 1,200 men should be prepared to march the day after that, on October 14.
Van Rensselaer decided to proceed with his plans despite his problems coordinating the American forces. Not only was he not working effectively with Smyth, he had failed to act in concert with U.S. commanders farther afield — Captain Isaac Chauncey on Lake Erie and William Henry Harrison, who had been named by Madison to replace the disgraced Hull as commander in the Northwest. It was the
usual set of problems the Americans encountered early in the war. The commanders got on badly and seldom hesitated to express their feelings. Instead of a coordinated series of attacks on Upper Canada, bringing their superior numbers to bear, the Americans made do with a feint here and a feint there against a more agile opponent. Justifying his actions after the battle, Van Rensselaer wrote: “On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion and the service in disgrace.”16
For Van Rensselaer, the days leading up to his attack could not have been worse. Instead of a well-coordinated operation, the attack was to be made without all the available units being prepared to participate.
At 3:00 a.m. on October 13, three hundred U.S. regular soldiers boarded embarkation vessels and set out for the Canadian shore. Major General Van Rensselaer had put his cousin Solomon in command of these lead troops. To cover the U.S. crossing, two 18-pounders in Fort Grey, in the hills above Lewiston, and a mortar in the adjacent woods opened fire on the British positions across the river. Only thirteen vessels made the initial assault, which meant that too few troops were deployed to make the attack fully effective. Again, American disorganization was a factor. Thirty-nine vessels were available not far away at Fort Schlosser, but they were not commandeered to give the first assault more punch.
The roar of the American guns alerted the defenders at Queenston that an assault was underway. On duty for a fifth consecutive night, Lieutenant George Ridout, a Canadian officer in the 3rd York Militia, later wrote to his father that when he heard the gunfire, “I went down to our battery from whence the view was truly tremendous, the darkness of the night, interrupted by the flash of the guns and small-arms.” Ridout could see the Americans struggling against the swift current to make it to the Canadian shore. Three of the vessels were driven too far downstream and headed back to the point of embarkation. The other ten boats succeeded, however, in coming ashore upstream from Queenston, as intended.
The 49th Grenadiers and the Canadian militiamen opened fire on the Americans. Following a fierce engagement, the 160 soldiers in the 13th U.S. Infantry, led by Captain John E. Wool, drove off the defenders toward Queenston. Captain Wool and Colonel Van Rensselaer suffered severe wounds in the firefight, but the Americans were lodged on the Canadian side of the river. The wounded Van Rensselaer was ferried back to the American shore. Wool carried on, leading his men up the winding path to the summit of Queenston Heights, 106 metres above. There the Americans drove off the British gunners, who were directing the fire of their 18-pounder and mortar at the U.S. embarkation point.
The initial bellowing of the American cannon warned Brock at Fort George that the anticipated U.S. attack had commenced. He mounted his horse and rode approximately one kilometre to the scene of the attack. By the time Brock arrived, Captain Wool and his men had reached the summit. Downstream from Queenston at Hamilton’s Point, where the whole invasion force was supposed to have landed, four American vessels came ashore. There the soldiers of the 49th’s Light Company raked the U.S. force with a relentless series of volleys. The members of the 49th had been repositioned from the Heights as soon as the attack began, in order to meet the Americans at the riverbank. In this they were successful. Only one American vessel escaped. The rest of the U.S. soldiers in this second offensive attack were killed or captured.
Twenty-one-year-old Lieutenant John Beverley Robinson of the 3rd York Militia later described the American survivors from the botched landing: “The road was lined with miserable wretches suffering from wounds of all descriptions and crawling to our houses for protection and comfort.”17 Robinson, later knighted as Sir John Robinson, went on after the war to enjoy a distinguished career in Upper Canada.§§
At the summit, where the small American force under Captain Wool was installed, two companies of Canadian militia commanded by Brock’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonell, counterattacked. The Canadians initially succeeded in forcing the Americans back. But U.S. reinforcements arrived from below, driving the militia back down the hill and in the process fatally wounding Macdonell.
Alarmed that the Americans were once more installed at the summit and regretting the earlier decision to move the Light Company from the Heights, Brock prepared a new attack. He assembled all the men he had available to him in the village. Riding on his horse, he led the men southward. Just before reaching the foot of the Heights, he shouted, “Take a breath, boys — you will need it in a few moments.” Dismounting from his horse, Brock led his men up the hill.18
Outfitted in his scarlet uniform with gold epaulettes and the ornamental scarf that had been Tecumseh’s present to him after Detroit, the general led his horse by the bridle. He had taken only a few steps when a ricocheting bullet hit the wrist of his sword arm. It was a slight wound and did not deter Brock, who waved his sword and urged his men forward.
As Brock was leading the charge to battle, a scout from Ohio saw the tall general in his resplendent scarlet, took aim, and felled him with a shot that tore through his left breast.19 According to the account from George Jarvis, a fifteen-year-old gentleman volunteer in the 49th’s Light Company who was close to Brock when he was hit, “Our gallant General fell on his left side, within a few feet of where I stood. Running up to him I enquired, ‘Are you much hurt, Sir?’ He placed his hand on his breast and made no reply and slowly sunk down.”
A legendary account has it that, with his last breath, Brock uttered the words, “Push on, brave York volunteers,” to rally the York militiamen. Another man who saw the general fall, militia private John Birney, recounted, “With the help of others, he was laid on the grass and the surgeon called out, but he was past human aid and never moved or spoke.”20
Following the death of General Brock, the counterattack he had led against the Americans faltered. With about four hundred soldiers in place at the summit, the Americans fought off British assaults and managed to capture twenty-one soldiers, including the young George Jarvis. Abandoning Queenston Village by about 9:00 a.m., the British retreated to the north. Now in a position to cross the river unimpeded, the Americans managed to send reinforcements to the scene of the battle, and a 6-pounder along with them. Disorganization and lack of will hampered the American effort at this crucial moment. Boats were still in short supply and some of the U.S. troops wandered off to plunder the village, while others who wanted no more of the fight returned to the American shore.
With the Americans established on the Canadian shore and occupying the heights above the river, swift action could consolidate their position and give them the edge in the next phase of what remained a very fluid battle.
The British command shifted to Major General Roger Hale Sheaffe, who quickly mobilized his forces to drive the Americans from Canadian soil. He dispatched the 41st’s Light Company, under the command of Captain William Derenzy, and about 160 Grand River warriors from Fort George, commanded by John Norton, William Kerr, and John Brant, in the direction of Queenston. The latter were a remarkable trio. John Norton, whose parents were Iroquoian Cherokee and Scottish, and who had spent his early years in Britain, was a fully accepted member of Mohawk society. William Kerr was an Indian Department officer and was married to Joseph Brant’s daughter, Elizabeth. John Brant was the son of Joseph Brant.21 This force was equipped with two 6-pounders and a 5.5-inch howitzer. Sheaffe left Fort George for Queenston. Behind him, taking the same route, were 140 men from the 41st Regiment and some militiamen, including the Corps of Artificers, also known as the “Company of Coloured Men,” commanded by Captain Robert Runchey.22
While the British garnered their forces for an effective attack, the American commanders dithered. Without the counsel of his wounded cousin, Stephen Van Rensselaer was unsure what to do. At the onset of daylight, he ordered a massive artillery bombardment of Fort George and Newark from Fort Niagara. The rounds fired had been heated in a
shot oven until they were nearly red-hot. The barrage soon had the courthouse, the jail, a brewery, and a number of homes in flames. The British managed to quell panic by bringing the fires quickly under control and launching their own artillery bombardment to silence the American guns. The dozen heavy guns at Fort George did not manage to knock out the American artillery but did succeed in reducing their volume of fire.
Having learned that the Americans had mounted to the Heights, Norton led his force into the woods, though half of them left, fearing for their families at Niagara. The remaining eighty warriors climbed the heights, using the forest to keep themselves concealed from enemy view. At about 11:00 a.m., they launched an assault on the American rearguard, quickly pushing the militiamen back to the main U.S. line. The Iroquois kept themselves low in the brush and were largely unaffected by the volleys the Americans fired at them. As was not unusual at this stage of the war, the inexperienced American soldiers often aimed too high.
The warriors soon charged out of the woods in a direct attack. This drew heavy return fire from the U.S. troops, and the Grand River men took some casualties and fell back. Norton’s force managed to get to the south of the Americans and threaten their line, but the U.S. troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Winfield Scott, counterattacked and drove them back. Although this counterattack was partially successful, volleys from the warriors continued to harass Scott’s troops, who were also subject to British artillery fire from below.
The fighting paused while Sheaffe led his 650 regulars and militia inland on a circular route up the Heights so that he would be in position to assault the enemy across flat ground. “Revenge the General!” the British shouted as they attacked the panicked Americans. Once Sheaffe charged, supported by the Iroquois on the flank, Scott’s force collapsed. Having methodically mobilized his force and positioned them to the rear of the foe, Sheaffe had all but assured victory for the British side.
