Behrends first officially registered as a lobbyist for Blackwater in May 1998 and began advocating for the company in areas ranging from disaster planning to foreign relations.8 That month, Behrends’s firm Boland & Madigan “delivered” Representative Rohrabacher and another “staunch defender” of the Second Amendment, Representative John Doolittle, to Prince’s Moyock compound for Blackwater’s grand opening—at the company’s expense.9
While Prince—with Behrends’s lobbying assistance—built up his Blackwater empire, Behrends was simultaneously becoming deeply involved in areas of U.S. foreign policy that would become front lines in the war on terror and areas of revenue for Blackwater. Among these was a high-stakes Big Oil scheme, led by petrol giant Unocal, to run a pipeline through Taliban-governed Afghanistan. Behrends worked as a lobbyist for Delta Oil, Unocal’s partner in the scheme, pushing for the United States to officially recognize the Afghan government.10 Prince and Behrends’s former boss, Rohrabacher, had long been interested in Afghanistan, since his days working as a senior speechwriter in the Reagan White House, when the United States was aggressively backing the mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation of the country. Rohrabacher, known as a fan of various U.S.-backed “freedom fighters,” traveled to Afghanistan in 1988, personally joining the mujahedeen in the fighting against the Soviet forces before being officially sworn into Congress.11 It was not surprising when Blackwater became one of the first private military firms contracted to conduct operations inside Afghanistan after 9/11.
Prince and Behrends had long served together on the board of directors of Christian Freedom International, the evangelical missionary organization founded and run by veterans of the Reagan administration—several of them major players in the Iran-Contra scandal. Its founder and president, Jim Jacobson, cut his political teeth working under Erik Prince’s friend and beneficiary Gary Bauer, when Bauer served as the head of President Reagan’s Office of Policy Development. Jacobson also served in the George H. W. Bush administration. CFI passionately supported the Bush administration’s war on terror, faulting the White House’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan only for not doing enough to defend Christians.
At the time of the Fallujah ambush, there were few lobbying firms with more influence on Capitol Hill than Alexander Strategy, a centerpiece of the GOP’s “K Street Project,” under which lobbyists raised “enormous sums of money from their clients to ensure that Republicans remain the majority in Congress. For this fealty, the leadership grants the lobbyists access to the decision-makers and provides legislative favors for their clients,” according to the Congressional watchdog group Public Citizen.12 Behrends and his associates wasted no time in going to work for Prince and Blackwater. “[Blackwater] did not go out looking for the publicity and did not ask for everything that happened to them,” said Chris Bertelli, a spokesman for Alexander Strategy assigned to Blackwater after the Fallujah killings. “We want to do everything we can to educate [the media and Congress] about what Blackwater does.”13
A week to the day after the ambush, Erik Prince was sitting down with at least four senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, including chairman John Warner.14 Former Navy SEAL turned Blackwater executive Patrick Toohey accompanied Prince to his Congressional meetings,15 as did Behrends. Senator Rick Santorum arranged the meeting, which included Warner and two other key Republican senators—Appropriations Committee chairman Ted Stevens of Alaska and Senator George Allen of Virginia.16 This meeting followed an earlier series of face-to-faces Prince had with powerful House Republicans who oversaw military contracts. Among them: Tom DeLay, the House majority leader and Alexander Strategy’s patron; Porter Goss, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee (and future CIA director); Duncan Hunter, chair of the House Armed Services Committee; and Representative Bill Young, chair of the House Appropriations Committee.17 What was discussed at these meetings remains a secret, as neither Blackwater nor the Congressmen have discussed them publicly. But there was no question: the company’s moment had arrived.
With well-connected ASG operatives steering the publicity-shy Erik Prince and other company executives around, Blackwater was positioning itself to cash in on its newfound fame, while staking out a key role in crafting the rules that would govern mercenaries on U.S. government contracts. 18 “Because of the public events of March 31, [Blackwater’s] visibility and need to communicate a consistent message has elevated here in Washington,” said ASG’s Bertelli. “There are now several federal regulations that apply to their activities, but they are generally broad in nature. One thing that’s lacking is an industry standard. That’s something we definitely want to be engaged in.”19 By May, Blackwater was reportedly “leading a lobbying effort by private security firms and other contractors to try to block congressional or Pentagon efforts to bring their companies and employees under the same justice code” as active-duty soldiers.20 “The Uniform Code of Military Justice should not apply to civilians because you actually give up constitutional rights when you join the armed forces,” Bertelli said. “You’re subject to a different legal system than you are if you are a civilian.”21 (Two years later, despite Blackwater’s efforts, language would be slipped into the 2007 defense-spending authorization that sought to place contractors under the UCMJ.) In June, Blackwater would be handed one of the U.S. government’s most valuable international security contracts to protect diplomats and U.S. facilities. 22 At the same time, Blackwater was given its own protection, as Bremer granted a sweeping immunity for its operations in Iraq.23
But while Blackwater executives worked the GOP elite on the Hill, others in Congress began to question what the Blackwater men were even doing in Iraq, not to mention Fallujah that day. A week after the ambush, thirteen Democratic senators, led by Jack Reed of Rhode Island, wrote to Donald Rumsfeld, calling on the Pentagon to release an “accurate tally” of the number of “privately armed” non-Iraqi personnel operating in Iraq. “These security contractors are armed and operate in a fashion that is hard to distinguish from military forces, especially special operations forces. However, these private security companies are not under military control and are not subject to the rules that guide the conduct of American military personnel,” the senators wrote.24 “It would be a dangerous precedent if the United States allowed the presence of private armies operating outside the control of governmental authority and beholden only to those who pay them.” The senators asserted that security in a “hostile fire area is a classic military mission” and “delegating [it] to private contractors raises serious questions.” Rumsfeld did not respond to the letter.25 Instead, the Iraq reconstruction floodgates opened wide and mercenary contracts poured out. As the New York Times bluntly put it, “The combination of a deadly insurgency and billions of dollars in aid money has unleashed powerful market forces in the war zone. New security companies aggressively compete for lucrative contracts in a frenzy of deal making.”26
Two weeks after the Fallujah killings, Blackwater announced plans to build a massive new facility—a twenty-eight-thousand-square-foot administrative building—on its Moyock property for its operations.27 The finished product would be sixty-four-thousand square feet, more than twice the originally projected size.28 It was a major development for Blackwater, which had been denied permission for the project for six years because of objections by the local government. In the days after the ambush, county officials worked to amend local ordinances for Blackwater’s expansion. With the new permissions, Blackwater was given the green light to build and operate firearms ranges and parachute landing zones, and to conduct explosives training as well as training in hand-to-hand combat, incendiary-type weapons, and automatic assault weapons.29 “It will be our international headquarters,” said company president Gary Jackson.30
Meanwhile, just two weeks after the Fallujah killings, Blackwater issued a press release announcing that it would be hosting the first-ever “World SWAT Conference and Challenge.” The release declared, “Never before in the history
of the world has there been such a need for men and women who can respond effectively to our most critical incidents. Blackwater USA, the world’s largest firearms and tactical training facility, has put together a conference to meet that need that is unlike any other before it.”31 It boasted of workshops on a number of subjects, including “resolving hostage situations, suicide bomber profiling, and the psychology of operating and surviving critical incidents.”32 After the conference portion, there would be a SWAT Olympics, where teams from across the United States and Canada would compete in a series of events televised by ESPN. At the event’s press conference, Gary Jackson refused to answer any questions about the Fallujah ambush, steering all discussion back to the SWAT challenge.33 The only mention of Fallujah came during the chaplain’s blessing of the event. “This is almost a vacation compared to what a regular week looks like,” Jackson told reporters at the opening of the games.34
At the conference, retired Army Lt. Col. David Grossman, author of the book On Killing and founder of the Killology Research Group, addressed participants in a hotel ballroom, pacing around with a microphone.35 He spoke of a “new Dark Age” full of Al Qaeda terrorism and school shootings. “The bad guys are coming with rifles and body armor!” he declared. “They will destroy our way of life in one day!” The world, Grossman said, is full of sheep, and it was the duty of warriors—the kind of men assembled at the Blackwater conference—to protect them from the wolves. “Embrace the warrior spirit!” he shouted. “We need warriors who embrace that dirty, nasty four-letter word kill!” Meanwhile, Gary Jackson sent out an e-mail to the Blackwater listserv encouraging people not to miss the “fantastic” dinner speaker at the challenge, one of the most experienced spies in recent U.S. history, J. Cofer Black, at the time the State Department’s head of counter-terrorism. 36 In the aftermath of 9/11, as head of the CIA’s counterterrorism division, Black had led the administration’s hunt for bin Laden. A year after the Fallujah ambush, he would join Blackwater as the company’s vice chairman—one of several former senior officials the company would hire in building up its empire and influence.
As Blackwater plotted its tremendous expansion at home, it emerged as the mercenary industry trendsetter. “Increased violence this month has thrown a spotlight on the small army of private US security firms operating as paramilitaries in Iraq under Pentagon contracts,” reported PR Week, a public relations trade journal.37 “As calls for greater regulation over these companies increase, [they] are ramping up their presence in Washington to make their voices heard. . . . At the forefront is Blackwater USA, the North Carolina firm that lost four employees after an attack in Fallujah on March 31.” After Blackwater started using well-connected ASG lobbyists to promote its services, other mercenary firms followed suit. All seemed to realize that the mercenary gold rush was on. The California-based Steele Foundation, one of the earliest private security companies to deploy in Iraq, hired former Ambassador Robert Frowick, a major player in the Balkans conflicts, on April 13, 2004, to help manage “strategic government relationships” in Washington.38 Meanwhile, the London-based mercenary provider Global Risk Strategies rented office space in D.C. that month to base its own lobbying operations. “We are fully aware that D.C. operates in a totally different manner,” said Global executive Charlie Andrews. “What we need to assist our company is a hand-holding organization basically who will guide us through procedures and D.C. protocols.”39 In the midst of the flurry of lobbying activity by private military companies, Senator Warner told the New York Times his view of the mercenaries. “I refer to them as our silent partner in this struggle,” he said.40
The day after Erik Prince met with Warner and the other Republican senators, his new ASG spokesman, Chris Bertelli, boasted about a considerable spike in applications from ex-soldiers to work for Blackwater. “They’re angry,” Bertelli said, “and they’re saying, ‘Let me go over.’”41 Bertelli said that with the graphic images of the Fallujah ambush, “it’s natural to assume that the visibility of the dangers could drive up salaries for the folks who have to stand in the path of the bullets.”42 By late April, the New York Times was reporting, “[S]ome military leaders are openly grumbling that the lure of $500 to $1,500 a day is siphoning away some of their most experienced Special Operations people at the very time their services are most in demand.”43
In Iraq the situation was fast deteriorating. On April 13, in a dispatch from Baghdad, British war correspondents Robert Fisk and Patrick Cockburn reported, “At least 80 foreign mercenaries—security guards recruited from the United States, Europe and South Africa and working for American companies—have been killed in the past eight days in Iraq.”44 The violence rocking the country had brought “much of the reconstruction work” to a halt and contractors were being killed or abducted in record numbers.45 Nearly fifty were kidnapped in the month after the March 31 Blackwater ambush.46 The targeting of foreign contractors (brought in to support Washington’s occupation and reconstruction operations), aid workers, and journalists would provide a major source of funding for the very forces fighting the United States in Iraq. Though the United States has an official policy of not paying ransoms, a classified U.S. government report estimated that resistance groups were taking in as much as $36 million annually from ransom payments.47 In April 2004, Russia withdrew some eight hundred civilian workers from Iraq48 and Germany followed suit,49 while a senior Iraqi official said that month more than fifteen hundred foreign contractors had left the country.50 As Fortune magazine reported, “[T]he upsurge in violence comes just as the government is awarding $10 billion in new contracts, and companies like Halliburton and Bechtel are trying to increase their presence there.”51 The United States was struggling to interest more business partners and organized a series of international conferences to entice new businesses. “In Rome there were over 300 companies and there was so much interest we had to use a spillover room,” said Joseph Vincent Schwan, vice chair of the Iraq and Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force.52 He boasted that 550 businesses showed up at a similar conference in Dubai, and another 250 in Philadelphia. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also distributed its “Doing Business in Iraq” PowerPoint presentation across the world, from Sydney to Seoul to London.53
At the conference in Dubai three weeks after the Fallujah ambush, described by the local press as an “opportunity to win billions of dollars in subcontracted work in Iraq,” Schwan told potential contractors, “Iraq presents an opportunity of a lifetime.”54 But to cash in on this opportunity, security was a necessity, and the contractors were being encouraged to add on new costs in their billing to hire mercenaries. As a public service the “Doing Business in Iraq” presentation included a list of mercenary companies for hire.55
Meanwhile, the newly appointed U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq, Stuart Bowen Jr., explained the extent of the new demand for mercenary services in Iraq. “I believe that it was expected that coalition forces would provide adequate internal security and thus obviate the need for contractors to hire their own security,” Bowen said. “But the current threat situation now requires that an unexpected, substantial percentage of contractor dollars be allocated to private security.”56 As a result of the ever-increasing demand for private security services from companies like Blackwater, corporations servicing the occupation began billing the CPA substantially more for their protection costs. “The numbers I’ve heard range up to 25 percent,” Bowen said, versus the initially estimated 10 percent of the “reconstruction” budget that would go to pay for security for private companies like Halliburton. 57 The Pentagon official in charge of Army procurement contracts backed up Bowen’s estimate.58
“The US military has created much of the demand for security guards,” reported The Times of London. “It has outsourced many formerly military functions to private contractors, who, in turn, need protection.”59 Because the U.S. privatized so many of these essential services—like providing food, fuel, water, and housing for the troops—and m
ade private corporations necessary components of the occupation, the Bush administration didn’t even consider not using contractors when the situation became ultralethal. As one occupation official, Bruce Cole, put it, “We’re not going to stop just because security costs go up.”60 Instead, the administration dug deeper into the privatization hole, paying out more money to more companies and encouraging an already impressive growth in the mercenary industry. “When Halliburton teams working to rebuild oil pipelines first arrived in the country, they had military protection,” according to Fortune magazine. “But now they’ve had to hire private security. With armored SUVs running more than $100,000 apiece and armed guards earning $1,000 a day, big contractors like Bechtel and Halliburton are spending hundreds of millions to protect their employees. Since the government picks up the tab, ultimately that means fewer dollars for actual reconstruction work.”61 And many more dollars for private military companies.
What became clear after the Fallujah ambush and firefight at Najaf was that mercenaries had become a necessary part of the occupation. “With every week of insurgency in a war zone with no front, these companies are becoming more deeply enmeshed in combat, in some cases all but obliterating distinctions between professional troops and private commandos,” reported the New York Times. “[M]ore and more, they give the appearance of private, for-profit militias.”62 A year after the invasion began, the number of mercenaries in the country had exploded. Global Risk Strategies, one of the first mercenary companies to deploy in Iraq, went from ninety men to fifteen hundred, Steele Foundation from fifty to five hundred, while previously unknown firms like Erinys thrived—hiring fourteen thousand Iraqis to work as private soldiers.63 The global engineering firm Fluor—the largest U.S. publicly traded engineering and construction company—hired some seven hundred private guards to protect its 350 workers, servicing its nearly $2 billion in contracts.64 “Let’s just say there are more people carrying guns and protecting than turning wrenches,” said Garry Flowers, Fluor’s vice president.65 “Established” mercenary firms—or those with connections to the occupying powers—began complaining about ramshackle operations offering security services in Iraq for cheaper and with far less “qualified” contractors. There was also controversy about former apartheid-era security forces from South Africa, whose presence came to light only after some were killed. “The mercenaries we’re talking about worked for security forces that were synonymous with murder and torture,” said Richard Goldstone, a retired justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa who also served as chief prosecutor of the UN war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. “My reaction was one of horror that that sort of person is employed in a situation where what should be encouraged is the introduction of democracy. These are not the people who should be employed in this sort of endeavor.”66 A Pentagon official told Time magazine, “These firms are hiring anyone they can get. Sure, some of them are special forces, but some of them are good, and some are not.”67
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