The Boers of the Transvaal region of South Africa had been recently annexed into the Confederation of South Africa. There was real discontent among the Boers over British rule and this was to spill over into open warfare in 1880. The Boers achieved three crushing victories against the British, commanded by Sir George Colley. Gladstone’s government decided to send reinforcements to bolster Colley, and Wood was chosen to accompany the troops. On his departure, Wood wrote to his doctor and physician, Norman Moore, and he displayed a complete ignorance of the difficulties he was to face when he stated, ‘I scarcely expect to see a fight this time and anticipate the rebellion will collapse as soon as the British reinforcements arrive, if not sooner.’31 His political naivety was to cost Wood dear.
On his arrival, Wood wasted no time in bringing up a column of reinforcements to support Colley and both men set about planning the next British action against the Boers, who had taken position on Laing’s Nek, which transversed the border of Transvaal and Natal. Wood returned to Pietermaritzburg to encourage the remaining reinforcements forward, and he received a promise from Colley that no further military action would be taken until his return.32 It appears that Colley wished for one last engagement to try to regain his battered reputation and he also believed that the Boers might soon accept British peace overtures, while still in possession of Natal territory. Colley seems to have considered that peace on such terms would have been disreputable and he thus wanted to clear the Boers from Laing’s Nek before peace could be agreed. To this end, on the night of 26/27 February 1881, Colley led a force of 300 troops to occupy the extinct volcano of Majuba, which looked down upon the Boers at Laing’s Nek. Once in place, Colley thought the British occupation of Majuba would make the Boer position untenable and force their retreat. Colley underestimated the resilience of the Boers, and their determination to throw the British off Majuba. The small British force was insufficient to hold the position against a determined attack. The Boers routed the British and in the resulting confusion Colley was killed.33
On hearing of the defeat, Wood immediately had himself sworn in as Acting Governor of Natal and Administrator of the Transvaal, and rode to Laing’s Nek in an attempt to restore order and moral. While it is clear that Wood’s first concern was for his troops, particularly those besieged in their Transvaal garrisons, he also began planning a fresh action against the Boers. He felt that he needed to buy some time to allow for the arrival of reinforcements and decided to again enter into negotiations with the Boers, with the apparent aim of reaching a settlement. On 5 March, the day before he met Joubert in peace talks, Evelyn telegraphed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and stated: ‘My constant endeavour shall be to carry out the spirit of your orders but considering the disasters we have sustained I think the happiest result will be that after a successful action which I hope to fight in about 14 days, the Boers should disperse without any guarantees, and the many now undoubtedly coerced will readily settle down.’34 Evelyn also confirmed to the Queen that his intention had been to fight before entering into peace negotiations.35
Wood, by agreeing to a truce, had entered the world of politics, and any freedom to negotiate with the Boers he might have possessed was taken out of his hands by the British government. He was even compelled to become one of the Special Commissioners tasked with agreeing peace terms with the Boers. Although Wood was to express privately to the government his dissatisfaction at his position, he felt that he could not resign and carried out the government’s instructions as to the peace negotiations. Many found his actions inexplicable, and one of his sternest critics was the Queen herself. She wrote, ‘Oh! Why have you [Wood] made peace after them [the 3 British defeats] and a peace giving up the Transvaal? It is so unlike Sir E. Wood’s character that the Queen looks for some explanation to what (she is bound to tell him) has produced a very painful impression here and we hear at the Cape too. To give up the Transvaal when the Government maintained they would retain it is very humiliating. The Queen has such faith in Sir E. Wood that she trusts he can explain that this is not so – but she feels anxious and unhappy about it all.’36 Wood was stunned by this criticism and responded by stating, ‘Sir Evelyn Wood is unfortunate in being the instrument of a policy which is condemned as he anticipated it would be by a great majority of the educated classes in England. He is unfortunate in that his proceedings have made his Sovereign anxious and unhappy but he would consider himself as still more unfortunate if the Queen should cease to trust him.’37
Although, after a series of exchanges, Wood was able to explain his actions to the Queen, and regained her trust to the extent that she asked him to name his latest daughter after her, he had little success in pacifying certain sections of the army. Officers in South Africa openly denounced the ‘abject surrender’, and even one of Wood’s own colonels offered his resignation, so disgusted was he by the peace agreement. Even Wolseley bitterly claimed that, if Colley had had 10,000 men at his command, as Evelyn had, he would never have made such a peace, and he furiously declared that by signing the peace treaty Wood ‘has injured our national renown most seriously abroad’.38 Wolseley could not bring himself to forgive Wood for not driving the Boers out of Natal before agreeing a settlement, and his patronage lessened for a number of years, and as a consequence Wood’s career suffered.
Wood was next to see active service in Egypt. Wolseley was given command of a British expedition that was designed to defeat the Egyptian forces commanded by Arabi Pasha, who had led a populist nationalist uprising against the government of Khedive Tewfik. It appears that, following his decision to agree peace terms with the Boers, Wood was a reluctant choice for a command on this expeditionary force, and he was thus forced to seek the support of the Queen to secure a position.39 Despite this patronage, Wolseley appointed Wood to the rather unsatisfactory role of commander of the British forces guarding the lines of communication around Alexandria. Wood’s force also acted in a diversionary manner, while Wolseley led the main British assault on the Egyptian entrenched position of Tel-el-Kebir. To add to Wood’s dissatisfaction, Wolseley took with him Major General Gerald Graham, who was junior to Wood. Graham would later see action at the battles of Magfar, Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir, which must have further angered the ambitious Wood and he wrote to Victoria to express to her how ‘aggrieved’ he was that he had been overlooked and that Graham had been favoured.40
With Wolseley’s victory at Tel-el-Kebir, the war was effectively won, and Wood returned to England to resume his command at Chatham. Within a few months he was back in Egypt, following an approach from Lord Granville to accept the position of head, or Sirdar, of the re-commissioned Egyptian army. Granville played upon Wood’s vanity and Wood accepted this new role, although he was to later tell Victoria that he had reluctantly taken the post.41 The backbone of the training of the new 6,000-strong army fell upon 25 specially selected officers, who were recommended to Wood by the War Office. Wood was blessed with the quality of men he received; thirteen would later rise to the rank of at least Major General in the British army, and many, such as Lord Kitchener, Smith-Dorrien and Sir Archibald Hunter, would become the more enlightened leaders of men in future conflicts.
Wood and his officers made astonishing progress with the Egyptian troops and Wood was later to express his delight at their achievements to the Queen. He candidly stated, ‘The soldiers marched past in a manner which astonished Everyone but none perhaps more than Sir Evelyn himself!’42 Despite his delight, Wood was well aware of his men’s limitations. In an openly frank letter to the Duke of Cambridge, in December 1883, Wood stated; ‘these four battalions are as good as Egyptians can be made in ten months and I think will stand up well until their English officers are knocked down, when they would become sheep. I regard the other four battalions as practically useless for Field work.’43
It was thus no surprise to Wood that his Egyptian force was not sent to clear rebels from the Red Sea coast area around Suakin, but that British regulars, under Graham, we
re chosen. However, when the British government finally agreed to send a force to relieve Gordon in Khartoum, Wolseley was happy to use 2,000 of Wood’s Egyptian army as porters along the lines of communication, with Wood as commander of this force. The futile attempts to rescue Gordon placed extreme stress upon all those involved, but perhaps no more so than Wolseley and his immediate subordinates. Wolseley’s feelings towards Wood, in particular, became more virulent and he stated in his journal that,
Wood’s vanity and self seeking and belittlement of everyone but himself would be positively disgusting if one did not view it from the ridiculous side, and laugh at it and him instead of being angry over it. When I look back and remember my estimate of Wood’s character as it was presented to me ten years ago … I begin to think I can be no judge of character, for Wood’s cunning completely took me in…. All this ridiculous Egyptian Army has been worked by him for purposes of self-glorification.44
There is no doubt that Wood’s Egyptian forces made a positive contribution to the efforts to reach Khartoum and although Wood did make mistakes as Director of Lines of Communication, for example, in his decision to purchase cheap, inferior camels, his usual drive carried the force forward and success was almost achieved. His last task, after resigning his position as Sirdar and resuming his rank in the British forces, was to supervise the withdrawal of troops, from their advanced position at Gakdul back to Korti. This ten-day march, although superbly controlled and handled by Wood, was extremely testing, and Wood’s health suffered to such an extent that on his return Wolseley ordered him to travel back to England to seek rest and medical treatment.45
This was to be Wood’s last period of foreign service and, for the rest of his career, he was based in England, where he was at the forefront of army reform. Despite Wolseley’s loathing of Wood’s personality, he did recognise that Wood had an inherent ability as a trainer of men and the zeal of a reformer, and Wolseley thus secured for Wood a number of appointments in which he could demonstrate his skills. The first one of these was as commander of the Eastern District, based at Colchester, but Wood was also to gain command of Aldershot, the army’s main training base, and here he at last had the open space to expand fully his ideas on field training. From 1891, Wood held regular manoeuvres, and he was the first to introduce large-scale manoeuvres, in which all branches of the armed forces were actively engaged. In his official report to the War Office on the lessons learnt from the various exercises, Evelyn clearly outlined that the services had demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of each other and how each unit worked and interacted. Continued exercises soon demonstrated to Evelyn how important it was to educate all men with an understanding of all branches, and he was, for example, keen to teach infantry and cavalry officers the importance of effective artillery fire on the battlefield. On his departure from Aldershot, The Times stated that Wood:
struck a blow – a mortal blow, we may be allowed to hope – at that system of interminable parades, which disgusted the soldier, filled up his time and squandered his energies. In compensation, field-training, which is, after all, the best substitute and preparation we can give the soldiers for his ultimate business of fighting the enemy, has been invested with actuality, and brought to a pitch of excellence hitherto unknown in the British Army in time of peace…. Sir Evelyn Wood will be remembered as the originator of the cavalry manoeuvres. What is still more important, he has taught the three arms to work together as they have never worked before…. To sum up, the intelligence and interest of all ranks have been spurred, and troops quartered at Aldershot are far in advance of others in field training. Aldershot has become what it ought to be, the exemplar to which all other camps of exercise look for light and leading. Sir Evelyn Wood has breathed into it a new spirit. It would not be too much to say that he has founded a new system.46
Wood later rose to the rank of Quartermaster General and finally Adjutant General, the second most senior position in the army. Both were secured with the patronage of Wolseley, although the Queen had to take some persuading to support Wood’s candidature for the position of Adjutant General, as she felt that he was a better commander than administrator.47 Wood was greatly aided in his new role as Adjutant General by the passing of the Manoeuvres Act of 1898, which he had earlier advocated. This Act allowed greater access to land for exercises, which had always been a hindrance to Wood’s plans for large-scale manoeuvres. His plans were further enhanced when the government purchased 41,000 acres of Salisbury Plain. Here the army was able to assemble two army corps for field manoeuvres. In the months before the mobilisation of forces for South Africa, Wood ensured that this land was utilised for both cavalry and artillery exercises. He was also able to develop and expand the School of Musketry at Hythe, in Kent, and Wood was able to persuade Ian Hamilton to be its new commandant. Both men worked well together and much credit should be given to them for the foresight that resulted in improvements in musketry skills in the British army, which would reap dividends on the fields of France in 1914.48
With the outbreak of war with the Boers in 1899, Wood was responsible for the mobilisation of British forces and for their dispatch to South Africa. The efficient manner in which this took place received much praise.49 However, Wood was, to a lesser extent than many of his contemporaries such as Wolseley and Buller, criticised for the performance of the British army in its first engagements. Although he managed to avoid most of the criticism directed at the War Office at this time, any ambitions he may have had of active service were dashed. Furthermore, Wolseley bluntly informed Wood that, ‘This Ministry will never employ you in South Africa with the remembrance of the Laing’s Nek Treaty [1881 Peace Treaty].’50 There is no doubt that, by signing this treaty, Wood’s active field career was ruined.
Wood’s last task for his friend and patron, Queen Victoria, was to co-ordinate the plans for her funeral. The Queen passed away on 22 January 1901 and, as Adjutant General, Wood worked alongside the Lord Chamberlain and Viscount Esher to ensure that the funeral of 2 February went well. Wood, displaying the same level of military precision he had displayed at army manoeuvres, came away from the day with credit for all his hard work. He had been one of Victoria’s generals and a friend for over twenty years. He would continue to serve his country until his death in 1919. After the Boer War he commanded the Southern District where, with the encouragement of the Commander in Chief, Lord Roberts, Wood furthered his plans for army reform. It was left to the Queen’s son, Edward, to appoint Wood to the rank of Field Marshal in 1903 and he retired from the army the following year. In his retirement he still served the cause of the army; he argued strongly for national conscription and, when this was not forthcoming, supported Haldane’s attempts to raise a Territorial Force. During the First World War he served in an informal capacity and Wood was always ready to make a speech or present a medal if he felt he could benefit the war effort. He outlived all his senior contemporaries and lived to have the satisfaction of seeing British arms victorious against their German foe. On his death, The Times concluded its obituary by stating that Evelyn was a ‘magnificent if not very great man, who lived a magnificent life and did his country service such as it has been given to few to do’.51 A plaque was erected in St Paul’s Cathedral, the words of which epitomised Wood’s service to his Queen and Empire. It states ‘INTREPID IN ACTION, UNTIRING IN DUTY FOR QUEEN AND COUNTRY.’
Hlobane and Khambula, 1879
Following the crushing Zulu victory at the battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879, the commander of British troops, Lord Chelmsford, was forced to withdraw his remaining forces back across the Thukela River, the physical boundary into Zululand. From his base in Natal, Chelmsford awaited reinforcements and planned the next stage of the campaign, which was centred on relieving the British troops, under Colonel Charles Pearson, who were besieged by the Zulus in the town of Eshowe. At the start of the campaign Colonel Evelyn Wood had been given independent command of Number 4 Column, which comprised approximately 1,500 men of th
e 1/13th Foot and Wood’s own Regiment, the 90th. He also had a number of native and colonial troops, who were given the names of Wood’s Irregulars and the Frontier Light Horse (FLH), with the latter under the command of Redvers Buller. With news of Isandlwana, Wood realised that any further advance into Zululand was now impractical and he decided to consolidate his forces in a strong defensive position on the slopes of the Khambula Hill.
Over the next few weeks, Wood did not remain idle, and the war now entered a much more brutal phase in which Wood’s men focussed on the need to destroy the Zulus’ homes and economy, in an effort to wear down their resistance. Wood ordered Buller to conduct a number of harrying raids and reconnaissances towards the Hlobane mountain. This activity led the Zulus to fortify further their sanctuary on this mountain by the construction of stone walls, and their vast herds of cattle were moved to graze on the plateau of the mountain. Also, Prince Mbilini, the local Zulu commander, who loyally supported the Zulu King, Cetshwayo, led a series of retaliatory, marauding parties into the neighbourhood of Luneberg and the next weeks were characterised by a series of brutal raids and exchanges between Wood’s forces and the Zulus.
Wood soon earned the fear and respect of the Zulus. Indeed he learnt that they named him Lakuni, which was the native word for the particularly hard wood that was used to make the Zulu’s smashing weapon, the knobkerrie.52 Chelmsford was delighted by Wood’s aggressive approach, as well as his coup in enticing a local chief, Prince Hamu, Cetshwayo’s eldest brother, to come over to the British with all his followers. Chelmsford showed his appreciation by appointing Wood as Brigadier General and, when he planned his rescue of Pearson’s men from Eshowe, he turned to Wood for assistance. Chelmsford requested that Wood use his forces to mount a diversionary attack so as to relieve some of the pressure from the British advance on Eshowe.53
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