by Rob Harper
indians and colonists nursing injuries, mourning loved ones, and pondering
vengeance. above al , dunmore’s War encouraged hundreds of colonists to
move west into the formerly forbidden ground of Kentucky.
Chapter 3
Opportunity, 1775– 76
in early 1775, cornstalk led a young girl on a chil y midwinter journey to
point pleasant, where hundreds of his fellow shawnees had fought invading
Virginians the previous fal . This time he found about one hundred militia
huddled in a hastily built stockade. speaking for his own nation and their
haudenosaunee neighbors, cornstalk expressed regret for the recent war,
pledged to honor dunmore’s terms, and pleaded that the governor return his
hostages. he also handed over the girl, whom his people had adopted at some
time in the past, as well as some horses. in reply, the Virginian commander,
William russel , promised that if the shawnees complied with dunmore’s de-
mands, they had nothing to fear. But both indians and colonists had reason
to doubt these promises. even dunmore’s native allies feared renewed Vir-
ginian aggression, and other indians still bristled at colonial expansion. a
few weeks after the meeting at point pleasant, a team led by daniel Boone
began widening a chain of ancient bison trails to the Kentucky river, clearing
the way for others to follow. Before dawn on 25 march, a small group of pe-
kowi shawnees and cherokees attacked Boone’s camp, killing two men and
wounding another. two days later they fell on another party nearby, killing
two more. The roadbuilders pressed on to the Kentucky, where they built an
outpost they called Boonesborough. hundreds of colonists soon followed,
enraging Ohio indians and cherokees. as antagonism mounted, dunmore
evacuated Virginia’s Ohio river forts, including russel ’s stockade. Beset by
revolution, the governor soon escaped Williamsburg to the safety of a British
warship.1 no vestige of government authority remained between embittered
indians and land- hungry colonists. prospects for peace seemed dim.
in the months that followed, however, fears of imminent war repeatedly
proved groundless. When dunmore fled, one of his shawnee hostages es-
caped to warn his people that the colonists “were all determined upon War
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with the indians.” Fifty- two days later, after walking nearly five hundred
miles, the shawnee reached home and found Virginian goodwill messengers
rather than soldiers. similar warnings reached cornstalk on his way to a
pittsburgh peace council, but when he arrived his hosts welcomed him with
open arms. several hundred miles downstream, an english traveler named
nicholas cresswell and a band of colonists, paddling around a bend in the
Ohio, found themselves surrounded by ten canoes “full of indians.” assum-
ing the worst, they jettisoned their cargo, loaded their guns, and paddled des-
perately for shore. But just before they opened fire, the indians called out that
“they were friends.” On closer examination, their rifles proved to be “poles or
paddles” and several of the imagined warriors proved to be “very handsome”
delaware women. relieved, the colonists gave their new acquaintances some
salt and tobacco and took no offense when they “laughed at us for our feares.”2
This relative peace in the west stemmed from war and upheaval to the
east. in april 1775, massachusetts militia rebelled against royal troops. in the
months that followed, most of the colonies’ royal and proprietary govern-
ments col apsed, giving way to improvised committees, conventions, and an
increasingly radical continental congress. in the Ohio Valley, motives for
bloodshed— racial antipathy and competition for land— remained as strong
as ever, while frequent intercultural interactions afforded many opportuni-
ties to kil . But without functional governments to support them, militants
struggled to bridge internecine divisions, mobilize fighting men, or supply
them with food and weaponry. Through mid- 1776, indians and colonists pe-
riodical y harassed, threatened, or stole from one another, but they hardly
ever resorted to deadly violence.3 rather than unleashing bloody chaos, the
col apse of imperial authority sparked political innovation, as both indians
and colonists sought to build new relationships with one another and with
colonial governments. as crown and congress competed for the loyalties of
western allies, Ohio Valley inhabitants readily exploited the crisis for their
own ends. When killing resumed, sporadical y in mid- 1776 and ferociously
in mid- 1777, British and revolutionary resources played a decisive role.
late in the summer of 1776, hundreds of upper Ohio colonists assembled at
pittsburgh to fight indians. recent reports from shawnee country warned
that “an indian War [wa]s inevitable” and that 1,500 Ojibwe and Odawa war-
riors would soon attack Fort pitt. On the order of congress’s treaty commis-
sioners, men hurriedly assembled for battle. One militia battalion, asked for
100 men, turned out 350. it was the largest mobilization of Ohio Valley
Figure 2. Th e Ohio Valley, 1775–79.
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militia, by far, in the early years of the revolutionary War. The congressional
agents praised the colonists’ “spirited conduct” and described them as “a race
of hardy, experienced woods- men, whom it will be no easy task to overcome.”
But their mettle remained untested: rather than a fearsome horde, the ap-
proaching Ojibwes proved to be a handful of diplomats. When the surpris-
ingly large militia army showed up, the agents thanked them for their trouble
and sent them home. The men meekly complied. a month later, over six hun-
dred delaware, shawnee, and haudenosaunee men, women, and children
made their way to pittsburgh for a treaty council. The colonists who had so
recently mobilized for war harmed none of them.4
given previous and subsequent history, this reticence seems odd. Ohio
Valley colonists frequently and notoriously voiced an eagerness to kill indi-
ans. according to one congressional agent, many harbored “great hopes of
an indian War & express[ed] great Joy at a prospect thereof.” in 1774, and
again starting in 1777, bands of colonists repeatedly murdered defenseless in-
dian men, women, and children. But in 1775 and 1776 such attacks became
surprisingly rare. small groups of colonists occasional y threatened, chased,
and even shot at indians around pittsburgh, but did little damage. They at-
tacked no indian communities across the Ohio. The restraining power of the
state— any state— posed no real obstacle: the congressional agents’ authority
rested on a few pieces of paper from philadelphia. But without government
backing, isolated homesteaders could do no more than threaten the indians
they hated. Far from self- reliant pioneers, Ohio Valley colonists looked to
embryonic revolutionary governments for both material support and re-
gional coordination. The march against the phantom Ojibwe army was an
exception that proved the rule. alone, fear or hatred of indians did not spur
colonists to a
ction. But they did mobilize when faced with a specific and im-
minent threat, in response to orders from recognized political authorities,
and under the aegis of formal county militias.5 political conflicts and the lack
of key resources— both worsened by the revolutionary crisis— deterred in-
dian haters from going to war on their own.
in early 1775, county surveyor William preston alerted governor dun-
more to a dire new threat. Without deploying “an armed force,” preston
warned, a “valuable & extensive territory will be forever lost to Virginia.”
rather than fear of indians, preston’s dread sprang from the intrigues of car-
olina lawyers. Williamsburg newspapers had recently printed advertisements
for land in a new colony called “transylvania.” its founders, a coterie of attor-
neys led by one richard henderson, had gotten rich prosecuting debt- ridden
Opportunity, 1775–76
71
backcountry farmers. now they drew on that wealth to offer the cherokee
nation a large supply of goods for about half of present- day Kentucky. many
cherokee men, who stood to lose some of their best hunting territory, de-
nounced the offer, but older leaders eventual y accepted the goods. together
with dunmore’s success in Ohio, henderson’s advertisements sparked wide-
spread fervor for the “new found paradise” in the west. They also reconciled
the lawyers with many of the poor farmers they had persecuted. a few years
before, henderson had tried to arrest daniel Boone for an unpaid debt; now
Boone agreed to cut a road to the Kentucky river in exchange for a piece of
the new colony. The march attacks on Boone’s crew drove dozens back across
the mountains, but a peaceful summer and fall attracted many more. even
well- connected Virginia speculators sought land from transylvania, gam-
bling that the scheme might eventual y prove legitimate. echoing preston’s
alarm, the governor of north carolina warned that “such adventurers will
possess themselves soon of all the indian country.”6
The transylvania project flew in the face of imperial policy; the govern-
ments of Virginia and north carolina quickly condemned it. But rather than
rebelling against formal authority, the schemers hoped that legal loopholes,
influence peddling, and well- directed offers of land would ultimately win
them state approval. everyone involved took pains to lend the project a sem-
blance of legality. henderson justified his purchase with a creative interpreta-
tion of legal precedents. he and his partners adopted the title “proprietors” in
imitation of those who ruled colonies granted by the crown. When royal
authority col apsed they changed tack, pledging to support “the general cause
of america” while urging congress to acknowledge their claims. congress
rebuffed them, but the ambiguities of both British and revolutionary land
policies offered hope for future state recognition. The Boonesborough colo-
nists, well aware that their land rights stood on shaky legal ground, divided
up land into small parcels and distributed them by lottery: a quasi- legal ap-
proximation of official procedure that they hoped would stand up in court.
henderson privately called them “a set of scoundrels,” but he shared their
desire for legitimation from some version of the anglo- american state.7
The new Kentucky colonists found themselves in a precarious situation.
Their very presence angered western indians, who maintained they “[had]
never sold these lands.” They could expect scant help from dunmore, hud-
dling aboard ship in chesapeake Bay: through 1775 and 1776, the unfolding
eastern revolution left aspiring westerners on their own. material insecurity
worsened their plight. in the spring of 1775, even the more established
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monongahela colonists faced food shortages— dunmore’s army had ex-
hausted their grain supplies the year before— and the newcomers to Ken-
tucky had even less. Within weeks of Boonesborough’s founding, henderson
complained that his colonists had killed or driven off all the nearby game. By
June, new arrivals could find no flour at harrodsburg; Boonesborough re-
portedly had “no bread at al .” They keenly remembered the march attacks on
Boone’s roadbuilders, and subsequent rumors of indians sent many flying
eastward in panic, but they built only rudimentary defenses. instead, colo-
nists scattered across the landscape— hunting, farming, raising livestock,
and, above al , claiming land— leaving them with little means of defending
themselves. nonetheless, throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1775,
Kentucky colonists reported no new attacks. By the spring of 1776, one colo-
nist voiced “not . . . the least dread or apprehention” of an indian war.8 as
fears abated, westward migration swelled.
henderson’s scheme soon foundered, but Virginia’s budding revolution-
ary government continued what he had started. in the winter of 1775– 76, the
transylvania partners doubled the price of land and reserved many of the
best tracts for themselves. The bait- and- switch outraged many colonists, who
petitioned Virginia to protect them against “the gentlemen stiling themselves
proprietors.” rather than loyalty to the Old dominion, this change of heart
reflected the colonists’ decision that Virginia was more likely to grant them
legal title at a low price. eager to reclaim dunmore’s western empire, the
state’s revolutionary convention took steps to secure its claim to the region.
starting in mid- 1777, Virginia raised and paid militia companies to help de-
fend Boonesborough and similar outposts, encouraging colonists to remain
on the land rather than fleeing east for safety. in 1779, Virginia enacted a new
land law that, at least in theory, honored the preemptive claims of early Ken-
tucky colonists. many would be disappointed— by the mid- 1780s, byzantine
procedures and a whirl of litigation left most of them landless— but in the
interim, thousands of hopeful migrants moved west.9
meanwhile, hundreds of miles upriver, a haudenosaunee delegation met
John connol y to talk peace. dunmore, falling from power, had instructed
connol y to disband his pittsburgh garrison and court the friendship of
western indians. after symbolical y wiping away their tears and “removing
every uneasiness from the heart,” connol y agreed to meet his guests the next
day at Fort pitt. But it was not to be. That night, a band of armed colonists
appeared out of the darkness to interrupt the council. But rather than attack-
ing the indians, they kidnapped connol y. The next morning, when the
Opportunity, 1775–76
73
haudenosaunees showed up to resume their talks, they found “nothing but
his bed.”10
connol y’s abduction had less to do with either indians or the imperial
crisis than with feuds among the region’s nascent colonial elite. in 1774, con-
nol y and his pro- Virginia allies had seized control of pittsburgh. Over the
year that followed, they repeatedly persecuted their pro- pennsylvania rivals.
in the spring of 1775, they jailed two oppo
nents for months; seized others’
cattle, hogs, and land; and brought exorbitant lawsuits against all who op-
posed them. But news of revolution muddied the waters. in may, the two
factions separately formed county committees and called for local militias to
resist parliamentary tyranny. as many suspected, connol y remained loyal to
his patron dunmore, but most of his erstwhile allies resolved to “oppos[e]
the invaders of american rights and privileges to the utmost extreme.” When
dunmore fell from power, connol y’s opponents saw their chance for pay-
back. They seized him in the middle of the night, dragged him over fifty miles
to territory they controlled, and called for continental troops to “prevent the
Virginians from taking possession” of Fort pitt. But the captors underesti-
mated their adversaries’ fervor. The pro- Virginia faction seized three pro-
pennsylvania leaders and shipped them ninety miles down the Ohio “in an
old leaky Boat.” a negotiated prisoner exchange ensued. On 29 June, con-
nol y returned to pittsburgh and rejoined his haudenosaunee guests, who
had spent the intervening week camped quietly nearby, enjoying food and
gifts from colonists anxious to befriend them.11 With war raging in the east,
and partisan animosity still heated in the west, neither faction dared alienate
Ohio indians or let their adversaries gain their favor.
The boundary dispute flared again in the fal , with deadly consequences.
in september the Virginia convention sent one hundred men to reoccupy
Fort pitt. cresswel , returning from an amicable tour of Ohio indian towns,
found “nothing but quarreling and fighting” in pittsburgh. tensions cooled
briefly in October, when large delegations of delawares, shawnees, and sen-
ecas visited for a peace council, but violence broke out soon after the indians
left.12 On a pittsburgh street in late October, connol y’s wife, susanna, came
to blows with a woman who lived with richard Butler, a prominent fur trader
and pro- pennsylvania partisan whom John connol y had jailed the previous
year.13 Butler’s friend reportedly “beat and abused [susanna connol y] in an
