General Anthouard de Vraincourt’s guns were soon deployed near Borodino to bombard the Russian positions. Eugène later moved the 22nd Light Cavalry Brigade to the left bank of the Voina and had two squadrons deployed near the village of Bezzubovo, where a Bavarian Horse Artillery battery was also set up. French artillery ire covered almost the entire Russian right flank, reaching the third lines, where, as Norov recalled, ‘we spread out on a wide distance to present smaller targets for the enemy cannon-balls’.
The opening act of the battle was now over. The French were in control of Borodino, but as Löwenstern remarked, ‘it ceased to play any role in the great drama that would be soon named after it’.
The seemingly futile engagement around the village claimed numerous lives. The Life Guard Jäger Regiment alone lost twenty-seven officers killed and wounded, while its rank-and-file suffered forty-six killed, 527 wounded and 101 missing.248 After the battle, the men of the Life Guard Jäger Regiment were awarded two Orders of St George (4th class), three Orders of St Vladimir (3rd class), three of St Anna (2nd class) with diamonds, fourteen Orders of St Vladimir (4th class) with ribbon, three Orders of St Anna of 2nd class and sixteen of third class, and nine officers received golden swords for courage.249 Ninety-four private soldiers were rewarded with the medal of the Military Order, also known as the soldiers’ Order of St George. On the French side, the 106th Line had twelve officers killed, six died of wounds and thirty-eight wounded, while its overall casualties reached almost 1,000 men. The 92nd Line lost eight officers and seventy-six soldiers in its attempt to rescue the 106th. Certainly the greatest loss was the death of General Plauzonne, first of the many generals to die that day.
The attack on Borodino had important consequences, since it kept Kutuzov’s attention diverted from the left flank. The actions of the 106th Line, which rushed across the Kolocha without orders, were perceived by Kutuzov’s staff as part of Napoleon’s battle plan and further operations were expected in this direction. As a result, when he received urgent appeals for reinforcements from Bagration on the left lank, Kutuzov delayed sending them until it was clear that there was no immediate threat to his right flank.
Southern Sector – The Bagration Flèches
While Eugène made a diversion on Borodino, the main French assault began to the south. Through the dissipating mist, the Russians could see the masses of enemy troops around Shevardino, where Napoleon had concentrated approximately 60,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry and 297 guns. Davout was destined to carry the burden of the attack, aimed at seizing Bagration’s flèches. He was instructed to have
Compans’ Division arranged in brigade columns […] with 16 guns of the corps’ reserve artillery and 14 guns of the Divisional artillery deployed ahead of it. Dessaix’s division should be deployed in similar fashion between the captured redoubt and the forest, with 14 guns arranged on its left flank. Friant’s division should be placed in brigade columns on the same level as the redoubt.250
In total, Davout had about 22,000 men and over 70 guns in the three divisions destined to lead the assault. Marshal Ney was told to deploy his three divisions (about 10,000 men) behind the redoubt, arranging them in brigade columns with the artillery on the left wing. Behind them were two divisions (about 7,500 men) from VIII Corps.251 Ney’s forces were supposed to move around 7am, attacking the village of Semeyonovskoye and supporting Davout’s assault to their left. The infantry would be supported by almost 300 guns, which would be gradually employed, while Murat reported that his
I, II and IV Corps of Cavalry Reserve [about 18,000 men in total] were in columns of each brigade […] The I Reserve Corps was to support the attack of the I Corps [Davout], the II that of the III Corps [Ney]. The IV [Reserve Cavalry] marched in reserve at the centre and was to support either of those corps according to the need.252
On the Russian side, the flèches were occupied by Vorontsov’s 2nd Combined Grenadier Division, with one battalion in each lèche and the remaining eight battalions deployed in the second line beyond the redoubts. The southern lèche was protected by twelve guns of the 32nd Battery Company, while the 11th Battery Company had eight guns in the northern lèche and four cannon in the middle lèche. The grenadiers were also supported by the 1st Don Cossack Artillery Company and four guns of the 21st Light Company, and some sources suggest that 2nd and 12th Battery Companies might also have had some guns near the flèches. Behind the grenadiers was Neverovsky’s 27th Division, arranged in battalion columns and reinforced by the 3rd Battery Company. Bagration deployed the 2nd Grenadier Division (Prince Mecklenburg-Schwerin) at Semeyonovskoye, where a small redoubt (with six guns of the 1st Battery Company) was constructed on the north-western edge of the village. The 31st Battery Company was set up on the opposite corner of the village. Closer to Rayevsky’s Redoubt was the 12th Division and, behind it, IV Cavalry Corps. Duka’s 2nd Cuirassier Division (twenty squadrons) was south-east from Semeyonovskoye.
To further strengthen his defences, Bagration had moved his artillery reserve closer to the first line, bringing as much firepower as possible to bear upon the advancing French. While the precise number of guns employed is difficult to establish, it is possible to ascertain that 172 cannon were gathered in this direction, with over 50 deployed in and around the flèches, some 40 at Semeyonovskoe and the rest in the reserve. Bagration took advantage of thick brushes and woods on the western side of the Semeyonovskii ravine to deploy there the six battalions of the 6th, 49th and 50th Jäger Regiments, while the 5th, 41st and 42nd Jägers were extended in a skirmisher line along the Kamenka brook as far as the Utitsa woods. Shakhovsky’s detachment (20th and 21st Jägers, and two Combined Grenadier Battalions of the 3rd Division) was concealed in the Utitsa woods. In total, Bagration had about 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry in the vicinity of the flèches. By the end of the day, this number would increase to some 40,000 infantry and over 11,000 cavalry.
Around 6.30am, following the artillery bombardment, Davout ordered the advance. One of the French officers could see the effect the artillery barrage had on the vicinity, where
the peaceful plain and silent slopes erupted in swirls of ire and smoke, followed almost at once by countless explosions and the howling of cannon shot ripping through the air in every direction.253
Mayevsky recalled that:
The dawn of 26 August turned into a real hell! Our wretched corner, that is, the left lank […] drew the ire from the entire artillery of the French Army. Bagration was correct in saying that there was no place for a coward there that day.
As Compans’ men advanced towards the woods, they ‘disappeared into a cloud of dust infused by a reddish glow by the radiant sun …’ as Dumonceau recalled, adding: ‘The deafening din of our cannonade was interspersed with a sound that seemed like a distant echo.’254
Compans had two objectives, securing the flèches and clearing the nearby woods of Russian Jägers that might harass the French flank. His troops moved in two columns: the one on the left (57th and 111th Line) moving towards the southern lèche, and the one on the right (61st and 25th Line) advancing against Russian Jägers from the brigades of General Shakhovsky and Colonel Glebov. To the left, and slightly behind Compans, the 4th Division of Dessaix (except for two battalions of the 85th Line, left behind to protect battery) was also advancing in column. Friant’s division remained in reserve.255
Entering the woods, the French came under the Jägers’ fire and their progress was delayed. As Shakhovsky reported, his adjutant Stepanov, ‘observing an enemy column marching towards our battery, gathered about thirty skirmishers [‘strelkov’] from various regiments’, who engaged the enemy at once.256 Thus, Ney’s warning to Compans, that the march through woods would delay the attack, began to materialize, as there were more jägers in this thick woods than Compans had expected. Compans’ men became involved in the protracted skirmishing and precious time was wasted. In order to proceed with the attack, Colonel Charrière sent the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 57th Line through the
forest to engage the jägers, while the 3rd, 4th and 6th Battalions turned left to lank the southern flèche.257 Yet, as the French emerged from the forest, they encountered devastating canister ire, which caused frightful casualties to their dense columns. Löwenstern, on the Russian end of the guns, recalled that:
The execution wrought by our batteries was frightful and the enemy columns faded away perceptibly despite the continual reinforcements which arrived. The more effort the enemy put into the attack, the higher their casualties piled up.258
As the French regrouped for a new assault, Compans, who had suffered an injury to his arm two days before, again fell wounded ‘along with the bravest of his soldiers’ (Ségur). General Teste replaced him and rallied the troops, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 111th Line.259 The French demonstrated magnificent courage during this assault, especially the 57th Line, which living up to its nickname ‘Le Terrible’, advanced steadily with muskets levelled, but withholding ire despite growing casualties. Impressed by the courage of these soldiers, Bagration clapped his hands several times and yelled ‘Bravo, bravo!’260
Through the deafening artillery thunder, Dutheillet de Lamoth, of the 57th Line, was still able to discern the command to assault the lèche. Running with his comrades from the 6th Battalion, he followed in the wake of the 3rd and 4th Battalions, which were already fighting on the parapets of the flèche. According to Löwenstern: ‘the enemy impetus against the [Russian] battery was so powerful that it was forced to retreat’.
As the Russian gunners began to quickly remove the guns from the flèche, the grenadiers deployed in support engaged the French in bitter hand-to-hand combat, but it was an unequal struggle. One French soldier looked on as ‘a brave [Russian] officer, seeing his men about to fall back, placed himself across the entrance to the redoubt and did everything he could to prevent them leaving it but was shot through the body’. Almost all the Russian grenadiers were killed.
Some French troops pursued the retreating Russians and Dutheillet de Lamoth later recounted, with a certain swagger, that he and his companions of the 6th Battalion advanced over ‘two hundred paces’ beyond the flèche before Major Yager ordered them to immediately return. Even so, the soldiers ‘resisted his orders, wanting to pursue the enemy and telling the officer he had sent to us, “Have us supported by other troops.’’ ‘261
As the left column (57th Line and a battalion of the 111th Line) of the 5th Division entered the flèche, the right column – General Guyardet with the 61st and 25th Line – was fighting the Russian jägers in the woods. Informed of the capture of the lèche, Guyardet initially dispatched two companies of voltigeurs to secure the woods close to the flèche and then led the rest of the 61st and 25th Line towards the lèche itself. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 57th and the 5th and the 6th Battalions of the 111st Line were still engaged in the forest. Two other Battalions (2nd and 3rd) of the 111th Line were kept back to defend artillery battery.262
The 4th Division of Dessaix was, by now, in the heat of the action and General Friederichs moved his 85th Line by quick march through the woods, which only exhausted the troops, while Dessaix himself, accompanied by his adjutants du Bourget, Girod de l’Ain and Marquiaut, rode forward to assume command of the 5th Division after Compans was wounded.263 Dessaix was now in formal command of both divisions but General Friederichs exercised actual command of the 4th Division, while General Teste led the 5th Division.264 Girod de l’Ain, riding a white horse:
got there just as the first redoubt had been taken by storm. They were nothing but redans, that is chevron-shaped campaign works not closed at their throat, in such a way that the enemy’s second line swept their interior with the sharpest musketry and grape. So it was a lot harder to gain a foothold and stay there than to have stormed them.
Dessaix ‘remained a few instants totally exposed beside one of the redoubts, examining the Russian units’ position and movement’, when a musket ball smashed a bottle of brandy, which Dessaix carried in his saddle holsters. ‘It was more than he could take not to exclaim angrily, turning to [Girod de l’Ain]: “I owe that to your damned white horse!” ‘ General Teste was less lucky, as a canister shot soon shattered his right hand.265 His adjutant, Mouchon, was mortally wounded and Dutheillet de Lamoth, short of footwear, ‘stripped the unfortunate, still not cold, of the boots he had on his feet to put them on my own!’ Soon after, Major Yager, of the 57th, was killed as well.
Meantime, Vorontsov, ‘noticing that one of the redoubts on my left lank was lost’, charged with the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Division to reclaim it. Bagration also ordered Neverovsky to counter-attack with several battalions of his division.266 The Russian infantry attack and artillery fire soon prevailed and forced the French out of the lèche. This is, however, a very contentious issue since, as we will see later in this section, both sides claimed success in the fighting around the flèches.
As for Poniatowski’s supporting assault on the extreme Russian left, this had now been delayed. In effect, the Poles could not now threaten Bagration’s wing to support Davout’s charges. Furthermore, Marshal Davout, riding forward to rally Compans’ men at the very beginning of the attack, had his horse shot from under him, throwing him to the ground and inflicting a severe contusion.267 The rumour quickly turned Davout’s concussion into a violent death, the news of which stunned Napoleon. Davout had to send his aide-de-camp to assure the Emperor that he was still alive. According to Murat:
upon receiving the word the Prince of Eckrmühl [Davout] had been [only] wounded, [Napoleon] gave me orders to go and take command of the I Corps if the Prince was not in condition to resume his command. I returned to inform His Majesty that the Prince had told me his wound was only a contusion and that he was able to continue to command.268
Considering the less-than-friendly relations between these two marshals, Davout’s response was hardly surprising. Still, Napoleon sent Rapp, his aide-de-camp, to assist Davout. Then, ‘observing the enemy’s movements through his telescope’, the Emperor ordered Ney to advance.269 That first hour of waiting must have been nerve-wracking for the men of the III Corps as they stood awaiting orders. Pelleport, of the 18th Line, recalled ‘complete silence reigning in our ranks […] Everyone was deep in thoughts and emotions.’ But not everyone was in such sombre mood. Lossberg, sitting on his horse, was writing letters (he managed to finish three of them) home. The Westphalian troops mainly consisted of young conscripts and Captain Franz Morgenstern of the 2nd Westphalian Line described a fascinating scene as the battle developed:
We had already suffered casualties when my senior sergeant, who had seen much action in his past service […] delighted me with his sense of humour when he came up to me and suggested that I order the three flankers next to me to stick out their tongues. This I did and was surprised to see that all their tongues were as white as their uniforms! I at once ordered others to do the same; theirs, too were white. The sergeant assured me that this was the case with all men who were going into action for the first time. Of course, I had to put this to the proof and demanded that he show me his tongue; he obliged immediately – it was lobster-red! ‘And yours, captain?’ he grinned. ‘We will just let that remain my secret,’ I replied. The ‘tongue test’ spread quickly to neighbouring companies and caused considerable hilarity as they were all white.
Around 7am, as Suckow described, the troops were told that the Russian fortifications were already seized. The III Corps, inspired by the news, was then ordered to advance. The 10th Division marched first, arranged ‘in attack columns, with its last regiments in battalion columns deployed at the distance of a division, ready to form square and to serve as reserve’. It was followed by the 25th and 11th Divisions and the 8th (Westphalian) Corps, which was moving in two columns.270 Count Ségur could see as ‘Rapp galloped up to replace Compans and led the troops at a run with levelled bayonets against the redoubt.’271 As he reached the flèches, Rapp placed Dessaix’s 4th Division in the first line and m
oved the worn out 5th Division into the second. Rapp himself was at the head of the 61st Line, ‘whom I had known in Upper Egypt [in 1798]; there were still a few of the officers from that period and it was very strange to meet them again’. It is unclear if Rapp’s attack was successful but he himself described that ‘the firing was still terrible; cannon-balls and shells rained down all round me’.
Noticing the French reinforcements, Bagration also began to concentrate his forces. He rallied the 27th Division and Vorontsov’s grenadiers around the flèches and requested four battalions of the 12th Division, then assigned to the 27th Division. The artillery was told to concentrate its ire on the narrow front around the flèches. Bagration then ordered the 2nd Cuirassier Division to cross the Semyenovskii stream and instructed Sievers to ‘dispatch some cavalry to support the infantry deployed inside the two flèches on forward positions’. The Novorosiiskii Dragoon and the Akhtyrskii Hussar Regiments were ordered to move forward at once.272
Unaware of events unfolding further south, Bagration asked Lieutenant General Tuchkov, who formally was not under his command, to send the 3rd Division of the III Corps. However, Tuchkov himself faced an attack and barely had troops to spare. Furthermore, his relations with Bagration were somewhat strained. Mayevsky was quite outspoken when he noted:
[Bagration’s] two requests to Tuchkov remained unanswered because of Tuchkov’s dislike of Bagration. The third dispatch was entrusted to me and I delivered it to Tuchkov, telling him, in decisive terms, the will of [Bagration]. The 3rd Division […] [was] then sent back with me …
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 17
