Ney was appalled by the exposed position of the 33rd Line, which suffered heavy losses from a barrage of Russian cannon-balls and canister: ‘Who is the imbecile who placed you here?’ he exclaimed at one point, and, apparently realizing the answer, he turned to Murat, shouting, ‘Why don’t you charge with your cavalry or have this infantry advance, since you seem so bent on getting it killed off?’ Friant barely escaped death when a canister shot struck him in the chest: he refused to leave the battlefield and continued commanding the troops.445 As a Russian officer Lubenkov described:
It was a fight between ferocious tigers, not men, and once both sides had determined to win or die where they stood, they did not stop fighting when their muskets broke, but carried on, using butts and swords in terrible hand-to-hand combat, and the killing went on …
The fighting for Semeyonovskoye continued throughout the afternoon and the French made repeated attempts to advance beyond the village. Between 2pm and 3pm, Ney ordered the I, III and VIII Corps (see page 000 for discussion) to resume the attack, and as Pelleport, Pelet, Girod de l’Ain and Le Roy described, the French troops managed to gain some ground.
On the Russian side, Lieutenant General Lavrov was ordered to shift his Guard regiments to the left, following reports that the French were seeking to turn the Russian left flank and their skirmishers, lodged on the edge of the woods there, were harassing the Russian cavalry. Lavrov dispatched a battalion of the Life Guard Finlyandskii Regiment, under the command of Colonel Zherve, to support the cavalry, but was soon informed that enemy forces were increasing in this direction. As a consequence, he sent two more battalions of the same regiment, led by Colonel Kryzhanovski. Zherve, meantime, deployed a thick screen of skirmishers and engaged the French for half an hour before reporting additional enemy columns arriving. Kryzhanovski then led a bayonet charge with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, which succeeded in driving the French back. The Russians took up position inside the woods but could not advance further, due to effective fire from the French artillery.
Both Davout and Ney requested additional reinforcements but their appeals fell on Napoleon’s deaf ear. By now, almost all of the Grand Army was committed to the battle, except for the Imperial Guard, and its involvement might have had a crucial effect on the battle. According to Ségur, Murat sent one of his officers (Borelli) to the Emperor and upon reaching Napoleon:
that officer pointed to the clouds of dust which the charges of the cavalry were raising upon the heights […] Borelli insisted [on reinforcements], and the Emperor promised his Young Guard. But, scarcely had it advanced a few paces, when he himself called out to it to halt. The Count de Lobau [Mouton], however, made it advance by degrees, under pretence of dressing the line. Napoleon, perceiving it, repeated his order.
Soon after, Ney, Davout, and Murat again called for the Guard. Murat sent Belliard, his chief of staff, to the Emperor. Belliard declared that, from their position near Semeyonovskoye, the French could see confused crowds of Russian soldiers and carriages retreating and only a single effort was required to win the battle. Napoleon hesitated and ordered Belliard to have another look. Belliard soon returned, reporting that the Russians were rallying and ‘the opportunity was about to escape; that there was not a moment to be lost, otherwise it would require a second battle to terminate the first!’
But Bessières, whom Napoleon also had sent him to examine the Russian positions, argued that the Russians, far from being in disorder, were in their second position, and seemed to be preparing for an attack. Confused by two contradicting reports, Napoleon murmured that ‘nothing was yet sufficiently unravelled [and] he wanted to see more clearly upon his chess-board’. Belliard, in consternation, returned to Murat and complained about finding the Emperor ‘still seated in the same place, with a suffering and dejected air, his features sunk, and a dull look; giving his orders languishingly, in the midst of these dreadful warlike noises, to which he seemed completely a stranger!’ At this account, Ney supposedly exclaimed:
Are we then come so far, to be satisfied with a field of battle? What business has the emperor in the rear of the army? […] Since he will no longer make war himself, since he is no longer the general, as he wishes to be the emperor every where, let him return to the Tuilleries, and leave us to be generals for him!
Back at the command post, Count Daru, the Secretary of State, supported by Count Mathieu Dumas, Intendant-General of the Grand Army and Marshal Berthier, again approached Napoleon with a request to send in the Imperial Guard. Napoleon replied: ‘And if there should be another battle tomorrow, where is my army?’ No further attempts were made to urge Napoleon to commit his élite force to the battle.
Napoleon’s refusal to commit the Guard became one of the most debated issues over the 200 years following the battle. Participants and scholars argued that this was surely one of the decisive moments of the campaign and envisioned what would have happened if the Imperial Guard had attacked. This issue is directly connected with Napoleon’s overall conduct during the battle. Unlike his other battles, Napoleon was unusually passive at Borodino – a fact noted by many. During the morning he rarely mounted his horse to observe the front line and stir up his troops. Instead he spent hours sitting near the Shevardino Redoubt, periodically pacing up and down with his hands clasped behind his back, occasionally looking through his telescope, and quietly listening to reports. It seemed that poor health – cold, sore throat and urinary problems – had an effect on his mental state and put him in some kind of depression. He was seen taking cough drop pills from a little box in his pocket and did not eat breakfast or lunch, except for ‘a slice of bread and a glass of Chambertin wine, without diluting it with water’.446
Napoleon’s apologists often use his ill health to explain the indecisive outcome of the battle. His health does much to explain his passivity that day but cannot be used as the sole factor in Napoleon’s meagre performance at Borodino. The tactical situation he was facing was no more difficult than earlier battles he had successfully fought. During the Italian Campaign of 1796–97 he was often struck by fever, but that did not prevent him from waging a victorious campaign against a numerically superior enemy. One can admit that cold and exhaustion had hindered his physical performance but it would difficult to explain the collapse of will so evident at Borodino. Chambray could not recognize in this tired old man the warlike commander of the past, who would gallop about the field encouraging his troops and spotting the right moment to launch the decisive attack. ‘Previously it was above all on the battlefield that his talents had shone with the greatest éclat; it was there that he seemed to master fortunate itself.’ Lejeune was surprised to find the Emperor always seated in the same attitude, following movements with his pocket telescope and giving his orders with imperturbable composure:
We all agreed in wondering what had become of the eager, active commander of Marengo, Austerlitz, and elsewhere […] We were anything but satisfied with the way in which our leader had behaved, and passed very severe judgments on his conduct.
There is certainly some justice to the critique of Napoleon’s decision to keep the Guard in reserve. Such an attack probably would have delivered a more decisive victory but one can only speculate if the Russian Army would have been routed as a result of this. The Guard would have certainly suffered losses – maybe even significant losses – in the process. Besides, it is often forgotten that Napoleon did commit the Young Guard and the Guard artillery, so the only force remaining in reserve was the Old Guard. As prominent British historian David Chandler argued, Napoleon’s ‘refusal to commit the Old Guard was probably correct in the long term view; he never forgot that 1,200 miles separated him from the French frontier and consequently was well-advised to retain his last major formation intact’. Napoleon himself was well aware of the disapproval surrounding his actions. After the battle he summoned Dumas and Daru to discuss the battle results and, among other things, told them:
People will be surprised that I did not commit my r
eserves in order to obtain greater results, but I had to keep them for striking a decisive blow in the great battle which the enemy will fight in front of Moscow. The success of the day was assured and I had to consider the success of the campaign as a whole. That is why I kept my reserves in hand.447
The sporadic battle around Semeyonovskoye continued well into the evening. According to Colonel Kutuzov, the Allied cavalry, after exhausting itself charging the Russian squares, was moved back and the French infantry made repeated attempts to advance but was repelled. During one such attack, shortly after 4pm, General Friant was wounded again and Dufour took over the command of the 4th Division; some French scholars (Thiry, Tranié) suggest that Friant was replaced by Gallichet, but other sources do not be substantiate their argument. According to Murat’s report, one of the French attacks, taking place around 5pm, shattered the Russian position, drove the enemy further into woods and cleared the valley behind Semeyonovskoye. However, Murat’s claims are not supported by the Russian sources and even some French participants contradict him. Thus, Pelleport complained about disorder and lack of coordination between the French forces and noted that the Russians, although suffering heavy losses, held ground.
The French artillery, however, hardly missed its target and, as Colonel Kutuzov lamented, ‘wreaked havoc among us’. This forced the Russians to redeploy to a new line of defence. Between 6pm and 7pm the soldiers of the 33rd Line noticed that the Russian troops, near the woods, were changing position. Led by Captain Michel, the French skirmishers approached them but, fearing an ambush, they were reluctant to proceed into the woods. They were later recalled by General Dedem. Russian Colonel Udom described that, after hours of enduring the bombardment, his regiment, leaving skirmishers for cover, finally retreated towards the nearby woods, where it joined a battalion of the Izmailovskii Regiment. Lavrov also described how, late in the evening, the French made several attempts to seize woods where the Life Guard Finlyandskii Regiment was deployed with orders to ‘defend it at any cost’. The enemy was repelled and, to prevent future attacks, the Russian skirmisher chain was reinforced with two companies. Lavrov reported: ‘the skirmishers held ground on the edge of the woods for the rest of the evening and around 9pm the fire began to die down, and completely ended by 10pm’.
Central Sector – The Second Assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt
After the first French assault failed, Prince Eugène planned to utilize his Italian Guard to launch a new attack on the redoubt, while artillery bombarded the Russian troops massing in the centre. But French preparations were interrupted by news of the sudden appearance of the Russian cavalry on the extreme left flank, which compelled Eugène to postpone his attack for a couple of hours and take reinforcements to the threatened positions. The French cavalry, meantime, was redeployed to plug the gap between Ney and Davout around Semeyonovskoye and Eugène’s forces near Borodino.
The delay in attacking the redoubt proved costly for these cavalrymen, as they remained exposed to the Russian artillery for the best part of three hours. Polish Colonel Malachowski lamented that:
our cavalry was exposed to the fire, without taking any precautions against it. Cannon-balls were like an autumn wind […] a hail of cannon-balls reaped men and horses from our lines. The gaps were filled in with new soldiers, who assumed places of their fallen comrades.
Griois was amazed at the sight of ‘cannon-balls, bullets, shells and canister raining down from every direction and creating large gaps in our cavalry, which remained exposed and motionless for several hours.’ He could see that
the plain was covered with the wounded men making their way back to ambulances and of riderless horses galloping around in disorder. I noticed a Württemberg [Westphalian?] cuirassier regiment, which was particularly hard hit with the enemy cannon-balls and their helmets and cuirasses kept flying apart in shattered fragments.
Combe complained that
The enemy redoubt directed its main fire against the artillery deployed on our right lank but some of its guns also targeted us. Cannon-balls hit us and ricocheted through our ranks, as we stood at attention with our sabres raised to our epaulettes. We remained in this terrible position for six hours.
The carabiniers of the II Cavalry Corps bitterly complained at having to suffer these casualties. At one moment, the exasperated Sergeant-Major Ravat shouted, ‘Either we charge or we leave the field!’ but was quickly silenced by Captain du Barail’s response: ‘One more word and I will break your gob, you miserable Jean-Foutre [good for nothing]!’448 The Saxon Prinz Albert Chevau-léger lost almost half its men without even engaging the enemy. One officer of the Vistula Legion close to II Cavalry Corps described seeing ‘long lines of French cavalry, in whose ranks the enemy artillery blasted bloody lanes at every moment’.449 Among the killed and seriously wounded officers were Colonel Désirat of the 11th Chasseurs and Daubenton, Pajol’s aide-de-camp.450 Subervie, of the 16th Light Cavalry Brigade, escaped death by a hair’s breadth when a shell exploded close to him, ripping off the legs of two soldiers nearby. Major von Werder, of the 1st Prussian Uhlans, had his horse killed under him but, to the surprise of all around him, immediately stood up, calmly smoking his pipe. As Thirion de Metz explained:
In a charge […] everyone is excited, everyone fights and parries if he can; there is action, movement, hand-to-hand combat; but here our position was quite different. Standing still opposite the Russian cannons, we could see them being loaded with the projectiles which they would direct at us, we could distinguish the eye of the gunner who was aiming at us and it required a great dose of composure to remain still.
After waiting patiently for reinforcements, Thirion de Metz saw ‘poor Westphalians, partly recruits, surprised to find themselves so close to thundering guns and to see us moving, shouting, ‘Wir bleiben nicht hier! Wir bleiben nicht hier!’ [‘We are not staying here! We are not staying here!’]451
Around noon, Captain Biot – who served as adjutant to Pajol – saw General Montbrun approaching Pajol and witnessed their conversation. After exchanging greetings, Pajol complained that he was so exposed that ‘not a single shot misses my troops’. Montbrun suggested moving to the left and the two generals travelled to take a look at the terrain there. Biot goes on to recount:
And there we were, passing along the front of our line […] Montbrun was to our right, flanking us toward the enemy, Pajol in the middle, and I was to on the left […] Suddenly I heard a dull thud. ‘Someone has been wounded,’ I exclaimed. At the same instant General Montbrun rolled off his horse …
A Russian round-shot had pierced Montbrun from side to side, leaving a gaping wound that proved deadly. Officers rushed to help the wounded general but the injury was too severe. Physician Roos, who was among the few who witnessed the scene, watched as Montbrun ‘quickly turned pale and then yellow. His very lively look had been extinguished and we saw his strength gradually fail’. Still, the General somehow found strength to mutter, ‘Excellent shot,’ before losing conscience. Montbrun was quickly taken to the celebrated surgeon Dominique Larrey but he could do nothing to rescue him. ‘A round shot passed through the region of his kidneys from side to side,’ Larrey noted, ‘There was little to be done. Death was certain and not far off. I applied a dressing, and had him carried to a little village nearby.’ There, in the shadow of trees and under the thunder of guns, the 42-year-old Montbrun breathed his last around 5pm.452
A Hero’s Death
The death of Montbrun was a grave loss for Napoleon and the Grand Army. A talented cavalry general, he was in his prime and would have accomplished much in the years to come. There was even a talk of him eventually becoming a marshal.
After the battle, Marshal Lefevbre had him buried near the northern flèche and had a small wooden tablet erected over his grave. A year after the battle, an Englishman (J.T. James), visiting the battlefield, described:
a small wooden tablet, attached to a rough stake, erected over the place where [Montbrun] was interred, bearing an
inscription to his memory. It had been penned in ink after the hurry of the day was past; but the simple and classical turn of its style well entitles it to record:
Here lies
General Montbrun
Passer-by of whatever nation
Honour his Ashes
They are the remains of
One of the Bravest of the Brave,
Of General Montbrun.
The Marshal of the Empire and Duke of Danzig
Has erected this modest monument in his honour
His memory will live for ever in the hearts of the Grand Army
Tensions were running high among the soldiers and officers. Travelling along the ravine, General Thielemann barely survived after a Russian shell exploded nearby, wounding his horse. He was already irritated by considerable losses among his troops and by what he perceived as Latour-Maubourg’s repeated instructions. This brush of death, and the subsequent death of his favourite adjutant, only further incensed him. As bad luck would have it, one of Latour-Maubourg’s adjutants arrived with new orders at that moment and, failing to notice Thielemann, delivered orders to the regimental commanders, who, apparently, began to move. Thielemann immediately stopped them and, finding Latour-Maubourg’s adjutant, demanded to know why the order had not been delivered to him. The adjutant blurted that the General was not at his spot, which threw Thielemann into a rage. Chasing the adjutant with his drawn sword, he galloped directly to Latour-Maubourg, where he brusquely explained to him that he was not one of those who could be pestered with instructions and ordered about by adjutants. Before leaving, Thielemann also warned Latour-Maubourg against sending that adjutant again, since next time he would run him through with his sabre!453
The Russians fared no better and to Barclay de Tolly, ‘it seemed as if Napoleon decided to eliminate us with his artillery’. Paskevich recalled the horrors of artillery bombardment:
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 27
