104. Kumar, Community Warriors, 156–58.
105. “Prison Term for Bihar Legislator,” BBC News, September 17, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7620999.stm (accessed November 17, 2015); “Bihar Legislator Acquitted in Abduction Case,” Indo-Asian News Service, December 11, 2010, http://www.sify.com/news/bihar-legislator-acquitted-in-abduction-case-news-national-kh2pOcedcafsi.html (accessed January 12, 2011).
106. Dan Morrison, “The Dark Side of India’s ‘Mr. Clean,’” Al-Jazeera, August 8, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/2012869281872518.html (accessed July 24, 2015); Nalin Verma, “MLC Arrested from House,” Telegraph (Calcutta), July 25, 2009.
107. A drunk Pandey allegedly shouted: Kya dikha rahe hain app? Vishwanath, thok de. Marva de. (What are you showing? Vishwanath, shoot them. Get them killed.) See “Bihar MLA Threatens to Kill Reporters,” Times of India, June 25, 2006.
108. “Jailed Bihar Legislator Gets Doctorate for Non-violence Thesis,” Indo-Asian News Service, March 5, 2009, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/article43590.ece (accessed October 18, 2010).
109. Giridhar Jha, “Murder Accused Turns in to Fight Bihar Elections,” India Today, September 23, 2010; K. C. Philip, “Gang War on Train Draws Blood in AC Coach,” Telegraph (Calcutta), June 10, 2004.
110. Pooja Kashyap, “Widow Takes on Hubby ‘Killer,’” Times of India, October 29, 2010.
111. Alok Mishra, “Danapur’s Terror’s Ads Anger Voters,” Times of India, October 31, 2010.
112. Ramashankar, “Ganglord Jumps into Poll Ring from Jail,” Telegraph (Calcutta), October 18, 2010. Ritlal Yadav’s criminal rap sheet was so lengthy—20 cases in all—that he needed a separate annexure to detail them in his 2010 election affidavit submitted to the Election Commission.
113. Mishra, “Danapur’s Terror’s Ads Anger Voters.”
114. “BJP Leader Killed in Patna,” Press Trust of India, April 30, 2003, http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=21003 (accessed October 2, 2010).
115. At the time of writing, none of these four politicians has been convicted. Just before Bihar’s 2015 assembly election, Anant Singh was finally arrested on murder and kidnapping charges, prompting Nitish Kumar to expel him from the party. Singh, though lodged in jail and forced to contest as an independent, handily won reelection from Mokama without ever setting foot on the campaign trail. His party-mate Sunil Pandey was also arrested after being implicated in a January 2015 bomb blast case. Pandey too was dropped by the JD(U) and did not contest the election, although his wife ran (and lost). The RJD’s Ramanand Yadav successfully won reelection from Fatuha, and Ritlal Yadav, who remains in jail awaiting trial, won election to Bihar’s upper house of the assembly as an independent. See Amarnath Tewary, “JD(U) MLA Anant Singh Arrested,” Hindu, June 25, 2015 (accessed November 15, 2015); Amarnath Tewary, “JD(U) MLA Sunil Pandey Arrested,” Hindu, July 12, 2015; Giridhar Jha, “Jailed Gangster Ritlal Yadav Wins Bihar Election against JD-U and BJP Rivals,” India Today, July 10, 2015.
116. Ward Berenschot, Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
117. Ibid.
118. Michelutti, “Wrestling with (Body) Politics,” 60.
119. Ibid. Although the scholar Lucia Michelutti uses the term goonda to describe the criminal Yadav politicians she studies, they are arguably more akin to dadas given their political prominence and relative position in the local criminal hierarchy.
120. Hansen, Wages of Violence.
121. As Berenschot explains, there is a rationale underlying the violence employed by goondas in India that is grounded in the local political context. Violence and criminality are essential to cultivating an image of being “tough.”
122. Hansen, “Politics as Permanent Performance,” 21. Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray’s role cannot be minimized in this respect; his “art of building up hysteria” and “very effective histrionics” are crucial to the Shiv Sena’s politics of performance. See Suhas Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 14/15 (April 3–16, 2004): 1497–1507.
123. Wilkinson, “Constructivist Model of Ethnic Riots.”
124. Berenschot, Riot Politics.
125. Author’s interview with BJP Rajya Sabha MP, New Delhi, July 2009.
126. Author’s interview with senior representative of a national party, Patna, October 2010.
CHAPTER 6. THE SALIENCE OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS
1. “Lucknow Goes Blue for Chief Minister’s Birthday,” Indo-Asian News Service, January 14, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-lucknow-goes-blue-for-chief-minister-s-birthday-1145075 (accessed June 2, 2012). Mayawati’s biographer reports that for her fifty-first birthday, Mayawati’s birthday festivities included a 51-kilogram cake, 100,000 ladoos (Indian sweets), 60 quintals of marigolds, and around 5,000 flower bouquets. See Ajoy Bose, Behenji: A Political Biography of Mayawati (London: Penguin, 2009).
2. The allegation regarding the meteoric rise in Mayawati’s personal assets was contained in a charge sheet filed by federal investigators looking into the former chief minister’s “disproportionate assets,” a euphemism for corruption. See “Mayawati Can Be Prosecuted in Corruption Case: CBI,” Press Trust of India, August 27, 2010, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/mayawati-can-be-prosecuted-in-corruption-case-cbi-429031 (accessed November 16, 2015).
3. In July 2012, the Supreme Court dismissed the CBI’s probe into Mayawati’s “disproportionate assets,” claiming that the CBI had overextended its mandate in a separate corruption investigation it had opened against the BSP leader. The Supreme Court clarified in May 2013 that the CBI could open a new investigation into Mayawati’s assets, but the CBI demurred. In January 2014, a private citizen filed a public interest suit with the Supreme Court demanding the CBI initiate a fresh probe. The court agreed and ordered a new investigation, although the CBI continues to resist. “SC to Hear Mayawati’s Disproportionate Assets Case,” Outlook, January 28, 2010; Liz Mathew, “No Material Evidence against Mayawati: SC,” Mint, July 9, 2012; J. Venkatesan, “CBI Free to Probe Mayawati Assets Case: Supreme Court,” Hindu, May 1, 2013; “DA Case Comes Back to Haunt Mayawati,” Times of India, January 18, 2014.
4. “Indian Dalit Icon Mayawati Attacked over Rupee Garland,” BBC News, March 16, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8570289.stm (accessed June 7, 2012).
5. Affidavit submitted by Mayawati to the Election Commission of India in advance of the Uttar Pradesh 2012 state assembly election; Ajoy Bose, Behenji, chap. 14.
6. “Mayawati Dalit Ki Beti Nahin, Daulat Ki Beti Hain,” Rediff, January 6, 2015, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/mayawati-dalit-ki-beti-nahin-daulat-ki-beti-hain/20150106.htm (accessed November 17, 2015).
7. Sharat Pradhan, “Mayawati Spends Crores to Fulfil Her B’day Dream,” Rediff, January 15, 2003, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/15up.htm (accessed November 15, 2015); Sharat Pradhan, “Mayawati Wants Cash on Her Birthday,” Rediff, January 14, 2005, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/sharat/20050114.htm (accessed November 15, 2015); Srawan Shukla, “Having Her Cake and Eating It Too,” Tehelka, January 24, 2009.
8. Quoted in Steven I. Wilkinson, “The Politics of Infrastructural Spending in India,” unpublished paper, Institute for Policy Studies and the World Bank, July 31, 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHIINDGLOECO/Resources/Wilkinson_ThePolitics_of_InfrastructuralProvision_in_India.pdf (accessed November 15, 2012).
9. Subash Mishra, “Film Flare,” India Today, March 17, 2003.
10. Sharat Pradhan, “Engineer’s Murder Sparks Off State-Wide Protests in UP,” Rediff, December 25, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/25up-engineers-death-sparks-off-protest.htm (accessed June 10, 2012).
11. Sharat Pradhan, “I Take Money for Party Tickets: Mayawati,” Rediff, June 5, 2006, http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jun/05maya.htm (accessed June 10, 2012).
12. U.S. Embassy New Delhi, “Mayawati: Portra
it of a Lady,” diplomatic cable, October 23, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELHI2783_a.html (accessed January 10, 2015).
13. Ibid. Somewhat colorfully, the same U.S. diplomatic cable described Mayawati as acting like “a virtual paranoid dictator replete with food tasters and a security entourage to rival a head of state. . . . In addition to this outsized security apparatus, she constructed a private road from her residence to her office, which is cleaned immediately after her multiple vehicle convoy reaches its destination.”
14. Vibhuti Agarwal, “Mayawati: WikiLeaks Founder Should Be Sent to Mental Asylum,” Wall Street Journal India Real Time (blog), September 6, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/09/06/mayawati-wikileaks-founder-should-be-sent-to-mental-asylum-2/ (accessed December 1, 2015).
15. According to Shekhar Tiwari’s affidavit submission ahead of the 2007 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections, only 2 of his alleged 14 criminal cases had formally commenced the judicial process.
16. “BSP Leader Manipulating Engineer’s Murder Case, Says Witness,” Indo-Asian News Service, October 14, 2009, http://twocircles.net/2009oct14/bsp_leader_manipulating_engineers_murder_case_says_witness.html (accessed June 3, 2012).
17. “BSP MLA Chargesheeted in PWD Engineer Murder Case,” Indian Express, January 3, 2009.
18. U.S. Embassy New Delhi, “Mayawati Cancels Birthday Party, Cash Gifts Still Welcome,” diplomatic cable, January 16, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NEWDELHI108_a.html (accessed January 10, 2015).
19. Man Mohan Rai, “BSP MLA, Shekhar Tiwari Gets Life Imprisonment in PWD Engineer Murder Case,” Economic Times, May 7, 2011.
20. U.S. Embassy New Delhi, “Mayawati Cancels Birthday Party.”
21. Smita Gupta, “BSP at the Crossroads,” Economic and Political Weekly 33, no. 26/27 (June 27–July 10, 2009): 20.
22. Author’s calculations based on affidavits submitted to the Election Commission of India by candidates contesting Uttar Pradesh state assembly elections in 2007.
23. The corresponding share of candidates facing serious cases in unreserved seats was 17 percent. Author’s calculations based on affidavits submitted to the Election Commission of India by candidates contesting Uttar Pradesh state assembly elections in 2007.
24. Incidentally, most parties typically do not field Dalit candidates in non-reserved constituencies.
25. Indeed, the BJP government of Narendra Modi and the preceding Congress-led government were noncommittal about setting a release date for the detailed caste enumeration, citing the “sensitivity” of the information.
26. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984).
27. Mona L. Krook and Diana Z. O’Brien, “The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide,” Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (April 2010): 253–72.
28. For a brief history of India’s legislative reservations, see Francesca Refsum Jensenius, “Mired in Reservations: The Path-Dependent History of Electoral Quotas in India,” Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 1 (February 2015): 85–105.
29. Sections 330 and 332 of India’s constitution stipulate that seats in the state assemblies and the lower house of Parliament should be reserved for SCs or STs in proportion to their respective populations in the state as a whole.
30. In this section, I use jati as shorthand to refer to caste as well as tribal divisions within the larger umbrella groupings of SC and ST. Some research finds some support for the idea that internal divisions among SCs are less salient due to SCs’ common bonds. See Thad Dunning, “Do Quotas Promote Ethnic Solidarity? Field and Natural Experiment Evidence from India,” unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California–Berkeley, September 2010, http://www.thaddunning.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Dunning_Quotas.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016).
31. Even if one believes that jatis are electorally relevant to SCs and STs, divisions within the umbrella SC and ST are largely irrelevant to citizens from other caste groups.
32. Kanshi Ram, The Chamcha Age (An Era of the Stooges) (New Delhi: Self-published, 1982).
33. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, Mr. Gandhi and the Emancipation of the Untouchables (Bombay: Thacker, 1943), 24–25.
34. It is important to note that Ambedkar’s views were not consistent on the issue of separate electorates, as he later spoke out against their use.
35. Ram Vilas Paswan, “Dalit Politics in Contemporary India,” Roundtable India (blog), March 30, 2010, http://roundtableindia.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1162:dalit-politics-in-contemporary-indiamr-ram-vilas-paswan&catid=61&Itemid=56 (accessed August 17, 2015).
36. Author’s interview with a senior official from a major national party, October 2010, Patna.
37. For more on the political “styles” of Yadavs and the connection to criminal activity, see Lucia Michelutti, “Wrestling with (Body) Politics: Understanding Muscular Political Styles in North India,” in Pamela Price and Arild Ruud, eds., Power and Influence in South Asia: Bosses, Lords, and Captains (Delhi: Routledge, 2010).
38. Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
39. Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), 102. In another article, Jaffrelot wrote of Scheduled Caste reservations: “Not having received their mandate from their caste fellows—always a minority in the reserved constituencies—elected officials in these constituencies were not very keen to defend their interests in the assemblies to which they were elected.” See Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Impact of Affirmative Action in India: More Political than Socioeconomic,” India Review 5, no. 2 (2006): 173–89.
40. Galanter, Competing Equalities, 549.
41. Francesca Refsum Jensenius, “Power, Performance and Bias: Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India” (PhD diss., University of California–Berkeley, 2013).
42. Francesca Refsum Jensenius, “Development from Representation? A Study of Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7, no. 3 (2015): 196–220.
43. Rohini Pande, “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India,” American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (September 2003): 1132–51; Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande, and Vijayendra Rao, “Political Economy of Panchayats in South India,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 8 (February 24, 2007): 661–66.
44. Simon Chauchard, Why Representation Matters: The Meaning of Ethnic Quotas in Rural India (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
45. The creation of the state of Telangana, carved out of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh in 2014, increased the tally of Indian states to 29. Delhi and Puducherry, though both union territories, not states, also possess elected assemblies. This takes the total number of elected assemblies to 31.
46. Statistical estimates are derived from a multilevel logistic regression of a binary measure of whether a constituency has at least one candidate standing with a serious criminal record on reservation status and other constituency factors. The model also includes random effects parameters for states, districts, and years. For more information on much of the regression evidence cited in this chapter, see Milan Vaishnav, “The Merits of Money and ‘Muscle’: Essays on Criminality, Elections and Democracy in India” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012).
47. To investigate the possibility of underrepresentation of SCs and STs among the “criminal” population, I accessed 2004 data from the Ministry of Home Affairs on the group-wise breakdown of convicts and those in jail while undertrial. The data are disaggregated by caste grouping and state, which allows for a comparison of the percentage of convicts and those in jail under trial who are identified as SC (ST) against the SC (ST) proportion of the state population. For the majori
ty of states, there is no evidence that SCs and STs are underrepresented among the criminal population.
48. For a review, see Sonalde Desai and Amaresh Dubey, “Caste in 21st Century India: Competing Narratives,” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 11 (March 12, 2012): 40–49.
49. Yogendra Yadav, “The Paradox of Political Representation,” Seminar 586 (June 2008), http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/586/586_yogendra_yadav.htm (accessed August 17, 2012).
50. One study concludes its investigation of delimitation in two large Indian states by suggesting that “a politically neutral redistricting process can be implemented by a non-political body with a transparent and inclusive process.” See Lakshmi Iyer and Maya Reddy, “Redrawing the Lines: Did Political Incumbents Influence Electoral Redistricting in the World’s Largest Democracy?” Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 14–051, December 2013, http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=46005 (accessed August 20, 2015). Similarly, scholar Francesca Jensenius examines claims that past delimitation commissions have unfairly drawn the boundaries of SC reserved constituencies so as to include large numbers of Muslims who had no chance of standing for public office. She finds no empirical basis for such allegations. See Francesca Refsum Jensenius, “Was the Delimitation Commission Unfair to Muslims?” Studies in Indian Politics 1, no. 2 (December 2013): 213–29.
51. The seven states included in this analysis are: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram, and Odisha. There is a small degree of switching between reserved categories. In the dataset, seven constituencies previously reserved for SCs became reserved for STs, and two former ST constituencies became SC reserved. But switches from one reserved category to another account for only 5.5 percent of all switches. For the analysis, I disregard these nine constituencies.
52. The analyses compare the longitudinal differences in criminality, or the changes over time, only in those constituencies that switched reservation status. The outcome of interest is the constituency share of candidates facing serious cases and the key variable of interest is the reservation status, controlling for other constituency-level factors.
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