12. Crankshaw, Gestapo, 89.
13. See map in Liang, The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic, 12–13.
14. Richard L. Miller, Nazi Justiz: Law of the Holocaust (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 52.
15. Ingo Müller, Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 175.
16. Wannsee Protocol, Jan. 20, 1942, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/wannsee.asp (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
17. Bernett, “Alfred Flatow,” 2:94, 99. See also Siggi Emmerich, “Olympische Geschichte(n): Alfred Flatow,” Unsere Zeit—Zeitung der DKP, Aug. 13, 2004, http://www.dkp-onlin.de/uz/3633/s0302.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2013); “Flatow Alfred,” in the Central Database of Shoah Victims’ Names, Yad Vashem, http://db.yadvashem.org/names/search.html?language=en (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
18. Karin Schmidl and Jens Weinreich, “Auch zum 80. Geburtstag Stefan Flatows ist die Umbenennung der Reichssportfeldstraße noch nicht vollzogen Die unendliche Geschichte der Flatowallee,” Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 4, 1996, http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/newsticker/auch-zum-80—geburtstag-stefan-flatows-ist-die-umbenennung-der-reichssportfeldstrasse-noch-nicht-vollzogen-die-unendliche-geschichte-der-flatowallee,10917074,9186642.html (visited May 15, 2013).
19. Bericht über einen polit. Vorfall, Oct. 4, 1938, Julius Ignatz Gold, A Rep Pr. Br. Rep. 030/21620, Bd. 5, Haussuchungen bei Juden 1938–39 (FB Bd. 5), Landesarchiv Berlin. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Gold arrest are from this document.
20. Berlin streets may be located at http://www.berlin.de/stadtplan/ (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
21. See Yad Vashem, Central Database of Shoah Victims’ Names, http://db.yadvashem.org/names/search.html?language=en (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
22. Bericht über einen polit. Vorfall, Sept. 4, 1938, Alois Adler, A Rep Pr. Br. Rep. 030/21620 Bd. 5, Haussuchungen bei Juden 1938–39 (FB Bd. 5), Landesarchiv Berlin. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Adler arrest are from this report.
23. See map in Liang, The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic, 12–13.
24. Arnold Paucker and Konrad Kwiet, “Jewish Leadership and Jewish Resistance,” in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism: German Society and the Persecution of the Jews, 1933–1941, ed. David Bankier (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 390.
25. Ergänzungskarten der Volkszählung von 17.05.1939, Bundesarchiv R2/GB. This source also shows: RAD: J. Datum: 25101941.
26. See Yad Vashem, Central Database of Shoah Victims’ Names, http://db.yadvashem.org/names/search.html?language=en (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
27. Der Amtsgerichtspräsident, Strafmaß bei Bestrafung von Juden Auftrag vom 16 Dezember 1938, Jan. 13, 1939, Bundesarchiv (BA) Lichterfelde, R 3001/alt R22/1129.
28. Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zum Schutze des inneren Friedens vom 8. Dezember 1931, Achter Teil, Kapitel I, Reichsgesetzblatt 1931, I, S. 699, 742.
29. John R. Angolia and Hugh Page Taylor, Uniforms, Organization, & History of the German Police (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 2004), 129.
30. Wolfgang Finze and Philip Pai, “Mangel-Erscheinungen” (Symptoms of Deficiency), Visier: Das Internationale Waffen-Magazin, July 7, 2006, 136, 142.
31. For more on these models, see the Walther website at http://www.waltheramerica.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/CustomContentDisplay?langId=-1&storeId=10002&catalogId=13102&content=10002 (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
32. See Gerald Schwab, The Day the Holocaust Began: The Odyssey of Herschel Grynszpan (New York: Praeger, 1990), 24–25; Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 68.
33. A comprehensive search of the literature in English and German on Reichskristallnacht did not reveal any source that mentions the disarming of Jews in October, before the pogrom. One source misreads the date the disarming began, but otherwise correctly observes: “The police had, in fact, already taken precautions to ensure that the Jews could not fight back effectively. On November 8, they had begun disarming Jews, removing anything that could be used for protection from every Jewish household.” Read and Fisher, Kristallnacht, 64, 260, citing the Völkische Beobachter, Nov. 9, 1938 (noting statistics of weapons seized).
34. See Schwab, The Day the Holocaust Began, 1–6, 59–76.
35. “Razzia auf Judenwaffen,” Der Angriff, Nov. 9, 1938, 14; “Bewaffnete Juden,” Fränkische Tageszeitung, Nov. 9, 1938, 2; “Berlins Juden wurden entwaffnet,” Berliner Morgenpost, Nov. 9, 1938, 2; “Entwaffnung der Berliner Juden,” Der Völkische Beobachter, Nov. 9, 1938, 11; “Waffenabgabe der Juden in Berlin,” Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Nov. 9, 1938, 1.
36. “Waffenabgabe der Juden in Berlin.” As on other topics preceding the pogrom, documents concerning the pre-Reichskristallnacht action to disarm Berlin’s Jews have been difficult to locate, and most may have been destroyed. Landesarchiv Berlin includes extensive police president records dating to the 1920s, many relatively insignificant, but no records on this subject could be found under that category in initial searches. Eventually, the documents related to Flatow, Gold, and Adler were discovered there. These may be the tip of the iceberg—no pretense is made that all potentially-relevant record groups and archives have been examined.
37. Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zum Schutze des inneren Friedens, Achter Teil, Kapitel I, Reichsgesetzblatt 1931, I, S. 699, 742, § 1(2).d
38. Arnt Cobbers, Architecture in Berlin: The Most Important Buildings and Urban Settings (Berlin: Jaron, 2002), http://www.berlin.de/international/attractions/index.en.php (visited Feb. 9, 2013).
39. Betr.: Erteilung von Waffenscheinen an Juden, Preußische Geheime Staatspolizei, B.Nr. I G–352/35, Dec. 16, 1935, DCP 0072, BA R 58/276.
40. Daniel Fraenkel, “Jewish Self-Defense under the Constraints of National Socialism: The Final Years of the Centralverein,” in Bankier, ed., Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, 344.
41. Fraenkel, “Jewish Self-Defense,” 348.
42. Arnold Paucker, German Jews in the Resistance 1933–1945: The Facts and the Problems, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 2003), 11 n. 16.
43. Hans Reichmann, Deutscher Bürger und verfolgter Jude: Novemberpogrom und KZ Sachsenhausen 1937 bis 1939 (German Citizen and Persecuted Jew: November Pogrom and Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen, 1937 to 1939), ed. Michael Wildt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1998), 105.
44. Michael Wildt, “Violence Against Jews in Germany, 1933–1939,” in Bankier, ed., Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, 195–97.
45. Reichmann, Deutscher Bürger und verfolgter Jude, 105.
46. Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten 1919–1938 (The Reich Association of Jewish War Veterans 1919-1938) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977), 177.
47. Reichmann, Deutscher Bürger und verfolgter Jude, 105. The editor of this volume suggests that Reichmann was mistaken on the time period because the Reich Ministry of the Interior decreed a prohibition on possession of weapons by Jews on November 11, 1938. However, this decree was preceded by other actions and decrees to deprive Jews of arms, so Reichmann was not mistaken.
48. “Un destruction préméditée,” Journal de Genève, Nov. 16, 1938, 8, quoting from the Jour-Echo de Paris.
11
Goebbels Orchestrates a Pogrom
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1938, Herschel Grynszpan, a seventeen-year-old Polish Jew living in Paris, went to the German embassy there intending to shoot the ambassador. Instead he shot and mortally wounded Ernst vom Rath, the third secretary. Grynszpan’s family was included with a number of Polish Jews living in Germany who had been deported to Poland, but Poland had refused to accept those without proper Polish passports. Thousands were left stranded at the border in wretched conditions.1
An alternative view suggests that the murder was staged by the Nazis to justify the planned pogrom. Nazi agents in Paris
may have instigated Grynszpan to shoot Rath. There is evidence that the cartridges in Grynszpan’s revolver were unfired, suggesting that someone else shot vom Rath. During the war, German authorities took custody of Grynszpan, but a planned show trial was cancelled. State Secretary Leopold Gutterer of the Ministry of Propaganda stated: “We would disgrace ourselves terribly in a trial if the truth emerged from it.”2
Whether the opening move was thoroughly planned or not, this shooting gave the Nazis the pretext for a clearly well-planned pogrom, known as Reichskristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass), on November 8–10. Jews were attacked, their homes and businesses ransacked, synagogues were burned, and 20,000 to 30,000 Jews were detained. A central focus of this onslaught was that Jews were dangerous; their premises must be searched for weapons, and any caught with arms must be thrown into concentration camps.
On November 8, Berlin police president Helldorf drove to Munich with Goebbels, who was elated that Helldorf had been appointed SA senior group leader (Obergruppenführer). Goebbels noted in his diary about the overriding event: “In Paris, the Polish Jew Grynspan [sic] has shot the German diplomat vom Rath in the embassy and wounded him severely. As revenge for the Jews. Now however the German press cries out…. In Hesse big anti-Semitic rallies. The synagogues are burned down. If one could now for once release the popular fury!”3
On the morning of November 9, German newspaper headlines reported Helldorf’s disarming of Berlin’s Jews in the previous weeks, as described in the previous chapter. The Nazi hierarchy recognized the shooting in Paris as creating a favorable opportunity to consummate the disarming of Germany’s entire Jewish population in one fell swoop.
November 9 was the “Tag der Bewegung” (Day of the Movement), the anniversary of Hitler’s failed 1923 Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. Hitler gave his annual speech in the Bürgerbräukeller to commemorate and remember the “fallen heroes” who had died in the shootout with the police.4 Goebbels noted in his diary that vom Rath’s condition had worsened, adding: “Helldorf has completely disarmed the Jews in Berlin. They will have to get prepared for a lot more.”5 Although Helldorf’s disarming of the Berlin Jews had only that morning been made public in the newspapers, it had likely long been a point of discussion and planning between Hitler, Goebbels, and other Nazi leaders. Now that the Jews were defenseless, as Goebbels stated, they would have to endure escalating hardship. And it would begin that very night.
The explosive turn of events was reported by the foreign media. A New York Times headline reported from Berlin: “Nazis Ask Reprisal in Attack on Envoy” and “Berlin Police Head Announces ‘Disarming’ of Jews.” Its account repeated the statistics from Helldorf of weapons seized and the announcement that “any Jews still found in possession of weapons without valid licenses are threatened with the severest punishment.” The attempted assassination was called “a new plot of the Jewish world conspiracy against National Socialist Germany,” and the German press called for retaliation.6
Recalling David Frankfurter’s shooting in 1936 of German Nazi leader Wilhelm Gustloff in Switzerland, the Börsen Zeitung declared: “International Jewry and foreign Jews living in Germany as well will soon feel the consequences that the Reich will draw from the fact that for the second time in three years ‘a Jew has shot.’” The Angriff asked for “the sharpest measures against Jews.”7 The Swiss press did not lose sight of the parallel with the Gustloff incident, which the Nazis used to condemn all Jews.8
Goebbels noted the dramatic turn in events: “In Kassel and Dessau big demonstrations against the Jews, synagogues set on fire and businesses demolished. In the afternoon the death of the German diplomat vom Rath is reported.”9
Hitler was notified of Rath’s death early that evening while dining at Munich’s town hall chamber. He turned and spoke quietly to Goebbels. Mentioning localized anti-Jewish riots the previous night, the führer stated that the Nazi Party was not to initiate such demonstrations but would not intervene to halt “spontaneous” pogroms. Hitler was overheard to say that “the SA should be allowed to have a fling.” Goebbels then gave a speech calling for revenge with such vehemence that the party and police leaders would discern that they should take an active role.10 Goebbels recorded the events in his diary:
I go to the Party reception in the old Rathaus. Enormous business. I describe the issue to the Führer. He decides: demonstrations should be allowed to continue. The police should withdraw. The Jews should for once get to perceive the popular fury. That is right. I forthwith give the requisite instructions to the police and the Party. Then I briefly speak accordingly to the Party leadership. Blustery applause. Everyone immediately rush to the telephones. Now the people will act.
Some lukewarm men act timidly. But I push repeatedly always higher. We may not leave this cowardly murder unanswered…. The Hitler shock troop [Stoßtrupp Hitler] is likewise unleashed in order to clean up Munich…. A synagogue is hit in Klump. I try to save it from the fire. But that fails.11
Goebbels traveled about Munich, refining his orders and noting the ambivalence of his companion and long-time Nazi politician Adolf Wagner, then Bavarian minister of education and culture: “With Wagner to the district. I issue another precise decree that formulates what may be done and what may not be done. Wagner gets cold feet and trembles for his Jewish businesses. But I am not myself disconcerted. The shock troop meanwhile performs its work. In fact it does great work. I give orders in Berlin to ensure that the synagogue in Fasanenstraße is destroyed.”12
The orders issued by Goebbels were typified by the orders given to chief of staff of the SA North Sea Group (SA-Gruppe Nordsee), Roempagel, by his superior, which were included in a secret SS report prepared the following year. Among the instructions Roempagel received were: “All Jewish stores are to be destroyed immediately by SA men in uniform”; “Jewish synagogues are to be set on fire immediately, Jewish symbols are to be safeguarded”; “the police must not intervene. The Führer wishes that the police does not intervene.” The following instruction would ensure the success of the attacks as well as achieve an ultimate goal: “All Jews are to be disarmed. In the event of resistance they are to be shot immediately.”13
The order from SA commander Böhmcker of the North Sea Group in Hanover included the following statement: “Mayors shall be consulted to determine which businesses, warehouses and traveling salesmen are Jewish. All Jews shall be disarmed immediately. If they offer resistance, shoot them on the spot.”14
After 11:55 p.m. on November 9, Standartenführer (Colonel) Heinrich Müller of the SS sent an urgent teleprinter message from Gestapo Headquarters in Berlin to every state police bureau in the Reich, alerting them that “demonstrations against the Jews, and particularly their synagogues, will take place very shortly.” The Gestapo was not to interfere but was to cooperate with the regular police to prevent looting and other excesses. Some 20,000 to 30,000 Jews, in particular wealthy ones, were to be arrested. Müller concluded: “If, during the actions about to take place, Jews are found in possession of weapons the most severe measures are to be applied. The special task units of the SS as well as the general SS may be employed for all phases of the operation. Suitable measures are to be taken to ensure that the Gestapo remains in control of the actions under all circumstances.”15
As an example of such communiqués, the mayor of Nauen, which is near Berlin, reported that at 6:00 a.m. on November 10, the Gestapo telephoned the following directives:
Secret: in consequence of the assassination in the German Embassy in Paris, actions against Jews are shortly expected to take place throughout Germany. These actions are not to be interfered with. However, looting and theft are not to take place. If Jews are found to be in possession of weapons during these actions, these Jews should be arrested. I request that the chief administrative officers of the States and the majors contact the district committees in order to agree on the implementation of the demonstrations. Only such measures as will not endanger German lives or property are permi
ssible. Arson is not permitted on any account. Jewish businesses and apartments may be destroyed but not looted. The police should be instructed to monitor the implementation of this disorder and to arrest any looters. Jews of foreign nationality should not be affected by the actions. All existing archive material should be confiscated from synagogues and business premises belonging to the Jewish religious community. Male Jews who are of a fairly young age in possession of assets should be arrested. Arrested persons should not be mistreated. The actions are to begin immediately. I expect an immediate report by telephone.16
Baron Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Eberstein, the chief of police and security in Munich, phoned Security Chief Reinhard Heydrich at 11:30 p.m. on November 9. Von Everstein reported that after he accompanied Hitler to his Munich apartment at 10:00, he had gone to a ceremony of SS recruits and there learned that a synagogue and castle had been set on fire and that the firemen were stopped from putting out the flames. Von Everstein sent the SS to put out the fire, restore order, and arrest the arsonists. Then he called Heydrich and asked for instructions.17
Heydrich quickly called Himmler, who first had to talk to Hitler. It was 1:20 a.m. by the time Heydrich replied with official instructions, which combined Müller’s plan and the SA orders. Heydrich instructed that “[o]nly healthy men who were not too old were to be arrested. They were not to be treated roughly but transported to concentration camps as quickly as possible.”18
Goebbels recorded in his diary the evolving pogrom, further clarifying Hitler’s orders and the escalating attacks on Jews:
S.S. Swearing-in at the Feldherrnhalle. About midnight. Very solemn and tremendous. The Führer speaks to the men. It goes to the heart.
I want to return to the hotel, there I see the sky blood-red. The synagogue burns…. We put out [fires] only as is necessary for the surrounding buildings. Otherwise left to burn down…. The shock troops perform terrifying work. From all over the Reich information is now flowing in: 50, then 75 synagogues are burning. The Führer has ordered that 25–30,000 Jews are immediately to be arrested.19
Gun Control in the Third Reich Page 21
