King Harold was now at the summit of his career. He had earlier driven off Tosti’s raids, and outfaced the threat of a Norman invasion across the Channel. Now he had defeated and slain one of the most renowned warriors of the day, in open and decisive battle. We can perhaps see traces of what was originally intended as a celebratory poem dedicated to Harold in the Vita Eadwardi:
And who will write that Humber, vast and swollen
With raging seas, where namesake kings had fought,
Has dyed the ocean waves for miles around
With Viking gore. . . .28
This campaign also demonstrated further the continued effectiveness of the English military system. Thus Earls Edwin and Morcar were able to recruit a force substantial enough to oppose the large Norwegian army in what must have been a period of only a few days from the time that the alien fleet was first sighted. Although this force was defeated and York taken, it may have inflicted sufficient casualties on the Norwegians to delay their plans to move south. Thereafter, King Harold himself recruited a substantial army from places as widely scattered as Essex and Worcestershire, brought it to York in only ten days, and totally defeated the still considerable Norwegian army in a difficult battle. This cannot suggest that the English army of Harold’s reign represented an obsolescent force.29
This achievement was undoubtedly Harold’s greatest, and his crown now must have seemed secure. The battle had not only removed the Norwegian threat and finally disposed of the problem presented by Tosti, but such a thorough victory would cause other challengers to pause for thought. Surely William of Normandy would think twice before making another invasion attempt when he heard the news. Everything seemed set fair for King Harold, but then the north wind, which had blown Harald of Norway to his doom, veered to the south.
ELEVEN
THE LAST CAMPAIGN
Here King Harold was killed.1
While King Harold celebrated his great victory in Yorkshire, and perhaps mourned and buried Tosti, Duke William’s fleet lay trapped at St Valery by the same northerly winds which had brought Harald of Norway to England. William’s position was rapidly becoming untenable as supplies ran short, and he resorted to desperate prayers to stem the contrary winds. Then finally, as if in answer, the wind veered round to the south on 27 September and William seized the opportunity for which he had waited so long. The Norman army embarked in its ships, crossed the Channel overnight and made landfall at Pevensey, on 28 September.2
One of the most dangerous parts of William’s risky enterprise, the Channel crossing and landing in England, had now been completed successfully. His plan had succeeded thus far partly because of the unusually favourable weather conditions this late in the season, but more importantly because of King Harold’s absence in the north. This latter fact meant that William’s landing was unopposed, which would not have been the case before 8 September, when Harold was still maintaining his coast watch. It has been suggested that William knew of the disbandment of Harold’s coastal defence forces and that he chose to set sail at this time in order to exploit this circumstance. However, it is likely that King Harold would have remained in London even after the disbandment of the coastal garrisons, and that he could have moved rapidly against William’s forces before they became established. It was Harold’s absence in the north that enabled William to secure seventeen clear days in which to disembark his army and consolidate his position in England, the distraction of the Norwegian invasion proving the vital factor in his unopposed landing. It has also been suggested that William knew about the Norwegian invasion and arranged his crossing to exploit Harold’s absence. This is very unlikely; William of Poitiers makes it quite clear that the change in wind direction was the crucial factor in William’s actions at this point rather than any knowledge of Harold’s circumstances. In addition, he shows that William only learned of Harald of Norway’s invasion after his own landing in England. There is no reason to doubt William of Poitiers’ account on these points, and it fits with English reports of surprise at the Norwegian invasion.3
Soon after his landing, Duke William began to construct a castle at Pevensey in order to consolidate his foothold. However, the unsuitability of his landing place as a base of operations quickly persuaded him to move along the coast to the nearby port of Hastings. The security afforded by Harold’s absence in the north, and his knowledge of it, allowed him to carry out this move successfully on 29 September. There, based on the narrow peninsula on which the town of Hastings stood, William was in a position to protect the escape route to his ships anchored in the harbour. If the need arose, he could defend the base of the peninsula with a rearguard while the bulk of his army re-embarked safely. Here William ordered another castle to be built, while his forces combined scouting with raiding the surrounding countryside. This raiding was necessary because the Norman army was now short of supplies, but it may also have been intended to provoke an English response.4
The measures William took in the first few days after his landing were sensible precautions to adopt in a strange land when he was still unsure of the situation. However, he remained in this same position at Hastings for a total of seventeen days, which seems rather a long time. This has been seen as a prudent policy of remaining near to the coast and his line of retreat. Although a certain amount of caution had undoubtedly been an important element of William’s previous campaigns, his present invasion of England had, so far, been anything but prudent. He may simply have returned to his more familiar policy of wariness, but if so it seems an odd time to have done so. William was in a restricted position at Hastings, where he would have found availability of supplies gradually reduced as his troops denuded the surrounding area. It is difficult to see how he hoped to win the kingdom by remaining near his line of retreat until he ran out of supplies. It would surely have been preferable for his cavalry to move out into more open country, where he could make full use of the advantage conferred by their mobility both to secure provisions and to conquer the kingdom. Indeed, he could probably have taken advantage of Harold’s absence in the north to advance on Dover, Canterbury or Winchester. So why did William fail to adopt a more active course of action? The answer probably lies in the news he received soon after his landing.5
The news that Duke William received, probably on the day after his landing, was that King Harold had secured a crushing victory at Stamford Bridge. The news was provided by Robert, son of Guimara, who was most likely a local man known as Robert of Hastings, recorded in Domesday Book as holding land in Sussex from the Abbey of Fecamp. It must have given William considerable food for thought, and indeed he did not follow the bold words attributed to him by William of Poitiers: ‘I will not hide behind ditches or palisades . . . but will engage Harold’s army as soon as possible’. In fact, William did not seek to engage Harold at all, but on the contrary remained in his defensive position. He clearly realized that if the Normans advanced inland then they might well be caught by King Harold’s victorious forces returning from the north. At this point, William may even have momentarily considered abandoning the invasion, and some of his followers probably did so. Although there exists no direct evidence for this, the tone of William of Poitiers’ account makes clear the significance of Harold’s victory. This news and the previous reluctance of the Norman nobles to invade in the first place, make second thoughts about the feasibility of the invasion a distinct possibility. However, this would involve William abandoning the dream for which he had now risked everything. He could only continue, but probably decided to adopt his static defensive posture in response to the new situation. As a result, the Norman army remained close to its ships and escape routes, and made no effort to advance inland and use its mobility, which were the usual tactics. This would certainly explain William’s relative inactivity during the period leading up to the battle of Hastings.6
News of the Norman landing probably reached King Harold while he was still in York, perhaps two or three days later on 29 or 30 September. Acco
rding to John of Worcester, he was in the midst of restoring the strength of his tired and depleted forces and tending to the wounded. Once again, King Harold received an extremely unpleasant surprise, and once again he set about dealing with it in the same purposeful manner. He is said to have assembled a large army, in effect the fourth to be summoned during this astonishing year – the first two summoned for two months each to garrison the coast, and the third to deal with Harald of Norway. This was a remarkable feat for a supposedly moribund military system. It seems likely that this new army was once again formed around the surviving core of the force of huscarls which had just destroyed the Norwegians. In order to restore its losses, additional troops were drawn from a wide area of the country, stretching from East Anglia to Hampshire. Some of these reinforcements may have joined Harold’s army as it journeyed south, but the bulk of them probably gathered in London to await his arrival. They may have been collected under the auspices of one of his brothers. A late source speaks of Earl Gyrth accompanying the king to Stamford Bridge, so perhaps Earl Leofwine had been left in charge in the south.7
Unfortunately, as in the case of the earlier campaign against the Norwegians, we have only fragments of information on the men who answered Harold’s summons. Again, the men of the English abbeys appear to have been well represented, although this seeming preponderance may simply be a result of the greater survival rate of monastic sources. Two abbots are known to have died during the Hastings campaign, presumably while accompanying their men: Abbot Aelfwig of the New Minster at Winchester, who fell apparently in the battle itself, and Abbot Leofric of Peterborough, who died of an illness contracted during the campaign. In addition, men holding land of the abbeys of Abingdon, St Benet of Holme, Bury St Edmunds, and St Augustine’s, Canterbury, appear to have fought in this campaign. A number of other men came to serve their king, including Godric, Sheriff of Berkshire, Eadric the Deacon, an unnamed freeman of Harold from Cavendish in Suffolk, Breme from Suffolk, a freeman of King Edward and, presumably therefore, of his successor Harold, and two unnamed freemen from Tytherley in Hampshire. It may simply be a coincidence but it is nevertheless interesting that those abbeys and counties noted as sending forces to join Harold at Hastings are different from those who had sent forces to join him at York. This may possibly reflect a sophisticated form of selective summons, whereby different abbeys and counties provided troops on different occasions. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to prove this.8
The absence of the northern earls from King Harold’s army at Hastings has been seen as evidence of dissension between Harold and his ‘rivals’. In fact, Orderic Vitalis describes the earls as Harold’s ‘close friends and adherents’ and we must remember that the earls’ sister, Alditha, was Harold’s queen, and therefore they had a stake in his success. A late source claims that Harold replaced Earl Morcar with Marleswein, Sheriff of Lincolnshire, and possibly a newly appointed staller. This seems unlikely as Morcar is still named earl, later in the year, and was probably taken hostage to Normandy early in 1067 as Earl of Northumbria. It is more probable that the crushing defeat at Fulford had resulted in such disastrous losses among the forces of Edwin and Morcar, and particularly among their huscarls, that they required time to rebuild them. The reference to Marleswein’s activities in the north might then be part of his function as a royal staller to assist them in this process. This delay meant that the earls were unable to march south with King Harold but followed him when they were ready, arriving in London not long after the battle of Hastings.9
Meantime, King Harold moved rapidly southwards with the core of his northern army, the remnants of his own and perhaps Earl Gyrth’s huscarls. This was the second great journey of this year, and brought Harold to London possibly around 8–9 October. This assumes a roughly comparable speed for this southward journey, based on the same rates of progress for mounted troops, as for the recent journey to Stamford Bridge. It is probable that Harold again made use of mounted royal messengers to carry his latest summons to the shires. In this way, he could have ensured that another substantial army was already collected in London on his return. The period of time involved would easily allow for such a possibility, and this would mean the bulk of Harold’s forces would be reasonably rested and ready for him to collect on his way south. He halted briefly in London, perhaps for a day or two, to rest those troops he had brought back from the north and to allow reinforcements to join him. Chronicle D speaks of another large army being raised, and the probable size of the English force at Hastings also indicates that Harold received substantial reinforcements. It was only when suitably reinforced that Harold then marched his army the 60 miles or so southwards into Sussex. This final march perhaps took some three days, allowing for slower progress of 20 miles a day through the more difficult country of the Sussex Weald to where the Norman army remained at Hastings.10
The rapidity of King Harold’s reaction to William’s landing is undoubtedly impressive, but some have seen weakness in the haste attending his journey to Sussex. It is important here to distinguish between Harold’s rapid journey south to London and his subsequent advance into Sussex. The former served to bring him swiftly to the scene of action in southern England, but should not be given undue weight in consideration of the subsequent battle. As discussed above, it is probable that Harold spent one or two days in London collecting reinforcements, resting those troops brought back from York and considering what course of action to adopt. According to the recorded dates, he was then left with three days for the onward movement to Hastings, and it is this short period, the time that Harold spent in London and his subsequent march to Hastings, that should be examined when considering the claim that he acted rashly. It has been suggested, on the basis of the Chronicle texts, that Harold went into battle with less than his full forces, even though time had been on his side, and that he should have waited for his full strength before engaging the Normans. In this context, Chronicle E is rather ambiguous, stating only that Harold ‘fought with him [William] before all the army had come’, which could mean that the battle began before all Harold’s army had arrived on the field, but that reinforcements joined him as the day progressed. This suggestion may receive support from Chronicle D, which states that the battle was joined ‘before his [Harold’s] army was drawn up in battle array’. John of Worcester, writing later, elaborates on these statements but whether on the basis of additional knowledge or in an attempt to clarify the earlier texts is unknown. He states that ‘although he [Harold] knew that all the more powerful men from the whole of England had already fallen in two battles, and that half of his army had not yet assembled, yet he did not fear go to meet his enemies in Sussex, with all possible speed’. John’s account clearly intends to imply that Harold left London without all the troops he had summoned, but its author goes on to complain that the narrowness of Harold’s position at Hastings prevented a full deployment of his army, rather than there being a depleted number of men in the first place. This is confusing and contradictory. The sources are not entirely conclusive and either interpretation is possible; the balance of the contemporary accounts perhaps favours Harold having sufficient forces available, but that not all were deployed at the start of the battle. The length and intensity of the battle itself seems to confirm that there was no lack of English troops.11
If Harold did in fact arrive in Sussex before the full force he had gathered could be deployed, what was the reason for this? The contemporary Chronicles provide no explanations for Harold’s motives. John of Worcester is not specific, but perhaps suggests an element of recklessness in his account of Harold’s great haste and insufficient forces. However, recklessness does not appear to have been one of Harold’s normal character traits. He had previously showed considerable caution in his dealings with Gruffydd of Wales, and only mounted his surprise attack on Rhuddlan after careful calculations as to the chances of success. Similarly, he had only attacked the Norwegian army at Stamford Bridge after first collecting intelligenc
e at Tadcaster, and therefore being confident of success. William of Poitiers suggests the reason as a desire to curb, as soon as possible, the Norman devastation of his family lands in Sussex. This almost certainly played a part in King Harold’s reasoning, but it is unlikely to have been more than an incidental factor. A man who had previously sacrificed his brother, when the larger interest required, was unlikely to be distracted from his purpose by the ravaging of his lands. Also, as king, Harold held vast lands all over England and the temporary wasting of a small portion is unlikely to have affected him very deeply.12
The Norman accounts suggest Harold intended to repeat the tactics used to such effect against Harald of Norway and to catch William by surprise at Hastings. Initially, this seems a more plausible reason for Harold’s actions, but it must be considered that now the circumstances were very different. In September the Norwegians had just won a major victory against local forces and had taken York with ease. They were off guard and not expecting the swift arrival of a southern army when Harold attacked. Even then, Harold had first confirmed that the Norwegians were unprepared and isolated from their fleet before launching his attack. In contrast, the Normans were still anxiously awaiting an English response to their landing, in what must have seemed a rather exposed position, and were fully prepared for flight. Therefore, they would be alert and prepared to respond to any attack. Any supposed plan for a surprise attack is further called into doubt by William of Poitiers’ account of Harold’s messenger and his talks with Duke William. Of course, this may be merely a conventional elaboration added to his story to enable him to set out Duke William’s case, but equally it may be true and if so, effectively removes surprise as a possible reason for Harold’s haste.13
Harold Page 24
