As noted above, the ‘Roman leaders’, presumably Valens, Richomeres, Sebastianus, Victor and Trajanus, gave orders for the army to deploy in the typical Roman battle formation once the wagons had been sighted (see Chapter Fifteen). This deployment appears to have been completed long before the arrival of the Gothic cavalry. The clue to this is the next part of the text of Ammianus where he tells us ‘And while that same wing was being extended, still without interruption, the barbarians were terrified by the awful din, the hiss of whirring arrows and the menacing clash of shields’. The Goths would have been alerted to the presence of the Roman army long before they saw any actual troops. This would have been due to the clouds of dust rising above the Roman column; this dust cloud would have been seen for miles on that clear summer’s day. One can only imagine the scene within the Gothic encampment at that point. The Gothic warriors would have been filled with a mixture of both dread and grim determination, demanding Fritigern and the other chieftain to tell them what to do. Their families would no doubt have been filled with a mixture of panic and fear at the approach of the Romans. Once the Roman army was actually seen to be approaching along the road, and then observed to be deploying before the wagons, it’s no wonder the Goths started raising their war cries and appealing to their God and ancestors for protection from what they no doubt believed was the battle to come. The Goths do not appear to have made any effort at this point to interrupt the Roman army from deploying in battle formation. In fact the Romans appear to have been able to form their left wing under the protection of bow fire, probably from both bow-armed cavalry attached to the cavalry forming the left wing as well as bow-armed infantry skirmishers. Whilst the left wing was deploying, the Roman infantry began making a lot of noise by clashing their weapons against their shields. This was no doubt to deter the Goths from leaving the wagons.7 Once the army had fully deployed the formation at this point may well have resembled a semi-circle, mirroring the section of the Gothic wagon laager the army was facing. This would have led to the Roman army curving around the wagons with both cavalry wings forming the extremities of this semicircular formation with the infantry in the centre of the formation (see diagram 5). This formation would have exposed the flanks and rear of the Roman cavalry to any Goths not directly approaching from the wagons and may explain the actions of the Roman cavalry once battle was joined. The deployment was in all probability completed between 1.00 pm and 3.00 pm at the latest, depending on whether Valens took the direct route or the longer one following the Tonzos River.
It is useful at this point to try and speculate as to the general direction the Roman army was facing when it was deployed, because it may indicate the direction where the Gothic cavalry came from. If the army was marching in a north-easterly direction when the Gothic wagons were sighted then it is not too presumptuous to assume that the army deployed with the centre of the army facing north or north-east. This would have meant that the sun would have either have been behind or to the right side of where the army was facing the wagons. This was a tactically sound deployment advocated in a number of Roman military manuals: having the sun behind you, and the enemy facing into the sun, places the enemy at a distinct disadvantage, especially when it comes to employing missile fire as the sun would have dazzled those looking in its direction.
At this point in the text of Ammianus he lays the ground for the suspicion that the Goths are up to no good, that they are stalling for time and that what was to happen was all part of some nefarious Gothic plan. He wrote:
… and since a part of their forces under Alatheus and Saphrax was far away and, though sent for, had not yet returned, they sent envoys to beg for peace. The emperor scorned these because of their low origin, demanding for the execution of a lasting treaty that suitable chieftains be sent; meanwhile the enemy purposely delayed, in order that during the pretended truce their cavalry might return, who, they hoped, would soon make their appearance; also that our soldiers might be exposed to the fiery summer heat and exhausted by their dry throats, whilst the broad plains gleamed with fires, which the enemy were feeding with wood and dry fuel, for this same purpose. To that evil was added another deadly one, namely, that men and beasts were tormented by severe hunger.
Some points need examining in this statement. Firstly, Ammianus stated that the Gothic cavalry were ‘far away’ without stating where they were. It’s likely that the Gothic cavalry were out foraging for supplies. They must have been a fair distance away because they did not arrive until a few hours after the Roman army’s deployment. The envoys sent by Fritigern sound similar to the ones sent the previous evening, although why Fritigern had sent envoys whose lowly stature would not have been accepted is a mystery. Unless of course Fritigern was once again sending his Christian envoy, with the attendant ‘humble folk’ as further example that as a fellow Christian his intentions were honourable? There is an interesting thought here: were the Goths also hoping that Valens had the same physical disposition and temper of his brother Valentinian, would Valens fly into a fit of rage and thus trigger a stroke with fatal consequences?
As I noted above, it does not take much imagination to visualize the scene behind the Gothic wagons. The Gothic warriors and their families, seeing the Roman army deploying before their encampment, were no doubt beseeching Fritigern and the other Gothic nobles to enter into negotiations to prevent an assault and the ensuing slaughter. Up to this point Valens at least was following the plan as suggested by Fritigern, namely to show the rest of the Goths his army in full battle array and ready to fight.
The suspicion that the Goths were delaying things for as long as possible to allow the return of their cavalry is raised when Ammianus describes how the Roman troops were beginning to suffer the effects of not only the fierce heat of the summer sun, but they were also suffering from smoke inhalation from the grass fires set by the Goths and also from lack of food and water. I believe that the fires were set initially as a way of alerting the Gothic cavalry to the presence of the Roman army, or they may have lit as a pre-planned signal for the cavalry to return. The fires would have sent up plumes of smoke that would have alerted the foraging Gothic cavalry that they needed to return. The smoke plumes would also have helped mask the dust cloud raised by the Gothic cavalry as they headed towards the wagons. As stated above, the Goths behind the wagons would have seen the cloud of dust raised by the Romans on their march towards the Gothic encampment long before the Romans actually came into sight. They must have been aware that the Romans would in turn see the dust cloud raised by their returning cavalry. A smoke screen would do the job nicely of concealing the approach of their cavalry; and that is why the Romans were caught totally unaware of their arrival. It was an unintended, but useful side effect to have that smoke then blow into the faces of the Romans facing the wagons! At this stage it also appears Fritigern was sticking to his part of the deal according to Ammianus:
Meanwhile, Fritigern, shrewd to foresee the future and fearing the uncertainty of war, on his own initiative sent one of his common soldiers as a herald, requesting picked men of noble rank be sent to him at once as hostages and saying that he himself would fearlessly meet the threats of his soldiers and do what was necessary.
Fritigern was in an awkward position, his troops were no doubt demanding action and without his cavalry to hand, any hostile action against the Romans was potentially disastrous, so he was forced to do ‘what was necessary’ and commence negotiations. This could well be an allusion to the contents of the letter received by Valens from Fritigern the day before at Adrianople where Fritigern had suggested Valens ‘show them (the Goths) near at hand his army ready for battle, and through the fear aroused by the imperial name check their destructive eagerness for war’. There is no reason to suspect any treachery at this point on Fritigern’s behalf. Valens may have believed his army outnumbered the Goths behind the wagons by a factor of at least two to one, and he could have ordered an attack at any moment, with a very real chance of inflicting a crushing d
efeat upon the Goths. It is at this point that in all probability the disaster of the Battle of Adrianople actually took place. Valens had a golden opportunity to attack the Goths whilst they were at a severe disadvantage. The Goths were penned up behind their wagons and they still did not have any cavalry to provide them with additional support. I doubt very much that had the Roman army attacked the Goths at this stage then the Gothic cavalry arriving several hours later would have saved the day. More likely the returning Gothic cavalry would have arrived just in time to see a mass slaughter of their kinsmen within the Gothic encampment. That is if in fact they would have returned at all, because any deserters or survivors from the Gothic encampment would have naturally have fled toward the direction they knew their cavalry was coming from, and once informed of the disaster at the wagons those cavalry would have naturally sought safety in flight themselves.
Was Fritigern actually making good on his word and actually wanting to enter into treaty arrangements? Fritigern probably had no idea of how long it would take for the Gothic cavalry to return and he was no doubt acutely aware that should Valens order an immediate attack he and the rest of the Goths behind the wagons faced almost certain defeat and destruction. If Valens was prepared to meet most of Fritigern’s demands then a treaty could have been hammered out that would have been advantageous for both sides. The Goths would have a new homeland whilst Valens would have a new source of recruits for his delayed invasion of Sassanid Persia. There is absolutely nothing to indicate Fritigern was deliberately delaying to allow the return of the Gothic cavalry. In fact it’s likely Fritigern had no idea that the cavalry would arrive at all. No, it’s more the case that it was better for Ammianus and others to claim it was Gothic duplicity that led to the Roman defeat rather than admitting that it was a case of extremely bad timing on the Gothic cavalry’s behalf, coupled with Valens not ordering an immediate attack that led to the Roman defeat at Adrianople.
It is entirely possible that at this point of the engagement Valens had sent messengers to the camp outside of Adrianople for the troops stationed there to come to the army’s aid. He could even have attempted to summon them beforehand if we accept that Valens was himself being duplicitous, using the negotiations as a way of giving time for the potential reinforcements to arrive. Whatever the case was, negotiations were eagerly entered into by both sides.
The proposal of the dreaded leader was welcome and approved, and the tribune Aequitius, then marshal of the court, and a relative of Valens, with the general consent was chosen to go speedily as a surety. When he objected, on the ground that he had once been captured by the enemy but had escaped from Dibaltum, and therefore feared their unreasonable anger, Richomeres voluntarily offered his own services and gladly promised to go, thinking this also to be a fine act and worthy of a brave man. And soon he was on his way (bringing) proofs of his rank and birth.
Valens and his council were no doubt eager to enter into negotiations at this point as reports must have reached him that his men were suffering from the effects of both lack of food, water, and from the extreme heat of the day. Valens needed to get the treaty signed and take the army back to Adrianople before nightfall. If the army had deployed by between 1.00 pm and 2.00 pm then the negotiations between Valens and Fritigern probably commenced after the army deployed. The negotiations would have taken at least an hour, probably two, so if Valens did indeed return to Adrianople he would have had to leave the Gothic encampment by 5.00 pm at the very latest to prevent the entire column having to march in the darkness.
It was probably of great relief to have Fritigern asking for hostages to be exchanged as that indicated a serious gesture on his behalf, and there would be no recourse to fighting a battle after all. Again, Valens had no reason to doubt Fritigern, up to this point both of them appear to still be sticking to the plan outlined in the secret letter sent the previous day. We do not know how long the debate between Valens and his inner council took, not too long one would have thought and it must have been a shock to Valens when Aequitius declined the ‘honour’ of being a hostage, citing he had recently been a captive of the Goths but managed to escape and feared Gothic retribution.8 It must have astonished all those present at the debate when at this point Richomeres volunteered to go in Aequitius’ place. Richomeres was one of the most reputable and ablest commanders in Valens’ army, one whose generalship would surely have been better employed outside of the Gothic camp rather than in it! This was a massive blunder on Valens’ behalf and perhaps tells us something about Valens’ state of mind at that point. Valens surely could not have been expecting a Gothic attack or he would have never allowed Richomeres to offer his services as a hostage. Whatever the case was, Richomeres set off towards the Gothic wagons with ‘proofs of his rank and birth’. He never arrived. At this very moment Bellona sounded her mournful horn and the Battle of Adrianople began.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the battle itself, it is at this point that the positions on the battlefield of Valens and his commanders become important. Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, better known as Vegetius, wrote a work, Epitoma Rei Militaris, better known as the Epitome of Military Science, sometime between AD 385 and AD 450. It was not an entirely original work; Vegetius used surviving military manuals and treatises by Celcus, Cato, Frontinus and Paternus amongst others to put together his Epitome, using what he believed to be the best bits from them all. It is clear from the text of the Epitome that it is a mixture of both ancient and contemporary practice, using as he does descriptions of current military arms, i.e. the term Spiculum for the standard Roman spear being just one example. Book III: Field Strategy and Tactics, Chapter 18 details, ‘In what position the commander-in-chief, the second- and third-in-command should stand.’ This chapter indicated that if Valens was commanding the army he should have been located on the right hand side of the main infantry force between the juncture of the infantry and the right flank cavalry. Richomeres, as the second-in-command should have been with the infantry in the centre facing the wagon laager, or if he was actually taking command of the army, then he would have been positioned between the infantry and cavalry on the right. Sebastianus, as third-in-command, would have been positioned on the left flank, between the infantry and the left flank cavalry. When Richomeres elected to go to the Gothic camp then Sebastianus would have taken his position in the centre with the infantry. It was highly unlikely Richomeres would have allowed the infantry lines to be broken up in order to allow him and his escorting cavalry through. Richomeres would have had to have taken a route towards the Gothic encampment going around the back of the infantry towards either the left or right hand side of either flanks’ cavalry then gone around those flanking cavalry to then head towards the wagons. I believe Richomeres headed towards the right side of the flanking Roman cavalry for reasons I will give below.
As Richomeres was heading towards the Gothic wagons disaster stuck.
Eagles in the Dust Page 11
