Eagles in the Dust

by Adrian Coombs-Hoar

  Whilst all this was happening, where was Valens? As stated earlier Valens, as commander-in-chief, should have been ‘…between the infantry and cavalry on the right flank. This is the position from which the whole line is commanded, and from which there is direct and unobstructed forward movement. He stands between the two arms so as to direct with his advice and exhort by his authority both cavalry and infantry to battle. It is his task to use his cavalry reserves with light infantry mixed in with them to surround the enemy’s left wing, which stands opposite himself and press it constantly from the rear.’12 It is patently obvious that if Valens were in this position then he would have been very exposed to attack once the Gothic cavalry swept away his right wing cavalry. This explained why Ammianus stated that:

  While all scattered in flight over unknown paths, the emperor, hedged about by dire terrors, and slowly treading over heaps of corpses, took refuge with the Lancers (‘lancearios’, the ‘Lanciarii’) and the Mattiarii, who, so long as the vast numbers of the enemy could be sustained, had stood unshaken with bodies firmly planted. On seeing him Trajanus cried that all hope was gone, unless the emperor, abandoned by his body-guard, should at least be protected by his foreign auxiliaries. On hearing this the general called Victor hastened to bring quickly to the emperor’s aid the Batavi, who had been posted not far off as a reserve force; but when he could find none of them, he retired and went away. And in the same way Richomeres and Saturninus made their escape from danger.

  The two units Valens sought refuge with are likely to have been the Lanciarii Seniores and the Mattiarii Iuniores; two crack Palatine Legions who had served with distinction during Julian’s Sassanid campaign. The Notitia notes that they were part of the eastern army which Valens would have commanded. Valens, who may or may not have remained on his horse at this point, made his way towards his left where the two crack legions were still maintaining the line. They were not held in reserve, as the Primani Legion had been at Argentoratum as evidenced by the fact that Trajanus, observing that Valens had fled to the safety of those two legions without the protection of his bodyguard, who appeared to have deserted him, called out for assistance from the auxiliaries posted as a reserve. Victor heard Trajanus’ plea and ‘hastened to bring quickly to the emperor’s aid the Batavi’. The Batavi are mentioned a number of times within Ammianus’ history and appear to have served with distinction at a number of battles although they are recorded as performing so badly at one battle that they had to plead not to be disbanded.13 They may well be the Auxilia Palatina unit mentioned in the Notitia and who were normally brigaded with either the Heruli or Regii Auxilia Palatina units (see Chapter Fifteen). However, the Batavi could not be found, they had fled the battlefield apparently along with the fleeing cavalry and the rest of the infantry reserves. Victor, taking stock of the perilous situation of the army, and there being no longer reserves to assist Valens or the rest of the infantry for that matter, also left the battlefield. At some point in the battle both Richomeres and another senior officer, Saturninus, also ‘made their escape from danger’ and left Valens to his fate. Richomeres probably got swept along by the flight of the right wing cavalry and elected to make his escape to safety rather than return to the battlefield.

  Ammianus gives a chilling, graphic account of what happened next.

  And so the barbarians, their eyes blazing with frenzy, were pursuing our men, in whose veins the blood was chilled with numb horror; some fell without knowing who struck them down, others were buried beneath the mere weight of their assailants: some were slain by the sword of a comrade; for though they often rallied, there was no ground given, nor did anyone spare those who retreated. Besides all this, the roads were blocked by many who lay mortally wounded, lamenting the torment of their wounds; and with them also mounds of fallen horses filled the plains with corpses. To these ever irreparable losses, so costly to the Roman state, a night without the bright light of the moon put an end.

  So, the Roman army finally broke and attempted to make their way to safety. It appears that some made an orderly retreat, standing their ground when hard pressed, but they just could not stem the tide of Gothic warriors. And here in the text there is yet another mention of the roads near to the battlefield, although they were hardly of any use containing as they did a tangled mass of the dead or dying. The cause of the Romans finally giving up and fleeing was the onset of the night as the darkness would have presented the only means of escape, and one cannot blame or fault the overwhelmed Roman troops for attempting to escape when the opportunity presented itself.

  What happened to Valens when his was army routed? This perhaps will never be known for no one appears to have seen what happened to him. Ammianus tells it thus:

  At the first coming of darkness the emperor, amid the common soldiers as was supposed (for no one asserted that he had seen him or been with him), fell mortally wounded by an arrow, and presently breathed his last breath; and he was never afterwards found anywhere. For since a few of the foe were active for long in the neighbourhood for the purpose of robbing the dead, no one of the fugitives or of the natives ventured to approach the spot. The Caesar Decius, we are told, met a similar fate; for when he was fiercely fighting with the barbarians and his horse, whose excitement he could not restrain, stumbled and threw him, he fell into a marsh, from which he could not get out, nor could his body be found. Others say that Valens did not give up the ghost at once, but with his bodyguard (candidatis) and a few eunuchs was taken to a peasant’s cottage near by, well fortified in its second storey; and while he was being treated by unskilful hands, he was surrounded by the enemy, who did not know who he was, but was saved from the shame of captivity. For while the pursuers were trying to break open the bolted doors, they were assailed with arrows from a balcony of the house; and fearing through the inevitable delay to lose the opportunity for pillage, they piled bundles of straw and firewood about the house, set fire to them, and burned it men and all. From it one of the bodyguards leaped through a window, but was taken by the enemy; when he told them what had happened, he filled them with sorrow at being cheated of great glory, in not having taken the ruler of the Roman Empire alive. This same young man, having later escaped and returned secretly to our army, gave this account of what had occurred. When Spain had been recovered, with a similar disaster the second of the Scipios, we are told, was burned with a tower in which he had taken refuge and which the enemy had set on fire. This much, at any rate, is certain, that neither Scipio nor Valens had the fortune of burial which is death’s final honour.

  It is interesting that this implies that Valens’ clothing and armour did not single him out as being the Emperor, and that his appearance was the same as the rest of his troops. It was widely rumoured that he had not perished on the battlefield but had been escorted by his bodyguard, and some eunuchs, to a fortified farm building where they attempted to treat his wound. Not only Ammianus, but Jordanes, Socrates, Sozomen and Zosimus all tell versions of this tale.14 The Goths discovered that there were Roman troops in the building but were unaware of the presence of Valens; when they could not persuade the Romans to leave, instead being greeted by a hail of arrows by the defenders, the Goths set light to the building, killing Valens in the process. Whilst Ammianus lamented the fact that Valens had perished in the flames and had not had the ‘fortune of burial’, most of the other accounts felt that it was a case of ‘divine wrath’ that he perished by fire!

  And so perished Valens, along with Trajanus and Sebastianus, Aequitius and Valerianus; thirty-five Tribunes also fell including Potentius the son of Ursicinus, one of Constantius II’s most illustrious commander-in-chiefs. What was worse was that ‘barely a third part’ of the Roman army managed to escape and this would have a profound impact in the decades to come. As Ammianus so tragically put it, ‘The annals record no such massacre of a battle except the one at Cannae.’

  The infantry who broke scattered ‘some to the right, others to the left, or wherever their fear took them’. A
large proportion headed back to Adrianople where the Roman camp and the city walls would offer them protection.

  In concluding this chapter I believe I can now draw up a timetable of events of the Battle of Adrianople as shown below:

  1. The Roman army left Adrianople at approximately 6.00 am. The baggage train was left behind in the camp, indicating that Valens did not expect to fight a battle that day.

  2. The army marched initially over rough terrain or by winding paths but at some stage they approached the Gothic wagon laager by a road or roads. It was travelling in a column at least eight miles long.

  3. The Roman army was marching with part of the cavalry on its right flank whilst the rest of the cavalry were marching with the infantry, indicating that something to their left was protecting that flank, probably the Tonzos River.

  4. The Roman scouts sighted the Gothic encampment at a distance of eight miles into the march. The column was travelling at a speed of 3 miles an hour and arrived at approximately 10.00 am and was fully deployed around the Gothic camp by approximately 1.00 pm. Alternatively, the column was taking a longer route or travelling at a rate of only 1.5/2 miles an hour on average, instead of the more usual 4 miles an hour. If this was the case then this indicated that the route the army took was either very rough, delaying their rate of travel, or they took a route that was much longer than the quickest route to the Gothic encampment.

  5. The Goths had formed up their wagons in a circle, not as a series of barricades or a semi-circle, such as others have claimed.

  6. The Roman army deployed with the sun behind them, indicating they were facing north/north-east.

  7. The Roman army was fully deployed and ready for battle by the time Valens and Fritigern entered into negotiations.

  8. Richomeres set off behind the Roman right flank with the Scutarii and Sagittarii cavalry guard units as an escort. It was these units that initially engaged the Goths before then fleeing the battlefield, taking the rest of the Roman right wing cavalry with them.

  9. The main Gothic attack, initiated by the flight of the two guard cavalry units, began on the Roman right wing, probably around 4.00 pm.

  10. The Roman left wing infantry managed to reach the wagons and were engaging the Goths. The infantry were forced to retreat and move to their right when the Roman cavalry to their left fled the battlefield. This indicates that part of the Gothic cavalry force had made its way around the back of the wagons to attack the Roman left wing, or another group of Gothic cavalry coming from the north-west attacked that wing by surprise.

  11. Valens was stationed on the Roman right wing, or between the infantry and the cavalry to their right. Valens then headed towards his left for the perceived safety of the legions that were stationed in the centre of the Roman army when the Gothic cavalry routed the Roman cavalry on the right wing.

  12. The Roman infantry on the left were forced right towards the Roman centre by the combined Gothic cavalry and infantry assault.

  13. The Roman infantry held in reserve fled the battlefield, probably as a result of seeing the Roman cavalry on both wings leaving the battlefield.

  14. The Roman army continued fighting until nightfall, approximately 8.00 pm, when the remaining Roman infantry finally routed and fled for safety under the cover of darkness. Some of them reached Adrianople where the residents initially refused them entry.

  15. Valens was caught up in the rout and either perished with those who were cut down by the pursuing Goths, or was wounded and taken to a fortified farmhouse where he was burnt to death.

  16. Whilst some notable officers were able to make their escape, including Victor and Richomeres, the loss of experienced generals such as Sebastianus and Trajanus, along with a large number of Tribunes and other officers, plus the loss of two thirds of the army was to have a major impact on future campaigns.

  Chapter Twelve

  Aftermath

  Night brought an end to the slaughter of the Roman army. Valens either lay dead on the battlefield or was being besieged in a local farmhouse before meeting a grisly end. The remnants of his army were scattered, some hid in the hills and woods nearby, and most were fleeing down the roads and byways towards Adrianople. It’s not hard to imagine how the victorious Goths spent the night. They would have plundered the fallen Romans of their weapons and armour, and then celebrated in their tribe’s fashion, praising the martial prowess of Fritigern and offering thanks to their ancestors and to God. However, by daybreak they were on the move, determined to reach Adrianople and take it by storm. Deserters and captured prisoners had informed the Goths that the Court officials, Valens’ imperial insignia, and the imperial treasury were all located at Adrianople. According to Ammianus the Goths had encircled Adrianople ‘at the fourth hour of the day’.1 This would have been approximately 9.00 am. This would have meant that if the Goths had indeed left at daybreak, approximately 6.00 am, they would have covered the distance from their encampment in just three hours, whereas the previous day the Romans may have taken at least seven hours to reach the Gothic encampment, a fact that has not been commented on before and raises many questions, not least why didn’t the Romans the previous day take the same route to the Gothic encampment which would have taken probably only half the time to get there? As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Romans took the shortest route to the Gothic encampment and were fully deployed by 1.00 pm. Or they took a route where they hoped to approach from a direction the Goths were not expecting them to approach from, but was a much longer one. Or the Roman army took a route which afforded the army some protection, i.e. by initially following the Tonzos River north before the army turned north-east towards the Goth encampment, which also was a longer route than they could have taken.

  If the Goths had thought that the defeat of the Romans the previous day would lead to a similar victory at the city itself they were in for a very rude awakening. Many of the survivors from the battle had not been allowed entry inside the city and were taking shelter in buildings close by to the walls. The citizens of Adrianople were no doubt suspicious of those outside the walls, and of course they were deserters from the battle and did not deserve the protection of the city walls. These survivors, aided by missile fire from the walls, put up a stout resistance which lasted ‘until the ninth hour of the day’ (approximately 2.00 pm). Without warning 300 of the Roman defenders down by the walls broke ranks and went over to the Goths. They no doubt believed the Goths were going to welcome them with open arms but to their surprise the deserters were instead seized by the Goths and butchered to a man. The Romans watching from above and below the walls took note and there were no further desertions! A sudden thunderstorm then sprang up and put paid to the conflict, the Goths streamed back to their encampment in the pouring rain without having achieved their aim.2

  An envoy was sent by Fritigern the next day to the city, probably including the same Christian who had carried the letters from Fritigern to Valens. He was not allowed entry into city and he was forced to read the contents of Fritigern’s letter from outside the walls. The letter ordered the defenders to hand over the city and upon doing so their lives would be spared. The defenders refused Fritigern’s demands and made preparations to defend the city from further attacks.3 Fritigern then turned to subterfuge to gain access to the city. He ordered some Romans, who had deserted to the side of the Goths after the battle of Adrianople, to make their way to the city as if they had escaped and were fleeing from the Goths. Once inside the city they were to set light to part of it and whilst the defenders were engaged in putting out the fire the Goths, on seeing the smoke and flames, would then be alerted that this ruse had worked and they would then be able to storm the undefended section of the walls and thus take the city. The plan was foiled because although the deserters were admitted back into the city, the defenders became suspicious of the conflicting tales they gave and under torture the deserters confessed as to their true purpose and were executed (Amm, 15, 7–9). The Goths, unaware of this, carried ou
t their preparations for attacking the city and ‘before the beginning of the third watch’ (approximately 2.00 am) they attempted to storm the city’s gates. They were met not with an undefended city but by a storm of missile fire by the alert and waiting defenders. The Goths were further taken aback during the battle when the Romans began to rain down stones from the artillery pieces on the walls and they had to be rallied by their chieftains who attempted to inspire their fellow tribesmen by fighting in the front ranks.4 The Goths made a concerted effort to scale the walls with specially prepared ladders but these attempts were thwarted when the inhabitants of the city began breaking up columns in the city and throwing down the drums they were made up from on to the Goths below the walls. The battle went on throughout the entire day and when night fell the Goths retired to their temporary camp not far away, having again not achieved their aim of taking the city.5 The Goths spent the night taking stock of the situation and realizing that they were not going to be able to take Adrianople as they had planned, they decided instead to move to other less well defended cities such as Perinthus, as Roman deserters from the battle several days beforehand had told them the location of that city and others who were not so well defended and also the location of the valuables in those other cities.6