“What exactly did the source say?” asked Michael.
Aaron leaned forward and stated that Shirazi met with his intelligence officer and directed a spectacular attack.
“The plan will be submitted to him within a few days. We know nothing else,” sighed Aaron.
Puzzled by Aaron’s response, but clearly understandable, he asked Aaron where the attack would likely be directed.
“Our analysts suggest two courses of action. The first is a suicide bombing aboard a commercial jet heading into the United States. The second is a suicide bombing on American soil. Probably a major metropolitan city such as New York or Washington, D.C.”
Intelligence analysts undergo rigorous training prior to their assignments. They develop multiple courses of action, also known as analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH), to operators during the planning process. This in turn allows operators such as Aaron and Michael to develop their own courses of action based on expected enemy behavior.
A red team analyst sitting across from Aaron, then spoke.
“There are many scenarios we envision, but we believe Shirazi will plan something his organization has not yet accomplished elsewhere. The possibilities are endless, unfortunately.”
Michael thought to himself. This was useless information provided yet again by an intelligence analyst. Though he respected most analysts’ motivation and intellectual capacity, vague predictions such as this annoyed him. How could anyone act on such analysis or information?
Michael turned to Aaron.
“Did the source indicate he would make contact again in a few days? Or are we in a wait-and-hear mode?”
“He will report to his contact as soon as possible. However, that information could be delayed by at least twelve hours due to reporting methods,” said Aaron.
Michael thought to himself that twelve hours would be too long. What if the analysts were correct and ISIS directed its attack at the Homeland? His mind contemplated the horrific consequences of these and other similar attacks. A plane, if the hypothesis was correct, could already be airborne.
“I would like to meet your asset and remain there until the source reports. Can you arrange this Aaron?”
Aaron, anticipating Michael would likely ask, already cleared the meeting with his boss earlier in the morning.
With a few keystrokes, Aaron revealed Mossad’s asset on his iPad.
“Iskenderun, Turkey. We’ll arrange travel and provide specifics this afternoon.” Michael’s attention turned to the iPad. This face would not be difficult to memorize.
Iskenderun, Turkey - November 3, 11:00 PM
There she sat. At the end of the bar inside the inner section of Cafe Eroglu, Elif Turan waited. As usual, she enjoyed her glass of red wine and some peanuts to curb her hunger. A beautiful woman with long black hair in her mid-thirties, Elif was the perfect “false flag.”
False flags, a method often used by Mossad, were human collectors (spies) who represented themselves from other nations or organizations. Mossad found this method of human intelligence collection effective and often necessary. In the Middle East and nearby regions, getting Arabs to spy for Israel was nearly impossible, despite the asset’s political or religious views. Condemnation from family, friends or brutal regimes merely limited one’s risk and tolerance from assisting the Israelis. The peril was not worth it, despite Mossad famously offering large sums of money for reliable information.
Elif became Mossad at an early age. Found in the slums of southern Lebanon by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the 1982 Lebanon War, an errant mortar attack from PLO militants killed her entire family. At least that is what her schoolteachers told her in Tel Aviv years later. She never questioned her past; after all, she was highly educated, given immense responsibilities, and Jewish for as long as she could remember.
“Hello Elif,” said Raif. “Nice to see you this evening.”
Elif was her usual friendly self.
“Hi Raif, good to see you as well.”
After the two went outside and found themselves a table, Elif was ready for her update. Monthly meetings between Raif and Elif were common. Most of the reporting focused on activity along the Syrian border. Raif had family fighting in northern Syria with members of the elite People’s Protection Units (YPG).
“Aleppo has not been retaken,” stated Raif.
According to his sources, Aleppo was too fortified. Coalition air strikes, though highly accurate, proved ineffective at eliminating Islamic State fighters from their defensive positions. Attacks would continue in the coming days, but without air support, his sources indicated taking Aleppo might be futile.
Elif listened attentively and asked Raif a simple question.
“Is there anything I can provide if air strikes continue to be unproductive?”
“Weapons. I’ve been specifically asked to inquire about anti-tank weapons like the AT-4.”
The Soviet Union built and deployed the anti-tank four (AT-4) Spigot in 1970. According to its founders and designers, its real name was the 9M111 Fagot. The tube-launched system’s maximum effective range was two thousand meters and built at the Tula Machinery Design Bureau in Tula, USSR.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War in December 1989, Soviet military equipment was up for grabs. Anyone around the world with cash in hand was a prospective buyer. Terror groups, military despots, rebels, mercenaries, and Kings relished in the opportunities to purchase tanks, trucks, AK-47s, ammunition, or anything else they needed for whatever purposes. Only nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) seemed off limit.
“The AT-4 system is very hard to find Raif. And missiles are even more difficult due to limited stockpiles,” said Elif. “What exactly will they need the systems for?”
Raif proceeded to inform Elif that Islamic State fighters were using captured tanks and armored personnel carriers from Iraqi and US stockpiles in the region. They were providing a substantial tactical military advantage in and around Aleppo preventing YPG offensive operations. Elif knew that Islamic State had acquired such capabilities but unsure of exactly how many.
“If we were to offer a dozen systems, could you deliver them to your contacts along the border?” asked Elif.
“I believe I can. But will the government pay for such systems knowing they will go to the YPG?”
“Leave that to me Raif. In the meantime, I’d like you to propose a plan on how you will move the equipment to your contacts along the border.”
Raif pressed Elif further. He asked how she would acquire such sophisticated systems. It seemed odd she was willing to try considering the Turkish government had historically opposed the YPG. However, after a few more attempts, and sensing Elif becoming a bit annoyed, he stopped.
Next order of business for Raif was to discuss his fee for such an endeavor. As a smuggler of illegal goods ranging from western cigarettes to American jeans, bribes were necessary to move the equipment along the border. Moreover, the risk he would take was substantial. In addition, his contacts would need cash for the same reason.
Elif agreed and with a wink and a smile said, “The Turkish government will take care of you Raif. Payment will be generous.”
After finishing their drinks and discussing social issues such as upcoming events in the city, the night was over. Both would part ways with much work to do.
Ar-Raqqa, Syria – October 30, 2014, 5:20 PM
Immediately following the IS military and intelligence council meeting, Hassan Akbar confronted Nidal Qureshy. Nidal knew it was coming.
“Why did you not support my efforts for three hundred fighters to take Kobani? We are so close. It is all I need to finally take the city and expand our operations. I would have paid them well after the siege.”
Though Hassan’s cash reserve was low, taxing the residents of Kobani would prove to be a wo
rthy financial endeavor. If only he took Kobani.
Qureshy’s fierce eyes gazed into Hassan’s and he simply stated, “I cannot afford to lose them, and many will not leave the Aleppo region.” Qureshy was right on both accounts. First, his Islamic State forces and those loyal to President Assad’s military units were still battling for large portions of Aleppo. In addition, Free Syrian Army (FSA) backed rebel groups and Nusra Front fighters (Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria) were also battling for Aleppo. This chaotic battleground filled with dozens of belligerents defined anarchy. Also, caught in the crosshairs of all the waring factions were civilians who had few choices and staying alive meant submission.
Nidal went further. “How can I ask that many fighters to leave their homes and fight for Kobani? Kobani is full of Turks.”
Nidal referred to the Islamic State’s capacity to recruit local fighters when expanding their operations. Islamic State was achieving success recruiting foreign fighters, but the bulk of their forces were composed of the local population convinced to extend the caliphate to their neighbors.
Their strategy was simple – ferociously attack a target such as Aleppo with a small force of determined fighters, preferably with military training in the Iraqi or Syrian armies. They would then use local men to administer Sharia law and govern. It also included public executions for anyone who attempted to resist them. Beheadings were commonplace for those civilians living in towns and cities where the Islamic State made their advances. The tactic had played out well throughout Iraq and Syria thus far.
“Much of Aleppo remains in your control. Three hundred fighters for just a few weeks will make the difference, Nidal,” said Hassan passionately. Nevertheless, Nidal would have none of it.
“Hassan. It will not happen. You must focus your attention and resources to recruiting fighters in and around Kobani. Allah Akbar.”
Off Nidal went, escorted by several of his loyal lieutenants. Hassan was furious but clearly mindful he would not convince Nidal to change his mind. He needed to reach out to other commanders and convince them to send fighters. But how he thought to himself? He did not have the funds to pay them, their journey to Kobani would be perilous, and Shirazi may not even authorize the repositioning of fighters. The trip back to Kobani would allow him time to think but only for a short while.
Tel Aviv, Israel – November 4, 12:10 PM
Michael returned to the Rothschild Hotel and finished lunch with Aaron. After his successful meeting with Mossad, he only had a few hours before Aaron would return. Time to update Langley he thought and inform them of his pending departure to Iskenderun.
After his report to Langley, Michael turned his attention to Laura. It was clear to him he would not return in the next few days and needed to let her know. Laura was different and needed an explanation. Though he only knew her a short time, Michael wanted to see her again and see where their fates would take them.
His email was short.
Hi, Laura. Our factory in Jerusalem had a fire. Some of the workers were injured and production is going offline. Leaving for the airport soon and not sure when I will be back. It could be a few weeks. Hope to see you soon and looking forward to dinner. Please let me know how it went in New York. Michael
Michael now had just under two hours to prepare for his short flight. Time for a nap as his instincts told him this mission could be his most challenging and dangerous.
At 3:00 PM, Aaron returned to pick up Michael. Upon exiting the Mossad vehicle, Aaron updated him. He told him the plane would take him directly to Iskenderun and an agent would meet him at the airport.
“They will then take you to our secure facility in Iskenderun and update you with the latest Intel. There are a few files on board you can review in flight.”
“Thanks, Aaron. I cannot thank you enough for the hospitality, the update, and support from Mossad. You have my word I will share everything from Langley with your contact in Turkey. Shalom, my friend.”
The two men shook hands, and up the air stair ramp, Michael went. The trip to Iskenderun would be short and provide him an opportunity to review critical files with pertinent operational details while in Turkey. The Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Astra 1125 business jet was now airborne.
Hatay Airport, Turkey – November 4, 5:40 PM
Approximately fifteen miles from Iskenderun, Michael’s Astra 1125 jet landed at Hatay airport. Hatay was the nearest airport to Iskenderun and used extensively by Mossad when transporting personnel into Turkey. Operating under the guise of a jet supporting executives from the Israeli Electric Corporation, Hatay was the perfect entrance point into Turkey. It would be no different with Michael aboard.
“Welcome to Iskenderun, Mr. Brennan.”
“Thank you, you must be Elif? Have you heard anything from Raqqa?”
The two walked briskly from the aircraft to the Mercedes GLK 350 SUV. Though Mossad used Hatay often, individuals within sight of the hangars, and terminal could always be Turkish Intel, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT). Unbeknown to Michael, a fuel truck operator nearly 300 yards away took a photo.
“Nothing from our contact. I am hoping for an update this evening. Let’s get to the safe house.”
Within an hour, Elif and Michael arrived at the safe house on the eastern side of Iskenderun. It was an unassuming location off Ataturk Boulevard along 18th Street.
Inside the safe house were two of Elif’s associates. Both men appeared Mossad, but Michael could not be sure.
They might be local contractors, thought Michael.
“Mr. Brennan, we should hear from our contact in a few hours. I recommend you get some sleep. The room in the back is yours and should have what you need to shower and rest. I am going to pick up some coffee and return shortly. Any requests?”
“Thanks, Elif,” said Michael, who was still feeling a bit of jet lag from his transatlantic journey. “I’ll grab some sleep.”
MIT Headquarters, Ankara, Turkey – November 4, 6:46 PM
Tadio Sadik sat at his computer. A junior intelligence officer with MIT, his first assignment was as a night watch officer in the Israeli counter-intelligence directorate. A lackluster position but expected of a new analyst within the organization.
He had to perform well, ensuring reports were properly cataloged and disseminated to the veteran analysts focused on Israeli activities inside Turkey. Additionally, his Directorate leadership would scrutinize his decisions when informing them of tactical data and real-time information from numerous sources throughout the country. He had to get it right each time if he wanted a promotion and placed onto an analytical team. There he would have the flexibility to think creatively without all the rules that come with night shift duties.
Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, also known as MIT, the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey, had a long history and reputation as a corrupt and inept organization. Its roots dated back to the end of the Ottoman Empire. For nearly seven decades, while undergoing several rebranding efforts, MIT mostly filled its ranks with relatives of current and former employees. Restructuring began in the mid-2000s changing this dynamic. Cultural change is necessary specifically when an organization loses confidence from the public. MIT had done that long ago.
Well into his shift, Tadio received a secure message from a source near Hatay. The source simply wrote, this man may be an Israeli intelligence officer. He arrived this afternoon at Hatay airport shortly after 5:30 PM. Subject quickly entered a black Mercedes SUV, possibly a GLK 350 model. Attached is his photo along with the others.
Tadio recognized the others, but the photo depicted a man not seen before. Utilizing his computer’s facial recognition software, he uploaded the picture and launched the scanning feature.
After a few minutes, no matches existed within the MIT database. Tadio became curious as the subject entered Hatay using the established method by Israeli intelligence. After enhancing the qual
ity of the photo, he ran it again. Nothing new.
Tadio picked up the phone and called his supervisor who still worked at her desk. A few minutes later, Dabria Uzun arrived.
Dabria, an officer with MIT since 2002, was the first female supervisor at the operations center in MIT history. Her brilliance as an analyst became legendary when she assisted with the apprehension of an Israeli spy in 2010.
While serving in an operations role tasked to support the External Operations Directorate, she also served with distinction in Yemen from 2011-2013. There, Dabria provided MIT valuable information on Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leadership and financial activities. In just two short years in Yemen, coupled with identifying a mid-level Mossad agent in Istanbul, her path to senior leadership within MIT was secure.
“Yes, Tadio. What is it?” asked Dabria.
“I received a report from one of our sources in Hatay. He sent us photographs of a group of individuals arriving in the country this afternoon. I did not recognize one of them. So, I ran his photo. Nothing. Here he is.”
“Okay, send me the photo and contact the intelligence unit at national police intelligence and Interpol with an informal inquiry. Keep it discreet, Tadio. Maybe they will have something on him. I’ll check with some of our associates in the west,” stated Dabria as she began walking toward her office.
Tadio surmised Dabria’s reference to the west likely included CIA, MI6, and BND with who MIT occasionally conducted joint intelligence operations. Western intelligence agencies often initiated them when high-value targets were in Turkey or just traveling through.
This was way above his paygrade, he thought. It was time to make some phone calls and execute Dabria’s guidance. His first inquiry would be to the intelligence unit at national police intelligence.
While Tadio began collaborating with national police, Dabria sat down. She could not believe what she had seen. A secure phone call away from headquarters was in order, and would need to be initiated quickly.
Into The Shadows Page 3
