October 25
The magazine Itogi asks the governor of St. Petersburg, “Could Russia be a parliamentary republic without a president?” Valentina Matvienko, a close ally of Putin, replies, “No, that wouldn't work for us. The Russian mentality prefers a master, a tsar, a president. In other words, a leader.” Matvienko is capable only of repeating what she hears in Putin's immediate entourage.
The Human Rights Association has responded:
We are outraged by this pronouncement, which is an insult to the national dignity of the Russian people. The sense of these words is clearly that the Russian people are serfs who cannot do without a master, craven subjects who cannot get by without a tsar. The addition of the word “president” only makes it clear that the new ruling elite sees the head of state not as a democratic leader, but as an authoritarian potentate. This assertion of the innate servility of the Russian people is racist. In effect the governor of St. Petersburg has expressed her disagreement with the Constitution's premises of inviolable democratic freedoms … The notion of our national inferiority and the innate servility of the Russian people is at the heart of the main Russophobic theories. It was such doctrines that the ideologists of German Nazism used to underpin their aggressive attitude toward Russia. It is particularly reprehensible that such views should come from the person in charge of the heroic city of Leningrad. We demand the immediate resignation of Valentina Matvienko.
Nobody thought it necessary to reply. The new ruling elite no longer consider it necessary to conceal their true attitude toward the majority of their compatriots and the principles of constitutional democracy.
October 28
A very public split in the Yabloko Party. The youth wing are being shown on the main television stations taking issue with Yavlinsky.
Meetings in support of Putin, organized by United Russia, are taking place in many cities. The largest is in Moscow, and it was there that the leader of the youth wing of Yabloko spoke out.
Students and pensioners are the mainstay of protest meetings organized by the opposition. For the first time, the Communist Party, Yabloko, and the Union of Right Forces are uniting to conduct anti-Putin protests.
October 29
The state authorities remain on course for the abyss, taking all of us with them. The procurator general, Vladimir Ustinov, announced in the Duma that, in the opinion of the main institution charged with supervising citizens’ rights, and of himself, it is necessary urgently to adopt a law regulating action to be taken in the event of a terrorist attack. His main proposals are that fast-track court proceedings for terror suspects be introduced; that relatives of terrorists be seized as counter-hostages; that the property of terrorists be confiscated.
The prospect of having a video recorder, television, or even their Zhiguli confiscated seems unlikely to deter those going off to commit suicide and slaughter other people.
The procurator general's idea of fast-track court proceedings for terrorist suspects is a straightforward revival of what were known under Stalin as “mass purges,” or more recently, to use the language of the “an-titerrorist operation,” “cleansings.” All these simplified procedures are only too familiar in Chechnya and Ingushetia, where they have been in use for five years and more. The security agencies (all of them: the Interior Ministry, FSB, the army's Central Intelligence Directorate, and others) arrest whomever they want, sometimes after receiving operational information, but more often without it. They beat, cripple, and torture as they see fit, extracting confessions of terrorist activity or at least of sympathy with the terrorists, although in reality they don't really even need the confessions.
There are two possible outcomes: if their victim has been seriously mutilated, they kill and bury him; or if the family has managed to raise a bribe, they put him in court. Nobody has the least interest in evidence. In the “zone of the antiterrorist operation,” fast-track court cases are the only kind they have. Gotcha! You are a member of an illegal armed grouping: fifteen or twenty years. The presence of a lawyer and procurator at the trial is purely decorative, to give a veneer of legality to the statistics of terrorists condemned and terrorist acts averted. The lawyers usually do no more than persuade the accused to confess to everything; the task of the procurator is to tell the family that complaining will only make matters worse.
Our procurator general's stated plans would effectively abolish the presumption of innocence. In the “zone of the antiterrorist operation,” in Chechnya and Ingushetia, there has been a presumption of guilt for several years and in future that will extend to the rest of Russia. For the past five years most people had supposed that the horror of extrajudicial lawlessness on the part of state institutions would affect only faraway rebels, which was nothing to worry about; the rest of Russia would somehow be immune. Unfortunately, miracles do not happen. At some point the practice was bound to spread.
The procurator general's proposal to seize relatives as counter-hostages is undoubtedly innovative. He explained to our Duma deputies that we would seize the terrorists’ relatives, demonstrate what might happen to them, and the terrorists would then free their own hostages and surrender.
This method has also been used in Chechnya, particularly during the second Chechen war when Kadyrov's forces became powerful. Torturing relatives in order to make those they are seeking surrender has become their trademark. Kadyrov-style hostage taking has, however, also been practiced on the state's behalf with the blessing of the directorate of the procurator general in the North Caucasus, and with complete disregard of the law and Constitution by the procurators.
We now find ourselves in a disastrous situation. For five years the procurator general's office has been encouraging a wave of terrorism in the North Caucasus, carried out in accordance with the wishes of the president of Russia. It has not only condoned this by averting its eyes: procurators have often been present during torture sessions and executions, and have then issued assurances that everything has taken place within the framework of the law.
What kind of arguments can now be found to persuade people like that? How can someone who is in reality an anti-procurator general be made to withdraw his bloodthirsty innovations from the Duma? The procurator general's office is interested solely in its own institutional survival, in ranks and rewards, in concealing the truth about what it has been complicit in. The state authorities hold on to their power at the price of our lives. It's as simple as that.
The procurator general's speech to the Duma was interrupted—by applause. Our Parliament thought it was all a great idea. President Putin, sworn to protect the Constitution, did not remove a procurator general who was proposing massive violations of the law.
The year 1937 marked the height of Stalin's terror. Today Chechnya's 1937 is developing into another 1937 for Russians generally, whether we attend meetings at the Solovki Stone memorial to Stalin's victims or not. Any of us might now go out to buy bread and never return. Or return twenty years later. In Chechnya people say their farewells before going to the bazaar, just in case.
On October 29, 2004, as ever, the Russian people remained silent, hoping it would be the neighbors they would come to get.
November 3
The Soviet of the Federation has rubber-stamped the abolition of the local election of governors.
November 6
Mikhail Yuriev, a former journalist who now works in the Kremlin, has placed an article on behalf of the presidential administration in Komso- molskaya Gazeta, helpfully advising on how to differentiate between someone who is helpful to the president and someone who is an enemy of Russia. The false antithesis is blatant and deliberate. According to Yuriev, an enemy of Russia is anybody who criticizes Putin. Those who spoke in favor of negotiations during Beslan, or against using chemical weapons in the Nord-Ost assault, are enemies; as are those who attend protest meetings against the war in Chechnya, or who organize them. Likewise those who call for peace talks on Chechnya and cessation of the civil war.
&
nbsp; The Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers have formed their own political party, as they said they would back in February. Their founding congress is no random event. It results from the complete devastation of our political landscape after the Duma elections, when those deputies they could rely on to lobby for military reform and the interests of conscripts all lost their seats. As their chairperson, Valentina Melnikova, said: “Our party program sets out our basic goals as being to ensure that the state takes a responsible attitude toward human beings, and to create a secure framework for life in Russia. Bringing about a democratic transformation of the Russian armed forces is only a part of that larger task. In economics we are a party tending toward liberalism, and as regards the state's responsibilities toward society we incline toward socialism.”
The Party of Soldiers’ Mothers is the first political organization in Russia to state that it will fight to protect our lives. The Russian electorate doesn't really have that great a choice. Our politicians might slip us a hundred rubles before election day, but they have no time to fight for the issues that vitally affect us. They are far too busy fighting for their own place in the sun.
The founding congress took place on board the steamer Konstantin Fedin, moored for the winter in the farthest corner of the Northern River Port in Moscow. Why was it held on a steamer? Because nobody would give it house room for fear of the regime's reaction.
The party was established by 154 representatives from more than fifty regions, all of them part of a movement that has saved the lives of thousands of conscripts and new recruits since its foundation in 1989. The movement began back in the USSR. In the late 1980s, women trying to protect their sons from the bullying of the army's granddads and from universal conscription began forming themselves into committees. In 1989 they were successful in persuading Gorbachev to release 176,000 soldiers from the army ahead of time so that they could continue their education. In 1990 he also issued directives “On the Implementation of Proposals from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers” and on state insurance benefits for conscripts. In 1991 the committees were successful in having Yeltsin grant an amnesty to soldiers who had deserted, and in 1993-94 their persistence ensured an inquiry into the deaths from starvation, disease, and torture of more than 200 sailors on the island of Russkoye. Between 1994 and 1998 they were the first of Russia's human rights organizations to demand immediate cessation of the war in Chechnya, got President Yeltsin to pardon 500 soldiers who had conscientiously objected to participating in the first Chechen war, forced an amnesty for all who had participated on either side in the Chechen war, and managed to get a specific item included in the state budget for seeking and identifying the remains of soldiers killed in Chechnya. Since 1999 the Soldiers’ Mothers have demonstrated against the second Chechen war, conducting a public campaign against falsification of the true numbers of casualties, and compiling and publishing lists of those who had died and disappeared without trace.
Their main goal became putting an end to the slavery of conscription and replacing it with a fully professional army. All the democratic parties supported them and, with time, the idea of a professional army was accepted by top officials and successive ministers of defense, whose speeches were often taken word for word from their flyers. But in the implementation everything was twisted: contracts were signed on a “compulsory voluntary” basis, wages were not paid, the war continued, and recruits were sent straight to Chechnya. After last December's elections there was nobody left in Parliament to lobby for democratic legislative projects.
In late January 2004 the Soldiers’ Mothers decided it was time to create their own party. Ten months passed, because creating a new party involves a huge amount of bureaucracy and is extremely expensive. During this period they were stigmatized as a fifth column supported by the West to undermine Russia's combat capability. That is, they were “enemies within” in a period of military extremity.
Their political strength, and the thing that will ensure their survival, is that their policies come from the heart. Until now people here have become politicians at the dictate of their minds. Party passions simmered primarily over who was to be top dog, rather than what could be done for the electorate. In 2003 the state authorities played on this very successfully and sordid compromises undermined what trust people still had in the opposition. In the end no democrats or liberals made it into the Duma.
The Soldiers’ Mothers’ greatest strength is their passion to defend our children, and our trust that they will do this to the best of their ability. They have no other political capital. Their maternal urge sweeps all before it, as was evident within two minutes of talking to any of the delegates outside the conference hall (and, indeed, inside it). We soon found ourselves discussing the fate of some particular soldier who urgently needed help: “Look at what is happening in our region,” Lyudmila Bo-gatenkova from Budyonnovsk said, pulling from her bag a stack of soldiers’ testimonies about the most appalling treatment. She has brought them for the main military procurator's office.
“For as long as there is conscription, the soldier in the army is a nobody,” Lyudmila Vasilievna says indignantly. “He can be used for anything. He can be used as an unpaid laborer. Millions of our people are slaves today, and our mission is to bring about the abolition of this slavery. There can be no compromise about that!”
The main discussion at the congress concerned the wording of the manifesto. Should they campaign for the abolition of conscription, or leave it to one side for the time being? More generally, should the new party follow the usual Russian path of cocking a snook when no one is looking, saying that you are against conscription, but leaving it out of the program so as not to upset the presidential administration and making it easier to get the party registered? Or should they be completely honest and worry only about gaining the respect of the Russian people?
In this major matter of principle, the second approach won. Passionate conviction is impossible without total honesty. Abolition of conscription went into the manifesto. They will fight for it, and thank God for that, because being trusted by the electorate will be their main asset. If they start trying to strike “sensible compromises,” they will be cheated by the authorities, who know how to manipulate compromise-mongers, and the voters will desert them.
“Yes, it's important that our women should get into the Duma,” Lyud-mila Bogatenkova explains. “Otherwise it would be impossible to push through the abolition of conscription. If we are in the Duma it will also be simpler to help soldiers and conscripts in particular situations, and to prevent the authorities from stonewalling when a crime has been committed.”
One of the few remaining ways to exert influence, after the resurgence of the bureaucracy, is the parliamentary question. A deputy's question can produce rapid and significant results, and speed is often essential. Most of the cases where soldiers have been saved have required prompt investigation and action. When a story gets publicity and a deputy gets through to the procurator general's office, somebody in the closed world of the army has a chance of surviving. The lack of that opportunity often means death.
One of the first toasts proclaimed after the creation of the party was: “To 2007! Look out, Duma, here we come!”
The Party of Soldiers’ Mothers has a lesson to teach the world. It will have to create its own future with the sincere passion that the women in their committees live by. For a long time we have been told that the more cunning a democratic politician, the more effective he is. This has proved to be untrue. Our people do not care for cleverness and cunning, or for those who lack passion. That's the kind of people we are. First the passion, then clear-headed, straight thinking. Never the reverse.
November 9
The Kaluga branch of the Yabloko Party has demanded a referendum on retaining benefits in kind for retired workers, victims of Soviet repression, and those who worked on the home front during the Second World War. The benefits concerned are free travel on suburban buses and free medicine. The Kal
uga Province authorities were planning to abolish all benefits in kind in return for a derisory monthly supplement to pensions of 200-300 rubles [$7–$10.50]. So far, officialdom has paid no attention to protests, but a referendum might force a rethink. This is a very sensitive matter. Who will be entitled to benefits after January 1, 2005? The “monetarization” of benefits was intended to reduce the number of claimants, which we are told is currently half the country. There is certainly scope for rationalization.
(Nothing came of the idea of a referendum. The democrats abandoned it because they thought the resistance was too great.)
November 11
Crisis in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. A crowd has occupied the office of Mustafa Batdyev, the president, and is demanding his resignation. The reason is a case involving the abduction, murder, and destruction of the bodies of seven young businessmen in which Batdyev's brother-in-law was involved. He has already been arrested.
The authorities are in an unenviable position. If Batdyev is thrown out, there may be a chain reaction. Next in turn will surely be Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia. Batdyev ran away from trouble, just as Zyazikov did earlier in the year, but was sent back by Kozak, Putin's representative in the Southern Federal District. It was Kozak who came to talk to the people in Cherkessk, and a few hours later the television stations were announcing the good news that the “coup” had failed. Kozak had persuaded the crowd to leave Batdyev's office, he would return and his administration would continue as before.
It was another disaster for Putin's human resources policy. The Kremlin-controlled local leaders are incapable of leading, or taking any responsibility at all. At the least sign of danger, they run for their lives. The authorities, meanwhile, react to a mob. Kozak would have gone nowhere if the mob had not seized Batdyev's office by force. If people had requested a meeting with him, they would have had to badger him for a good six months, no matter how serious the issue.
A Russian Diary Page 23
