Achtung! Panzer! disclosed no secrets – the Pz Ills and IVs were not mentioned – and the latest thoughts about the ambitious role of panzer divisions for deep penetration were muted. But support for Hitlerian opinion was evident in those sections where it led towards Guderian’s objectives. He quoted from Hitler’s speech at the 1937 Motor Show: ‘“It is cosiness, not to say indolence, which protests loudly at all the revolutionary innovations which demand new efforts of mind, body and soul”’ and ‘“This much is certain: the replacement of animal power by the motor leads to the most tremendous technical and consequently economical change the world has ever experienced.”’ The Four Year Plan, which operated under Hermann Göring, was invoked to show how, very soon, Germany’s dependence upon imports of petrol and rubber would be eliminated, thus minimising a fundamental objection to mechanised forces to the effect that Germany could not support them in time of war. Guderian’s peroration went far beyond the call for a defence force, however: ‘One thing is certain, only strong nations will continue to exist and the will for self-determination can become reality only if supported by the necessary power. It is the duty of politics, science, the economy and the armed forces to strive towards the establishment of German political power. Only by providing the Army with the most modern and effective armaments, equipment and intelligent leadership can peace be safeguarded … But it is an indisputable fact that, as a rule, new weapons require new techniques in tactics and organisation. One should not pour new wine into old bottles. Deeds are more important than words. The goddess of battle will crown only the most daring with laurels.’ The 1930s were days of the propagandists led by Dr Josef Goebbels: Guderian learnt well from him.
The book flattered Hitler and all that he stood for, as probably it was calculated to do. Walther Nehring points out that Guderian did not have many contacts with Hitler prior to 1939 – indeed it would have been surprising for so junior an officer; he only became Generalmajor in August 1936. Nevertheless he did far better than the Chief of the General Staff. Guderian’s opponent, Beck, seems to have had only one private meeting with Hitler throughout his term of office from 1935 to 1938 and this must have hurt Beck.
Conflicting emotions were tearing at the German generals as Germany approached Armageddon. In November 1937 Hitler had told Blomberg and Fritsch that he intended to expand to the east, if necessary by means of war in 1943 – and they had surprised him by their horror. These men Hitler now removed by means of charges (trumped up in the case of Fritsch) that denigrated the moral standing of both officers. The resignation of Blomberg and the defamation of Fritsch on 4th February 1938 deeply disturbed Guderian. But the consequential assumption of C-in-C the Wehrmacht by Hitler, the appointment of Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of the OKW, of Brauchitsch as Army C-in-C and Reichenau as Commander of Group Command 4 (and thus virtually in charge of mechanised development) can hardly have displeased him. Keitel may have been advantageous to his prospects for, in addition to the family connection, Wilhelm’s brother, Bodewin, who was of his regiment and his wife’s relative and now too a general, was also Chief of the Army Personnel Office – a position of great power and influence in arranging postings and appointments. It mattered less that Wilhelm Keitel was a mere sycophant of Hitler (picked by the Führer with the cry ‘That’s exactly the man I’m looking for’, after Blomberg, who was Keitel’s father-in-law, had reported that Wilhelm was, ‘nothing but the man who runs my office’): he might be used as one more channel direct to the Führer, particularly now that the Führer was set upon employing the OKW Staff as his personal instrument to the gradual exclusion of the Army Staff. Reichenau he welcomed as a progressively minded intelligent soldier for whom I felt a comradely friendship’. His own elevation to Generalleutnant and to command XVI Corps, with Paulus as Chief of Staff, was not unwelcome either, even though it meant supplanting Lutz, who was made to retire. And yet a letter written to Gretel on 7th February transmits foreboding while making it obvious that, not for one moment, did he suspect Hitler’s complicity in what had taken place:
‘However pleasant and honourable the new appointment, I do not go with an easy mind because, apparently, serious and real tasks are before us and, indeed, differences of opinion which will require strength and nerve. I will have to provide myself with a thick hide. The report to Hitler [in connection with Blomberg and Fritsch] has provided me with insight into things which would better not have happened. The Führer has acted, as usual, with the finest human decency. It is to be hoped that he will be approved by his colleagues [the Nazi leaders].’
This letter must be contrasted with Guderian’s comments in Panzer Leader where he refers to 4th February as ‘the second blackest day of the Army High Command’ and goes on to defend Fritsch and criticise Brauchitsch for not waiting for the promulgation of a Court of Inquiry upon his predecessor before taking serious steps. At the same time he points out that ‘For the majority [of German generals] the true state of affairs remained obscure’. There is also evidence in the letter that Guderian saw Hitler as somebody apart from the Party.
Now came the ‘serious and real task’, an order to command the leading troops in the surprise occupation of Austria on 12th March 1938. The thrill at this honour and the opportunity it gave to demonstrate the panzer forces and their potential in a long march was paramount. It also allowed a Waffen SS formation to make a showing and it was a suggestion from Guderian, passed to Hitler by Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the SS Leibstandarte, which led to the vehicles being decked with flags and greenery as ‘a sign of friendly feelings’. Guderian had friendly feelings for Dietrich, too, the ex-Landskneckht who provided yet another direct link to Hitler and to whom Hitler referred as ‘simultaneously cunning, energetic and brutal’ – a fitting description for most of the world’s best fighting men.
Standing proudly beside Hitler on the balcony in Linz when the Führer addressed the people, Guderian was deeply moved by this reunification of German nationals. So, too, was Gretel whose emotions overflowed in a letter to her mother:
‘One can as yet hardly believe that Austria has become German. One Reich, one people, one Führer. He who does not understand that Hitler is a very great man and leader cannot be helped. I am deeply moved and cried for sheer joy … I felt tremendously proud that my husband was permitted to experience this historic event in close proximity to the Führer. The Führer on several occasions affectionately pressed his hand and was very pleased with the surprisingly quick march through Austria. The achievement of the Panzertruppe was specially praised.’ And then she got ready to lead the wives of the garrison to welcome Austrian troops with flowers when they arrived for training in the German method.
Nevertheless, shortcomings in the reliability of his vehicles (with a 30 per cent official breakdown rate among the tanks, that was probably higher, plus supply difficulties) were failings which he would tackle with customary vigour when the celebrations were concluded. He was working at fever pitch to perfect the three panzer divisions under his command in XVI Corps as fresh political clouds blew up over Czechoslovakia and the German minorities in the Sudetenland. The exercises of autumn 1937, in which he acted as umpire, had exposed the logistic failings of the Corps and had been disagreeably confirmed during the march into Austria. Since war in the autumn of 1938 was now possible (in May Hitler had told Keitel to prepare for an invasion of Czechoslovakia) there was no time to be lost – but as yet there were only a handful of Pz Ills and IVs in service, and the issue of radio sets to all tanks was minimal.
As usual the theory of panzer operation reached far ahead of practical implementation. A paper written in 1937 (as rebuttal to criticisms in a General Staff publication, The Review of Military Science) had postulated startlingly original reasons in support of the concept of independent action by fast tank groups. Guderian propounded the theme: ‘… until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our belief in tanks �
�� properly employed …’ His faith was based upon strategic speed: ‘… to be able to move faster than hitherto: to keep moving despite the enemy’s defensive fire and thus to make it harder for him to build up fresh defensive positions’. This was essentially different from the reason commonly espoused by others – of speed as a means of tactical protection against enemy fire: to this Guderian never gave much weight, accepting that ‘… in unusually unfavourable conditions the hostile artillery can have serious effects on the movement of tanks’. As usual he could not restrain his sardonic wit: ‘It is said “The motor is not a new weapon: it is simply a new method of carrying old weapons forward.” It is fairly well known that combustion engines do not fire bullets …’ This sort of jibe in conference or on paper did not endear him to opponents among the Army hierarchy who lacked his sense of humour.
Reports from the world’s tank battlefields in 1937 were not beneficial to Guderian’s case. Italian light tanks had made a poor showing against badly armed tribesmen in Abyssinia in 1935; the Japanese had tried only a limited use of inferior machines in the Far East; and in Spain, where some of the ineffectual Pz Is had been committed to action under the advice of Major Ritter von Thoma, as part of the Kondor Legion, the results had been anything but encouraging. German and Italian tanks fighting on the Fascist side, and Russian tanks with the Republicans, had been used in relatively small numbers. They were poorly supported and therefore did not achieve worthwhile gains. Thoma, a Bavarian and a bachelor of uncertain swings in mood and opinion, intensely annoyed Guderian with reports which suggested that tanks were a failure and that there was no need for each to have a radio set. These reports arrived at a critical moment during the negotiations for funds to buy fresh equipment and hampered his efforts to expand the panzer force. Staunchly Guderian pointed out the inadequacy of the tanks and the techniques that were being employed on unsuitable ground. In Achtung! Panzer! he declared that ‘neither the war in Abyssinia nor the Civil War in Spain can be regarded, in our opinion, as a sort of “Dress Rehearsal” with regard to the effectiveness of the armoured fighting vehicle’, but he was really only stonewalling. The fact remained that operations by the tank’s sister weapon, bombing aircraft, were regarded in precisely that light – as the demonstration of a match-winner. Blood-curdling accounts of destruction from the air dominated the world’s newspapers to strengthen the proponents of air warfare, who claimed it as a prime means to a decision when aimed at the civil populace. Tanks could lay no such claim and therefore were held much lower in esteem and in the order of priority for resources.
Believing with the utmost sincerity in the essential nature of his demands and fearful that his opponents would rob Germany of the fruits of his labours (undoubtedly he cast himself in the role of a military apostle), he began to react more out of character as the strain upon him increased. For example, during the training exercises of 1938 when Hitler was present and witnessed an awful muddle due to inept orders from the commander and staff of Panzer Regiment I, he saw red. In the concluding discussions Brauchitsch and General J. von Blaskowitz let the miscreants off quite lightly – they may even have relished a debacle in one of Guderian’s units. But Guderian took them all to one side and told them in no uncertain terms what he thought of them. His elder son, then a young officer, was present and remarks that it was a pulverising performance -one upon which his brother junior officers commented favourably afterwards because they thought the ‘rocket’ overdue. Most unusually, however, Guderian followed up his reprimand by posting a number of senior officers, the sort of action he rarely took. He was more accustomed to making the best use of the available material – men, land and equipment.
The stresses and strains being imposed upon his superiors now began to recoil directly upon him. Beck, a tragic figure who found it hard to convert conviction into action and was among the very few senior officers with the insight to understand the threat that Hitler posed, was urgent in his attempts to persuade Brauchitsch to make a stand over the treatment of Fritsch who, in February 1938, was falsely accused of scandalous behaviour. Brauchitsch declined. Convinced of the folly of attacking Czechoslovakia, Beck next endeavoured to resist Hitler’s intentions on the grounds that Germany was unprepared for war. But Brauchitsch again would not challenge the elected representative of the people, – and sold the pass. From this moment nothing the generals could do, other than by outright rebellion, could halt Hitler or prevent their degradation. Beck resigned and the hunt was on for a more compliant Chief of Staff. General Warlimont, whose impressions of Guderian between 1933 and 1939 are chiefly of ‘… a passionate panzer man – nothing more’, seems to recall that Guderian was considered as a possible successor to Beck. It seems unlikely that this was a serious proposition though its mere suggestion in high places was bound to arouse antagonism among the alarmed generals. While Guderian lacked the requisite seniority and prestige for such an august post, he was also the representative of a minority military faction and clearly a favourite of Hitler. Franz Haider eventually took over from Beck and also continued the scheme of resistance to Hitler – though with muted zeal.
The dialogue between Hitler and Guderian had become closely personal. Invitations to dine and to accompany him to the opera led to discussions upon tank problems. The habit of giving Guderian a leading part in military operations became almost a formality. Thus XVI Corps received the role of occupying the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement had postponed war. To Gretel on 5th October he wrote describing the ‘suffering and repression’ which the Germans of the Sudetenland had suffered under Czech rule – they had ‘lost all hope’ – and in Panzer Leader he tells of enthusiastic crowds greeting the Führer and his troops. When Hitler entered Guderian’s car ‘he shook hands with me in a very friendly way … A very great man!’ he wrote. ‘To achieve such a victory without a stroke of the sword is perhaps unprecedented in history. It was of course only possible because of the new, sharp sword in our hand and with the will to use it had peaceable means not been possible. Both these determinations were evident from this courageous man.’
He went on to tell of the occupation: ‘… the enemy fortifications not nearly as strong as thought, yet better taken this way’; the ‘lively satisfaction of everyone, including the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, that war had been avoided’; his happy accord with Reichenau, ‘we were in full agreement. His staff not so helpful. Pity!’ There can have been few in Germany at that moment who disagreed with his assessment of Hitler. The injustice of Versailles was being wiped out at no cost in lives. But the long-term effects were more ominous and Guderian seems to have given little consideration to them at this moment, so uncritical was he of the Führer.
Resources were in short supply as the rearmament programme got into gear. The spectre of inflation loomed large as Austria was digested, as Hitler reached out for the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, and as the financial manipulations of the Minister of Economies, Dr Schacht, came close to collapse: the taking of Austria and of the Sudetenland merely added to rather than subtracted from Germany’s debt. In 1937 Schacht had fixed both a limit of time and amount on the money available for rearmament and in January 1939, as President of the Reichsbank, told the Economics Minister to declare the Reich bankrupt by refusing to make a routine monthly advance. According to Göring, the head of the Four Year Plan, Schacht was at once dismissed on the grounds of his impossible attitude. But world opinion was turning against Germany and Guderian, who visited Britain about that time, must have known it.
When Czechoslovakia was seized in March 1939, and the pressure was next put upon Poland, there could no longer be doubt in the minds of the generals where they were headed. The Army General Staff, conjoint with the civil populace, adopted roughly three different opinions. Subject to the usual reservations about generalisation and allowing for all shades of variation in opinion, there were those like Guderian who welcomed the Hitler regime as a means of restoring Germany’s prestige and authority, whose pride was in the
army they were rebuilding, and whose fascination was with the new weapon systems they were creating – sharpened, undoubtedly and rather understandably, by an inquisitive ambition to see if their ideas would work. This group was probably most fearful of the Poles and abhorrent of the Communists: the Western Powers to them (as to the other groups too) poised a counterweight to their most acquisitive ambitions since they were apparently too strong to attack. Then there were the disgruntled soldiers and civilians who had been removed or snubbed by Hitler – Hammerstein-Equord and Schacht, for example, and Beck who favoured peace chiefly because he thought Germany was not ready for a major war: with them Guderian also concurred since he knew too well the imperfections of the panzer force and the rest of the Army. Finally there was the vast majority, those in harness who agreed with the second group but either would not resign, were not sacked or who soldiered on without caring to think too deeply about the issues that were involved. Beck and his kind would gradually form an active resistance movement against Hitler. Haider would debate and temporise with the conspirators, among whom Fellgiebel was now prominent, in their tentative schemes to assassinate Hitler at an appropriate moment. But, when it came to the crunch, he would withdraw, pleading the compulsion of the Oath sworn to Hitler on 3rd August 1934, or his sense of duty to the Army in the hope that, while remaining at duty instead of resigning, it might yet be possible to achieve something good. Argue though Haider would against Hitler’s schemes with which he disagreed, he nevertheless complied with his orders and prosecuted the preparations for war.
Guderian: Panzer General Page 12
