by Senan Molony
I trust this lengthy explanation, which I ought to have made earlier, but for various reasons could not, will be the means of removing the undeserved stigma which rests upon me, and through me, upon an honourable profession.
I am Sir, yours truly,
[signed] Stanley Lord
(Late Master, steamer Californian)
Liverpool, 14th August, 1912
Lord has introduced two new elements here. One is his suggestion (agreed by Stone?) that the Californian’s neighbour had steamed away ‘at least eight miles’ over the course of an hour, far beyond the possibilities of drift or current swing. This is a speed of at least 8 knots, compared to the 11 knots Californian had been doing before she stopped earlier that night. It may also suggest the Californian’s visible horizon.
The second new idea is the suggestion that Evans transmitted the Californian’s stopped position at 5.15 a.m., before receiving the Titanic’s SOS position, thus eliminating the possibility of subsequent invention of the Californian’s position. Such a transmission, however, was not explicitly stated at either Inquiry. However the possibility is there, since Evans gave evidence in Washington of sending a service advice message to the Virginian the next morning, seeking the distress position for the Titanic. Service advice messages, carrying an MSG prefix, commonly carried the transmitting vessel’s position before giving body text. Evans testified:
I sent them [Virginian] a message of my own, what we call a service message, that an operator can always make up if he wants to find out something. I sent a service message, and said, ‘Please send me official message regarding Titanic, giving position’.
A section of the letter sent by Captain Lord to the Board of Trade on 10 August 1912. He writes: `My employers, the Leyland Line, although their nautical advisers are convinced we did not see the Titanic, or the Titanic see the Californian, say they have the utmost confidence in me, and do not blame me in any way, but owing to Lord Mersey’s decision and public opinion caused by this report, they are reluctantly compelled to ask for my resignation, after 14½ years service without a hitch of any description, and if I could clear myself of this charge, would willingly reconsider this decision’.
Evans’ previous service message had been an ice warning the night before, and had carried the Californian’s longitude and latitude at the start. It read: ‘To Captain, ‘Antillian’, 6.30 p.m. apparent time, ship; latitude, 42° 3’ North; longitude 49° 9’ West. Three large bergs…’
Thus, the giving of Californian’s position at 5.15 a.m. may have happened as Lord says, but it was not corroborated in evidence. Captain Gambell of the Virginian did not testify, as we have seen, and neither did anyone else from that vessel – a great pity.
It will be remembered that Gambell had told reporters at Liverpool that when he first had contact with the Californian ‘he was then 17 miles north of the Titanic and had not heard anything of the disaster’. How did Gambell know where the Californian was, if he had not been told? If he was told the Californian’s position by that ship at a time when the Californian herself ‘had not heard anything of the disaster’, does it not once more exonerate Captain Lord’s vessel of being the Titanic’s mystery ship?
In a handwritten letter to the Board of Trade on 10 August 1912, Lord had notably declared: ‘April 15th, about 5.30 a.m.,I gave my position to the Virginian before I heard where the Titanic sunk; that gave me 17 miles away. I understand the original Marconigrams were in court’ (National Archives documents MT9/920E, M23448, Kew).
The implications of these claims are naturally enormous. But they were never officially tested, such as by examination of the Marconi originals and Virginian PV, or wireless record. Gambell was not interviewed, and neither was his wireless operator.
Meanwhile Captain Lord had also begun contacting the newspapers with a view to vindicating his reputation. This is an example (Weekly Irish Times, Saturday 24 August 1912):
TITANIC DISASTER
Statement by the Captain of the Californian
Capt. Stanley Lord, late master of the liner Californian, last Friday [August 17] issued a statement regarding his action in connection with the Titanic disaster, which, he trusts, will remove the undeserved stigma that rests upon him.
The remainder of this long story consists of the same facts and phrases published a month later in the publication of Captain Lord’s professional association. Similar accounts appeared in other newspapers, including the Times, showing he had mounted a spirited, if futile, campaign.
In an affidavit prepared many years later, Lord meanwhile told what had happened when he returned to Liverpool, after giving evidence, in order to rejoin the Californian. There now also follows an account of his later life, with one paragraph relocated for clarity, together with an editorial note and sub-headings to aid the narrative.
RELIEVED FROM DUTY
I returned to Liverpool on the evening of May 15th, being due to sail in the Californian on the 18th. However, after my return home I was verbally informed by the Marine Superintendent that I was to be relieved and I accordingly removed my gear from the ship.
Initially I had been assured by the Liverpool management of the Leyland Line that I would be reappointed to the Californian. However, I was later told privately by Mr Gordon, Private Secretary to Mr Roper [Head of the Liverpool office of the Leyland Line] that one of the London directors, a Mr Matheson KC, had threatened to resign if I were permitted to remain in the company, and on August 13th I was told by the Marine Superintendent that the company could not give me another ship.
I then saw Mr Roper, who said that it was most unfortunate but the matter was out of his hands and public opinion was against me. I was therefore compelled to resign, up to which time I had been retained on full sea pay and bonus.
I [had] first read the findings of the Court of Inquiry in the Press, and while naturally not at all pleased at the references to myself, I was not unduly concerned as I was confident that matters would soon be put right. I immediately approached the Mercantile Marine Service Association, of which I was a member, and a letter putting my side of the case was published in the September 1912 issue of the Association’s magazine, The Reporter.
At a later stage, Mr A.M. Foweraker, of Carbis Bay, a gentleman whom I had never met, but who took a great interest in my case, supplied a series of detailed analyses of the evidence which were published in The Reporter and also in the Nautical Magazine under the title of A Miscarriage of Justice [April, May and June issues, 1913].
Albert Moulton Foweraker, whom Lord had ‘never met’ (and possibly never heard of) was a scientist and painter. Aged thirty-nine when he contacted Lord, he was a graduate of Christ’s College, Cambridge, with a background in chemistry, engineering and journalism. Foweraker is chiefly remembered however as a watercolourist. He died in 1942 at the age of sixty-eight.
Foweraker was convinced Lord had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice. From his contacts with Captain Lord, he appears to have obtained the basis for this sketch of the field of ice that the Californian encountered that night. We know Captain Lord drew a sketch of his own, the apparent precursor to Foweraker’s version. Lord told as much to the British Inquiry in April 1912:
7385. [Mr Dunlop] Did you prepare a rough sketch to show the position of the ice and also the course which you took from 6 a.m. to 8.30 a.m.?
[Lord] Yes, I did; I drew a rough sketch of it.
[Dunlop] I would like your Lordship to see the sketch he has made.
[The Commissioner] Hand it up. [The sketch was handed in]
[Lord] It is not to scale or anything.
7389. [The Commissioner] Where did you draw this thing? — I drew that in Boston, my Lord.
Subsequent questions elicited that Lord had prepared it alone, aboard ship, before being summoned to give evidence at the US Inquiry. He said that after Gill’s statement in the papers ‘that we were supposed to have ignored the Titanic signals, I knew at once there would be an Inquiry over it’ (7396).
The questions continue:
7397. You drew it for the purpose of showing that you had not ignored the signals? — I did it for the purpose of showing where we were, and the course we travelled on our way down to the ship.
Mersey, who said ‘You must leave this sketch with me’, also noticed a long statement in pencil on the reverse that Lord’s own counsel had not seen. It was Lord’s private notes made at the same time.
7411. Are these notes supposed to tell the story from your point of view? — Yes, private notes I made.
Lord Mersey, noticeably, immediately handed the sketch to the Attorney General. A moment previously Leyland Line counsel Robertson Dunlop asked Lord:
7406. Assuming that [Titanic] sank somewhere between 2 and 3, could you, in fact, if you had known at 1.15 a.m. in the morning that she was in distress to the southward and westward of you, have reached her before, say 3 a.m.? — No, most certainly not.
Chart showing the course of the Californian on 15 April, with the positions of wreckage and probable position of the accident according to Captain Lord (re-lettering, 1985 wreck site, collision point by author).
Lord Mersey, as we have seen however, concluded the exact opposite – that she could have saved all aboard.
The sketch, ‘not to scale or anything’, shows the course that Lord discussed and confirmed in evidence, down to his sighting of the Mount Temple, a pink-funnel steamer, and the Carpathia.
It also showed the ‘probable position of the accident according to Captain Lord’. This was marked with the legend ‘Titanic struck 11.40 p.m.’, which has been changed in this book to reflect the fact that it was Lord’s guess in 1912 as to where the Titanic foundered. Lord specified a spot at 41° 39’N, 50° 01’ W. The location of the actual wreck site has been added to the sketch, to show where the debris was found in 1985 – at 41° 43’N, 49° 56’W. Lord was out in his estimate by just four minutes of latitude and five minutes of longitude. Put another way, his guess was wrong by only 5 nautical miles for a ship he had never seen, compared with both the Titanic and the British Inquiry being wrong by 13 nautical miles in their adherence to the SOS position. The record shows the accuracy of Lord’s instincts. The present author has also added an indication of where the Titanic might have been at the time of iceberg impact – somewhere to the north and east of the debris field to allow for sinking drift.
We can compare Lord’s icefield sketch to the similar guesses of the captain of the SS Birma and the US Naval hydrographer, John J. Knapp of Washington DC.
A tale of three icefields… this sketch (shown opposite) brings together the plotted positions of the floe ice according to US hydrographer John Knapp, left, Captain Lord, middle, and Captain Ludwig Stulping of the SS Birma, right. Clearly both Captains Lord and Stulping disagreed with Knapp, and unlike him were there at the time.
A position given for the southern extremity of the icefield, 41° 20’ N, 50° 02’ W, later given by Captain Gambell of the Virginian, also contradicts Knapp, who had the field much further west to ‘allow’ the Titanic to reach the SOS position. Similar contradictions of Knapp were given by the Mount Temple and Carpathia.
Added material to the amalgamated chart shows the actual location of the wreck, discovered in 1985, a fraction over 13 miles to the east and south of the SOS position. It is shown in the centre of the Birma sketch, with a deduced Titanic collision point to indicate where the iceberg may have been at its highest possible latitude. Californian’s 1912 stop position would seem roughly equidistant between this point and the SOS position (between 19½ and 20 nautical miles away by Lord’s evidence. Lord’s account of post-disaster developments now continues.
REQUESTS FOR REHEARING REFUSED
Letters were addressed to the Board of Trade both by the MMSA and by myself requesting a rehearing of that part of the Inquiry relating to the Californian. This request was consistently refused. The MMSA also sent a letter to the Attorney General [Sir Rufus Isaacs] requesting an explanation of the comment in his closing address that ‘perhaps it would not be wise to speculate on the reason which prevented the Captain of the Californian from coming out of the chartroom’ on receiving the Second Officer’s message at 1.15 a.m. This obvious reflection on my sobriety I greatly resented, for it was my invariable practice to refrain from taking alcohol in any form while at sea, quite apart from the fact that no previous reference to such a possibility had been made during the course of the Inquiry. The only reply received was that Sir Rufus was on holiday and must not be troubled with correspondence.
A tale of three icefields. This sketch brings together the plotted positions of the floe ice according to US hydrographer John Knapp, left, (see his chart no.2), Captain Lord, middle, and Captain Ludwig Stulping of the SS Birma, right.
MOUNT TEMPLE
I received a letter dated August 6th, 1912, from a Mr Baker, who had served in the Mount Temple on her return voyage from Quebec. This appeared to indicate that she was the ship seen to approach and recede from the Titanic. Although this letter was brought to the attention of the Board of Trade, no action was taken… Through Mr Baker, I met Mr Notley, the officer referred to in Mr Baker’s letters who had been taken out of the Mount Temple. He confirmed that he would give his evidence if called on to do so, but could not volunteer information because of the adverse effect this might have upon his future employment – a conclusion with which I quite agreed.
CORRESPONDENCE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
I also corresponded with others whose evidence and opinion might prove of assistance to me and received letters from Captain Rostron of the Carpathia; Mr C.H. Lightoller [second officer of the Titanic]; and Captain C.A. Bartlett, Marine Superintendent of the White Star Line.
Captain Lord’s correspondence with Lightoller, the senior surviving officer of the Titanic, drew these compassionate replies:
October 12th 1912 (on board RMS Majestic)
Dear Capt. Lord,
I can truly assure you that you have my sincerest sympathy, and I would have written to you before to that effect had I known your address. I sincerely hope that your efforts may be successful in clearing up the mystery of which you speak.
That another ship or ships might have been in the vicinity is quite possible and it seems a strange attitude for the B of T [Board of Trade] to take. I quite see how horribly hard it is for you – in fact that has been my feeling all along – and it must be doubly so with this other ship in your mind. I certainly wish you every success in clearing the matter up. Believe me, yours very sincerely,
C. H. Lightoller
And later:
December 16th 1912 (on board RMS Majestic)
Dear Capt. Lord,
We have so little time at home that my letters have to wait till I get to sea. I have read your enclosure with great interest – it certainly does seem extraordinary. All the same those Mount Temple chaps might have volunteered the information when it would have been of some use to you.
I am awfully sorry but I have not the faintest idea how her head was. You see, I just turned out and went straight to the boats, and beyond what came out in the evidence I know absolutely nothing about it or I would gladly let you know.
With regard to the steamer seen – I saw a light about two points on the port bow and could not say whether it was one or two masthead lights or a stern light – but it seemed there about 5 or 6 miles away. I did not pay much attention to it beyond calling the passengers’ attention to it for their assurance.
I really do hope you will be able to clear the matter up. As to the BT [Board of Trade], their attitude towards you is as inexplicable as in many other things – I don’t hold any brief for them.
Wishing you success. Believe me, sincerely yours,
C.H. Lightoller
Scan of the last page of a letter sent by the senior surviving Titanic officer, Charles Lightoller, to Captain Lord from aboard the Majestic and dated 15 December 1912. He wrote that he had ‘not the faintest idea how her head was’ in reference to the di
rection in which the Titanic came to rest. Shown here are his concluding remarks.
Lord goes on:
I continued my endeavours to obtain what I considered to be the justice due to me but without success, although I personally visited the House of Commons on October 23rd 1912, and engaged in correspondence with the Board of Trade during 1913.
Toward the end of 1912, I was approached by Mr [later Sir] John Latta of the Nitrate Producers Steamship Co. Ltd [Lawther, Latta & Co.], who had apparently been approached on my behalf by a Mr Frank Strachan, United States agent for the Leyland Line, who had throughout done everything possible to assist me.
After a visit to London to meet Mr Latta, I was offered an immediate command with the company and entered their service in February 1913. I served at sea throughout the First World War, and as the aftermath of the Titanic Inquiry in those days was not such as to affect me personally or professionally in any way, I decided to let the matter drop.
I continued to serve in Lawther Latta’s until ill-health compelled me to retire in March 1927. Sir John Latta’s opinion of my service as a shipmaster is given in the reference I received from the company.
After my retirement I was unaware of any adverse reference to the Californian in respect of the Titanic disaster, as I have never been a filmgoer and was not attracted towards any books on the subject. Latterly my eyesight also began to deteriorate and the amount of reading I could do was consequently considerably curtailed. However I noted some extracts from a book called A Night to Remember in the Liverpool evening newspaper, the Liverpool Echo, although the brief extracts which I read – which did not contain any reference to the Californian – did not impress me.
