by Mitt Romney
One positive exception: the disarmament of Libya, which followed our invasion of Iraq. A suddenly chastened and fearful Qaddafi threw open his secret arsenal of chemical weapons and his nuclear program; American diplomats arranged for the transfer of it all out of the country. Here, military power opened the door to a diplomatic success and we took advantage of the opening to execute not a treaty promising disarmament of Libya’s WMD, but actual disarmament.
We have been particularly ineffective in enhancing diplomatic power by exploiting the potential of our alliances and our associations with other nations. America is of course strongest when our friends are standing with us. We have a base of friends in NATO, yes, but to date we have found it difficult to bring together its member nations to jointly confront our most pressing threats. NATO does fully participate in the peacekeeping in the Balkans, but it was American resolve led by former president Bill Clinton that stopped the bloodletting there. And NATO has agreed to join the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, and that is no small accomplishment. But in the case of some nations, the commitment of fighting forces lags far behind where it ought to be. And the NATO countries have yet to adopt the kind of comprehensive, collaborative mission to defeat radical jihadism that has been proposed, for example, by Spain’s former prime minister, José María Aznar. Even after repeated devastating blows from the jihadists across Europe, our alliance still balks at implementing the far-reaching strategy that is required.
It is not only in NATO and Europe where we have underperformed in constructing productive, results-oriented associations with our friends and allies. In Asia, our policies and initiatives often come off as ad hoc and uncoordinated. In Latin America, our friends are mystified by our inaction and inattention to the spread of Castro’s and Chávez’s radicalism and anti-Americanism. And in Africa, even as former president George W. Bush’s humanitarian programs have won the admiration of tens of millions, we have seemed powerless in the face of genocide and perpetual civil wars.
There are some who look to the United Nations as a vehicle for us to exercise soft power. But looking at the appalling ineffectiveness of the United Nations and its inclinations toward authoritarian regimes, it may serve as a pulpit, but it is no actor in the cause of freedom and human rights. Its Security Council is hamstrung by China and Russia; even Syria, a state sponsor of terror, was only recently a member. The United Nations stood by as Hussein slaughtered Kurds and Shia, as nearly a million people were murdered in Sudan and Darfur, and as Syria flaunted the sovereignty of Lebanon and killed tens of thousands of Lebanese. Only when democratic Israel acts in Lebanon to defend itself from Hezbollah attacks does the United Nations snap into high dudgeon.
It is long past time for America to strengthen and effectively deploy our soft power. There should be no misunderstanding of the fact that soft power is real power; that it can and does affect world events. The Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 is only one example.
When conflict broke out between Hezbollah and Israel, many observers were surprised to see Hezbollah garner so much support among many of the Lebanese people. Hezbollah was launching rockets from Lebanese neighborhoods, making them the open targets of Israeli retaliation, but nonetheless, large segments of the Lebanese people, including a majority of Shia, cheered Hezbollah, even offering its soldiers refuge and logistical support. Many Americans were stunned by the deep well of support for the terrorists that began the war and that brought so much punishment down upon the Lebanese people.
A good deal of the support for Hezbollah stemmed, of course, from deep-seated anti-Israel sentiment and resentment. But it was also the result of Hezbollah’s long effort to help the Shia community by building village schools, health clinics, and a wide array of other social services. Israeli officials with whom I spoke explained that Hezbollah contributed only a few million dollars a year to this effort, but it was money very effectively spent. In this instance, soft power meant real power for the Hezbollah.
And where were we when the Hezbollah were building their support? A few years before the war broke out, we had celebrated Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution as a victory for democracy. But following the toasts and self-congratulations, we and our Western allies effectively declared victory over Syria and went home. When we did, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and the Syrian secret police remained to go about the long-term work of changing hearts and minds, and in some cases, to wield the intimidation of assassination. Why didn’t we or other nations like France, which has long and still-important ties to the country, invest in the villages and families of Lebanon? Why didn’t we aggressively promote soft power, particularly when democracy was so fragile and just gaining root? And why didn’t we push Syria out, firmly and finally, when we had the chance to do so?
Perhaps the simple and unacceptable answer is that no one of substantial stature and clout was paying attention. Beyond assistant secretaries and State Department bureaucrats, who in the United States is charged with thinking about Lebanon every day? Who will be held personally accountable if Lebanon retreats back into its status as Syria’s puppet? Who has the resources—including money—to implement a soft-power strategy? Who can direct experts at the U.S. Agency for International Development to partner with the Department of Health and Human Services to help design a medical clinic? Who can direct the Department of Education to help design a school for a Lebanese village? Who can hire local contractors to build a clinic, a school, or a water project? No one.
If an official in this country wanted to secure funds for medical clinics and schools in Lebanon, he or she would have to go before committees and subcommittees of Congress, before agencies and departments of the executive branch, and then—if by some miracle money was authorized and appropriated—they would have to follow federal-contracting rules to get them built. By that point, Hezbollah would be firmly ensconced. Given the encouraging Lebanese elections of 2009, we have an opportunity to learn from and rectify our mistakes of the past.
Global strategist Thomas P. M. Barnett has written important books on the past and future uses of American soft power. In The Pentagon’s New Map and subsequent volumes, Barnett argues that connecting the gap to the developed world is the most effective and important of all American initiatives. Barnett is an apostle of soft power, and while his message cannot replace the necessity of a robust military establishment and the willingness to use it when required, the soft-power doctrines he extols should become routine components of the projection of American power abroad.
Our government is not presently configured to allow for such deployments of soft power. Beyond State Department bureaucracy, who in the United States with authority and power is focused every day on Latin America, for instance, and is responsible for moving its nations toward freedom and free enterprise? Who can draw on already appropriated funds to support charities, initiatives, and projects throughout Latin America in order to encourage people and politicians to adopt and abide by the principles of liberal democracy? No one.
You can be sure that opposition forces are not so inattentive or powerless in the deployment of soft-power initiatives. Go anywhere in Latin America and ask people if they have heard of Operation Miracle, for example. Of course, they will tell you, that’s the surgery Fidel Castro provides to cure cataracts. America spends far more on humanitarian aid in Latin America than does Castro, but his aid is known, branded, promoted—and is therefore more effective. Our relative ineffectiveness in the battle for the hearts and minds of South America’s emerging powers is startling.
Our nation’s military once faced a similar problem of accountability gaps when it came to performance. No one person was responsible for pursuing our military objectives in a given region. Each branch of service had its own command structure, and the regions of the several service commands often had different boundaries. Plans, priorities, and budgets regularly ran up against the barriers erected between the services. In other words, the situation was similar to our soft-power failures today.
After World War II, President Truman moved to impose accountability on the military, and approved a plan that divided the world into military regions and selected a single commander to be responsible for each region—for establishing military priorities, programs, objectives, and foreign-military relationships—across every branch of the service. And it has worked. Astonishingly well. Military success and failure are never orphans in the world of the American military. Every breakthrough or setback is owned by a very specific chain of command that ends in a very specific commander.
The same thing should be done to advance our soft-power effectiveness. The world should be divided into regions, preferably the same regions as those of the military. One individual—only one—would have responsibility to lead the promotion of democracy, freedom, stability, and free enterprise in that region. We might call this person a regional presidential envoy or the ambassador from CENTCOM or any of the other regional military commands. The title doesn’t matter. The authority and the accountability do.
Every year, an independent agency would gauge progress in that region using defined metrics and then report to the nation whether and to what extent the envoy was succeeding. The envoy would be given a budget, and he or she could call on the resources of federal agencies and departments to support this effort, using previously authorized budget dollars to compensate that department. The envoy could act innovatively, implementing plans and programs that were uniquely positioned to succeed in that region. The envoy’s sole mission would be to exercise soft power throughout their region, building more effective alliances, strengthening friendships, coordinating with NGOs, and working collaboratively against common adversaries. President Obama appears to have addressed this opportunity with the appointment of special envoys like former senator George Mitchell, Richard Holbrooke, and Dennis Ross. But these ad hoc arrangements lack the enduring commitment that will enhance credibility and success. The long-standing State Department bureaucracy, often staffed with wonderfully intentioned but hamstrung career diplomats, have seen special envoys come and go on a regular basis. We need to overhaul the country-by-county ambassador/career/CIA divisions within our embassies—a nineteenth-century system that was outmoded even before twenty-first-century communications systems revolutionized soft power.
It would be ideal if other allied nations created similar regional positions, and if we coordinated our efforts with theirs. France, for example, might play a leading role in Lebanon and among a number of nations in Africa; Spain could exercise its soft power with Cuba; and Britain could sustain important relationships with former colonies in Africa and Asia. NATO and new alliances could move beyond military missions to the promotion of stability, modernity, and democracy—alliances that would collaborate in addressing regional and global concerns.
There is growing urgency for the United States and the West to strengthen our soft-power effectiveness. Radical forces are competing with us to indoctrinate and mobilize large impoverished communities such as those in Somalia, Gaza, Bangladesh, and the Sahel region of Africa. These are areas, among others, where jihadists are being recruited in large numbers and where anti-Americanism is on the rise. The intelligent application of our soft power is critical if we are to counter the campaigns that have been unleashed by the radicals.
In the Islamist world, soft power is real power. The Muslim Brotherhood invests heavily in soft-power initiatives, as do Hamas and Hezbollah. Radical Saudi interests have long directed large appropriations of petro dollars into the penetration of Muslim communities in both Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Our soft-power responses to these initiatives, on the other hand, have either been nonexistent or applied ineffectively. Indeed, in many instances where U.S. funds were sent to help local communities, they were directed to the very people and organizations that had been indoctrinated by the radicals. In the war of ideas, our enemies have used our own soft power against us.
In a world in which we encounter both regional and global challenges, America must act decisively to build and exercise greater soft power. It is relatively inexpensive, it can help us promote freedom, and it may spare us from the tragedy and cost of armed conflict.
The Weight of Hard Power
Depend upon it, sir, the great Samuel Johnson remarked, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.
It is, of course, hard power—military might—that concentrates the minds of our adversaries. Nations with substantial hard power are generally the most able to influence the actions of others.
It is American military might that dictated the outcome of World War I and World War II, and which steadily but surely wore down the Soviet Union until the cost of the attempt to keep up with us exhausted their energy and brought about the Evil Empire’s collapse. Military might has always counted most when nations compete. Military power influences events even when it is not actually used.
This fact has not been lost on nations like North Korea and Iran. They have pursued nuclear weapons at great expense and some risk in part to satisfy their military aims, but also because of the influence that hard power can give them. It is Russia’s hard-power prowess, particularly its nuclear arsenal, which accounts for a measure of its disproportionate sway in global affairs, along with its energy stranglehold on Europe
If military might is the core of hard power, America is in a league of its own. Even so, there are those who like to overstate the extent of our military advantage, believing as they do that our military investment is excessive and disproportionate with our needs. One of the most frequent sights along the 2008 national campaign trail was a billboard trailer pulled behind an activist’s car that claimed that the defense budget is a shocking 50 percent of the national budget. But the chart is the product of accounting hocus-pocus. Their figures include only the budget’s discretionary spending. When all federal spending is included, defense is 20 percent of the total.
Reports of America’s share of worldwide defense spending can also be misleading. According to official budgets, we are responsible for about 48 percent of the entire world’s defense spending—approximately ten times the amount spent by China or by Russia. But again, reported numbers do not tell the real story. First, some countries simply do not report all their military expenditures. China, for example, does not include expenses for strategic forces, military purchases from foreign countries, or the cost of military-related research and development. So while its reported military budget in 2007 was 46 billion, its actual annual spending is estimated to be in the range of 100 billion to 140 billion.
Some analysts make an additional currency adjustment when comparing spending and resources in China with our own: rather than converting the Chinese yuan into U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate, they use the Purchase Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate, which compares the cost of a basket of goods in the United States with the same goods in China and then adjusts the currency accordingly. Because things generally cost less in China than they do here, applying the PPP exchange rate to Chinese military spending produces a Chinese defense budget range of approximately 240 billion to 340 billion—quite a different figure than the 46 billion that is reported.
But even the PPP adjustment is misleading when comparing the relative cost of specific resources like soldiers and ships and airplanes. For example, it costs the United States 129 billion a year to field 1.5 million troops. China, by contrast, can raise an army of 2 million troops—33 percent more men and women than in our combined services—for only about 25 billion annually. If their cost per soldier were the same as ours, instead of spending 25 billion for their troops, they would have to spend 172 billion. China’s lower troop cost is largely the result of conscription and the nation’s low wage rates.
For all these reasons, if you were to accept the argument of the activists opposed to the defense budget’s size and you were to look at reported defense spending figures as a measure of the military strength of the two countries, you would get a very inaccurat
e impression. If China’s cost to employ a soldier and to purchase an item of military hardware were identical to those that are paid in the United States, its budget would be closer to half the size of ours, not the one-tenth that is reported.
China and other nations also enjoy other cost-saving advantages. The United States invests heavily to ensure that we continue to lead in defense technology—which we must—but our invention and research is regularly incorporated by foes and friends alike, at no cost to them. Sometimes it’s stolen through espionage, and sometimes it simply becomes widely available in the marketplace. In 1967, I attended the Paris World Air Show at Le Bourget Airport. America’s Grumman F-11 fighter was proudly displayed on the tarmac, cordoned off by velvet ropes and closely guarded by a number of U.S. military personnel. And oddly, it seemed to me, its landing gear was partially retracted, so it sat quite low to the ground. I asked a friendly soldier why, and he explained that the landing gear’s design was innovative and his superiors didn’t want people with cameras to get too close a look.
America’s military innovations go far beyond landing gear, of course, and foreign nations employ decidedly more sophisticated techniques for stealing them than simply snapping photos at air shows. The FBI identifies China, in fact, as having an aggressive and wide-ranging effort aimed at acquiring advanced technologies from the United States. So aggressive has the People’s Republic of China’s quest for our technology been that the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency lists China as our leading espionage threat. The weapons we spend billions of dollars to develop for our defense are often simply appropriated at a fraction of the cost by our competitors.
