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TO
JOHN LEE
CONTENTS
Cover
Welcome Page
Dedication
INTRODUCTION
Chapter One: STRATEGY
Chapter Two: TACTICS
Chapter Three: PREPARATIONS
Chapter Four: ZERO HOUR
Chapter Five: THE FIRST OF JULY
Chapter Six: AFTERMATH
Chapter Seven: LESSONS LEARNED
CONCLUSION
Preview
Appendix: The Order of Battle
Select Bibliography
Notes to the text
Index
Acknowledgements
List of Illustrations
About Elegy
Reviews
About Andrew Roberts
Also by Andrew Roberts
An Invitation from the Publisher
Copyright
INTRODUCTION
‘We have made a covenant with Death and with Hell we are in agreement.’
Isaiah 28:15
‘Has the enemy’s front line been captured?’ asked the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Newfoundland Regiment, Lt.-Col. Arthur Hadow. The reply he received from his 88th Brigade headquarters was terse: ‘The situation is not cleared up.’ It was 8.45 a.m. on the morning of Saturday, 1 July 1916—a beautiful summer’s morning with a clear blue sky—and Hadow had been given orders by his immediate superior, Brig. Douglas E. Cayley, to advance ‘as soon as possible’ to support the attack of the 87th Brigade on the German trenches situated in front of ‘Y’ Ravine at Beaumont Hamel north of the river Ancre in Picardy. He inquired whether ‘as soon as possible’ meant that he was expected to attack without the support of the 1st Battalion of the Essex Regiment on his right flank, and was told that it did.1 The Newfoundlanders were going to have to attack alone.
The Newfoundlanders had been crouching in support trenches behind the front lines awaiting the signal to attack since long before dawn. They had made their way up from their billets behind the lines in the pretty French town of Louvencourt at 9 p.m. the previous evening, so that they would not need to spend more than one night in the crowded, wet, dangerous trenches mired in sticky, yellowish mud. As they had marched out of Louvencourt, one of the men attached to the Lewis machine gun unit, Pte. Charlie ‘Ginger’ Byrnes of the 2nd Battalion the Hampshire Regiment, noticed how ‘Those people lining the village street, some of them were crying. Tears pouring down their faces. Well, I thought to meself, that’s cheerful, that is. Right bloody cheerful, that’s what.’2
PICARDY LANDSCAPE
A watercolour by Louis Welden Hawkins (1849–1910) showing the Somme countryside as it was before warfare destroyed it.
The Newfoundlanders had written their wills before leaving home. ‘I am on the point of leaving for England to fight for a great and just cause, for all that Englishmen the world over hold dear,’ wrote a second lieutenant from the island’s capital, St John’s,
in a word, for material existence. If am called upon to lay down my life, I hope the glory of the cause will fully comfort any who might mourn for me. I must record my admiration for my dear wife’s brave self-sacrifice, devotion and unflinching courage. So far from trying to dissuade me from the duty which lay clear before me, she has by her noble self-control and sympathetic love given me the encouragement and help I always knew she would. Of my beloved parents I must add that none have ever enjoyed better, or ever will. May God bless and keep them well. Farewell.3
That young subaltern was killed in the Battle of Monchy-le-Preux in April 1917, but his sentiments were fully representative of those of his comrades who fell on the first day of the Somme Offensive.
The Newfoundlanders had marched up to their support trenches and dugouts at St John’s Road (so named by the South Wales Borderers as a compliment) and Clonmel Avenue (named for the town in Tipperary) at 2 a.m. on 1 July, a full five-and-a-half hours before the general infantry assault timed for 7.30 a.m., ‘Z Hour’. They were to form part of the second wave of the vast British assault, and were intended to attack at 10.40 a.m., passing through the first echelons of the 87th Brigade, comprising the 2nd South Wales Borderers and 1st Border Regiment, and then regrouping on Station Road far behind enemy lines, before going on to capture Puisieux Trench a full 2 miles (3.2 km) away.4 That was the original plan, at least; in fact no-one in either brigade was even so much as to glimpse Station Road that day.
‘For officers there was no rest’, recalled the Newfoundlanders’ adjutant, Capt. Arthur Raley MC,
but the men, very tired after five hours marching, were soon asleep except of course for sentries, etc. Lewis gunners overhauled their guns and each man was roused in turn to have his equipment inspected. Another tedious duty was the issuing of further battle stores to those previously detailed to carry them. These stores consisted chiefly of trench bridges and ladders, to be carried by two men each, and Bangalore torpedoes… With inspections and issues of stores having been completed, there was only the wait for Zero Hour… Most of the men dozed, the officers strolled about their various commands chatting to groups in each firebay and giving final little bits of advice. Cigarette smoking was allowed and altogether it was very much like the final few minutes before a big football match. The British artillery was keeping up a continuous roar; so much firing was going on that the sharp crack of the field guns was almost reduced to nothing by the ceaseless rush of the shells overhead. Slowly the sky in the East grew lighter and as day broke a last meal was taken by all ranks… At 6 a.m. everybody was alert and the final wait had commenced.5
At 6.30 a.m. the men heard what Capt. Raley described as ‘the hurricane bombardment’ of the German front-line trenches as the now seven-day-long barrage against the enemy’s positions built to a crescendo. ‘The noise was now kept at a steady pitch; there was no break in the sound at all; in fact it seemed as if the sound was felt rather than heard, the air suddenly seeming to increase in weight.’6 It had been the heaviest bombardment in the history of warfare.
Officers synchronized their watches at 7.15 a.m. and then at 7.20 a.m. troops on both sides of no man’s land heard the tremendous explosion of an enormous mine on Hawthorn Ridge only a thousand yards (914 m) away from the Newfoundlanders’ trenches. Ten minutes later the sound of other units’ officers blowing their whistles signalled the first attack in the ‘Big Push’ that everyone—Germans, Britons, Newfoundlanders alike—had been expecting for months.
The ear-splitting sound of German artillery shells hitting the Newfoundlanders’ own positions, however, soon made it clear that the enemy’s guns had not been silenced, as the men had been assured that they would. Furthermore, trench raids over the previous few days had discovered that the British artillery bombardment had not cut through the dense rolls of barbed wire in no man’s land as deeply as the gunners had hoped. Worst of all, the huge number of wounded men hobbling and crawling back from the 87th Brigade’s initial attack soon told its own worrying story, for within a few minutes it had suffered over two thousand casualties without even reaching the wire. Yet the Newfoundlanders were not downhearted; they had waited for over two years to get to grips with the enemy, and this would be their chance.
Because the wounded of 87th Brigade were entirely blocking the communication trenches that the Newfoundlanders needed to use in order to reach the front line, the decision was taken that they would have to attack from the support trenches in which they were now congregated, a full 250 yards (228 m) to the rear of the frontline assembly trenches. Collecting his company c
ommanders together for a quick conference at 8.45 a.m., Hadow explained that there was now no time to come up with any new tactics for the changed situation, so the assault would have to use the same formation that had been practised for three weeks behind the lines at Louvencourt, whereby A and B Companies moved forward in lines abreast, followed by C and D Companies. The attack would have to cover the extra distance to the Newfoundlanders’ own front line in the open. Orders to subalterns and non-commissioned officers were relayed, and at 9.15 a.m. Brigade Headquarters (HQ) was told: ‘The Newfoundlanders are moving.’7
Hadow climbed out of the trench first, carrying, as he always did, his thick ash walking stick. When he had advanced 20 yards (18 m) he gave the signal and, in the words of one observer, ‘immediately the parapet swarmed with men. From each corner of every traverse [trench] men came pouring. With remarkable precision they took up their correct position in their sections.’8 For the first minute or so, it was a textbook operation.
MUD
Although mud was not a factor on the first day of the Somme Offensive, it was an almost ubiquitous feature in Western Front trench warfare.
Morale was high: when the news had got round that a rich society beauty from St John’s had promised to marry the first member of the regiment to win a Victoria Cross (VC), the single men had made up a battle cry with which they now went over the top: ‘Buxom Bessie or a wooden leg!’ The regimental historian recorded how, ‘All appeared to be in excellent spirits and confident in their ability to do the task assigned them.’9 Only a few days earlier, on 26 June, the commander of 29th Division, Maj.-Gen. Henry de Beauvoir de Lisle, had addressed the Newfoundland Regiment on parade and told them that the British 4th Army would fire 45,000 tons (40,823 tonnes) of ammunition at the German trenches, enough shells, he said, to fill 46 miles (74 km) of railway trucks. He added that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and French army’s 263 battalions on the Somme faced only thirty-two German battalions, which it would take the enemy a full week to reinforce. Lt. Owen Steele summarized the general’s speech with the words, ‘So we need fear nothing.’ The fact that the Germans actually had thirty-three regiments, each consisting of the equivalent of three battalions, was either not known by de Lisle or not mentioned by him.10
At divisional HQ after 7.30 a.m. on 1 July, de Lisle had somehow come to the early conclusion that his attacks were going far better than they were. Observers had exaggerated the strength of the groups from 87th Brigade that were moving forward unchecked, and crucially there were also reports of white flares being fired into the air, the signal that frontline trenches had been captured. He therefore ordered his reserve 88th Brigade under Brig.-Gen. Cayley to send two battalions behind the 87th along the Beaumont Hamel–Auchonvillers road. They were to attack without artillery support, with only a barrage from the 88th Machine Gun Company to suppress enemy fire.11 It later transpired that the white flares had in fact been fired by the Germans in the front-line trenches to signal to their own artillery that shells were falling short.12
Cayley’s orders to Hadow had been to advance from St John’s Road and Clonmel Avenue and pass through the narrow gaps in the four belts of British barbed wire that covered a slight hill running down towards the German trenches and then penetrate the Germans’ barbed wire in the middle of no man’s land—and all in broad daylight. ‘A more deadly piece of ground to cross it is hard to imagine,’ recalled Capt. Raley. ‘From the very start it was obvious that the enemy were not only extremely well prepared for an attack but were actually expecting it… Before the Newfoundland officer had finished synchronizing his watch, wounded men of the South Wales Borderers were flopping back over the parapet. In spite of our tremendous gunfire the enemy machine gunners and riflemen were firing as only well-trained men could.’ As well as being heavily wired, the German defences in front of Beaumont Hamel were deeply dug in, with Y Ravine in particular boasting many deep shelters. To the east, the ridge gave the Germans perfect observation of every movement in and from the British trenches.13 From the German trenches at Y Ravine at Beaumont Hamel today, it is easy to spot with the naked eye individuals standing where the Newfoundlanders’ trenches were sited.
‘It was daylight by then,’ recalled ‘Ginger’ Byrnes of the moments just prior to going over the top,
GERMAN DUGOUT
The Germans’ dugouts on the Somme were far deeper and more sophisticated than the British and French suspected.
lovely morning it was. I heard the rattle of machine gun fire: you could always hear that above everything else. After a while the [87th Brigade’s] wounded started… streaming down in fours and fives, one fellow helping another along; there didn’t seem to be any end to them. You got to thinking there couldn’t be many left out there. Of course you can’t see anything from the bottom of a trench. So we moved out of the way for the wounded… I put the ammo box over my shoulder, thinking, I dunno! If we’re going, I wish we’d go and get it over with. But still we stayed there. The officer came back, then went away. He did this about four times at about twenty minute intervals. He kept on looking at his watch. The last time he appeared he said ‘Come on lads. Time we went.’ They had a scaling ladder in this bay: that was a wooden ladder with about four rungs. The officer went first, then the other two chaps, then me. Of course I had those ruddy ammo boxes and my rifle, so I didn’t go over the top with dash you might say—more of a humping and scrambling really. No yelling ‘Charge’ or anything like that. I kept my eye on the officer ahead. He turned to wave us fellers on and then down he went—just as though he was bloody pole-axed. I just kept moving… there were blokes lying everywhere.14
The men set off at 9.15 a.m. in the direction which today can be traced from the splendid statue of a defiant caribou at the Beaumont Hamel Memorial Park towards what is now the Y Ravine cemetery. Within moments of clambering out of their trenches and dressing their lines, they were submitted to a devastating machine gun barrage that scythed men down long before they could even reach their own front line. German Maxim machine guns were capable of firing 500 bullets a minute, and the shape of the German trench line they were attacking in Y Ravine meant that the Newfoundlanders were caught in a concave front, with the enemy able to deliver enfilading crossfire as well as a direct frontal fusillade. The tiered German defences at Beaumont Hamel allowed their machine guns to cover the whole British front from no fewer than three separate supporting lines of trenches.15 Y Ravine ran east–west, but vitally it had a pronounced salient around its head, meaning that if it was not destroyed or captured early on, the machine guns there would also be able to pour enfilading fire on men attacking either side of it. The 2nd South Wales Borderers were destroyed in a matter of a few minutes after Z Hour, and in that time the gaps in the wire were revealed to the German machine gunners.16
GERMAN MACHINE GUNNERS
An enemy gun position on 15 July 1916: the amount of overhead cover suggests it is part of the German second main line position.
Just as disastrously, the machine guns from all around the sector could now concentrate entirely on the Newfoundlanders, since the 1st Essex Regiment would not be ready to attack for another forty minutes due to the total congestion of its trenches by the wounded from 87th Brigade. One artillery observer reported that the Newfoundlanders were dropping dead and wounded at every yard, yet the battalion pressed on without faltering. To make matters worse, because the commander of VIII Corps, to which 88th Brigade belonged, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, had, along with so many others in the High Command, convinced himself that the preliminary bombardment would destroy the German positions, the men had been ordered to advance at walking pace to conserve energy, and were loaded down with an average of 66 lbs (30 kg) of equipment each. ‘The only visible sign that the men knew they were under this terrific fire’, wrote Raley, ‘was that they instinctively tucked their chins into an advanced shoulder as they had done so often when fighting their way home in a blizzard in some little outpost in far off Newfoundland.�
��17
Despite attacking without artillery support across half a mile (0.8 km) of downward-sloping open ground in full view and range of the German machine guns and other ordnance, Capt. Jim Ledingham’s A Company and Joe Nunns’ B Company got through the second and third belts of British barbed wire, albeit with heavy losses. A hundred yards (91.4 m) behind them Capt. Rex Rowsell’s C Company came on, carrying picks and shovels as well as rifles and bayonets, and next to them D Company. It was only once A and B Companies got through the British wire that they could even see the German trenches hundreds of yards ahead of them, scars and slight ramparts in the earth beyond the German wire. Captain Nunns was shot in the leg when he had gone just beyond the British wire and ordered a subaltern, Lt. Hubert Herder, to take command of the company. Picking up his platoon sergeant’s rifle and bayonet—the Newfoundland officers had gone into action carrying revolvers—Herder shouted ‘Come on, boys!’ before being mortally wounded himself.18*1
By then German artillery—largely untouched by counter-battery fire from the Royal Artillery—was pouring shrapnel across the 750 yards (686 m) of front that the Newfoundlanders were attacking, and the corpses of young soldiers were piling up around a clump of trees and stumps bereft of leaves, including the petrified skeleton of one that is still there today, known as the ‘Danger Tree’.
Small parties that did manage to make it there, and orientate themselves towards a gap in the German wire, drew the machine-gunners’ special attention, not least because they were silhouetted on the horizon and hard to miss. Near that tree fell Frank Lind, who two days earlier had written a letter to the Daily News back home saying, ‘Tell everyone that they may feel proud of the Newfoundland Regiment.’
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