was now very clear to all that the regent’s control of the army was not as he had supposed. His authority over the troops, gained in hard campaigning in Cappadocia and Pisidia, was now undermined. Certainly Adea/Eurydice compromised
Perdiccas’ control over King Philip. The incident with Cynnane demonstrated that
the marriage to Cleopatra, despite the risks involved, was essential if the empire was to remain intact (cf. Just. 13.6.4).14 Eumenes, who had likely remained in
contact with Cleopatra (Anson 2004: 89 n. 45), was ordered secretly to reopen
negotiations concerning a marriage (Arr. Succ. 1a.26). Plans were now made for an invasion of Macedonia (Diod. 18.23.3, 25.3, 6). These plans would involve the very body of the dead Alexander. Initial y, as decided by the principes in Babylon in the same meeting that had seen the distribution of the satrapies, likely in response to Alexander’s own wishes, the former king’s corpse was to journey to Siwah for final internment (Diod. 18.3.5; cf. 18.28.3), but Perdiccas now determined to accompany the dead king to Macedonia. After two years of construction, Alexander’s
ornate funeral carriage had begun its journey west, led by the Macedonian
nobleman Arrhidaeus, leaving Babylon in early September 321 (Diod. 18.3.5, 28.2;
Anson 1986: 212–17).15 The carriage had taken “almost exactly two years to
complete” (Diod. 18.28.2). It was drawn by sixty-four mules, all outfitted with
gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18.27.5). Therefore, while the
carriage was completed by June of 321, it is unlikely that it began its journey until late August at the earliest, given that the hottest months of the year in Mesopotamia are July and August with a daylight mean of more than 100 °F. A departure in late
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August, with the travel time being approximately three months, would place the
carriage’s arrival in the Syria in the winter of 321/20 (Anson 1986: 212–13).
The importance of the dead conqueror’s body was that all things associated
with Alexander were sources of authority with the Macedonian veterans. In 318,
Eumenes and his forces formal y worshiped the dead king (Diod. 18.60.5–61.3;
Plut. Eum. 13.5–8; Polyaen. 4.8.2). The propaganda value of returning Alexander’s body to his homeland for Perdiccas, then, is obvious, although the assumption that possession of the body conferred legitimacy of rule is to give the corpse too much power.16 However, to arrive in Macedonia conveying the dead king, in the company
of the kings, as Cleopatra’s husband, and likely met by Alexander’s mother, would have made Perdiccas invincible. With this change in policy, Perdiccas now likely
responded to the earlier overtures from the Aetolians and the Athenian leader
Demades (Diod. 18.48.2; Arr. Succ. 1a.14). It was at this time also that Eumenes began his ascendancy to the position of chief advisor to the regent. Eumenes’ arguments for the inevitability of hostilities with Antipater and the importance of the marriage to Cleopatra now seemed proven.
In the winter of 321/20, Antigonus fled to Europe (Diod. 18.25.3–5; Arr. Succ.
1a.24; [Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B F-10, 11), where he found Antipater and Craterus in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia (Diod. 18.25.1–3). Since
being initial y summoned, Antigonus had given every indication that he meant
to defend himself against the charges, but all the while he clandestinely had
planned his flight to Europe (Diod. 18.23.3–4). Additional y, he had prepared for his eventual return to Asia by cementing his ties with Menander, the satrap in
Lydia, and possibly with Asander in Caria (Heckel 2006: 57). While it has been
argued that Asander and Menander remained loyal to Perdiccas until the success-
ful crossing to Asia by Antipater and Craterus (Briant 1989: 189, 208, cf. 169),17
there is evidence which suggests that Menander, at least, was deeply involved with Antigonus in the plot to draw Antipater and Craterus to Asia. Diodorus (18.23.3)
indicates that Antigonus was well informed of the intrigues involving Cleopatra
and Perdiccas. Menander as satrap of Lydia was ideal y situated to know of the
activities involving Cleopatra, since she was then resident in Sardis. Moreover,
when Antigonus returned to Asia early in 320 with but 3000 troops, both Asander
and Menander joined him without hesitation (Arrian Succ. 25.1–2, 26). Perhaps, the two satraps also feared Perdiccas’ “ambitions” (cf. Diod. 18.23.3; Hauben 1977: 92–3), or were simply reacting to Perdiccas’ often heavy-handed administration.
In addition to his actions against Antigonus, Menander, while remaining in
command of the military forces in Lydia, was apparently made subservient to
the authority of Cleopatra (Arr. Succ. 25.2).
A number of scholars have argued that Perdiccas was not personal y ambitious;
everything he did was to preserve the unity of the empire (Vezin 1907: 35–6;
Fontana 1960: 64–5).18 Perdiccas’ marriage to Cleopatra was, then, necessary to
increase the regent’s prestige and enable him to resist the forces of disintegration. It would appear difficult to defend all of the regent’s actions on this basis, especial y those against members of the royal family. He had countenanced Roxane’s murder
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57
of Stateira, one of Alexander’s Persian wives (Plut. Alex. 77.6), and the murder of Cynnane. While it has been claimed that by these actions Perdiccas only wanted
to prevent the emergence of a new dynasty from the descendants of Philip chal-
lenging Alexander’s son, Alexander IV (Rathmann 2005b: 65), this argument does
not explain his double-dealing with Antipater. While it is clear that Ptolemy was disloyal to the central government, having murdered Cleomenes, who had been
appointed in Babylon as his second-in-command (Paus. 1.6.3), soon after his
arrival in Egypt, and annexing the Greek city of Cyrene in Libya without authori-
zation (Diod. 18.19–21), Antipater was not. As indicated earlier, Antipater deferred to the regent. Perdiccas’ treacherous dealings with the Aetolians and with Demades did not serve the interests of centralization, only Perdiccas’ personal ambitions.
“Perdikkas’ career is an unfortunate tale of lofty ideals combined with excessive ambition and political myopia” (Heckel 1992: 151).
Upon his arrival in Macedonia, Antigonus warned Antipater of Perdiccas’
designs (Diod. 18.25.3; Arr. Succ. 1a.24). He stated that Perdiccas would soon divorce Nicaea and marry Cleopatra as a preliminary to proclaiming himself king
and invading Macedonia. Whatever proof Antigonus supplied, it was convincing.
Antipater and Craterus immediately made peace with the Aetolians and began to
prepare for an invasion of Asia (Diod. 18.25.3–5). It is difficult to believe that anything but the most damning evidence would have brought about this abrupt
reversal of policy. Even though Antigonus and Antipater were formal y “friends,”
Antigonus had supplied no help to Antipater in the Lamian War, and later when
Antipater and Craterus did invade Asia they were prepared to acknowledge, much
to the detriment of the Phrygian satrap, Eumenes’ control of Asia Minor in return for an alliance (Plut. Eum. 5.6). The philoi, friends, were the descendants of the Macedonian hetairoi, or king’s companions, described in the Introduction. This concept of formal friendship was retained in two relationships: the relationship of a superior with his advisors and lieutenants, and that among relative equals. In the first circumstance, while maintaining a sense of camaraderie, subordinates were
clearly under the authority of their superior (Le Bohec 1985; Billows 1990: 281–2).
In the second, these so-called friendshi
ps were little more than ritualized relationships in which those so joined were to render one another reciprocal services. In much the way in-laws through marriage are joined by the formal ritual of marriage, formal friendship established a relationship that bound people together, but as in such familial relations, they could easily break down into conflict and dispute
(Herman 1987: 10–18, 29). Eumenes and Antigonus in 319 “renewed their friend-
ship,” with outward and physical signs of affection (Diod. 18.41.6; Plut. Eum. 10.5).
Yet Eumenes required that Antigonus’ nephew Polemaeus be given up as a hostage
to ensure Eumenes’ safe return from this conference with “his old friend” (Plut.
Eum. 10.5). The cause of the break in the relations between Antipater and Perdiccas, then, had little to do with Antipater’s trust in his so-called friendship with the Phrygian satrap. Antigonus must have brought to Macedonia irrefutable
evidence of Perdiccas’ plans to seize the monarchy. The source may well have been someone in Cleopatra’s immediate circle who passed that evidence through the
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conduit of Menander to Antigonus (Anson 2004: 92–3). The First War of the
Successors was now about to commence.
Before proceeding to the narrative of these events, it is necessary to speak
briefly about the chronology of these early years. Among the many difficulties in reconstructing the ancient past is arriving at a timeline of events. Ancients used many different chronological systems, when they even deigned to provide a clear
chronological framework. Years in different places and at different periods began at different starting points, were commonly based on phases of the moon, and
years were generally identified by reference to the name of some eponymous
official or officials, or to specific regnal years. Our major narrative source for the period of the Diadochi down to the preliminaries to the Battle of Ipsus in 301,
Diodorus, attempted to place his history within a chronological framework. His
effort is then to be praised, however this praise needs to be severely muted. Years in Diodorus’ narrative are indicated simultaneously by Athenian archon years,
Roman consulships, and Olympiads. None of these had the same beginning or
ending dates, so when Diodorus states that a year occurred when “Polemon was
archon, and in Rome the consuls were Lucius Papirius … and Gaius Iunius; and
in the year the Olympic Games were celebrated for the one hundred and seven-
teenth time” (Diod. 19.77.1), he is in actuality claiming to start the year in July of 312 (Polemon’s date), or on the Ides of March of 313 (the start of the Roman year prior to 153 bc), or around the time of the summer solstice, the start of the Olympic Games in 312. Diodorus, moreover, frequently starts the year, despite his dating
system, with the start of the campaigning year, typical y in the spring.19 Dating by campaigning years and by seasons was apparently the system used by Hieronymus,
Diodorus’ major source for these years (Smith 1961: 283–90; Anson 1986: 209). For example, “when Democleides was archon at Athens,” Antigonus moved from his
winter quarters in Mesopotamia. It is clear from the narrative that he did not wait until the summer to leave his camp. Unfortunately, the other surviving narrative
sources for these years are not especial y helpful for chronology. While both
Justin’s abridgment of Pompeius Trogus and Photius’ epitome of Arrian’s History of the Successors tend to narrate events in a sequential fashion, neither presents a systematic chronology; nor for these years are Plutarch’s or Nepos’ relevant
biographies more than occasional y useful chronological y.
For the years following Alexander’s death to events in 309 bc, there are now three different chronological schemes adopted by modern historians. One, the so-called
“Low Chronology,”20 which dates most events one year later than the “High
Chronology,”21 and a third, hybrid, system, that combines the aspects of each of
the two preceding arrangements (Stylianou 1994: 71–84; Boiy 2007b). The determi-
nation of the timing of the events described in this chapter is hindered by the absence in Diodorus’ often flawed chronology of any reference to two crucial years: 321/20
and 320/19. For these years, he provides none of his usual references: no archon
years, consular years, Olympic years. However, unanimity concerning the sequence
of events from Alexander’s death down to the conclusion of the First Diadoch War is beginning to appear (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 163). There are certain
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59
indications that for the years of the first conflict of the Successors the “Low
Chronology” is the correct framework. Diodorus (18.36.7) notes that Perdiccas
served as regent for three years before his death during his invasion of Egypt. Since Alexander the Great died on June 11, 323 (Depuydt 1997), a determination based on a surviving Babylonian cuneiform tablet, with the period of strife which followed his death lasting a week (Curt. 10.10.9; Bosworth 2002: 55), this would place Perdiccas’
death in the late spring or early summer of 320. This exact chronological reference to the length of Perdiccas’ regency, as well as the reference to the “almost exactly two years” associated with the building of Alexander’s funeral carriage, in all likelihood comes from Diodorus’ source (Anson 1986: 209–11), which for his Books 18–20 is
believed to be Hieronymus of Cardia. Moreover, the date is confirmed by the Parian Marble, which places Perdiccas death in the Athenian archon year 321/20 ( FGrH
239 B F-11). The Athenian year began in July. Additional y, the Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs ( BCHP 3, Obv. 23–6),22 a fragmentary chronological listing of events, indicates that Perdiccas died early in the First Diadoch War, during the fourth year of the reign of Philip III, or 320/19. The Babylonian year began with the first new moon after the vernal equinox. The Chronicle ( BCHP 3, Obv. 23) lists a battle between the king and the satrap of Egypt prior to the year 319/18, in the month
of Aiaru, or Aj ar, (Smith 1924: 140, 142, lines 3–4, 6; Grayson 1975: 115–16, lines 4–7; Del Monte 1997: 183, line 6), or May/June (Parker and Dubberstein 1956:
34, 36).23 Since there is only one time when King Philip III was in Egypt, the
reference clearly is describing Perdiccas’ invasion of Egypt, one of the major
operations of the First Diadoch War. While the year is not specified, line 26
makes reference to Philip’s fifth year, noting an event that takes place in a fol owing year. There is no significant gap in the text here, so the events in line 23 must refer to that monarch’s fourth year. While Brian Bosworth (1992a: 75–9) has argued that
Philip became king of Babylonia the year before Alexander’s death, this assumption has been shown to be incorrect and that Philip’s first regnal year in Babylonia is synonymous with the first year of this kingship as Alexander’s heir for his brother’s entire empire (Boiy 2000; Anson 2002/3: 376–80). Final y, the Babylonian Chronicle reports that Seleucus entered Babylon on November 14, 320 ( BCHP 3, Obv. 24–5).
He left for Babylon later in the same year as Perdiccas’ Egyptian expedition. While al three sources of these dating referents have limitations – Diodorus so often confused in his chronology; the Marble on occasion in clear error (Anson 2002/3: 376); and the Chronicle both fragmentary and without a definite provenance (Anson 2006a: 2–3) 24
– there is nothing in the narrative of events that would indicate that this chronology is suspect. Arguments for the high chronology with respect to this war, on the other hand, are based entirely on speculation: Philip being named the king of Babylonia in the year before Alexander’s death; Diodorus’ three years being an exaggeration. As will be note
d later, however, this chronological controversy continues for subsequent events without any clear resolution.
While Perdiccas prepared to march in the spring of 320 to Macedonia and seize
the monarchy, events taking place elsewhere were to alter these plans dramatical y.
During the winter of 321/20, Ptolemy, by prearrangement with Arrhidaeus, the
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commander in charge of the transportation of Alexander’s corpse from Babylon,
and, perhaps, also in col usion with Archon, the satrap of Babylonia, who was
subsequently removed by Perdiccas (Arr. Succ. 24.3–5), intercepted the funeral cortège and diverted it to Egypt (Diod. 18.28.2–3; Arr. Succ. 1a.25; 24–5: Str.
17.1.8). Arrhidaeus’ reason for disobeying the regent is unknown. He may have
wanted to fulfill Alexander’s original desire, or he may have become aware of
Perdiccas’ grand intentions and wished to forestall them. Like Perdiccas, Ptolemy had also realized the value in possessing Alexander’s body. Given Perdiccas’
actions concerning Antigonus, Ptolemy may have decided that it was only a matter
of time before the regent, with even stronger provocation, moved against him.
When Perdiccas discovered Arrhidaeus’ plan, he dispatched a force commanded
by Polemon and Attalus to intercept the cortège (Arr. Succ. 24.1–4; 25), but this force was repulsed by Ptolemy and the funeral train continued on to Egypt (Arr.
Succ. 1a.25), where the body in the winter of 321/20 was interred temporarily in Memphis with elaborate rites (Paus. 1.6.3). Alexander was subsequently entombed
in Alexandria (Diod. 18.28.3), not in his preferred final resting place at Siwah.
Ptolemy’s capture of Alexander’s corpse was the culmination of a number of
independent actions by that Diadoch. The satrap of Egypt had by the end of 322
emerged as a major power in the eastern Mediterranean. He had used the 8000
talents he found in the Egyptian treasury to hire mercenaries (Diod. 18.14.1).
Besides the mercenaries, Ptolemy also inherited the 4000 troops and thirty triremes which Alexander had left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4.8.4; Arr. Anab. 3.5.3–5). He had murdered Cleomenes and may have already begun negotiations with the Cypriot
Alexanders Heirs Page 13
