his winter quarters actively seeking Eumenes. Eumenes had himself already left
Celaenae and was encamped in Cappadocia (Diod. 18.40.1), where he wished to
make full use of his cavalry on the plains. Although his troops had remained loyal in the wake of the disaster in Egypt, during the winter one of Eumenes’ commanders, Perdiccas, deserted with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Eumenes
recaptured the deserters, put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common
soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18.40.1–4). While
Eumenes’ earlier stratagem of plundering his rivals’ satrapies had alleviated his difficulties in paying his forces, this procedure had only delayed the problem.
Eumenes was cut off from access to the wealth of Asia. Even though he main-
tained that he, not Antigonus, represented the legitimate authority in Asia, the
various “royal” officials of Asia took their orders from King Philip. Antigonus, as the royal general in Asia (Arr. Succ. 1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7, 40.1), had access to the treasuries of Asia; the surviving Perdiccans did not. The various garrisons placed with their own commanders in various cities and as guardians of the various
treasuries proved to be most loyal to the official government of the kings. Now,
that government was represented by Antigonus and these commanders and
forces deferred to him as the official royal representative.
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The resources of the other Perdiccans were now also extremely limited, and
maintaining armies was an expensive proposition. Attalus and Alcetas presum-
ably still had some financial resources left over from Attalus’ acquisition of
800 talents at Tyre (Diod. 18.37.4). But it was Antigonus who had the financial
resources, and he was quick to take advantage of them. He made “great promises”
to Apollonides, a commander of Eumenes’ mercenary cavalry. Eumenes’ Cappa-
docian cavalry remained loyal; his wife and children remained in Cappadocia
throughout Eumenes’ campaigns (Nep. Eum. 13.4). While Eumenes raised 6300
Cappadocian and Paphlagonian (a Paphlagonian had killed Craterus [Arr. Succ.
1a.27]) cavalry for the Armenian campaign, these troops were not mercenary
soldiers. They were land owners who were rewarded for their services by the
remission of taxes and gifts of horses and other honors (Plut. Eum. 4.3), not with pay (cf. Plut. Eum. 8.9–10). Patronage was the means of securing loyalty from native peoples. This was a practice that was followed by Alexander himself. One
of the secrets to Alexander’s success was his ability “to create the conditions for a balance between his own ambition and the [indigenous] nobility’s desire not
to perish in the turmoil” (Briant 2002: 870). Eumenes’ remaining cavalry were
part of the “considerable army” given to him by Perdiccas in 320 (Diod. 18.25.6).
Mercenary cavalry played a prominent role in Eumenes’ battle against Craterus
and Neoptolemus; “he arrayed against Craterus not a single Macedonian, but
two troops of ‘mercenary’ horse” (Plut. Eum. 7.1).
Apollonides agreed that during the coming battle he would desert (Diod.
18.40.5–8; cf. Plut. Eum. 9.3). Eumenes had moved to a position at Orcynia in eastern Cappadocia where the ground was highly suitable for cavalry
maneuvers (Plut. Eum. 9.3).45 Antigonus advanced against him with more than 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and thirty elephants (Diod. 18.40.7); a sizable
portion of his forces had been left behind to guard against any attack by
the Perdiccans in Pisidia. He had been given 8500 Macedonian infantry and
perhaps as many as 2000 cavalry by Antipater before the regent crossed to
Europe, but only 5000 Macedonian infantry accompanied him in his pursuit
of Eumenes (Diod. 18.40.7). Additionally, even though the majority of the old
royal army returned with Antipater, certain elements from Perdiccas’ old forces,
including cavalry, elephants, and Greek and Asiatic infantry, were retained by
him as well. While the core of these armies was Macedonian, the majority of
the forces were Asian and mercenary forces. Later, against Alcetas, Antigonus
possessed 40,000 infantry (Diod. 18.45.1), and even though Antigonus had
acquired many of Eumenes’ defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18.41.4), Eumenes
only had 20,000 foot (Diod. 18.40.7) and his forces had suffered 8000 deaths,
most of which must have been infantry (Diod. 18.40.8). The difference in the
infantry numbers at Orcynia and in the battle against Alcetas therefore repre-
sents troops who were detached to watch the other Perdiccans while Antigonus
dealt with Eumenes (so Tarn 1969 [1953]: 471; Engel 1971: 228; Billows 1990:
75 n. 43). These likely included 40 elephants (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.43), 10,000–15,000
infantry, and perhaps 2000 cavalry.
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77
Opposed to Antigonus, Eumenes had approximately 20,000 infantry and 5000
cavalry. In the course of the battle, Apollonides, as prearranged, deserted; 8000 of Eumenes’ men were killed and his entire supply train captured (Diod. 18.40.6–8;
Plut. Eum. 9.3; Just. 14.2.1).46 Apollonides, however, did not long survive his treachery. He was later captured by Eumenes’ forces and hanged (Plut. Eum.
9.3). This was but a minor victory in the midst of an overwhelming defeat. Most
of Eumenes’ troops who survived the debacle enrolled with their conqueror
(Diod. 18.41.4; cf. Diod. 18.41.1; Plut. Eum. 10.1). After his defeat Eumenes marched rapidly toward Armenia, where he hoped to replenish his army (Diod.
18.41.1). Part of Armenia may have remained loyal as a result of his campaigning
in that area in 322 and 321. He probably also wanted to make contact with Orontes, the satrap of Armenia Major. Antigonus’ now superior cavalry, however, made
Eumenes’ movements difficult. Even though Antigonus’ infantry had fallen
behind Eumenes’ retreating force, his cavalry continual y forced the latter to
engage in rearguard actions (Nep. Eum. 5.2). Desertion was also a problem for Eumenes, with Antigonus enrolling the deserters (Diod. 18.41.1; Just. 14.2.3).
With escape becoming impossible, Eumenes dismissed most of his remaining
forces and, with 600 men, retreated into the fortress of Nora located somewhere in the foothil s of the northern Taurus mountains, just south of the Cappadocian
plain (Diod. 18.41.1–2; Plut. Eum. 10.1; Nep. Eum. 5.3; Just. 14.2.2–3).47 Entering the fortress with a larger force would have accelerated and aggravated the hard-ships of a siege, and Eumenes reasoned that he might under those circumstances
be surrendered to the enemy (Just. 14.2.3). Eumenes’ flight into Nora occurred in the late spring of 319 (Anson 1977: 251–6). Nora was a small but virtual y impregnable bastion, little more than 1200 feet in circumference, perched on the top of a mountain and well fortified. In addition, it contained sufficient supplies for
Eumenes and his party to endure a long siege (Diod. 18.41.2–3). After Antigonus
surrounded the fortress and began the construction of double wal s, ditches, and
palisades, he invited Eumenes to a conference (Diod. 18.41.6; Plut. Eum. 10.2–
11.3). While the two renewed their former friendship, Eumenes refused to attach
himself to Antigonus as a subordinate. Instead he demanded that he be reinstated
in his satrapy and cleared of all charges (Diod. 18.41.6–7; Plut. Eum. 10.6).
Eumenes’ demand that all charges against him be dismissed (Diod. 18.41.7)
clearly refers to the condemnation of him by the
army in Egypt, and the true
nature of that assembly is clear in that, apparently, there was no need for these charges to be appealed to another such assemblage. Antigonus forwarded this
request not to the royal army, but to the regent Antipater (Diod. 18.41.7; Plut.
Eum. 11.1). Plainly both Eumenes and Antigonus saw such decisions as royal prerogatives, as they had traditional y been in Macedonia (see the Introduction
above; Anson 1985: 303–16; 2013b: 26–42).
After leaving sufficient troops to maintain the siege, Antigonus moved in seven
days by forced marches into Pisidia to meet the remaining Perdiccans (Diod.
18.41.7, 44.1; Polyaen. 4.6.7). Diodorus reports that this march was completed
with all of his forces. The only way this could be true is if most of his army had
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already begun their march to Pisidia while the pursuit of Eumenes continued
with only cavalry and light-armed troops. Given that the force that defeated
Eumenes contained elephants (Diod. 18.40.7), such rapid movement with the
entire army from Nora to Pisidia would have been impossible. With part of
the army already left behind to deal with a possible attack from Alcetas, and
with most of the heavy infantry, including elephants, proceeding to join their
counterparts near Pisidia immediately after the battle, the remaining force of
cavalry and light infantry could pursue Eumenes, implement the siege, and move
rapidly to Pisidia. In Pisidia, Antigonus’ army now numbered 40,000 infantry and
7000 cavalry (Diod. 18.45.1; cf. 18.40.7, 50.3), which included part of Eumenes’
former force (Diod. 18.40.8–41.1).
In the Pisidic Aulon, an unidentified pass just south of the southern branch of the Persian Royal Road, the two opposing armies met and the last major Perdiccan
force was defeated (Diod. 18.44–7; Polyaen. 4.6.7). According to Polyaenus,
Antigonus surprised his enemy and captured the camp with most of Alcetas’
infantry still arming themselves for battle. Antigonus offered terms, and his former enemies now became part of his ever-expanding army. In Polyaenus, this was a
victory “without a battle.” Diodorus, however, presents a different scenario, and is to be preferred. Here, while the element of surprise is also attested, its results are not so overwhelming. It leads to Antigonus seizing the heights above the camp,
not securing a painless victory (Diod. 18.44.2). Antigonus’ attempt to catch the
Perdiccan army unawares was betrayed by the trumpeting of his elephants. This
allowed Alcetas and his fellow commanders to organize an attack on the heights,
giving their phalanx time to form for battle. Despite a gal ant effort in which many casualties were suffered on both sides, the Perdiccan attempt was defeated.
Victorious in this engagement, Antigonus launched 6000 of his cavalry into the
gap between Alcetas’ now defeated cavalry and his phalanx, preventing the two
from joining. Now, Antigonus launched his own phalanx down from the ridge and
onto the enemy. The Perdiccans, as a consequence of these separate actions, found themselves attacked on the flanks and rear by the enemy’s victorious cavalry
and in the front by Antigonus’ elephants and far more numerous infantry. The
remaining Perdiccan forces only contained 16,000 infantry and 900 cavalry.
Antigonus’ victory was complete. He obtained the surrender of almost the entire
surviving enemy force through negotiation, and enrolled these units into his now
immense army (Diod. 18.45.4). Not long after this battle Antigonus’ force had
grown to 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (Diod. 18.50.1, 3).
Attalus, Docimus, and Polemon, and many other former allies of Perdiccas,
were taken captive (Diod. 18.45.3) and held in that prison from which they later
launched their abortive escape attempt. Alcetas, who had long cultivated the
Pisidians, escaped into the Pisidic fortress of Termessus (Diod. 18.45.3–46.3),48
but was subsequently betrayed and committed suicide (Diod. 18.46.7). When
the body was turned over to Antigonus, he maltreated it for three days before abandoning it and Pisidia. Alcetas’ supporters amongst the Pisidians, then, recovered his corpse and performed the proper rites (Diod. 18.47.3). The particular hatred
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79
shown by Antigonus toward Alcetas, but not the other Perdiccan commanders, is
curious. Perhaps Alcetas had been especial y insistent that Antigonus be removed
from his satrapy in 322, or perhaps it was simply the familial connection to
Perdiccas. Antigonus now went into winter quarters at Celaenae in the fall of 319
(Diod. 18.52.1). The First War of the Successors had ended; it would not be the last.
Notes
1 Curtius (10.5.5) says to the “best” man.
2 See Anson (1988: 471–7) for an assessment of Antigonus’ power in 322.
3 Diod. 18.16.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.11; Plut. Eum. 3.12; App. Mith. 2.2; Just. 13.6.1. Clearly this campaign took place in 322. Diodorus (18.16.4) states that Perdiccas’ invasion
of Cappadocia and Craterus’ crossing to Europe, which occurred before the Battle of Crannon (cf. Diod. 18.16.4–17.8; cf. Plut. Dem. 28.1), were roughly contemporaneous.
The Battle of Crannon took place in early August (Schober 1981: 54, 66–8). Leaving in April/May, and taking approximately three months for the journey, Perdiccas likely arrived in Cappadocia in time to take advantage of the harvest which occurred there in late July and August (Engels 1978: 37). His rate of travel was slowed by the presence of elephants to between 9 and 12 miles per day (Engels 1978: 155; Proctor 1971: 34).
That elephants were present is not definite, but they were part of Alexander’s army and are found later with Perdiccas in Egypt (Diod. 18.35.1, 4), making their presence on the regent’s march to Cappadocia probable.
4 While Diodorus 18.16.2 suggests that only one battle took place, Diodorus’ abbreviation has compressed two battles into one.
5 Photius’ statement ( Bibl. 382–388B = Diod. 31.19.4) that Ariarathes fell in battle is in error (cf. Hornblower 1981: 40–3).
6 Diod. 18.16.2–3; 31.19.5; Plut. Eum. 3.12–13; Just. 13.6.1–3; Arr. Succ. 1a.12. Scholars dispute whether Neoptolemus was official y a satrap or a general, and, by whatever title, what his mission was in that region. While an emended Dexippus (Arr. Succ.
1b.6) would make Neoptolemus satrap of Armenia, no other source supports this
contention. Diodorus (18.29.2) in 320 cal s Neoptolemus hegemon, leader, not satrap.
There is little doubt that the actual satrap of Armenia at this time was Orontes. Western Armenia, however, had been a separate province from Greater Armenia under the
Persians (Xen. Anab. 4.4.4; cf. Str. 11.12.3–4; 14.1, 5; Joseph. AJ 2.252). According to Curtius (4.12.10, 12; cf. Arr. Anab. 3.8.5), there were two contingents of Armenians at the Battle of Gaugamela: “the Armenians who are called Lesser” and from the “nation of Greater Armenia.”
7 See Chapter 2; Tarn 1948: 151–3; Anson 1981; 1988b; Heckel 1982: 60–2.
8 No source gives any indication of the ending of 322.
9 Also, Ptolemaeus or Ptolemy (Plut. Eum. 10.3). While there is debate over the spelling of the name, Polemaeus is used here in preference to Ptolemaeus, the transliteration of the Greek for the more frequently used English Ptolemy, primarily to avoid confusion with respect to references to Ptolemy the satrap of Egypt.
10 For the date, see Bengston 1937: 77–8.
11 In this passage Diodorus mistakenly refers to Leonnatus as Philotas, but the reference to the latter as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia makes the individual indicate
d clear.
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12 Justin (13.6.6–7) inaccurately states that they were never married.
13 Denying that the name had such a designation: Badian 1982; Carney 2000: 33, 280–1
n. 113.
14 This is a point properly emphasized by Michael Rathmann (2005b: 78). Whatever may have been the extent of the regent’s ambitions, one was always to hold Alexander’s legacy intact.
15 Justin 13.4.6 states that this is King Philip Arrhidaeus who is accompanying the body: this is an obvious error.
16 As Schubert 1914: 180–1; Erskine 2002: 171; Schäfer 2002: 59–60.
17 Briant (1989: 161), however, had earlier stated that Asander and Menander knew of Antigonus’ proposed flight but did nothing to hinder it. Fontana (1960: 169 n. 6; cf. Billows 1990: 59, 403) argues that both were allied to Antigonus before he fled to Macedonia.
18 Rathmann (2005b: 65, 78) recognizes Perdiccas’ desire to maintain the integrity of the empire, but is undecided if this was as altruistic as Vezin and Fontana maintain.
19 For example, 11.27.1; 11.91.1–2; 12.51.2 and 53.1; 13.44.6 and 54.1; 13.96.5 and 103.3, 104.1; 14.17.12 and 19.1; 14.35.1 and 7; 14.88.2–3 and 90.1; 14.99.1 and 100.5; 15.12.1
and 14.1; 15.65.2 and 71.1; 15.73.4 and 75.1.
20 Followed by Manni 1949; 1951: 67–73; Errington 1970: 75–7; 1977; Billows 1990: 64–80; Anson 2002/3.
21 Followed by Beloch 1967 [1927]: 237–41; Bosworth 1992a; 1992b; and most recently by Romm 2011: xiv.
22 For the most recent edition and translation see Finkel and van der Spek 2013. Other editions include: Del Monte 1997: 183–4; Grayson 1975: 115; Smith 1924: 140, 142.
23 Finkel and van der Spek (2013) read the word accepted by other commentators as Aiaru as “same month.”
24 This cuneiform tablet was discovered in the British Museum and, while thought to be from Babylon and general y regarded as a copy of a lost original dating from the early third century bc, its actual origin and age are unknown.
25 The Parian Marble ( FGrH 239 B F-10) places the annexation in 322/21. According to the relative chronology of both Diodorus and Arrian, summer or fall of 322 appears the most likely time. Diodorus brackets his account between the start of Perdiccas’
war with Ariarathes (18.16.1) and his attack on the Pisidian cities (18.22.1). Arrian apparently placed the episode between the war with Ariarathes and Perdiccas’
Alexanders Heirs Page 17
