by the Thessalian Nicesipolis (Diod. 19.52.1; cf. Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3). By this marriage Cassander became King Alexander IV’s uncle and thereby a natural
choice for regent (Adams 1983: 27).
In addition to establishing a connection to the Argead house through marriage,
Cassander acted as king. He formal y entombed Philip III and Eurydice (Diod.
19.52.5), a custom usual y undertaken by the royal successor.5 He founded a city
and named it after himself, Cassandreia, in the Chalcidic peninsula (Diod. 19.52.2), and one after his Argead wife, Thessalonice, on the Thermaic gulf, Thessalonica
(Str. 7, frg. 21). In southern Greece, he refounded Thebes (Diod. 19.53.2), which had been destroyed by Alexander the Great in 335. A revived Thebes looking
to Cassander as its new founder, along with his control of Athens, made Cassander a formidable power in central Greece.
Cassander’s creation of Cassandreia and Thessalonica was by no means unique.
The Diadochs as a group were city founders (Cohen 1978; Billows 1990: 293–305;
1995: 146–82). Traditional y in Macedonia this was again a royal prerogative.
Philip II had created cities, as had his son Alexander. In the case of these monarchs the cities served multiple purposes. They were used to secure frontiers or local
populations that were deemed troublesome. Philip II had used these foundations
along with his distribution of land to formerly landless Macedonians to create a
loyal class of small landowners who would supply his new Macedonian infantry
and provide a loyal base for his creation of a Macedonian nation under the sover-
eign authority of the monarchy. In this manner he overcame the divisions that
the landed aristocracy had traditional y represented (Anson 2008a; 2009b: 88–98;
see also the Introduction above). For Alexander and his Successors, cities were a means of holding captured territory against neighboring tribal, nomadic peoples,
as a means to secure captured regions from internal revolutions by the conquered
(Brodersen 2001), and to safeguard important transit points, as apparently was
Seleucus’ first foundation, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris (Kuhrt 1996: 44). Even though
Alexander’s purpose in founding these communities was first and foremost
military, with each foundation possessing a core of veteran soldiers, most often
mercenaries, they were typically located so that they would be self-sufficient
and well placed for commercial activity. The remark most often associated with
Alexander’s foundations by Arrian is that they would “become large and prosper”
(Arr. Anab. 3.1.5; 4.1.3; 6.21.5). Of course, cities, especial y those named after the ruler, or some member of that family, or for some achievement by the founder
( Nicaea, from nike, victory, for example), advertised that leader’s power and authority, and would trumpet through the ages the name or accomplishments of
the founder. In the area of city-founding, Seleucus was the great heir of Alexander.
He is reported to have founded over fifty communities, naming nine of them after
himself (App. Syr. 57). Even if this number of foundations is significantly reduced
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(Tcherikover: 1973 [1927]: 174–5), the total still surpasses that of any other
Diadoch. The breadth, both in terms of territory and of ethnicities, of the lands brought ultimately under the control of Seleucus during his lifetime was likely
responsible for this policy of establishing loyalists in strategic locations throughout these lands.
While these foundations in most respects were established for reasons similar to
those of Alexander the Great, in one area they more closely followed the purposes of his father Philip II. Whereas Alexander settled spent and wounded troops, along with the many mercenaries formerly in Persian employ that were being swept up as
Alexander moved through Asia, the Diadochs were often settling in communities
soldiers who had been actively recruited for service in their competing armies.
Most often land was being given in return for military service (Griffith 1935: 157–9; Billows 1995: 132–7). These troops were then on a form of active duty, similar in many respects to those of the American National Guard, but unlike the Guard, they also provided pockets of supporters in the midst of often hostile populations and secured strategic locations within the ruler’s domains. Colonization also could
accommodate the large numbers of exiles and mercenaries floating through
the Greek world, and promote commerce and trade. But, the primary use of these
colonies was, as it had been for Philip and Alexander, military.
With respect to these foundations’ local governments, these communities were
modeled on the Greek city-state. They were peopled by many of the local, indige-
nous, population, but political y dominated by those of Greek and Macedonian
extraction. Moreover, while there is little evidence of major cultural interaction between the separate cultures (Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144–9; Cohen
1995: 69–70), in Asia and Africa these communities did serve as pockets of
Hellenism in foreign lands. Most often Hellenistic rulers treated the Greek/
Macedonian communities in much the same way as had Philip and Alexander.
They enjoyed a great deal of local autonomy, but always under the overall control of the ruler, who might interfere at any time (see Anson 2013b: 133–8). The relationship with those communities and peoples of Asian or Egyptian origins would
likewise follow the pattern established by the great Alexander (Briant 2002: 852, 869–70), which validated local elites and tied the ruler to these others through
structures which reflected local practice (van der Spek 1987; Sherwin-White
1987: 22–9; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144–5). With respect to existing
social structures, the Successors typical y supported and worked through them
(Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 144).
With the victory of the allies, Cassander, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Antigonus,
in the Second Diadoch War, peace would appear to have settled on the lands of
Alexander’s legacy. Eumenes was dead and Polyperchon on the defensive in Aetolia
and the Peloponnesus (Diod. 19.52.5–53.1, 54.3–4). This apparent peace was,
however, ephemeral, only a lull in an ongoing storm. Antigonus, after arranging
affairs in the east, returned to Asia Minor, arriving in Cilicia “after the setting of Orion” (Diod. 19.56.5), November 22, 315 (for the month and day, see Bickerman
1968: 144), settling in winter quarters in locations near the Cilician community
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
129
of Malus, near the mouth of the Pyramis (Ceyhan) river (Curt. 3.7.5). While there he arranged for 10,000 talents in the treasury in Cyinda to be brought to him
(Diod. 19.56.5). The next spring (314), as he was entering upper Syria, envoys
from his allies in the previous war came to him demanding for their commanders
a share of the fruits of Antigonus’ victory, claiming that they had all contributed to the triumph (Diod. 19.57.1; App. Syr. 53). Hellespontine Phrygia was to be given to Lysimachus, all of Syria to Ptolemy, Babylonia to Seleucus, and Cappadocia and Lydia6 to Cassander. There was also to be a division of the treasure acquired by
Antigonus, which by one estimate amounted to 45,000 talents, an astronomical
1200 tons of silver and gold (Hammond and Walbank 1988: 151). Antigonus’
response was predictable, although it appears to have caught those making the
demands by surprise. Antigonus told the emissaries to tell thei
r masters to
make ready for war (Diod. 19.57.1–2).
With respect to the demands, those of Ptolemy and Lysimachus were specious
at best. Neither, as far as can be told from our sources, had any serious role in the recent war. Lysimachus did see to the death of Cleitus after Antigonus’ naval and land victory in the Bosporus; Ptolemy apparently had removed the remainder
of the Phoenician navy to Egypt before Eumenes could acquire it, delaying the
relief force the Cardian was later to send to aid Cleitus and Polyperchon, and thus, perhaps, permitting the Antigonid victory to take place while the Eumenid fleet
was still sailing north (see the previous chapter). The Egyptian satrap had also
unsuccessful y attempted to dislodge Eumenes’ Macedonian forces from that
commander through persuasion before their march east. Of all the allies, the one
with the best claim was Seleucus. He had resisted Eumenes’ overtures and had
been an Antigonid al y in the struggle with the Cardian, but was ultimately
rewarded by being forced to flee from his satrapy of Babylonia. Cassander presents a curious case. His commander Nicanor and his navy did participate in the
Bosporan campaign, although initial y not very successful y. However, Cassander
had subsequently driven Polyperchon from Macedonia. Moreover, after the death
of Olympias, and after his marriage to Thessalonice, his founding of Cassandreia, and the formal entombing of the bodies of Philip III, Eurydice, and Cynnane in
the late summer of 315, Cassander raised the Macedonian levies and proceeded
south, intending “to drive Polyperchon’s son Alexander from the Peloponnesus”
(Diod. 19.52.1–53.5). During this campaign he refounded the city of Thebes
(Diod. 19.53.2, 54.1; [Parian Marble] FGrH 239 B F-14). In this campaign, prior to his return to Macedonia for the winter, he also, in the Peloponnesus, acquired
Argos and all of Messenia except Ithome, and established a force of 2000 soldiers to guard the southern entrance to Megara (Diod. 19.54.3–4). The Second War of
the Successors had ended with total victory in Asia and the enemy in full retreat in Europe, with Cassander responsible for most of the successes in Europe.
There is, however, another area where Cassander may have engaged in the war
effort and that might explain his claims to Asian lands. Diodorus (19.57.4) notes that there was an army loyal to Cassander, under the command of Asclepiodorus,
not the Antigonid commander of the same name, operating in northern
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Cappadocia even before the demands were issued to Antigonus. Since Cassander
and Antigonus were ostensibly allies and the Third Diadoch War had not yet offi-
cial y broken out, this is a curious situation. Menander, after his attempt to intercept Eumenes, had remained in Cappadocia with an army (Diod. 18.59.1–2),
perhaps, as “general” of Cappadocia (Billows 1990: 403). Now, it has been sug-
gested that Cassander had already begun the war and was not waiting for a
response to the coalition’s demands (Billows 1990: 108). This is certainly possible, but unlikely. That Cassander’s force would be attacking an al y, and doing so far from his base in Macedonia, is odd. The most likely explanation, although there is no evidence for this supposition, is that forces loyal to Eumenes (for the loyalty in general of the Cappadocians to Eumenes, see Schäfer 2002: 64–5, 113; Anson
2004: 81 n. 13) had attacked and, perhaps, even killed Menander. That commander
disappears from the record after his appointment to Cappadocia in 317. Cassander
was then securing Asia Minor for the coalition. Another possibility, as noted in the last chapter, is that in the late spring or summer of 317, Polyperchon had launched an invasion of Asia Minor (Paschidis 2008: 233–46). This then also would account
for the presence of Cassander’s army in Asia. Eumenes did produce in 316 that
fictitious letter reporting that Polyperchon had killed Cassander and had crossed to Asia to aid Eumenes (Diod. 19.23.2–3; Polyaen. 4.8.3). The letter, then, while a forgery, may have been based on certain known facts if the hypothesized invasion
by Polyperchon did take place. Cassander’s first invasion of Macedonia might then have occurred during a time when Polyperchon was busy elsewhere. While this
scenario of an offensive in Asia by the then regent is possible, especial y given our lack of information regarding Polyperchon’s activities in 317, noted earlier, it
would appear doubtful. Polyperchon did not command the Aegean, nor was he in
alliance with Lysimachus, who controlled the land approaches to the Hellespont,
thus making it difficult either to launch an invasion, or to return from one, successful y. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that Polyperchon would have been
operating so far from Macedonia in Cappadocia, with Cassander in Greece. This
does, then, remain an intriguing possibility, but a doubtful one. In any case, once the demands were refused, the nature of Cassander’s operation in Cappadocia
changed from the support of an al y to the annexation of these territories.
Antigonus realized the extent of the coalition that was being raised against
him and reacted immediately. Agesilaus, a long-time Antigonid adherent (Billows
1990: 364), was sent to Cyprus to persuade the kings of the Cypriot cities to support Antigonus; two more diplomats, Idomeneus7 and Moschion, went on a similar
mission to Rhodes. In Cyprus, Agesilaus enjoyed limited success, convincing the
kings of Cition, Lapithus, Marion, and Ceryneia to conclude a treaty of friendship with Antigonus. However, the majority of the kings of Cyprus, including Nicocreon, the king of the most powerful city, Salamis, remained loyal to Ptolemy (Diod.
19.59.1). That Antigonus did not send forces directly to Cyprus suggests strongly that his goal was to force Ptolemy to send troops to retain control of the island, thus diverting his attention from elsewhere. Ptolemy’s fleet, the appropriated
Phoenician navy, made the Egyptian dynast a powerful force in the Aegean.
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
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Polemaeus,8 one of Antigonus’ nephews, moved into Cappadocia with an army
of at least 8300 infantry and 600 cavalry (cf. Diod. 19.68.6) to relieve the siege of Amisus on the Black Sea, which was then under attack by Cassander’s general
Asclepiodorus (Diod. 19.57.4, 60.2). Once this task was achieved he was to
proceed to the Hellespont to block any attempt by Cassander to join his forces
in Asia with fresh Macedonian troops (Diod. 19.57.4). Antigonus also sent
Aristodemus of Miletus, one of his oldest and closest friends (Billows 1990:
369–70), to the Peloponnesus with 1000 talents to raise a force of mercenaries
and to establish an alliance with Polyperchon and his son Alexander (Diod.
19.57.5; Simpson 1957a: 371). After his retreat from Macedonia, Polyperchon
had established a power base in the Peloponnesus, holding, amongst other com-
munities, the important cities of Patrae, Sicyon, and Corinth (Diod. 19.54.3–4,
66.3, 67.1). Antigonus himself proceeded to Phoenicia to “put together a fleet,”
since he had few ships and his enemies had many. His fleet, which had defeated
Cleitus in the Hellespont, had during his absence in the east been acquired by
Ptolemy and Cassander (Diod. 19.58.1–2, 5).
Antigonus’ energy at the start of the war stands in sharp contrast to the seeming lethargy of his opponents. The latter appear to have expected their ultimatum to be their initial bargaining position which would then be followed by negotiations
(Billows 1990: 110–11 and n. 38). Antigonus’ response
appears to have caught them by surprise. They initial y are found in most circumstances simply reacting to
Antigonus’ initiatives. In Antigonus’ campaign in Phoenicia, only Tyre resisted,
perhaps because it alone had a Ptolemaic garrison (cf. Diod. 19.61.5). Before
beginning a siege of that city in the spring of 314, Antigonus called together the kings of the other chief Phoenician cities, now his allies, and his commanders in Syria to begin the construction of his new fleet. This fleet would be essential for the implementation of a full blockade on the city, and also to counter his enemies’ naval forces in the Aegean. Shipyards were established at Tripolis, Byblus, and Sidon, with two additional ones in Cilicia and Rhodes (Diod. 19.58.2–5). Diodorus (19.58.3)
reports that 8000 men alone were employed to cut down the trees and trim the
timber, with 1000 draught animals to haul the lumber from the forests of Lebanon
to the building sites. While the siege of Tyre was in progress, Antigonus, after
having left a force behind to continue operations against the holdout Phoenician
city, moved further south and captured the cities of Joppa and Gaza, both of which he garrisoned. He then returned to the ongoing siege of Tyre (Diod. 19.59.2).
Elsewhere in Asia, Polemaeus swept aside the force operating in Cassander’s
interests in Cappadocia and proceeded from the relieved Amisus along the Black
Sea coast. Here he also enjoyed great success, making alliances with Dionysius, the tyrant of Heracleia Pontica, an independent Greek city dominating much of
the central Black Sea shore of Bithynia, with the king of Bithynia himself, Zipoites, and with the independent Greek cities of Astacus on the Sea of Marmara and
Chalcedon on the Bosporus. Polemaeus also thwarted an attempt by Seleucus,
leading a Ptolemaic fleet of 100 warships, to seize the Ionian coastal city of Erythrae (Diod. 19.60.2–4; 62.4). On his way to the Ionian city Seleucus had attempted
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to intimidate the forces besieging Tyre by sailing past knowing that Antigonus was powerless to interfere, thus clearly demonstrating to all of Antigonus’ allies
Ptolemy’s domination of the sea (Diod. 19.58.5–6). Antigonus saw how disheart-
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