Another element of success was having an organization that sought to fill important gaps in U.S. collection and analysis capabilities. The DS&T did not try to duplicate what the National Security Agency was doing with regard to COMINT collection, but it did come up with novel ways to provide information that NSA or its military subsidiaries were not collecting—either because of their priorities or their technical approaches to collection problems. As a result, it was the CIA that developed the first telemetry intercept satellite and that deployed personnel to Iran to monitor telemetry from the TACKSMAN sites. Much of the CIA’s success resulted from identifying important gaps or shortcomings in other organizations’ programs and seeking to fill them.
The directorate’s connection to intelligence production—strongest when the agency’s nuclear and missile intelligence analysts were part of the directorate, but still strong after their transfer to the intelligence directorate—also helped produce success. The link between satellite developers and analysts that existed at CIA but not at the Air Force Office of Special Projects helped guide the developers’ work and motivate them to develop new capabilities that would solve old intelligence problems.
Of course, one factor underlying much of these gains was the presence of a major and very apparent enemy. Despite all the problems that the Soviet political and economic systems imposed on the nation, the USSR was still a formidable military threat—capable of deploying thousands of ICBM warheads and a massive army that could have, at the very least, destroyed Western Europe and the United States as modern civilizations. That threat helped attract many of the best and brightest to service in the CIA.
In addition, during much of the Cold War, CIA science and technology operated at the cutting edge, substantially in advance of what was being done in either the private sector or other parts of the government. For many who liked tough challenges, the CIA was an exciting place to be.
ROAD TO RECOVERY?
How the DS&T will meet the challenges of the future is a chapter of its history yet to be written. It will never be the bureaucratic empire that it was in 1972. Nor should it be. Clearly it is a vastly different world from 1972. The demise of the Soviet Union, the concern about transnational threats including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states (with their sophisticated secret police and denial and deception programs), the shift of the development of cutting-edge technologies to the private sector, the deployment of high-resolution commercial imagery satellites, and the shift in the volume and means of international communication mean that priorities and targets have shifted. The volume of information has also increased dramatically, making it harder to find useful information among the flood of data. New collection and processing capabilities have been developed, but much work still needs to be done to enhance collection, processing, and analytical capabilities.
It is clear that the directorate should continue to devote significant attention to how to employ information technology to ease the burden on intelligence analysts. In an April 1999 speech to a technology conference in Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, Basil Scott, a senior DS&T official, addressed both subjects. He enumerated a number of factors that made it harder to monitor foreign communications—including the spread of fiber-optic systems, the explosion of cellular phones, and encryption. At the same time, he suggested how information technology could be used to help analysts identify biological and chemical weapon activities, although information indicating such activities may be buried in a mass of data. Scott discussed an assortment of data-mining and data-retrieval techniques that could be employed, including clustering techniques that enable analysts to mine the most useful data sets first, link analysis to establish relationships, time-series analysis to identify time trends, and visualization—which lets analysts see “non-traditional presentations of data” that “can help [them] deal with large and complex data sets.”31
Exploiting information technology will undoubtedly be a key activity for the directorate, but that should not be its only reason for being. Indeed, if the only significant directorate activities were to be information technology and support to clandestine human intelligence operations, there would be little reason for it to exist as a separate directorate—for the offices involved could be placed comfortably in the intelligence and operations directorates.
But outside those activities there remain many potential challenges. Although analysts have a flood of information to deal with, there can also be a paucity of information concerning topics of crucial importance—including foreign weapons of mass destruction programs and terrorism.
As long as the Office of Technical Collection and the Office of Development and Engineering remain part of the directorate, it retains the potential to make a significant contribution to the technical collection of intelligence. With nations adopting increasingly sophisticated denial and deception strategies to foil collection of information by U.S. imagery and signals intelligence satellites, OTC development of emplaced sensor systems to detect nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons activity and OTC participation in the Special Collection Service may prove to be among the directorate’s most productive activities.
As previously noted, the Office of Development and Engineering, particularly as a result of the NRO restructuring, serves as a funnel for CIA personnel into the NRO rather than as a separate program element of the reconnaissance office. But the OD&E can ensure that some of the advantages that resulted from the directorate’s dual identity as the NRO’s Program B not be lost. The office recruited people from the Directorate of Intelligence, particularly the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research; this influx of personnel helped ensure that those developing reconnaissance satellites did not lose touch with the requirements of the analysts. In 1999, former OD&E director Robert Kohler said that the office felt like an “outcast,” with the connection to the rest of the agency being a tenuous one. If the CIA were to back away from the OD&E and the NRO, it would be a “huge loss” to the reconnaissance effort, according to Kohler.32 Likewise, Gordon Oehler, former director of the Non-Proliferation Center, has complained that “the centralization of the . . . NRO . . . , where the only major pot of development money remains, removed many of the CIA’s best technologists from day-to-day contact with operators and analysts in the rest of the CIA.”33 To reverse or limit such disengagement will require leadership from the top of the directorate.
Another factor in determining the extent to which the directorate prospers in the next decade is whether it continues to identify areas where the activities of other CIA and intelligence community components are deficient and moves to fill those gaps. As already noted, the directorate did not rise to empire status by attempting to duplicate what other agencies or CIA components did well.
Of course, people are another vital element in any future directorate successes. Over the almost forty years since it was created, the directorate has employed exceptional managers and scientists—as demonstrated by the directorate personnel named as CIA trailblazers in 1997, including the first four chiefs of the DS&T (Wheelon, Duckett, Dirks, and Hine-man) as well as analysts, scientists, and technical service personnel. Recruiting and retaining such people today—when the technological frontier is often found in Silicon Valley and when corporate salaries far exceed government compensation—are far more difficult tasks than in the past.
It will be up to the leadership of the agency and directorate to ensure that the DS&T’s mission involves more than helping analysts sort through data, as well as to make talented individuals realize that there are challenges to be met in the directorate that cannot be matched elsewhere. Robert Kohler does see some hope for the directorate. In early 2001, he noted that Joanne Isham was “trying very hard” and boosting morale, and George Tenet seemed to be listening to her. Kohler was “moderately encouraged.” 34 It is hoped that in the succeeding years, the reasons to be encouraged will increase, and the next set of wizards will be up to the challenges that will face t
hem.
*Smith declined to be interviewed for this book.
APPENDIX 1
DS&T Components, 1963–2001
(Items in bold type indicate offices established the previous year)
January 1, 1963 Office of Special Activities
Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
January 1, 1964 Office of Special Activities
Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
Office of Computer Services
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
January 1, 1966 Office of Special Activities
Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
Office of Computer Services
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Office of Special Projects
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
January 1, 1974 Office of Special Activities
Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Weapons Intelligence
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1975 Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Weapons Intelligence
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1977 Office of Research and Development
Office of ELINT
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1978 Office of Research and Development
Office of SIGINT Operations
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1989 Office of Research and Development
Office of SIGINT Operations
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Special Projects
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1994 Office of Research and Development
Office of Technical Collection
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1996 Office of Research and Development
Office of Technical Collection
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Advanced Projects
Office of Advanced Analytical Tools
Clandestine Information Technology Office
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
National Photographic Interpretation Center
January 1, 1997 Office of Research and Development
Office of Technical Collection
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Advanced Projects
Office of Advanced Analytical Tools
Clandestine Information Technology Office
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
January 1, 1999 Office of Technical Collection
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Office of Advanced Analytical Tools
Clandestine Information Technology Office
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Investment Program Office
February 1, 2001 Office of Technical Collection
Office of Development and Engineering
Office of Technical Service
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Office of Advanced Information Technology
Office of Advanced Technologies and Programs
APPENDIX 2
DS&T Leadership
Deputy Director for Research
Herbert J. Scoville April 15, 1962-June 17, 1963
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Albert D. (Bud) Wheelon August 5, 1963-September 26, 1966
Carl E. Duckett (Acting) September 26, 1966-April 20, 1967
Carl E. Duckett April 20, 1967-June 1, 1976
Leslie C. Dirks June 1, 1976-July 3, 1982
Richard Evans Hineman July 3, 1982-September 5, 1989
James V. Hirsch September 5, 1989-September 5, 1995
Ruth David September 15, 1995-September 4, 1998
Joanne O. Isham (Acting) September 5, 1998-April 1, 1999
Gary L. Smith April 1, 1999-January 10, 2000
Joanne O. Isham Jan 10, 2000-
Assistant Deputy Director for Research
Col. Edward B. Giller June 25, 1962-August 5, 1963
Assistant/Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology
(Title change from Assistant Deputy Director to Associate Deputy Director was effective May 8, 1973)
Col. Edward B. Giller August 5, 1963-May 4, 1964
Carl Duckett May 16, 1966-September 26, 1966
Lloyd Lauderdale June 5, 1967-March 21, 1969
Donald Steininger November 1, 1969-June 14, 1974
Sayre Stevens June 14, 1974-May 17, 1976
Ernest J. Zellmer June 1, 1976-September 24, 1979
James H. Taylor September 24, 1979-September 27, 1982
James V. Hirsch May 2, 1983-September 5, 1989
Gary W. Goodrich October 16, 1989-December 31, 1995
Peter M. Daniher January 1, 1996-November 12, 1997
Joanne Isham November 12, 1997-January 10, 2000
James Runyan January 10, 2000-
Director, Office of Special Activities (OSA)
James A. Cunningham (Acting) August 1, 1962-September 4, 1962
Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford September 4, 1962-August 1, 1966
Col. Paul N. Bacalis August 1, 1966-July 12, 1968
Brig. Gen. Donald H. Ross July 12, 1968-June 1, 1970
Brig. Gen. Harold F. Knowles June 1, 1970-July 6, 1971
Brig. Gen. Wendell L. Bevan Jr. July 6, 1971-August 31, 1974
James Cherbonneaux Nov. 1, 1974-January 1, 1975
Director, Office of Research and Development (ORD)
Col. Edward B. Giller November 29, 1962-May 4, 1964
Robert M. Chapman (Acting) May 4, 1964-March 11, 1965
Robert M. Chapman March 11, 1965-July 1, 1972
Sayre Stevens July 1, 1972-June 14, 1974
James V. Hirsch June 14, 1974-September 22, 1975
Donald L. Haas September 22, 1975-May 23, 1976
Donald L. Reiser (Acting) May 23, 1976-October 18, 1976
Frank Briglia (Acting) October 18, 1976-February 27, 1977
Philip K. Eckman February 27, 1977-April 1, 1989
Robert A. Herd III April 1, 1989-July 18, 1996
Russell E. Dressell July 18, 1996-October 1998
Office of Research and Development abolished effective October 1998.
Director, Office of ELINT (OEL)
George C. Miller July 30, 1962-June 14, 1971
John N. McMahon June 14, 1971-May 21, 1973
James V. Hirsch (Acting) May 21, 1973-June 14, 1974
Robert D. Singel June 14, 1974-September 22, 1975
James V. Hirsch September 22, 1975-February 14, 1977
Office of ELINT and Division D merged to form Office of Special Operations effective February 14,
1977.
Director, Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO)
Edward Ryan February 14, 1977-May 30, 1978
D. Barry Kelly May 30, 1978-September 28, 1981
A. Roy Burks September 28, 1981-July 15, 1984
M. Corley Wonus July 15, 1984-March 21, 1989
Joseph B. Castillo March 21, 1989-August 23, 1993
Office of SIGINT Operations and the Office of Special Projects (1988) were merged to form the Office of Technical Collection effective August 23, 1993.
Director, Office of Computer Services (OCS)
Joseph Becker September 16, 1963-June 1, 1966
Charles A. Briggs June 1, 1966-August 18, 1969
W. Douglas Climenson (Acting) August 18, 1969-September 1, 1970
John D. Iams September 1, 1970-April 1, 1973
Office of Computer Services transferred to Directorate of Management and Services and renamed Office of Joint Computer Support, effective April 1, 1973.
Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
Donald Chamberlain August 22, 1963-June 24, 1973
Karl H. Weber September 20, 1973-November 22, 1976
OSI transferred to the Directorate of Intelligence, effective November 22, 1976.
Director, Foreign Missile and Space
Analysis Center (FMSAC)
Carl E. Duckett November 7, 1963-May 16, 1966
David S. Brandwein May 16, 1966-September 4, 1973
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center merged with component of OSI to form Office of Weapons Intelligence, effective September 4, 1973.
Director, Special Projects Staff (SPS)
Jackson D. Maxey July 1964-September 1965
Special Projects Staff became Office of Special Projects on September 15, 1965.
Director, Office of Special Projects (OSP)
John J. Crowley September 15, 1965-November 16, 1970
Harold L. Brownman November 16, 1970-March 17, 1973
Office of Special Projects abolished and mission assumed by Office of Development and Engineering effective April 23, 1973.
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