38 . Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, pp. 46–47, 51n., 58; Annex D to Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/4, “Terms of Reference for the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee,” January 31, 1956; “Summary Statement of IAC Actions Leading to Consideration of a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee,” n.d., NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 188, Folder 6; interview with Henry Plaster, Vienna, Virginia, September 30, 1999.
39 . Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 84; Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, NIE 38–58, The Netherlands Nuclear Energy Program, November 10, 1958; Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, The French Nuclear Weapons Program, November 13, 1959.
40 . Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “The Decryption of a Picture,” Studies in Intelligence 1, 3 (Summer 1957): 41–53.
41 . John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 59, 79, 80, 83; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereinafter Senate Select Committee), Final Report, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 390, 395–397.
42 . Tim Weiner, “Sidney Gottlieb, 80, Dies; Took LSD to C.I.A.,” New York Times, March 10, 1999, p. C22; Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 59–60; Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 211.
43 . Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 24–25, 27; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book I, p. 387.
44 . Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 31–32, 44, p. 59.
45 . Ibid., pp. 60–61; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book I, p. 390.
46 . Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” p. 62.
47 . Ibid., pp. 61–62; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book I, p. 389.
48 . Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 90, 108; Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 207.
49 . James R. Killian Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 67–68.
50 . Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), Preface.
51 . Donald E. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate,” Studies in Intelligence 30, 2 (Summer 1986): 13–26 at 13–15; Victor K. McElheny, Insisting on the Impossible: The Life of Edwin Land, Inventor of Instant Photography (Reading, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1998), p. 294.
52 . Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 79; McElheny, Insisting on the Impossible, p. 301.
53 . Donald Welzenbach, “Din Land: Patriot from Polaroid,” Optics and Photonics News 5, 10 (October 1996): 22ff; Attachment 1, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence, November 5, 1954.
54 . Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 314.
55 . “A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence—A Summary,” attachment, Edwin Land to Allen W. Dulles, November 5, 1954.
56 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 4; R. Cargill Hall, “Post-War Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of Corona,” in Dwayne A. Day, John Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1998), pp. 86–118 at pp. 87–92.
57 . Edwin Land to Allen Dulles, November 5, 1954.
58 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 32–35, 40; A. J. Goodpaster, “Memorandum of Conference with the President, 0810, 24 November 1954,” November 24, 1954, Ann C. Whitman Diary, November 1954, Box 3, Ann C. Whitman File, DDE Papers as President, Dwight David Eisenhower Library (DDEL); Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 405; Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), p. 26; Oral History Interview with Richard Bissell Jr., Columbia University, 1973, p. 42.
59 . Bissell with Lewis and Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, p. 78; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 15–16, 30.
60 . Peter Wyden, The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 13.
61 . Ibid., pp. 12–13.
62 . Bissell with Lewis and Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, pp. 98, 105.
63 . Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 130.
64 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 66.
65 . Ibid., p. 60; Jonathan E. Lewis, “Tension and Triumph: Civilian and Military Relations and the Birth of the U-2 Program,” in Robert A. McDonald (ed.), CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, Md.: American Society for Photogramme-try and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 13–23 at p. 13. Eisenhower was certainly aware that the Air Force had, for a number of years, been conducting electronic and photographic reconnaissance flights that entered Soviet airspace. But it was expected that the U-2s would fly far deeper into the Soviet Union than the military planes—to reach key missile and nuclear targets that the military flights could not be expected to reach.
66 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 94–95, 100; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 25; William E. Burrows, “That New Black Magic,” Air and Space, December 1998/January 1999, pp. 29–35.
67 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 101, 104.
68 . Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 27; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 104–105.
69 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 105; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 27.
70 . Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 28.
71 . “Soviet Note No. 23,” July 10, 1956, White House Corr., Gen. 1956(3), Box 3, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, DDEL; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 109.
72 . Herbert I. Miller, Memorandum for: Project Director, Subject: Suggestions re Intelligence Value of AQUATONE, July 17, 1956, 2000 CIA Release, NARA.
73 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 111, 124.
74 . Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, 1983), pp. 27, 30; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 135, 139.
75 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 135, 139, 143; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” Studies in Intelligence 12, 4 (Fall 1968): 1–12 at 3.
76 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 143.
77 . Ibid., p. 165.
78 . Ibid., p. 168; CIA, “Situation Estimate for Project CHALICE, Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962,” March 14, 1960, 2000 CIA Release, NARA.
79 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 168.
80 . Ibid., pp. 174–176; Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Books, 2000), p. 165; interview with a former CIA official.
81 . Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 218; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 176; Transcript, “Debriefing of Francis Gary Powers, Tape #2,” February 13, 1962, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 230, Folder 3.
82 . “Testimony of Allen Dulles,” Executive Sessions of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. XII, Eighty-sixth Congress–Second Session, 1960 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 285.
83 . Ibid.
84 . Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 52.
85 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 215; Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Identification of Special Projects, August 13, 1958, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 42, Folder 5.
86 . Central Intelligence Agency, “Future of the Agency’s U-2 Capability,” July 7, 1960, pp. 4, 10; Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 31; Richard M. Bissell Jr., Deputy Director (Plans), Memorandum for: All Members U.S. Government IDEALIST Community, January 4, 1961, 2000 CIA Release, NARA.
87 . Wayne Mutza, Lockheed P2V Neptune: An Illustrated History (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military/ Aviation History, 1996), pp. 109–110; “Lockheed RB-69A ‘Neptune,’” www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/bombers/b5/b5-62.htm, July 28, 1999.
88 . Mutza, Lockheed P2V Neptune, pp. 110, 112–113.
89 . Ibid., p. 113; Jay Miller, Skunk Works: The Official History (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 1996), p. 58.
90 . Frederic C.E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, and Paul E. Worthman, The CORONA Story (Washington, D.C.: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997), p. 123; interview with Albert D. Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998; Mutza, Lockheed P2V Neptune, pp. 113–114; Miller, Skunk Works, p. 58.
91 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 260; Thomas P. McIn-inch, “The OXCART Story,” Studies in Intelligence 15, 1 (Winter 1971): 1–34 at 2.
92 . McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 3.
93 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 262–263; John L. Sloop, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1978), pp. 141–167.
94 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 263; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 3.
95 . McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 3; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 263, 267.
96 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 268–269.
97 . Ibid., pp. 270–271, 273; McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” p. 3.
98 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 273; Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, p. 200.
99 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 274.
100 . Ibid., pp. 274, 278.
101 . Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, June 2, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office: Office of Staff Secretary, Subject Series, alpha sub, b.15, F: “Intel Matters (15),” DDEL.
102 . Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, p. 18.
103 . Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. KEYHOLE Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 27; Bissell with Lewis and Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, p. 135.
104 . Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, pp. 10, 15.
105 . Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973), reprinted in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 3–39 at p. 5; Hall, “Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of Corona,” p. 113.
106 . Central Intelligence Agency/National Reconnaissance Office, “CORONA Pioneers,” May 25, 1995; interview with Frank Buzard, Rancho Palos Verdes, California, June 11, 1999; Dwayne A. Day, “Development and Improvement of the Corona Satellite,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 48–85 at p. 49; Robert A. McDonald, “Corona’s Pioneers,” in McDonald (ed.)., CORONA, pp. 141–152 at p. 145.
107 . Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: A Success for Space Reconnaissance, a Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution for Intelligence,” Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing 51, 6 (June 1995): 689–720 at 693; Central Intelligence Agency/National Reconnaissance Office, “CORONA Pioneers.”
108 . Dwayne A. Day, “The Development and Improvement of the Corona Satellite,” in Day, Logs-don, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 48–85, at p. 50.
109 . Buzard interview.
110 . Albert D. Wheelon, “CORONA: A Triumph of American Technology,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 29–47 at pp. 34–35; Greer, “Corona,” pp. 7–8; Bissell with Lewis and Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, p. 136.
111 . Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 235–246 at p. 236; Day, “The Development and Improvement of the Corona Satellite,” p. 49.
112 . Day, “The Development and Improvement of the CORONA Satellite,” p. 55.
113 . Greer, “Corona,” at pp. 16–21; McDowell, “Launch Listings,” p. 236; Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster and Their Family Network (New York: Dial Press, 1978), p. 432.
114 . “The Origin and Evolution of the Corona System,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 181–199 at p. 199.
115 . Buzard interview.
116 . Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 40; Greer, “Corona,” pp. 3, 22, 24; Dwayne A. Day, John Logsdon, and Brian Latell, “Introduction,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 1–18 at p. 10.
117 . Interview with a former CIA official.
118 . Ibid.
119 . J. Michael Selander, “Image Coverage Models for Declassified Corona, Argon, and Lanyard Satellite Photography: A Technical Explanation,” in McDonald (ed.), CORONA, pp. 177–188, at p. 177; Greer, “Corona,” p. 24; Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Mission Coverage Index, Mission 9009, 18 August 1960, September 1960, pp. 115–125 in Ruffner (ed.), CORONA, p. 120.
120 . Greer, “Corona,” p. 24; McDonald (ed.), CORONA, p. 718.
121 . McDonald (ed.), CORONA, pp. 698–700, 715, 718.
122 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-4-57, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957–1962,” November 12, 1957, pp. 26–27; Lawrence C. McQuade, Memorandum for Mr. Nitze, Subject: But Where Did the Missile Gap Go? (Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, May 31, 1963), pp. 7–8.
123 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-4-59, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959–1964, February 9, 1960, pp. 51–52.
124 . Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 10, 15–25, 96.
125 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-4-60, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960–1965,” December 1, 1960, p. 52.
126 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-61, Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack, June 7, 1961, in Donald P. Steury, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), pp. 115–119 at pp. 116–117.
127 . Jerrold L. Schechter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (New York: Scribner’s, 1992), pp. 273–274; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8/1-61, Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack, September 21, 1961, p. 4.
128 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8/1-61, Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack, pp. 2, 10–11, 13.
129 . National Security Council, NSCID No. 8, “Photographic Interpretation,” January 18, 1961.
130 . The Reminiscences of Arthur C. Lundahl, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University,
1982, pp. 11, 38, 42.
131 . Ibid., pp. 51, 56, 57.
132 . Ibid., pp. 182, 187, 197; Jack Anderson, “Getting the Big Picture for the CIA,” Washington Post, November 28, 1982, p. C7; Dino A. Brugioni and Frederick J. Doyle, “Arthur C. Lundahl: Founder of the Image Exploitation Discipline,” pp. 159–168 in McDonald (ed.), CORONA, at pp. 160–161.
133 . The Reminiscences of Arthur Lundahl, p. 221; interview with a former CIA official; Office of the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Notice No. 1-130-5, “Photographic Interpretation Center,” August 19, 1958.
134 . The Reminiscences of Arthur C. Lundahl, pp. 197, 201; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial, 1982), p. 110; Office of the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Notice No. 1-130-5, “Photographic Interpretation Center.”
135 . The Reminiscences of Arthur C. Lundahl, pp. 197–201, 229.
136 . Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 122–123.
137 . Joint Study Group, Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, December 15, 1960, pp. 1, 2.
138 . The Reminiscences of Arthur Lundahl, pp. 53, 61.
139 . Ibid., pp. 299–300; Marion W. Boggs, Memorandum, Subject: Discussion at the 474th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 12, 1961, January 13, 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers 1953–61, Ann Whitman File, pp. 4–9.
140 . Boggs, Memorandum, Subject: Discussion at the 474th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 12, 1961, pp. 6–7.
141 . Ibid., pp. 7–8.
142 . Ibid., pp. 8, 9.
143 . Ibid., p. 9; The Reminiscences of Arthur Lundahl, pp. 301–302.
144 . Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953–29 November 1961: Volume II, Coordination of Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, July 1973), p. 82.
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