Chapter 3: A New Beginning
1 . Donald E. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate,” Studies in Intelligence 30, 2 (Summer 1986): 13–26 at 24; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998.
2 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 24.
3 . Ibid., pp. 24–25.
4 . Ibid., pp. 25–26.
5 . Ibid., p. 26; Albert D. Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” December 19, 1984, address at CIA, p. 12; CIA, HN 20-49, “Announcement of Assignment to Key Position Deputy Director (Intelligence),” June 4, 1962.
6 . Central Intelligence Agency, R. V. Jones Intelligence Award Ceremony Honoring Dr. Albert Wheelon, December 13, 1994; Central Intelligence Agency, “Biographic Profile, Albert Dewell Wheelon,” May 10, 1966; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; Robert P. Crease and Charles C. Mann, The Second Creation: Makers of the Revolution in 20th-Century Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p. 175.
7 . Vita, Albert D. Wheelon, April 10, 1999.
8 . Wheelon interview; Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” pp. 7–8.
9 . Wheelon interview; Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” pp. 8–9; telephone conversation with Bud Wheelon, January 28, 2000.
10 . Wheelon interview; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, September 16, 1999; Wheelon telephone conversation, January 28, 2000.
11 . MSC [Marshall S. Carter], Memorandum for the Director, February 22, 1963.
12 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 26; Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” p. 12; Wheelon interview; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, June 14, 1999.
13 . Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999.
14 . Ibid.
15 . Ibid.
16 . Ibid.
17 . Ibid.
18 . Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” pp. 12–13; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999; Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 26.
19 . Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, HN 1-36, August 5, 1963, NARA, CIA HRP 89-2, RG 263, NN3-263-94-010, Box 5, HS/HC 706, Folder 7; Diary Notes for Colonel White, August 6, 1963, 2000 CIA Release.
20 . Interview with Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, Arlington, Virginia, October 7, 1999.
21 . Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, HN 1-36, August 5, 1963.
22 . Wheelon interview, May 11–12, 1998.
23 . Telephone interview with Albert Wheelon, April 2, 1997; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999; interview with Karl Weber, Oakton, Virginia, May 5, 1999.
24 . John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 491; interview with Albert Wheelon, Mon-tecito, California, March 21, 2000.
25 . Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 199–200. The battle over OSI was the most important but not the only dispute between Cline and Wheelon. They also clashed over the role of Cline’s Collection Guidance Staff and the related issues of the location of the Special Intelligence Staff and the intelligence directorate’s access to information about DS&T reconnaissance activities. Wheelon described the conflict over the Collection Guidance Staff as one of Cline’s “petty bureaucratic gambits.” Of more concern to Wheelon was Cline’s drafting of an OSI analyst to help produce an assessment in October 1963 of the significance of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s remarks on abandoning the race to the moon. In a memo to OSI chief Donald Chamberlain, Wheelon noted that Cline had not consulted him (Wheelon) or his deputy (Carl Duckett), nor had he shown Wheelon a copy of the assessment before it was distributed. In his memo, Wheelon noted that “I raised this with Cline yesterday and told him this would have to stop.” He instructed Chamberlain to inform everyone in OSI not to take any assignments from Cline unless “you . . . or your designated officer, are in the loop.”One battle that was not joined was an attempt to transfer NPIC from Cline’s directorate to the DS&T. A December 1963 memo to Wheelon asked him if he had “given thought to . . . Indian wrestling Ray Cline for control of NPIC.” The justification offered was NPIC’s inactivity in the research and development area. However, Wheelon felt that he already “had enough trouble with Cline,” and fighting for NPIC would not be worth a “bruising fight.” The best thing the DS&T could do for NPIC, Wheelon believed, was to “give them really good pictures.” (Ray S. Cline, Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Rationale for a Central Collection Guidance Function, February 28, 1964; Ray S. Cline [DDI], Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Differences of Opinion Regarding Collection Guidance Staff [CGS], March 13, 1964; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum for: Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence, Subject: Coordination with DD/I, October 31, 1963, 2000 CIA Release; [Deleted], Acting Assistant Director, Special Activities, Memorandum for: Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Subject: National Photographic Interpretation Center, December 31, 1963, 2000 CIA Release; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, March 5, 2001.)
26 . Systems Analysis Staff, Directorate of Science and Technology, CIA, A Report on DS&T Intelligence Collection Requirements, July 12, 1966, p. 7; China Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, “The Production Effort,” July 1965–June 1967, p. 20, NARA, RG 263, CIA HRP 89-2, NN3-263-94-010, Box 9, File HS/HC 735, Folder 2.
27 . Wheelon telephone conversations, September 16, 1999, and June 16, 2000.
28 . Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, Japanese Nuclear Energy Program, OSI-SR/65-55, November 1964; Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, Indian Nuclear Energy Program, November 6, 1964; Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Nuclear Research Reactors, OSI-SR/64-41, September 22, 1964.
29 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-64, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, July 16, 1964, p. 3; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2A-65, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, May 19, 1965.
30 . Donald F. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelligence, Memorandum for: Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Staff Member, National Security Council, Subject: The Nuclear Weapons Capability, October 18, 1965.
31 . Weber interview.
32 . George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability,” September 13, 1961, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff, 1957–1961; “Telegram from State Department to Embassy in Soviet Union,” July 15, 1963, in David M. Mabon and David S. Patterson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1961–1963, Volume VII: Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 801; “Telegram from Embassy in Soviet Union to State Department,” July 27, 1963, in Mabon and Patterson (eds.), FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume VII, p. 860. Rusk’s rejection of the McGhee proposal is noted in handwritten comments that appear on the document.
33 . Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, July 24, 1963, p. 1.
34 . John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 114; Joel Ullom, “Enriched Uranium Versus Plutonium: Proliferant Preferences in the Choice of Fissile Material,” Nonproliferation Review 2, 1 (Fall 1994): 1–15 at 1, 5.
35 . Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, p. 1.
36 . Ibid., pp. 2, 4; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 134–135.
37 . SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, p. 2.
38 . Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Memorandum for General LeMay et al., “Chinese Nuclear Development,” November 18, 1963, NARA, RG 218, Taylor Papers, Box 1.
39 . Johnson’s study remains classified but is conc
isely summarized in George W. Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 14, 1964. The paper was produced by Rathjens while he was a staff member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
40 . Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 333.
41 . Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-4-64, The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion, August 26, 1964, p. 1.
42 . Ibid., p. 2.
43 . Interview with Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.
44 . Interview by William Burr with Allen S. Whiting, Crystal City, Virginia, December 13, 1996; interview with former CIA official, April 7, 1997.
45 . “Transcript of Daily Press Briefing, Tuesday, September 29, 1964,” RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Undersecretary for Political Affairs, 1963–1965, Box 2, Psychological Preparations of Chinese Test, October 16, 1964.
46 . Donald Chamberlain, AD/SI to DDCI, Subject: Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test, October 15, 1964, in Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 107–108.
47 . Ibid.
48 . Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 116; V. Gupta and D. Rich, “Locating the Detonation of China’s First Nuclear Explosive Test on 16 October 1964,” International Journal of Remote Sensing 17, 10 (October 1996): 1969–1974.
49 . Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 345; Willis Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single- Outcome Forecasting,” Studies in Intelligence 28, 3 (Fall 1984): 57–70, reprinted in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), Inside the CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal 1955–1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 238–254 at p. 246; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.
50 . Letter, B. A. Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to General Curtis E. LeMay, December 26, 1963.
51 . Office of Computer Services, Directorate of Science and Technology, CIA, OCS Computer System Planning Report, June 1, 1965. FMSAC’s work was aided by help from outside specialists—from contractors as well as the national labs that analyzed the radar signatures and telemetry of satellites and missiles. Telemetry of Soviet reconnaissance satellites was analyzed in an attempt to determine their targets. Another group, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, analyzed Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons programs. (Albert D. Wheelon, Memorandum for: Director, BPAM, Subject: Replies for Questions by Bureau of the Budget Examiners, November 19, 1964; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998.)
52 . Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal, “Intelligence for the Space Race,” Studies in Intelligence 7, 4 (Fall 1963): 1–13 at 1.
53 . Ibid., p. 3.
54 . Telephone interview with Edward Proctor, March 16, 1999; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.
55 . Interview with R. Evans Hineman, Chantilly, Virginia, February 17, 1999; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.
56 . David S. Brandwein, “The SS-8 Controversy,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 3 (Summer 1969): 27–35.
57 . Ibid.; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-63, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, October 18, 1963, p. 12.
58 . Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.
59 . Interview with former CIA official.
60 . Ibid.; Wheelon telephone conversation, September 16, 1999.
61 . Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, November 29, 1998.
62 . Hineman interview.
63 . Ibid.
64 . Letter, Schriever to LeMay.
65 . Ibid.
66 . Ibid.
67 . Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Subject: CIA Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, January 2, 1964.
68 . Draft of Letter, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay to Gen. B. A. Schriever, AFSC, January 7, 1964.
69 . Department of Defense Directive S-5100.43, “Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (Defense/SMAC),” April 27, 1964; Richard L. Bernard, “The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center,” Cryptologic Spectrum, Fall 1981, pp. 30–33; Mark Clesh, “Dedication of New Operations Center for DEFSMAC,” Communiqué, March/April 1998, pp. 42–43.
70 . Clesh, “Dedication of New Operations Center for DEFSMAC”; National Security Agency, A Historical Perspective of DefSMAC with Charles Tevis and Max Mitchell, 1980 (video); Hineman interview.
71 . Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane’s, 1987), p. 51; James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon (New York: John Wiley, 1997), pp. 190–200; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-65, The Soviet Space Program, n.d., pp. 23–24, 28; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, March 2, 1967, pp. 6–7.
72 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-65, The Soviet Space Program, p. 27; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, p. 5.
73 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, pp. 5–6, 34–35; Harford, Korolev, pp. 155–156; William E. Burrows, Exploring Space: Voyages in the Solar System and Beyond (New York: Random House, 1990), p. 162.
74 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, pp. 6, 34–35; Har-ford, Korolev, p. 154; Burrows, Exploring Space, p. 134.
75 . Hineman interview.
76 . Wheelon and Graybeal, “Intelligence for the Space Race,” p. 5.
77 . Ibid., pp. 4–5.
78 . Harford, Korolev, p. 152.
79 . Frank A. Whitmire and Edward G. Correll, “The Failure of Cosmos 57,” Studies in Intelligence 10, 3 (Summer 1966): 25–29.
80 . Ibid.
81 . Ibid.; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, p. 33.
82 . James Burke, “Seven Years to Luna 9,” Studies in Intelligence 10, 2 (Summer 1966): 1–24 at 20.
83 . Ibid.; Burrows, Exploring Space, pp. 162–163.
84 . Robert C. Berman and John P. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 104; “Soviets Step Up Testing of First-Line ICBM Systems,” EUCOM Intelligence Report, April 13, 1966, p. 1.
85 . Jerold H. Klaimon, “Reentry Vehicle Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence 12, 3 (Summer 1968): 23–33.
86 . Ibid., p. 24.
87 . David S. Brandwein, “Telemetry Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence 8, 4 (Fall 1964): 21–29 at 23–24.
88 . Ibid., p. 24.
89 . Ibid., pp. 26–27; Klaimon, “Reentry Vehicle Analysis,” p. 28.
90 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-64, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, October 8, 1964, p. 41.
91 . Central Intelligence Agency, Cost Reduction Program FY 1966-FY 1967, September 1, 1965, p. 9, NARA, RG 263, HRP 89-2, Box 7, File HS/HC 713.
92 . Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 149, 158; Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), pp. 211–212.
93 . McMahon interview.
94 . Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Aides Say Loss of Post in Iran Impairs Missile-Monitoring Ability,” New York Times, March 2, 1979, pp. A1, A8; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.
95 . Interview with William H. Nance, Bethesda, Maryland, May 4, 1999.
96 . Smith, “U.S. Aides Say Loss of Post in Iran Impairs Missile-Monitoring Ability.”
97 . Interview with Robert Phillips, Rosslyn, Virginia, June 4, 1999; Nance interview.
98
. Nance interview; U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fiscal Year 1980 International Security Assistance Authorization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 366; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997; Phillips interview.
99 . Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-67, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, October 26, 1967, p. 10; Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 104; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-64, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, October 8, 1964, p. 13.
100 . “Soviets Step Up Testing of First-Line ICBM Systems,” EUCOM Intelligence Report, April 13, 1966; “Soviets Maintaining High Launch Rate for Major ICBM’s; SS-11 Crew Training May Be Under Way,” EUCOM Intelligence Report, August 18, 1966; “Series of SS-11 ICBM Tests to Pacific Impact Area Concluded,” EUCOM Intelligence Report, September 7, 1966.
101 . Frank Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” Studies in Intelligence 11, 2 (Spring 1967): 59–65 at 64.
102 . Ibid., p. 60.
103 . N. C. Gerson, “SIGINT in Space,” Studies in Intelligence 28, 2 (Summer 1984): 41–48 at 47; Directorate of Collection, Office, ACS/Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, History: Directorate of Collection, Office, ACS/Intelligence 1 July 31–December 1962, n.d., p. 3; Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 60–61.
104 . Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 63–64; Donald C. Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 2 (Spring 1969): 11–19 at 13.
105 . Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,” pp. 13–14, 19.
106 . Eliot, “Moon Bounce Elint,” pp. 61, 64.
107 . Ibid., pp. 64–65.
108 . William H. Nance, “Quality ELINT,” Studies in Intelligence 12, 2 (Spring 1968): 7–19 at 7–8; Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960–1975,” Studies in Intelligence 42, 1 (Spring 1998): 51–59 at 54–55. The specific technical characteristics that fall in the power and coverage categories are maximum beam power, total radiated power, antenna gain, and variation in gain (side and back lobe distribution) (Nance, “Quality ELINT,” pp. 7–19 at 10.)
109 . Nance, “Quality ELINT,” p. 15.
The Wizards of Langley Page 44
