I will leave Captain [Peyton S.] Wyatt in command at this point [with his Huntsville Volunteers] until I can relieve him with thirty-five regulars now at Refugio. I pray that your Excellency will cause all the regulars now enlisted to be formed into companies, and march to headquarters [Copano]. It will be impossible to keep up a garrison with the volunteers. Do forward the regulars. Capt. [Benjamin Fort] Smith had been relieved, and I met him on his way home today. Captain Patton will return to Lavaca County and bring on a company as soon as possible. I have sent Captain [Philip] Dimmitt to raise one hundred more men and march to Bexar forthwith, if it be invested; and if not to repair to headquarters with his company. Captain Patton will do likewise. I would myself have marched to Bexar but the Matamoros rage is up so high that I must see Colonel [William] Ward’s men. You have no idea of the difficulties I have encountered. Patton has told me of the men that make the trouble. Better materials never were in ranks. The government and all its offices have been misrepresented to the army.
I pray you send me copies of Austin’s letters, or rather extracts. If the Council is in session I do wish they would say something about the Confederacy. Please send me frequent expresses and advise me of your pleasure.24
On the surface, the January 17 letter appears to support Houston’s claim that he ordered the Alamo demolished and the city abandoned because manning forts such as the Alamo was not good military policy. A careful and complete analysis of the document, however, reveals the error of such an interpretation.
The missive shows Houston did order the “fortifications in the town” destroyed, but those barricades were in the streets west of the San Antonio River. The Alamo was a separate structure and garrison on the east side of the river. In regard to the defense of the Alamo, the letter shows Houston did not order the fortress destroyed and the town abandoned.25 Houston appealed to Governor Smith: “. . . if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers, the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country.”26
Thus Houston only requested Smith’s approval to demolish the Alamo and abandon the post. Also, the document shows Houston did not request authority to execute the two measures because as he later said, “Troops pent up in forts are useless,” but rather he wanted to take the actions because it was impossible “to keep up the Station with volunteers.”27
In his 1859 Senate speech, Houston claimed his orders to blow up the Alamo and abandon the city were “superseded by the Council.” In that allegation, the old general was half right. He failed to mention that Governor Smith, his political comrade and civilian superior, also ignored his recommendations regarding the evacuation of Bexar and the destruction of the Alamo.28
At that point in the Texas rebellion the provisional government of Texas was in disarray, split into two political factions. Governor Smith, Houston, and the Bexar troops were in favor of independence and total separation from Mexico. Lt. Governor James W. Robinson and the General Council, with the backing of Stephen F. Austin, supported the federal constitution of 1824 and continued participation in the Mexican nation as a state. The political fray was finally resolved with the arrival of Santa Anna’s army and the March 1 convention that selected independence and separation. Regardless, in mid-January 1836, the one issue on which the two political camps agreed was that the Alamo must not be destroyed and that San Antonio must not be abandoned.29
On or about January 21, Governor Smith ordered Lt. Colonel William B. Travis, a Smith and Houston supporter, to reinforce the Bexar garrison with one hundred men. Travis, however, was only able to muster about thirty soldiers for the assignment. Ironically, the unit arrived at Bexar on February 5, the date that Smith wrote: “Owing to their base management, much confusion prevails among our volunteer troops on the frontier, but, by using much vigilance, I have now got Bexar secure.”30
On January 31 the Council, having been informed of Houston’s advice to Smith, ordered that an “express be sent immediately to Bejar, with orders from the acting Governor [James W. Robinson] countermanding the orders of Genl. Houston, and that the Commandant be required to put the place in the best possible state for defense, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen, supply and provision the Garrison, and in no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity.” Truly, if there was an edict that Travis and Bowie did not obey, it was the last dictate that gave them the authority to “abandon or surrender the place” in the “last extremity”—death. Even in that situation, the commanders did not abandon the Alamo.31
Several questions, however, remain. On January 23, 1836, Colonel Neill notified Governor Smith: “If teams could be obtained here by any means to remove the Cannon and Public property I would immediately destroy the fortifications and abandon the place, taking the men I have under my command here, to join the Commander in chief at Copano. . . .” Historians and popular writers have offered Neill’s statement as evidence that he attempted to obey Houston’s alleged order to blow up the Alamo and abandon the city, but was prevented from doing so because of the lack of draft animals. An objective reading of the document, however, reveals that Neill did not want to leave Bexar because Houston had ordered him to do so. Neill had just received reliable intelligence that indicated Santa Anna was going to direct his forces against Goliad and Copano, not Bexar. Therefore, if the means had been available to move the cannon, Neill would have destroyed the Alamo and abandoned San Antonio in order to reinforce the troops at Goliad and Copano, not to fall back to Gonzales as Houston later claimed he had ordered.32
Additionally, other than ordering the destruction of the fortifications west of the San Antonio River, what other orders did Houston issue in response to Neill’s letter of alarm? Houston’s January 17 letter to Smith furnishes a partial answer.
Despite nearly two hundred and forty volunteers in the Goliad-Refugio area, Houston looked to the colonies east of the Guadalupe River to reinforce San Antonio. He sent orders to Captain Philip Dimmitt, who resided on the east side of Lavaca Bay, about forty miles east of Goliad, instructing him “to raise one hundred more men and march to Bexar forthwith, if it be invested; and if not to repair to headquarters with his company.”33
Also, according to the letter, Houston believed Captain William H. Patton was already at San Antonio with his mounted infantry company. Houston informed Smith that Patton was to “return to Lavaca county and bring on a company as soon as possible.” If the enemy was not at Bexar, Patton was ordered to join Houston at Copano.34
Many historians and writers insist that Houston dispatched James Bowie to the relief of Bexar with a quickly organized company of volunteers. While Bowie did hurry to San Antonio with a small volunteer company, the evidence suggests it was on his own initiative, not Houston’s order.
In writing Smith, Houston simply said, “Colonel Bowie will leave here in a few hours for Bexar with a detachment of from thirty to fifty men.” On January 30, 1836, Houston detailed events at Goliad and Refugio: “I immediately requested Colonel James Bowie to march with a detachment of volunteers to his [Lt. Colonel James C. Neill] relief.” Then on February 2 Bowie reported his version of the relief effort to Smith: “It was forthwith determined that I should go instantly to Bejar; accordingly I left Genl Houston and with a few very efficient volunteers came on to this place about 2 weeks since. I was received by Col. Neill with great cordiality, and the men under my command entered at once into active service.”35
Years later William G. Cooke, who was at Goliad in January 1836, recalled: “Bowie’s object appeared to be to induce our men to return to San Antonio—he used every means in his power to effect this object—They however at length determined to recognize the order of Genl Houston and marched to Refugio.”36
The fact that Bowie and Houston were contending for the services of the same men at Goliad and
the fact that Houston ordered the Alamo reinforced from the colonies suggest that the decision to support Bexar was made by Bowie and that Houston may not have truly supported the action. Thus the question remains: If Houston ordered the Alamo destroyed and the city abandoned, why did he allow Bowie to relieve the command? Also, if Houston ordered the Alamo destroyed, why did he make arrangements for other reinforcements to march to the city?
The totality of the evidence shows that Houston wanted to destroy all of the fortifications in Bexar and abandon the city. His reasons for wanting to take those actions, however, are clouded. Before the fall of the Alamo his reason for making the request to Governor Smith was that the location could not be manned with volunteers. After the tragic defeat, he alleged that he had actually issued orders for the actions because “with our small, unorganized force, we can not maintain sieges in fortresses, in the country of the enemy.”37
Until Bowie and his volunteers, members of Captain John Chenoweth’s United States Invincibles, arrived at Bexar, the town was for the most part garrisoned by Houston’s regular army soldiers. Houston was Lt. Colonel Neill’s commanding officer. Thus, Houston had the power to order all of the city’s fortifications destroyed and the site abandoned. After all, he had made the decision to garrison the city following the fall of Bexar and the expulsion of the Mexican army in 1835. Instead, Houston “passed the buck” to Governor Henry Smith. Also, because Houston made no mention of abandoning Bexar in his January 30 report to Smith, it appears he had backed down from the proposal in the face of Smith’s order for Travis and the Legion of Cavalry to join Neill at the Alamo. In regard to San Antonio, Houston only advised Smith: “Should Bexar remain a military post, Goliad must be maintained, or the former will be cut off from all supplies arriving by sea at the port of Copano.” If Houston truly believed that the Alamo should be demolished and the city abandoned, he could have sent written orders to Neill by Bowie. Neill, an excellent soldier, would have obeyed them without question. Why did Houston fail to send such orders to Neill? Bowie, because of his strong ties to the city and its citizens, probably voiced strong objections that stopped Houston from dispatching such orders to Neill.38
Houston appears to have been blind to the strategic importance of San Antonio. The town was the gateway to the Anglo-Celtic colonies of Texas. From Bexar, the Camino Real continued northeast to Nacogdoches. The road to Gonzales, Columbus, and San Felipe ran east from San Antonio to the heart of the colonies. Indeed, Bowie defined the significance: “The salvation of Texas depends in great measure in keeping Bejar out of the hands of the enemy. It serves as the frontier picquet guard and if it were in possession of Santa Anna there is no strong hold from which to repel him in his march towards the Sabine. . . . Col. Neill & myself have come to the solemn resolution that we will rather die in these ditches than give it up to the enemy. The citizens deserve our protection and the public safety demands our lives rather than to evacuate this post to the enemy.”39
Travis, who did not even want to be stationed at San Antonio, once at the Alamo, came to feel the same as Bowie. On February 11 temporary command of the garrison was transferred to Travis when Neill had to return home to Mina (Bastrop) because of an illness in his family.40 After taking command, Travis, echoing Bowie’s earlier concern about Bexar, warned Governor Smith: “This being the Frontier Post nearest the Rio Grande, will be the first to be attacked. We are illy prepared for their reception, as we have not more than 150 men here and they in a very disorganized state – Yet we are determined to sustain it as long as there is a man left; because we consider death preferable to disgrace, which would be the result of giving up a Post which has been so dearly won, and thus opening the door for the Invaders to enter the sacred Territory of the colonies.” Again, on February 16, Travis advised Smith: “I have nothing of interest to communicate that has transpired since my last. I must, however, again remind your Excellency that this [post] is the key to Texas and should not be neglected by the Govt.”41
Marshall De Bruhl, a recent Houston biographer, argues that the Battle of the Alamo is not worth remembering today. He observed: “Texas Independence and San Jacinto Day can be celebrated with honor by all Texans, no matter what and recognize the Alamo, for what it is—a sad, heart-wrenching monument to the dead, not the storied battleground of song and legend.”42
Mr. De Bruhl’s opinion notwithstanding, had the Alamo been demolished and Bexar abandoned as Houston wished, there would have been no constitutional convention to declare Texas independent and probably no conclusive Texian victory, at least not at San Jacinto. The thirteen days that Travis, Bowie, Crockett, and their men, women, and children valiantly gave Texas and the world prevented the fast moving Mexican army from sweeping deep into the Texian colonies.
On the other hand, some individuals argue that the Alamo siege gave Houston time to organize and train the army that defeated Santa Anna on April 21, 1836. Nothing could be further from the truth. At probably the most critical point in the Texas rebellion, February 1, 1836, when chaos and confusion ruled within the temporary Texas government, Houston relinquished his command over Texas’s military forces and went on furlough to adjust his private affairs and to smoke the peace pipe with his most loyal supporters, the friendly Indians of Texas.43
On February 23, 1836, as Mexican soldiers commenced their investment of the Alamo, Houston was safely ensconced in East Texas with his Cherokee friends, signing a needless peace treaty. On March 1, 1836, Houston, with full knowledge of the situation at San Antonio, took a seat at the convention as a delegate from Refugio, a settlement he had probably only visited once in his life, and ignored his military duties so he could play a political role at the birth of an independent Texas.44
Houston spent most of his free time at the convention in the local grog shops. Edwin Waller described delegate Houston with these words: “I found Genl. Houston drunk at the Consultation in Nov[ember] 1835 and left him in the same situation in Washington [on-the-Brazos] in [18]36. He had often to be picked up and put to bed by his friends.”45
Even Houston acknowledged his binge drinking at the Convention. Interview notes from an 1844 encounter with Mary Austin Holley quote Houston as having said: “Travis sending for assistance – none to give – had to make a constitution on my birthday – had a grand spree – eggnog – everybody – two days – bad business – hated it.”46
The previously mentioned Colonel Robert M. Coleman left this description of Houston’s activities at the convention:
Thus, while Col. Travis and his gallant companions were closely besieged by an overwhelming Mexican force, with Santa Anna at its head and letters were daily received from that brave officer imploring aid, and declaring that without timely and efficient assistance he must perish. While Col. Fannin was daily calling for a force to enable him to meet the enemy in the vicinity of Goliad. While too, the citizens were abandoning their homes and fleeing to the Eastward to escape from their barbarous enemy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Texas was spending his nights in the grog-shops of Washington, in company with the gamblers and dissipated multitude which the session of the Convention had collected at that place; and his days were devoted to sleep, except that portion of them which he spent in vain efforts to ally the fears of the people, and to account for his disgraceful inactivity.
With this view he declared that a fraud had been practiced upon the people by the officers of the frontier, for party purposes; that there was not an enemy on our borders; that one of the officers was endeavoring to wrest from him the command of the army, for which purpose he had caused these reports to be circulated, hoping the authorities, in the event of an invasion, and absence of the Commander-in-Chief, would confer that appointment upon another.47
One document that appears to repudiate Coleman’s allegation that Houston did not believe the enemy was on the frontier is an entreaty to the public that was published under Houston’s name, allegedly on March 2, 1836. It reads:
War is raging on the f
rontiers. Bexar is besieged by two thousand of the enemy under the command of General Sesma. Reinforcements are on the march to unite with the besieging army. By the last report, our force in Bexar was only one hundred and fifty men. The citizens of Texas must rally to aid of our army, or it will perish. Let the citizens of the east march to the combat. The enemy must be driven from our soil, or desolation will accompany their march upon us. Independence is declared; it must be maintained. Immediate action united with valor, can alone achieve the great work. The services of all are forthwith required in the field.
Sam Houston Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
P.S. It is rumored that the enemy are on their march to Gonzales, and that they have entered the colonies. The fate of Bexar is unknown. The country must and shall be defended. The patriots of Texas are appealed to in behalf of their bleeding country.48
Houston’s words were the truth, but his previous actions, his subsequent behavior, and the ensuing actions of the convention suggest that if the proclamation was actually issued on March 2, 1836, it was an insincere political action to give the impression that Houston was doing something to answer Travis’s call for assistance. Indeed, “the services of all” were required at the front, including the services of the “Commander-in-Chief of the Army.” Other evidence indicates that the Coleman accusation is true, and that Houston was successful in convincing most of the delegates that the Alamo was not threatened.49
On February 25 Travis wrote Houston of the conditions at the Alamo. He detailed the events that had passed since the enemy’s arrival and praised his troops: “I take great pleasure in stating that both officers and men conducted themselves with firmness and bravely.” Then, he closed with: “Do hasten on aid to me as rapidly as possible, as from the superior number of the enemy, it will be impossible for us to keep them out much longer. If they overpower us, we fall a sacrifice at the shrine of our country, and we hope posterity and our country will do our memory justice. Give me help, oh my Country! Victory or Death!” The missive arrived at Washington-on-the-Brazos on the evening of March 2. The impact of Travis’s call for immediate aid is recorded in the diary of a spectator at the convention. It reads: “It is believed the Alamo is safe.”50
Alamo Traces Page 3
