Almost fifty years later, Harmon wrote of his mission. He reported: “A day or two after our arrival at San Antonio, one morning, in company with Payton Bland, David Crockett & George Evans (afterward Maj. Evans, [who was] killed in the Alamo; Maj. Evans was a member of David Garner’s company when we left Jefferson).73 – When we went out to look after our horses, that were staked out on the high ground, or second bank [probably the east side of the San Antonio River near the Alamo], we met up with two soldiers (I can’t remember their names) – who asked Col. Crockett if he thought there was any chance for a fight, [for] if not they were going home.
“Col. Crockett said there had been plenty of men there to take the town, but that the men were going away as fast as they came, and remarked that if he (Crockett) was in command he would have given them ‘Sheet’74 long ago, meaning that he would whip them [reinforcements] out [of the colonies] – & [he] said that they needed some one to carry orders back to hurry up the drafted men & all soldiers at home.”75
David Crockett
Photo courtesy of Texas State Library and Archives Commission
Thus, when the time came during the siege for someone to go out and “whip” reinforcements into the Alamo, it appears that Crockett volunteered for the job. Also, it was a chance for him to do what he did best: scout and talk. A better man could not have been found to locate and motivate Fannin’s American volunteers to ride to the aid of the Alamo than the old “half horse, half alligator” himself, who had a reputation for “whipping his weight in wildcats.” Sure the Crockett tales were fiction. Nevertheless, the Goliad men were already boasting about how David Crockett had “grinned down” the Mexicans. Crockett had a reputation that would have appealed to the men from the United States; he was one of them, having come to Texas for the same reasons. If he could not talk them into the Alamo, nobody could. Sometime after dark, Crockett and two other men left the Alamo. One man’s task was to carry a packet of letters to Gonzales. Crockett and the third man’s mission was to locate Fannin’s force and guide it back to the Alamo.76
That night Santa Anna wrote General Jose C. Urrea to congratulate him on his rout of “the colonists at San Patricio.” In closing the missive, the “Napoleon of the West” mentioned that he was busy planning his final assault on the Alamo.77
Sometime before midnight, Crockett and his scouts probably located the combined force (Tumlinson’s rangers, Seguin’s Tejanos, Chenoweth and De Sauque’s men, Gilmore’s men, and about fifty other Fannin men) that were camped at the Cibolo ford on the Gonzales road, twenty miles east of the Alamo. Travis’s letter to the convention, with at least three other missives, was sent on to Gonzales. Also, Crockett would have informed the combined force that Houston was not coming to the Alamo’s aid. Nevertheless, he would have told them that additional men were forming at Gonzales and that Major Williamson was probably en route with more men as they talked. Chenoweth and De Sauque would have told Crockett that Fannin would join Williamson’s force, provided Fannin received timely notice. That is, if he was not engaged with another Mexican force at Goliad.78
Eleventh Day — Friday, March 4
Sometime before daylight, part of the combined force broke through the enemy perimeter and entered the Alamo. The Texians appear to have approached, like the March 1 group, from upriver of the Alamo, near the sugarcane mills. As with the first unit, the force did not go undetected. In 1838 Bennett McNelly, former second sergeant of Breece’s Greys company, put it this way: “. . . on the 4th [March] was driven across the prairie by enemy. . . .” The exact number of men who made it into the Alamo is unknown. The Arkansas Gazette of April 12, 1836, however, reported: “Col. Crockett, with about 50 resolute volunteers, had cut their way into the garrison, through the Mexican troops only a few days before the fall of San Antonio.” Word of the reinforcement reached Goliad by March 10. Joseph B. Tatom wrote his sister about the Alamo, reporting: “. . . I believe they have been reinforced by about fifty militia. . . .”79
Again, the Mexicans did not know exactly what had occurred. Colonel Almonte’s journal only contains a simple note: “The enemy attempted a sally in the night at the Sugar Mill, but were repulsed by our advance.” It appears that Almonte believed that the “enemy” came from the Alamo. That makes no sense. There would have been no reason for men from the Alamo to have gone on a mission to the mills during the night. General Filisola, writing many years later, appears to have confused the second relief with the March 1 entry. He wrote: “. . . 32 people of the Town of Gonzalez who under the cover of darkness joined the group two days before the attack on the fort. . . .” His date for Crockett’s group is exactly right, but the number is wrong.80
Historians, however, might argue that a reporter in Arkansas could not have known about a reinforcement of the Alamo. Regardless, the paper’s source for Crockett leading the men into the Alamo appears to have been Jesse B. Badgett, one of the Alamo’s convention delegates. But how would Badgett have learned of the relief? Badgett’s source for the information would most likely have been his brother, William Badgett, a member of Chenoweth’s company, who appears to have taken part in the March 4 reinforcement. At first it was believed that William had been killed at the Alamo. Jesse, however, informed the Arkansas Advocate, the Gazette’s competitor, that William had not been killed and that as of March 20, he was with Houston’s army on the Colorado River.81
Conclusive identification of all the men who entered the Alamo with Crockett that morning is probably impossible. Still, evidence exists for the following men.
Former New Orleans Greys from Breece’s company:82
George Andrews
Henry Thomas
Robert B. Moore
William Howell
Thomas P. Hutchinson
John Spratt
James Holloway
Stephen Dennison
Conrad Eigenauer
Henry Courtman
Chenoweth’s United States Invincibles:83
W. A. Moore
Dr. E. F. Mitchusson
Thomas H. Roberts
W. T. Green
W. H. Sanders
J. D. Elliott
A. A. Petrasweiz
William Hunter
N. Debichi
L. R. O’Neil
S. W. McNeilly
M. B. Clark
Samuel M. Edwards
Gonzales Mounted Rangers:84
George B. Kimbell
Thomas R. Jackson
James Taylor
Edward Taylor
William Taylor
Andrew J. Kent
Jacob Darst
George W. Cottle
Galba Fuqua
John Gaston
William George
James George
Freeman H. K. Day
Mina (Bastrop) Mounted Rangers:85
Robert E. Cochran
Lemuel Crawford
James Kenny
James Northcross
Charles S. Smith
James E. Stewart
Ross McClelland
Juan N. Seguin’s men:86
Juan Abamillo
Juan A. Badillo
Damacio Ximenes
Andres Nava
Guadalupe Rodriquez
Carlos Espalier
William Gilmore’s Tennessee Volunteer unit:87
John M. Thomson
George Olamio
Miscellaneous Fannin men:88
Edward Mcafferty
Francis H. Gray
Edwin T. Mitchell
The total is fifty-three men. The roster may contain a few errors and may not include all of the men who entered the Alamo with Crockett on the morning of March 4, 1836. Still, there is at least one piece of primary evidence that puts each man in the Alamo or strongly suggests each man was an Alamo defender.
The reinforcement was only partially successful in that perhaps only about one-third of the combined force made it into the Alamo. That result appears to have co
nvinced the remaining men that the enemy line around the Alamo was too strong for their small force to break through. Also, they probably had a few wounded men. The force, however, seems to have remained in the area. They most likely returned to the Cibolo ford on the Gonzales road to await the arrival of additional men from Gonzales and Goliad.89
In probably late afternoon, Santa Anna met with his generals, battalion colonels, and one major. The group discussed the commander-in-chief’s plan for the final assault of the Alamo.90 Almonte later wrote: “A meeting of Generals and Colonels was held . . . After a long conference [Martin Perfecto] Cos, [Manuel F.] Castrillon, Orisnuela [Gregorio Urunuela], and [Jose Maria] Romero were of the opinion that the Alamo should be assaulted – first opening a breach with the two cannon of ______ and the two mortars, and that they should wait the arrival of the two 12 pounders expected on Monday the seventh. The President, Gen. Ramirez [y Sesma], and I were of the opinion that the 12 pounders should not be waited for, but the assault made. Colonels [Francisco] Duque and [Agustin] Amat, and the Major of the San Luis battalion did not give any definite opinion about either of the two modes of assault proposed. In this state things remained – the General not making any definite resolution.”91
Travis may have also met with his officers that afternoon. As least they would have had much to consider. The large compound was encircled by almost 2,400 enemy soldiers, comprised of about 2,000 footsoldiers and artillerymen and about 380 horsemen. Major Williamson and Fannin should have arrived with a large force by that time, but they were nowhere to be seen.92
During the night, Santa Anna had the third and last Mexican artillery battery installed north of the Alamo. Lieutenant Ignacio Berrospe, an engineer officer, supervised the construction. The fortification was put in place to hammer the Alamo’s north wall for the final assault.93
Sometime that evening, John W. Smith left the Alamo for the last time. He rode east, probably to locate what remained of the combined force. If he found them, their officers probably told him they would not attempt to enter the Alamo without additional men. Getting killed while trying to enter the fortress would not have helped Travis and his men. Regardless of what may or may not have happened at the Cibolo ford, Smith continued on to Gonzales to search for help.94
There were men at Gonzales but not many. Captain Jesse Billingsly arrived sometime during the day with his company of Mina Volunteers. Lt. Colonel James C. Neill had arrived sometime after March 1 and had assumed command of all the troops at that settlement. The town had two bronze cannon, a four-pounder and a six-pounder, guns that had been captured at the storming of Bexar in December 1835. Neill had the guns mounted on carriages made from the front and back wheels of a cotton wagon. Also, he collected provisions, equipment, clothing, and medicine for the ride to the Alamo.95
Also, at Gonzales that day, Travis’s letters of March 3 and a missive from Crockett calling for assistance were most likely given to a courier to take to San Felipe and Washington-on-the-Brazos. The rider was William Bull, who was paid five dollars by Joseph D. Clements, a Gonzales resident, to deliver the express mail.96
Twelfth Day — Saturday, March 5
At San Antonio Colonel Almonte reported that the day was clear and moderate with a thermometer reading of fifty degrees. Ideal weather for the heavy labor of working hot cannon. He continued in his diary: “A brisk fire was commenced from our north battery against the enemy, which was not answered, except now and then.” At high noon the temperature was almost seventy degrees.97
Sometime that day, perhaps in the morning, Ben Highsmith arrived from Goliad. He later reported that as he approached the Alamo he saw that it was circled by cavalrymen “. . . on the look out for messengers whom they knew the Texan commander was sending from the doomed fort.” Highsmith, seeing that he had no chance to join Travis, departed for Gonzales. The enemy, however, saw the young Texian and pursued him. The chase continued for six miles—two miles beyond Salado Creek. Young Ben, who must have been riding an extremely strong and fast horse, escaped his pursuers.98
In the afternoon Santa Anna called his senior officers together. The Mexican general had made a decision about the Alamo. At 2:00 p.m. he issued “secret” attack orders to the “Generals, Chiefs of Sections, and Commanding Officers.” The assault was to be conducted by four separate columns from the north, south, east, and west. The attack was to take place the following morning just before daylight in order to catch the Alamo defenders by surprise, when their sleep was the most sound.99
Santa Anna’s secret plan was soon compromised to some extent. That evening Angel Navarro crossed the river and approached the Alamo. He requested that Juana Alsbury and Gertrudis Navarro, his daughters, be allowed to leave the compound. Undoubtedly, Navarro’s appeal made Travis realize that a major assault on the fort would soon take place. Thus, he took advantage of the opportunity to send a message out with Mrs. Alsbury, who went out to talk with her father. Little valid evidence of this incident has survived.100 General Filisola, however, left this description: “On that same evening about nightfall it was reported that Travis Barnet [sic], commander of the enemy garrison, through the intermediary of a woman, proposed to the general in chief that they would surrender arms and fort with everybody in it with the only condition of saving his life and that of all his comrades in arms. However, the answer had come back that they should surrender unconditionally, without guarantees, not even of life itself, since there should be no guarantees for traitors. With this reply it is clear that all were determined to lose their existence, selling it as dearly as possible. Consequently they were to exercise extreme vigilance in order not to be surprised at any time of the day or night.” Mrs. Alsbury, after hearing from Santa Anna or his representative, returned to the Alamo.101
Later that night the last courier from the Alamo left for Goliad. The rider was a young man named James L. Allen. Allegedly, he was selected because he had a “fleet mare.” Yet, he had no saddle. He rode bareback “with his arms about the animal’s neck and bending low the better to conceal himself. . . .” Apparently, he passed through the enemy lines unnoticed because of their preparation for the final attack on the Alamo. Allen would later tell Fannin that the Mexicans had erected an artillery battery four hundred yards from the Alamo and that “every shot goes through the walls.”102
The Mexican artillery remained quiet that night. Thus, the people in the Alamo obtained some much-needed sleep. The defenders, sleeping or not, probably knew that an attack, a fatal one, could occur at any time. Travis’s men would have been doing everything possible to repair the damage to the north wall, which was most likely nothing more than shoring up the interior side with a dirt embankment. Also, given the cannonball pounding the north wall had been taking, Travis would have realized that the main thrust of the attack would be at that point. Thus, he most likely shifted weapons, ammunition, and men to positions that would allow them to react quickly to wherever they were needed.103
That afternoon or evening John W. Smith would have arrived at Gonzales. The force there had not grown much larger. Besides Billingsly’s company, Sidney Sherman had arrived with a company of American volunteers from Kentucky. Moseley Baker’s San Felipe company of foot soon joined the Gonzales force.104
The Last Day — Sunday, March 6
At about a half-hour before daylight, Santa Anna’s soldiers, with rockets bursting in the dark sky to signal the assault, stormed the Alamo fortress from the south, the north, the west, and the east with a force of about 1,500 men. Ramirez y Sesma, with part of the Dolores cavalry, was stationed in the alameda (cottonwood grove) about a hundred yards southeast of the Alamo. Colonel Ventura Mora, with the rest of the cavalry, was stationed north of the Alamo, probably near the Mexican artillery battery.105
In a brief description, Colonel Almonte reported: “At 5 A.M. the columns were posted at their respective stations, and at half past 5 the attack or assault was made, and continued until 6 A.M. When the enemy attempted in vain to fly, the
y were over taken and put to the sword, and only five women, one Mexican soldier (prisoner,) and a black slave escaped from instant death. On the part of the enemy the result was, 250 killed, 17 pieces of artillery – a flag; muskets and fire arms taken. Our loss was 60 soldiers and 5 officers killed, and 198 soldiers and 25 officers wounded – 2 of the latter General officers. The battalion of Toluca lost 98 between the wounded and killed.”106
Sam Bastian and his comrades appear to have watched the final assault from their hiding place northwest of the Alamo. Bastian reported: “Disguising myself, and in company with Rigault, the creole, we stole into the town. Everything was in confusion. In front of the fort the Mexican dead covered the ground, but the scene inside was awful.” After they had completed their dangerous visit, Bastian claimed: “We now thought it time to look after ourselves, and made for the chaparral, where our companions were [waiting]. We had nearly reached the wood when a mounted lancer overtook us. Rigault awaited and shot him dead, and so we made our escape.” Ultimately, these men appear to have fallen back to Gonzales.107
The remaining members of the combined force that camped at or near the Cibolo Creek ford on the Gonzales road also realized the Alamo had fallen. Some of these men retreated to Gonzales, arriving on March 8. Others appear to have joined Fannin at Goliad. Juan Seguin may have sent a part of his Tejano company to his ranch and the Flores ranch on the San Antonio River to evacuate their families to Nacogdoches. Seguin and his remaining men then rode to Gonzales with John Chenoweth and Francis De Sauque.108
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