by Uzi Eilam
During a meeting with me, Yitzhak and Yedidia, Tzvi Zur announced that the change in R&D leadership would take place on October 1. The speed of the transition came as a surprise for Yedidia, who had still not decided whether to resign or to agree to our request to stay on. The lack of clarity surrounding the selection of the military deputy continued. During the meeting, Tzvi raised the possibility of having just a civilian deputy, who would in any case serve as the number two official at R&D. I knew that after my conversation with him that air force commander Benny Peled had also spoken with Tzvi. I also knew that the CGS wanted there to be a deputy director from the army. Tal, however, vehemently opposed the very idea of a deputy director of R&D from the air force. “I won’t have it!” he insisted. “It’s against the founding principles!” For me, it was clear that Tal, as chief of the Operations Branch, saw the R&D Unit in overly narrow terms as belonging to him and as a body meant primarily to serve the interests of the ground forces of the IDF. Within the rectangle between Tzvi Zur, CGS David Elazar, Tal, and Peled, I found myself in a mediating position which enabled me to continue promoting the idea of a deputy from the air force, based on my belief in joint inter-arm efforts in research and development.
At the end of the process the air force accepted my approach and proposed Lieutenant Colonel Nahum Dayagi for the position of deputy director of R&D. On the civilian side we upgraded the status of the civilian deputy and made Yedidia second in command of the R&D Unit. This created a balance that pacified the civilian element of R&D and the defense ministry, and at the same time assured we would get the significant technical contribution of an officer of the air force’s Equipment Squadron. The development plans included many important issues that were meant specifically to serve the air force, and Nahum’s contribution to the Unit was important.
The development plans for the ground corps were not in an ideal state. One day Tal summoned us on short notice to his meeting with the corps commander. Ground Department Director Yehoshua Rozen and I went up to his office, where we observed some of the less pleasant interpersonal sides of Israel Tal. I summed up the meeting in my journal as follows:
The discussion revolved around the tank assault kits. Previously, we had drafted a document, reviewed it with Tal, and, at his request, revised it approximately one and a half months ago. However, since then no progress has been made whatsoever. The whole time,[Major General Avraham] Adan was constantly pressuring us to authorize the expense of development work for bulldozer and plow kits, which Tal wanted to hear nothing about. Tal’s opposition was based on principle and had to do with the concept, not with the lack of utility or excessive budget. We had never sent the last document to the corps because Tal had not authorized it to be sent before we discussed it with him, and he never found the time do to so. In the meeting, Tal found himself pushed to the wall by Adan (justifiably in my opinion), with no way to justify the time it was taking him to address the issue. He then asked us a few questions about the document, which he had not read, and blew up, telling us that the work was worthless and that he had no R&D justification for the request of the corps. Later, he regained his composure somewhat and said that the equipment would be finalized as we made progress toward approving the model.
At one point during the meeting I got angry and spoke to Tal in a harsh tone, telling him that I refused to be rebuked simply in order to cover up problems with his working style, his failure to delegate authority, and his priorities regarding the issues that interested him (such as the Merkava, the roller-bridge, etc.). I decided that if he continues on as Operations Branch chief, I would stop being so nice.
This episode with Tal, who had just been appointed deputy CGS, was enough to show me what was waiting just around the corner, with my imminent appointment as director of R&D.
Summing Up My Tenure as Deputy Director — Self Examination
That year, the eve of Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, was particularly special for me, as it was preceded by a public announcement of my imminent appointment as director of R&D. At home things were tense in light of the many expectations. In a journal entry from the period I describe how “Osnat jumped up and down in excitement and was overcome with joy when they showed my picture (smiling, but somewhat contemplative) on the television screen and announced the news.” I had already had three personal meetings with the main people in the defense establishment with whom I was supposed to work closely — deputy CGS Tal, CGS Elazar and Itzhak Ironi, director-general of the defense ministry. At the beginning of the new year I was filled with positive energy and ready to begin a new chapter in my career.
One of the most important issues I managed to conclude was a meeting with Yedidia in which he agreed to carry on in his current position for another year. I also told Tzvi about how important it was that Yedidia remain in his position as civilian deputy director, especially since there was no better candidate for the position. During my meeting with Yedidia, I found that he understood the situation and knew there was no serious candidate to replace him. The meeting was easy for me, because the relatively straightforward situation meant both that I would plead with him and that he would agree. I was very pleased that this is in fact what happened. I suggested to Yedidia that Tzvi call him and personally ask him to stay on, so that that the request would be coming from the most senior authority within the ministry, and he liked the idea. I also spoke with Yedidia about Nahum Dayagi. Yedidia was concerned that Nahum’s appointment could harm his standing as the deputy director of R&D because he was an outsider and was not sufficiently charismatic and assertive, and that this in turn would make it hard to work with the department directors. I acknowledged that there was some truth to what he was saying, and that meant we would have to organize things in the office a bit differently. We ended our discussion by agreeing that we would dedicate the month ahead before the transition to planning our roles and the division of responsibilities. We also agreed that Yedidia would be second in command while that Nahum would be third in line. At the same time, I considered the possibility of asking Benny Ron to replace Ronny Katzin as assistant to the director of R&D. Ronny had told me long ago that he had wanted to leave R&D and that he had only stayed on because of me.
On Sunday afternoon, Tal called me from his home. He had been working on drafting his remarks for the upcoming General Staff meeting on the strategic situation, and he asked me to meet with him at his home. I cancelled all my meetings and appointments and drove to Tal’s house in Rehovot. When I arrived, he was wearing only shorts and not even a t-shirt (although he later put one on), and was informal, although still characteristically decisive and resolute. I began by saying that I believed things would change in the defense ministry once Tzvi left as planned and all the issues he had been handling were transferred to director-general Ironi. Tal maintained that the defense minister would not give any more power to the General Staff, and that there were three possible scenarios: (1) that the minister himself would assume Tzvi Zur’s responsibilities and get into the thick of things; (2) that the minister would appoint a new deputy minister to take on the work; and (3) that the minister would delegate the responsibilities in question to the chief scientist of the defense ministry.
On the subject of work in research and development, Tal was critical of the concept underlying the organization of the Unit and blamed CGS David Elazar for setting the unit’s current dependence. In any event, he explained that he regarded R&D as an independent unit that was subordinate to the Operations Branch only administratively. R&D needed to work directly with the services of the IDF and with the CGS, Tal continued, and it was his role to serve as the head of the ground arm of the IDF with regard to issues related to R&D. In all other areas, Tal promised to work with the R&D Unit like he did with the Adjutant General’s Branch and the Quartermaster’s Branch. Tal’s assessment sounded realistic and wise to me, and I agreed without hesitation. With surprising generosity, Tal said that we could even appeal decisions on gr
ound-related issues to the CGS. With a lighter heart and a greater sense of responsibility, I drove from Tal’s house directly to a meeting with the CGS.
At the very beginning of the meeting Elazar asked me to give him my assessment of the current state of affairs of the R&D Unit. I told him that the Unit functioned as a separate body that had not been integrated into the Operations Branch or the services of the IDF. This surprised the CGS, who immediately asked if this was the fault of R&D, the services of the IDF, or the deputy CGS. I told him that, to the best of my knowledge, it was not the fault of R&D, and that if the blame lay anywhere, it must be divided up between the deputy CGS and the services of the IDF. I quoted what Tal had to say about the R&D Unit’s status and told him that if this was an accurate reflection of things, it meant not only a great deal of responsibility for me, which I was willing to accept, but also a greater burden on him as CGS in terms of work and the need to take notice of certain issues. Elazar agreed that the fact that Tzvi Zur would be out of the picture this year changed many things, and the impression I got was that he was not sorry about the change. Elazar said that he had not yet let Tal off the hook with regard to his role in directing the administrative work at R&D and in various parts of the IDF. But Tal was a man of extremes, Elazar explained. For him, it was either all or nothing. “If it doesn’t work,” the CGS said, “then we’ll work like this.” With a pat on my back and a shake of my hand, he walked me into the lounge in his office. I left with mixed feelings: certain that I had Elazar’s support, which pleased me, but acutely aware of the great responsibility I was assuming and the complexity of my new position.
My meeting with Itzhak Ironi, director general of the Defense Ministry, was different. Ironi told me that the minister had informed him that he would assume responsibility for all the issues with which Tzvi had been dealing. Ironi knew that he needed to prepare himself, and he wanted to make use of the R&D Unit for all the ministry‘s activities. He appeared stable and trusting but lacked Tzvi’s charisma and charm. We agreed that we would begin by meeting on a weekly basis and then decide how to continue. I left the meeting deep in thought, concerned about the director general’s weakness in the face of the demands from the army. I also feared the traditional approach of the military industries which he had directed before he was appointed director-general, according to which Israel Military Industries (IMI) enthusiastically endorsed every request from the IDF. I believed that the Unit could in fact help Ironi carve out more authority for the defense ministry in its interactions with the IDF and the General Staff. I also regarded this as a difficult challenge, as well as a way to fortify the status and authority of the R&D Unit.
The general atmosphere 10 days before the beginning of the Yom Kippur War was complacent. No one dreamed that such a grueling war would soon engulf the country, claiming so many casualties and transforming so many parts of Israeli society. The eve of Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, is typically a time for self-examination, and this was even more true for me in light of the job I was about to begin after the holiday. I briefly summed up in my journal my tenure as Deputy Director of R&D as follows:
By briefly reviewing my tenure as deputy director, it is possible to sum up the work that has been done by the R&D Unit until this point, and perhaps also what needs to be done in the future.
We set up the R&D unit and Yitzhak, for the most part, instituted the structure and working methods of its sub-units.
We established initial procedures, and we now need to establish more detailed procedures.
We began the proper signing of contractual agreements and now must address the entire subject of contracts, with bodies within the defense establishment as well.
We recruited the maximum authorized number of employees, and we now must replace a number of key people.
Although we achieved integration between the development plans of the services of the IDF and effective work with the air force and the navy, the internal administrative work within the services of the IDF is still insufficient.
We put the R&D Unit on the map within the IDF and the defense ministry, but we have not yet taken full advantage of our exclusive ability to dictate procedures, policy, and oversight, and of the new teeth that were added to our budget.
Although we produced a number of good reports, there is still much room for improvement in terms of the subjects that have not yet been covered and the quality of the work. There is also room for improvement in the presentation of the subjects we did address.
We established project-focused agencies, and there is now a possibility of establishing a joint front with the Defense Ministry Acquisition Administration. This, however, is only a beginning, and it remains to be seen how it will actually be implemented.
We institutionalized our connections abroad, particularly with regard to the “Mighty Waters” project. However, we have not yet effectively addressed our other connections and the issue of technological information collection.
As director of R&D, I would still need to address these and many other undertakings, which all together were very challenging.
The Jewish year 5734 (September 1973–September 1974) had begun. As part of my process of self-examination, three days before I was supposed to be appointed as director of R&D, I wrote a journal entry spelling out what I hoped to achieve during my first year on the job. On a personal level, I resolved to develop a working style that would give my deputy directors and department directors a large degree of independence and encourage initiative and high quality work, but that at the same time would also enable me to retain effective control. I thought it was important to establish working procedures that would provide me with time for quiet thought and reflection, reading, and level-headed decisions regarding concrete issues, R&D organization and personnel, and long-term policy. My plan was to establish a position of authority and influence by ensuring proper working procedures and relations with the CGS, the deputy CGS, and the heads of the different services of the IDF on the one hand, and senior defense ministry officials on the other hand. In the office I planned out a division of responsibility that would truly make Yedidia my second in command and delegate to him a suitable portion of the work. I also believed it was important to upgrade the role of Nahum, my military deputy, to that of an autonomous deputy providing substantial assistance and taking on a share of the burden. I outlined detailed plans for the different departments of the R&D Unit. In particular I outlined ideas for Yehoshua Rozen’s Ground Force Department, which addressed not only the addition of new people but new responsibilities within the defense ministry, instead of simply leaving it as a Weapons Development Department of the ground forces. I paid a great deal of attention to supporting the Planning, Economy, and Systems Analysis Department, which would provide the framework for discussion and approval of the multi-year R&D plan and for creating a framework for annual updates. Another important task for the Planning, Economy, and Systems Analysis Department was to facilitate the discussion and approval of R&D policy within the General Staff and the defense ministry. Yet another important goal I identified at the time was to stabilize our budgetary resources in accordance with the multi-year plan and policy, and to ensure that neither the IDF, various services in the IDF, the financial advisor to the CGS, or anyone could tamper with these resources because of the constantly changing pressures under which they operated. I also gave high priority to the task of completing the work on specialization centers, and the attempt to generate a clear course of action on assigning new development projects. It was still necessary to provide content and to convince the defense establishment of the need for the new Economic Branch, as well as to establish the role of the Systems Analysis Branch as of the source of advice and assistance to the whole system on inter-arm issues and other central issues within the defense establishment.
I never doubted for a moment Yitzhak’s role in developing the R&D Unit’s innovative, revolutionary concept and principles of o
peration. I was grateful for his ability to see things in proper broad, long-term context, which he effectively incorporated into the process of establishing the unit. After retiring from the IDF, Yitzhak was appointed by Chaim Bar-Lev as chief scientist of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, where he also left a clear imprint of his originality and creativity. We stayed in touch after he left for New York to try his luck as a civilian technological entrepreneur. As my work in Paris was winding down in 2001, I was saddened to hear about Yitzhak’s arrest and the charges that had been filed against him for compromising Israeli security. At the request of his lawyers, I met with Yitzhak in the hotel in which he was being detained during his trial in order to understand what he had done and how, if possible, I could help him. Based on these meetings it became clear to me that Yitzhak had in fact committed some serious security offenses. After reading the draft of the book he had planned to publish and which was the source of the charges, I told him that the book could have easily been “cleaned up” to prevent him from getting into trouble, and that it was a shame that he had not done so. The fact that I was unable to speak on behalf of his innocence left me deeply saddened.
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The Research and Development Unit During the Yom Kippur War
