by Uzi Eilam
I finally found an opportunity to leave the General Staff Command Center, but only in order to enter a different command center – that of the Southern Command in the Sinai Peninsula in Um Hashiba. I approached the CGS as he was about to leave for a flight and he agreed to have me join him. I hoped we would go into the field to observe our combat forces, but most of our time was dedicated to a meeting between Moshe Dayan, Haim Bar-Lev, and Major General Shmuel Gonen. I assumed that the meeting had to do with the insubordinate Major General Arik Sharon, whom some already wanted to remove from his post three days earlier. Sharon, who had served as OC Southern Command until he was replaced by Gonen in July 1973, was convinced that he understood what was happening on the southern front better than Gonen. Sharon thought that some of Gonen’s decisions were mistaken, including several critical decisions of fundamental importance, and for this reason he refused to accept the authority of the new OC from the moment the war began. Sharon’s independent decision making continued even after Bar-Lev arrived to command the southern front; and indeed Bar-Lev also had difficulties with Sharon’s own personal agenda. But anyone who really thought that Dayan would agree to relieve Sharon of his command in the middle of the war was sorely mistaken. Dayan’s special relationship with Sharon had a long history, beginning in the early 1950s, when he appointed Sharon to set up the legendary Unit 101. During the entire period of Israel’s reprisal operations, Dayan, then serving as CGS, recognized Sharon’s abilities and the contribution he made to the fighting spirit of the IDF. Even after the Sinai Campaign, in the wake of the difficult battle fought by the Paratroop Brigade at the Mitla Pass, Dayan dismissed criticism of Sharon, who had entered the Mitla Pass without receiving an explicit order to do so. “It’s better to ride on the backs of noble steeds,” insisted Dayan, “than to beat lazy oxen with a shepherd’s staff.”
I kept my eyes and ears open with regard to everything and began to gain a clear picture of the interesting and extremely unusual situation that had evolved in the southern front. Bar-Lev was serving as an authoritative, supreme advisor, but was unable to issue direct orders. At the same time, OC Southern Command Gonen, though somewhat deferent and despondent, nonetheless continued to play the role of OC. Uri Ben-Ari, who was promoted to the rank of brigadier general during the war, served as the Southern Command’s combat bureau chief. Ben-Ari functioned quietly and methodologically while Asher Levy, a senior and highly experienced Brigadier General, functioned efficiently as the Command’s administrative bureau chief. Elazar recognized the unusual state of affairs in the Southern Command’s command structure but was powerless to change it. Instead, he supervised developments from a distance and relied on Haim Bar-Lev to handle the situation on the ground.
Throughout the day we followed the battles from closer proximity than we could have from Tel Aviv, and realized that Adan was in true form, conducting a stubborn and impressive day of fighting and even asking the Southern Command to allow him to continue his push the following day. Kalman Magen, now in command of the division of Albert Mendler who had been killed in battle, was holding off the advance of the enemy in the southern sector and had refortified his force. Sharon was occupied with the conquest of the Missouri stronghold, the menacing Egyptian position on the east bank of the Canal that had broken all the attacks of the 600th Brigade until that time. At the same time, two Israeli paratroop battalions were already operating along the west bank of the Canal against Egyptian commando units that had been sent to disrupt the crossing. These battalions had achieved substantial successes and were already highly valued by the Southern Command. Top level infantry forces again proved their value on the battlefield, and every time the tank brigades encountered an obstruction that looked like trouble, they requested the support of a paratroop battalion. By this stage of the war we had already concluded that we would need to invest a great deal of work in developing weapons systems for our excellent infantry forces. The ineffectiveness of the armored infantry brigades compared to the paratroops was a clear indication that we needed to reconsider how to address this issue in the future. It was clear we would have to develop different means for mobilizing and arming the armored infantry to allow them to fight alongside tanks. We flew back on an aircraft known as an Arava, which had been developed as a military–civilian aircraft by Israel Aerospace Industries with Ezer Weizman and Aharon Yariv, the reliable behind-the-scenes figures of the CGS. The plane travelled fast, but the roar of the engines was deafening. Elazar boarded the plane, sprawled out on his bench, and immediately fell asleep, despite the sound of the engines.
“The Security Council Decides on a Ceasefire within Twelve Hours,” screamed the newspaper headlines the next morning. The Israeli government had agreed, the papers reported, but Cairo and Damascus had not yet issued responses. Toward evening, the Egyptians agreed, and it was actually Damascus that remained silent for the time being. We thought that the Syrians were still preparing a counter-attack against Mt. Hermon, after we had finally re-conquered the summit at the steep price of another 60 casualties from the Golani Brigade.
The R&D Unit now had to organize itself and to adopt a regular working schedule to begin addressing routine working problems. During a staff meeting just before what we regarded as a rather questionable cease-fire we decided to begin a regular working regimen. Our return to work “as usual” was also reflected by limiting ourselves to two informational meetings per week and the resumption of regular working meetings.
As the hostilities began to wind down, debates regarding the lessons to be learned intensified. They dealt with a variety of issues, including:
The organizational structure of the IDF.
The role of the armored forces.
The importance of the infantry.
The anti-missile capabilities of the air force.
Independent military production in Israel, as opposed to reliance on weapons acquisition abroad.
The delegation of American military experts started giving us trouble when they realized that our people wanted only their help and were not interested in providing them with anything in return. We got in touch with Mordechai Gur, the Israeli military attaché in Washington, who immediately scheduled a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesigner. While still at the Pentagon, Gur called Yaakov Granot, our representative in Washington, and told him that our work with the American delegation would be “half and half,” meaning that we would have to give them something to satisfy their curiosity to a certain degree. I spoke with Intelligence Branch Chief Eli Zeira, and coordinated the change in plans for the visit of the American experts. We decided we would start with an intense series of tours in the areas where battles had been fought.
On the morning of Thursday, October 25 after the US issued us a stern warning the Israeli government was forced to completely abide by the ceasefire. This was neither the first nor last time we would try to achieve an additional, last-minute military success before a ceasefire to give us an advantage in future negotiations. It was also not the only time we did so for other reasons — such as pride, maintaining image, and deterrence. The hasty authorization of the IDF’s entry into East Jerusalem and the rushed, borderline incompetent combat procedure implemented for this purpose during the Six Day War may have stemmed from a desire to avoid finding ourselves in the midst of a ceasefire that would have prevented us from taking advantage of an historic opportunity. During the first Lebanon war (1982), fighting also continued despite international decisions. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear that we did not benefit from this extended fighting in any way. During the second Lebanon war (2006), the operations mounted during the last two days were also consistent with this pattern of behavior. This historical pattern obliges us to consider new ways to improve our ability to conduct the final phases of future wars in a different, more logical manner.
A few hours before we accepted all the terms of the ceasefire, Israeli forces made operational use of the
TOW missile on the northern front, destroying one Syrian tank that burst into flames and hitting five others tanks, the tops of which had been exposed but which were not completely destroyed. All in all, thirteen missiles were fired during the incident, and although it did not change the course of the war, it nonetheless gave us a good feeling: the new system had already proven itself.
We decided to take advantage of the ceasefire to begin collecting data to be used for generating lessons from the war. During a meeting with Yedidia, Nahum, and Ronny, I presented what I regarded as the main points, which included broad reference to the structure and equipment of the IDF. It was still quite early to be discussing lessons, since the war wasn’t really over yet. We lacked complete information regarding the issues we discussed, and the data collected by the R&D teams on the front was also still in a crude state. Nevertheless, I believed that the time was right to construct a foundation and to fill it with content later, with the understanding that we would be able to make additions, changes, and improvements as we proceeded. For the enemy, we hypothesized a scenario of good air forces, a surprise air offensive aimed at paralyzing our air fields, and a strong ability to strike at our strategic depth during an initial attack. We assumed that the enemy navy had already learned from its defeat, particularly with regard to electronic warfare. For the sake of discussion we assumed that the enemy’s ground forces still possessed the same strength they had at the beginning of the war, but had not undergone significant qualitative improvement.
As for Israel, our assumption was that we would be forced to make do with human resources limited by the number of new draftees into the regular army, and by the number of soldiers being added to the reserve forces, a function of the first number. We assumed that the quality of the cross-section of our soldiers would remain high, and that it would therefore be worthwhile to make efforts to use the human resources of the IDF. Our assumption about the air force was that we would need to build substantial anti-aircraft defenses both in our rear and in close proximity to our fighting formations to contend with enemy air power and to free up our air force to carry out counter-attacks. To cope with the enemy’s armored forces and to free up our armored forces for surprise offensive actions, we regarded it as necessary to equip the army with modern antitank missiles like the TOW and artillery with advanced shells. The problem presented by the large number of enemy infantry forces appeared to be solvable by means of artillery, anti-personnel tank weapons (“Flechette” warheads), and shrapnel shells.
I regarded the issue of command and control on the level of the combat divisions and the General Staff as critical. Other important aims included secured and impenetrable communications, particularly in light of our success in listening to the enemy during the war, and improvements in the area of electronic warfare. I was quite aware that we had not yet studied the tank battles, which were the largest in history in terms of the numbers of tanks involved. We had not yet considered the characteristics of the Sagger anti-tank missiles or the significance of the Egyptian anti-tank ambushes. We had also had not yet acquired a full SA-6 missile system to help us find its weak points and develop defense mechanisms and tactics for the air force. At that point we still did not understand the significance of our inability to see what was happening on the other side of the hill on the battlefield. This lesson emerged only later, and eventually motivated us to begin developing UAVs — unmanned aerial vehicles.
10
War Lessons and the Treasure Hunt
Initial Lessons of the 1973 War
When the fighting died down after the ceasefire the personnel from the R&D Unit who had joined the combat troops or the logistical support units returned to the Kirya government campus in Tel Aviv. The teams charged with collecting combat data for analysis returned too, bringing with them important information and impressions. The air force also held a combat analysis conference that focused on air battles and the challenge of the Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles. Air Force Commander Major General Benny Peled invited me to a meeting of all the squadron commanders and unit commanders above the rank of lieutenant colonel. I was the only one wearing the green uniform of the ground forces in this highly focused, five-hour discussion. I was impressed by the freedom of speech that Peled afforded his officers. These men were not merely letting off steam after a difficult and often frustrating war; they were also voicing exceedingly meaningful criticism.
Teams from the Israeli Navy, headed by Colonel Herut Zemach, also joined us, providing encouraging data about the missile boat battles. Much of their success stemmed from the electronic warfare systems that were installed on all missile boats. During an early 1973 meeting on working plans held in the office of the Operations Branch chief, Major General Tal vehemently objected to the Navy’s development plans, declaring that “The navy doesn’t need more electronic warfare devices” because “the ships anyway look like Christmas trees.” The war clearly proved that the Navy was right. In a more recent painful naval event that took place during the Second Lebanon War 33 years later, a successful enemy attack on the INS Hanit was clearly the result of weaknesses in Israeli naval command and intelligence.
When Simcha Maoz, director of the R&D Planning and Economics Department, returned from the logistical position he had been filling in Sharon’s division, he was harshly critical of the confusion and helplessness he had found in the Southern Command, saying that much of the needed equipment was either inoperative or did not arrive at all.
The time dedicated to preliminary working group meetings and other consultations was now freed up for a wide range of issues including meetings with defense industry executives, preparations to reorganize our work plans, consolidating the vast amount of data collected by the R&D teams and other IDF units, and the beginning of work with the American analysis delegation. I consulted with Brigadier General Yitzhak Yaakov about our work with the Americans, and he wisely advised me to fit the work into the already existing framework of the R&D department’s cooperation with the Americans. This, he said, would ensure that each area remained under our control, thereby displaying the political astuteness of a past master.
On Thursday, November 1, less than a month after the beginning of the war, the defense minister and all IDF division commanders attended a special meeting of the CGS working group. Dayan presented the thesis that we would soon need to attack and destroy the Third Egyptian Army and to do as much damage to the Second Army as possible. I thought Dayan was actually too delicate when he also asked the generals to stop besmirching each other in the newspapers. Elazar echoed this point when he summed up the conversation, passionately calling for an end to the war between the generals. “We have excellent soldiers and a wonderful army,” he said. “Don’t destroy them.”
On Friday, November 2, the Command Center was on high alert in light of explicit reports that the Egyptians were planning to launch an attack aimed at creating a corridor for the Third Army, which they had not managed to achieve through diplomacy. The next morning I went to the Command Center with a great sense of concern only to find it relatively empty. I was chatting with Chief Infantry and Paratroop Officer Emmanuel Shaked about the importance of the lessons learned in the fighting when Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal walked in. Ben-Gal, the hero of the Golan Heights battles, was lanky, unattractive and enchanting all at once. We greeted him enthusiastically and listened with great interest as he described his experiences during the war. Ben-Gal said that the Syrians were crazy, that they attacked and shot a great deal, and that we were lucky that they were not as skilled we were. Although he lost three battalion commanders during the war, he assured us that he still had excellent company commanders. I thought to myself how the war had been fought primarily by officers of the rank of brigade commander and below. The General Staff was responsible for facilitating air support and providing ammunition and reinforcements. But the primary war effort and credit for the achievements belonged first and foremost to the fighting forces themsel
ves.
Rehavam Ze’evi as Operations Branch Chief
One immediate outcome of the war was changes in the General Staff. A phone call from the office of the deputy CGS informed me that Rehavam Ze’evi had been appointed chief of the Operations Branch and that Avraham Tamir had been appointed chief of the Planning Branch and would be promoted to the rank of Major General. I wondered what Ze’evi’s role would be – would he work alongside Deputy CGS Tal or under his authority? I also wondered how all this would affect the R&D Unit. I went upstairs to ask Tzur what he thought about the changes, but he just told me that he had not yet spoken with Elazar about them. Later, Tzur called and said that as far as he understood I would be answering to the CGS and working in coordination with the chief of the Planning Branch, and that he viewed this as a good arrangement.
That evening I stopped in to see Ze’evi, who fleshed out the picture with a more details about the re-delegation of authority. Ze’evi proposed moving R&D’s Planning and Economics Department over to the new branch. It wasn’t clear to me where he got the idea so I quietly and patiently began to explain the structure of the R&D Unit and the logic behind its Planning and Economics Department. At one point, when Ze’evi sounded as if he didn’t get the point, I got irritated and raised my voice, and told him that he could dismantle R&D Unit as far as I was concerned. My anger apparently took him off guard, and he stopped badgering me about the issue. I understood that we were now in a complicated period of instability and uncertainty and that a great deal of effort, patience, and diplomacy would be needed to protect the R&D Unit from the surrounding madness. Within the R&D Unit itself Yedidia began working full time on working plans, and Nahum focused his attention on the unit’s work with captured enemy weaponry which involved consolidating data for lesson generation, and contact with delegations from abroad.
