by Uzi Eilam
This was the background for an important and fascinating experience that allowed us to see the power of cooperation among the agencies in Israel. We learned of the Iraqis’ efforts to cultivate a cadre of scientists capable of continuing their nuclear research and development independently. Our understanding of Iraq’s primary intention was based on their request, which had been refused, to buy a plutonium-producing graphite gas reactor and a facility for separating plutonium from irradiated fuel. We regarded French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac’s authorization to supply the Osirak reactor as a window of opportunity for Iraq to join the ranks of the countries with nuclear capabilities through the back door. The combination of these elements indicated a clear intention on the part of the Iraqis to move forward on a path that would ultimately provide them with the ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran, which had been at war with Iraq since the latter initiated hostilities against it in September 1980, was also aware of this danger. Although Iran attempted to bomb the site of the nuclear reactors near Baghdad from the air on September 30, 1980, the operation caused only minor damage to the site. The primary damage caused by the Iranian bombing was the flight of the foreign French and Italian experts and delay of the work in progress.
To understand the significance of attacking the reactor, I was authorized by the prime minister to appoint an external committee headed by Aharon Yariv, an intelligent and experienced major general in the army reserves. The committee highlighted, among other things, the possibility that the international community would impose sanctions on Israel, as well as the possible disruption of the peace processes in the region. In addition, a separate report included technical information regarding the possibility of environmental contamination. In the diplomatic realm, it was important to emphasize that Iraq had signed and even ratified the NPT, and was under the active supervision of the IAEA.
I attended the meeting of the Israeli security cabinet that discussed ways of stopping Iraq’s progress toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and I had no qualms about making my opinion known. One product of the brainstorming effort was a recommendation to submit a resolution to the UN for a nuclear-free Middle East. We recommended that Israel support such a treaty, which would be similar to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that had been signed by the countries of South America. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir had already used the podium of the UN General Assembly to issue a call to all countries of the Middle East to begin negotiations toward a multilateral treaty for a region that was free of nuclear weapons.
I was fundamentally opposed to taking military action against the reactors at the time, and I continued to voice my opinion in the regular cabinet meetings. One day, Brigadier General Poran called to inform me, in an apologetic tone, that the prime minister had requested that I not participate in the upcoming cabinet meeting. Begin, Poran explained, felt that I had too great an influence on his government ministers. The request, however, did not prevent me from meeting personally with cabinet ministers. I made it my goal to convince Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich, who had impressed me with his intelligence, his wisdom, and his special relationship with Prime Minister Begin. Ehrlich’s door was always open to me, and he listened to what I had to say. I also met a number of times with Interior and Police Minister Dr. Yosef Burg, who I thought understood the situation assessment I presented to him and would speak out against bombing the Iraqi nuclear facility at that particular time.
The third minister I approached was Prof. Yigal Yadin, deputy prime minister and the leader of the Dash party. Yadin was an extremely popular personality at the time: a well-known professor of archeology, he had served as CGS at the age 32 and as a member of the Agranat Commission in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. In the late 1970s and early 1980s he was a key figure in the Israeli political arena.
I knew that Begin regarded military action at the earliest possible date as a top national priority and had been working hard to persuade Yadin to withdraw his opposition. Other opponents to military action included Mossad Chief Yitzhak Hofi and the IDF Intelligence Branch chief, as opposed to Hofi’s deputy Nahum Admoni and all the other military personnel involved in the discussions who were in favor of a pre-emptive attack on the reactor.
As part of our monitoring of the Iraqi efforts and the continuing high-level deliberations regarding Israel’s response, we drafted another document in March 1981, entitled: “Bombing the Iraqi Osirak Reactor: Political Considerations.” The document emphasized the fact that the Iraqis had initiated diplomatic activity — including contact with a number of UN countries on July 24, 1980 — to highlight the threat of an air attack against their nuclear center. The document pointed out that the air attack against the al-Tawita facility near Baghdad carried out by two Iranian Phantom jets had caused only minimal damage, but resulted in the flight of French and Italian experts. It also surveyed and analyzed international reactions to the Iranian bombing and assessed that the US might ultimately be unwilling to join forces with Israel in an effort against the development of the Iraqi nuclear program. The document also posited that an Israeli attack could provide Iraq with the legitimacy to withdraw from the NPT regime, create pressure on Israel to join the treaty, and pose a threat of sanctions and international isolation if it failed to do so. The report concluded by emphasizing the danger of a possible military reprisal against Israel’s nuclear center.
One day, at the end of my weekly working meeting with the prime minister, Begin asked me to remain in his office. Calmly, and with a deep sense of conviction, he tried to clarify his aim of “immediately neutralizing the threat of nuclear weapons in Iraq.” Begin argued passionately that after the Holocaust it was unacceptable for Jewish children to be in danger of extermination. “I need to do it now,” Begin said at the end of the meeting, “‘they won’t dare to do it... ” This comment was the only hint that the upcoming elections played a role in the decision-making process, that Begin feared that he would be defeated, and that, in his opinion, a different leadership would refrain from bombing the Iraqi reactor. It is also important to remember that, during the period in question, Israel was suffering from the worst inflation in its history and that the polls were predicting that the Likud would lose the elections.
I drove to Yigal Yadin’s house. The Jewish Sabbath was about to begin, and Yadin received me in khaki knee-length shorts and a worn-out shirt. His wife Carmela served us coffee and cookies in his office with its library of archeological books. The house was dimly lit, and Yadin both looked and sounded despondent. He was tired and no longer capable of fighting for his opinion. Yadin told me that he had succumbed to Begin’s pressure, particularly the PM’s assurance that if he did not vote in favor of the bombing, Begin would not make the decision to carry it out. At that moment I understood that the lot had been cast and that there was no way I could change the decision.
My final effort was to prepare a position paper entitled “The Political Significance of Attacking the Iraqi Reactor,” which I sent to Foreign Minister Shamir on May 11, with a copy to the PM. In the paper we tried to impress upon the foreign minister that damaging the reactor would not eliminate the Iraqis’ ability to develop nuclear weapons, as the reactor was only one link in the chain. We also emphasized that fissionable material could be acquired through alternative channels (such as from Pakistan), and that such acquisition may actually be encouraged by an open military assault.
The paper articulated clear opposition to rushing toward a military strike against the Iraqi reactor and reminded the foreign minister that we had already concluded that we had more time than it seemed — not a few months but a few years. This fact, we maintained, allowed us to be flexible in setting a suitable date for military action and an appropriate way of carrying it out.
The appendices to the document itself included chapters on Iraq’s nuclear profile; on the Iranian air strike of September 30, 1980; on the position of the United States (including clarifications made by US Ambassador Sam Lou
is in a meeting with Begin, and by US Secretary of State General Alexander Haig); and on political developments in France, particularly the policy changes that had resulted from François Mitterand’s election to the French presidency, and his declaration that France would stop supplying Iraq with nuclear materials. Other appendices focused on the possible political ramifications of an attack in the Iraqi context, the Arab-Muslim context, and the Israeli context, including the recommendations of the Yariv Committee discussed above.
On the evening of June 7, 1981, as Israeli Air Force jets were en route to Baghdad, I assembled the IAEC initial response team, which consisted of the deputy director-general, officials from the Foreign Relations Department, and former IAEC Director-General Shalhevet Freier. We understood that now that the decision had been made to carry out the air attack we needed to focus all our efforts on the difficult battle in the international arena. An initial draft response was drawn up that night, and the day after the attack the informational material was edited and expanded in conjunction with Israeli intelligence agencies and the Foreign Ministry. This initial material was sent out to Israeli consulates and embassies around the world the same day, and a few days later we had already generated additional information to contribute to the global information effort.
The morning after the bombing I went to Jerusalem to meet with the prime minister along with Mossad Director Hofi. Our aim was to try to persuade Begin to refrain from taking public responsibility for the attack. We argued that it would be better to leave things vague, as the Iranians, who had already tried to attack the reactor once, were also suspected of carrying out the attack. This was plausible at the time, as the Iran–Iraq war was still at its height. Begin, however, would hear nothing of it. “We have nothing to be ashamed of,” he said. “On the contrary — let the world hear and judge for itself.” After Hofi and I finished our meeting with Begin, I remained with the prime minister for our weekly working meeting during which I presented him with the materials that had been produced by the response team and the preparations we had made for the information campaign. At the end of the meeting Begin deviated from his normal practice of remaining seated behind his desk as I left, and instead got up and walked me to the door. “Uzi,” he said, “placing a fatherly hand on my shoulder, “you’ll see that it was all for the best.”
“Mister Prime Minister,” I answered, “the arguments of the past are behind us now. The task at hand is to fight an effective battle in the international arena, and that’s what we’ll do to the best of our ability.” It pained me when, later that day, during a press conference at Beit Agron in Jerusalem, the prime minister repeated a mistaken justification someone had fed him for why the attack was carried out when it was, before the reactor went operational. In order to avoid risking the lives of the tens of thousands of civilians living in Baghdad, he explained, we needed to attack before the reactor began operating, because bombing it while it was operational would have caused the emission of nuclear fallout and a radioactive cloud above the entire Iraqi capital. Unfortunately, I was not at his side to intervene and provide an explanation that was more technically accurate, appropriate, and convincing.
The attack on the reactor was carried out four years after Begin’s election as prime minister and after four years of working closely together on issues related to the IAEC, our weekly meetings, and visits to Israel’s nuclear research centers. During this time I learned to appreciate Begin as a man of remarkable political acumen and as an honest, firm, and charismatic leader of his party, of the government, and of the country as a whole. Begin bore the burden of concern for the security of the people in a profound and concrete manner, and this was an important factor in his ultimately successful efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the Egyptians.
The threat of the Iraqi nuclear program filled Begin with a personal sense of duty and responsibility of the highest magnitude. However, at the same time he was also a Likud politician facing an election campaign in which the polls reflected an advantage for the Labor party, Likud’s historic rival. Begin had what he regarded as decisive evidence that a Labor-led government would never decide to bomb the reactor. It was a personal letter which Shimon Peres had written to him, in which he urged him to refrain from taking military action. At the time it seemed to me that Begin’s decision to announce Israel’s responsibility immediately following the successful attack stemmed not only from his conviction that it had been a sacred mission of which there was no reason to be ashamed but from a political assessment of the advantage it would give the Likud in the elections. Even today, 30 years later, I still believe that these were his two primary considerations.
After the fact, however, I came to agree with Begin’s decision, particularly the declarative and deterring dimension of the attack and the public statement that followed. Ten years later, after the first Gulf War, our assessment that Saddam Hussein would continue his efforts to develop nuclear weapons in alternative, clandestine ways was proven correct. From an historical perspective I believe that presenting differing and opposing views during the deliberations regarding the bombing was important and the right thing to do. Begin must also be credited for the freedom with which he allowed differing opinions on the subject to be raised during the cabinet meetings. I also think that the prime minister was justified in deciding that it would be better if I stop attending the cabinet meetings. Begin did not want me to threaten the consensus he wanted to reach within the cabinet.
In late August 1981 we published a policy statement that provided an extensive, detailed description of the Iraqi nuclear program and the justifications for bombing Osirak. It was the beginning of a period during which the IAEC assumed primary responsibility for providing the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Israeli representatives in world capitals and the UN with a regular source of rational, well-based informational material. This included an effort to contend with the report of the expert committee set up by IAEA, critical of the Israeli operation.
The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna
We were not pleased with the reactions to the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi reactor, although we certainly were not surprised. The attack was denounced by the spokespersons of a wide range of countries, including the United States. In Resolution 487, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the Israeli attack, describing it as being carried out “in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.” At its regular June meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors issued an unprecedentedly stern condemnation, emphasizing that the strike had been carried out on a member state’s nuclear facility while under IAEA supervision under the NPT. We knew we would face a difficult and complex campaign during the IAEA General Assembly in September.
After four years as director-general of the IAEC before the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, I had grown quite familiar with the IAEA, its director-general, and the political rules according to which it operated. Dr. Sigvard Eklund, who served as director-general of the IAEA for two decades, from 1961 to 1981, was a scientist and a friend of Israel. Membership in the IAEA was not conditional upon signing the NPT, and this is how Israel — along with India, Pakistan, and South Africa — found itself as a member of the organization without signing on to the treaty. In those days the agency was greatly influenced by Dr. Eklund’s personality and outlook. Israel had a significant presence on the agency’s Scientific Advisory Committee, of which Prof. Israel Dostrovsky was a member. Eklund greatly valued Dostrovsky’s opinion and used to consult with him on a personal basis as well.
The IAEA holds its general conference every year in September. Most years it is held in Vienna, where the agency’s administrative offices are located. However, once every four years the assembly is convened outside Vienna in one of the member countries. The first yea, the rest of the delegates and I made our way to Rio de Janeiro, where the Brazilians went to great lengths to put together a dignified and exceptionally well orga
nized event. The Israeli delegation to the conference included our representative in Vienna and our foreign relations man, Ephraim Tarry. I was pleased that Eklund had also invited Prof. Dostrovsky to take part in the discussions of the Scientific Advisory Committee, as it gave me another opportunity to learn from Dostrovsky’s vast experience with the IAEA.
The annual convention in Rio de Janeiro also provided me with firsthand experience with the internal politics of the IAEA, which to a certain extent mirrored the major blocs of countries in the international arena: the Western Bloc, led by the US; the Eastern Bloc, in which the Soviet Union set the tone; and the Third World, which consisted of countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa that referred to themselves as “nonaligned”. At times, member countries within their respective blocs also worked within smaller sub-groups based on geographical proximity and ideological identification. In some cases, I observed, countries voted by bloc, resulting in a European vote, a Muslim vote, a South American vote, etc. As in the world as a whole and the UN in particular, here too Israel was almost completely isolated, and its primary loyal ally was the United States. At the Rio de Janeiro conference we observed the increasing isolation of South Africa that resulted from its policy of apartheid.
