by Uzi Eilam
Five years later, after making slow progress in the process of gradually removing the secrecy-related obstacles to our collaboration, we reached the point of being able to write a draft agreement for French–Israeli cooperation in the realm of defense R&D. By this point General Marçais had already retired. He was replaced by another general specializing in armaments who was also an engineer and a graduate of École Polytechnique: Paul-Ivan de Saint-Germain, a thin and bespectacled officer with a pointy face and laser-like brown penetrating eyes. He managed his personnel sternly and decisively, and it was only after I got to know him better that I came to appreciate his softer side. With energy and vigor, he set to the task of improving Israeli–French relations, and within no time a draft agreement for cooperation in the realm of defense R&D was ready to be signed by the Israeli and French defense ministers. We waited for Defense Minister François Léotard’s visit to Israel as the guest of Defense Minister Rabin. At the meeting with the French minister’s delegation, I was asked to make a short presentation on the status of joint research and development activity. With audacity that I am still unable to explain today, I decided to give the presentation in French. Rabin and Léotard signed the agreement, which provided a strong tailwind for future ongoing joint work and which is still alive and in full force today.
French–Israeli cooperation in the realm of defense technology has known no dramatic developments. Rather, the ties between the Israeli and French defense industries have been based on an ongoing process of the gradual establishment of relationships and mutual trust between people. In the years that followed this sturdy foundation facilitated an expansion of the French–Israeli agreement, which was signed in 1999 by then defense minister Ehud Barak and French Defense Minister Alain Richard during a visit in Israel. This relationship also resulted in the exceptional development of limited but significant French procurement of Israeli weapon systems and ammunition.
Germany
Ever since the signing of the 1952 reparations agreement by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Chancellor Konrad Adenaur, Israel has enjoyed friendly relations with Germany. On the basis of our past experience, which began with Mr. Belkow and Dr. Held’s visit to the battlefields of the Sinai Peninsula following the Six Day War, we had no difficulty understanding the approach of our counterparts in the German Ministry of Defense, the Germany military, and the impressive German defense industry. After the Yom Kippur War the relationship between the two defense establishments was formalized and institutionalized, and evolved into a routine of regular meetings between senior officials, as well as a great deal of practical lower level work in the field.
During the 1980s the Israeli defense industries already possessed advanced technologies in diverse areas of electronic warfare that interested Germany during the previous decade. The key figure in the German Defense Ministry was Peter Runge, a talented, intelligent, and dominant engineer whose support was required for all new undertakings. Runge instilled fear in the personnel of the German Defense Ministry, as well as the Israelis who met him. I was fortunate enough to have been able to find my way into his good graces, not without drinking countless glasses of beer and listening patiently to the many stories he told in his loud, thundering voice. The high-level annual meetings between the director-generals of the two defense ministries continued, providing important assistance to the cooperative efforts that continued throughout the year. One of the high points in the relationship between the two defense establishments was Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s decision after the First Gulf War to provide the Israeli navy with two modern submarines almost free of charge. For years, a large team of Israeli naval and technical officers were stationed in Germany, in the capital city of Bonn and in shipyards in the north, to work with the Germans on the construction of the submarines.
The Germans knew that I was scheduled to finish my work at MAFAT in 1997 and invited me to make a formal official farewell visit. Fortunately I was allowed to bring my wife Naomi; however, both of us were somewhat taken aback when we stepped off the plane and were received by a formation of officers and soldiers of the honor guard dressed in elegant ceremonial uniforms. Runge and his wife went to great lengths to make the touristic parts of our visit pleasant for us. Throughout our entire trip there was a police presence in all the areas we visited by car, and we were escorted by police cars and motorcycles to clear the way and provide protection. At that time Germany was already in the practical stages of integrating the East and West parts of the country, and at my request my hosts also arranged a visit to the East German defense industry, which was still having trouble reaching the efficiency levels of Western industries. In East Germany we visited the city of Dresden, where our host one evening was a well-known politician with great influence in Bavaria. This talented and experienced man, I had been quietly informed, had been caught embezzling money and was sent into exile in East Germany, where the Germans expected him to rehabilitate the floundering East German defense industry. During the day we visited the Zeiss optical industry, which had been the pride of the German defense industry prior to World War II. We also visited a factory for growing gallium arsenide crystals meant for optical products for the defense establishment. During dinner our host delivered an emotional speech about the obstacles he faced in his efforts to rehabilitate and upgrade the East German defense industry.
Britain
Britain’s defense relations with Israel grew chilly after the Six Day War, primarily for political reasons. During the golden age of British–Israeli relations before 1967 Britain supplied Israel with its first submarines (including the Dakar, which sunk in the Mediterranean while en route from Britain to Israel) and collaborated with Israel on the development of the Chieftain tank. We tried but did not succeed in finding ways to resume collaboration even if only on a limited scale and without entering sensitive and classified areas. On a formal level, everything was fine: we had a respectable embassy in London with economic, commercial, and military attachés, and there was no official policy of a British arms embargo against Israel. In the field, however, there was no activity whatsoever. Even the war against terrorism, from which Britain itself started to suffer not only from the IRA but also from Arab-Islamic terrorists, did not bring about closer relations. Neither did the downing of the Pan-Am passenger plane above the city of Lockerbie, the assassination of Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London (which served as the pretext for the outbreak of the first Lebanon war), and a long list of other terrorist attacks. Indeed, at the height of the first Intifada, the British refused to authorize Israel’s acquisition of Land Rover jeeps, stating that we would undoubtedly arm them and use them against the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
Relations between the two countries were suddenly transformed after a meeting with the chief scientist of the British Defense Ministry, who was a mathematics professor with great experience in research and development. I met him at the annual conference organized by the US Defense Department’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. At the conferences, which were usually held in the United States, Israel was always treated with great respect, which was justified because we truly were pioneers in the development of regional defense systems against long-range missiles. The British, the French, the Germans, and the Japanese took interest, received information, established teams to consider the issue, but never initiated substantial development operations and never committed to purchasing American systems.
This was one this reason why the Americans made sure to periodically hold the conference outside of the US. We attended such a conference in June 1995 in Britain. In addition to our missile interception technologies and an analysis of our practical test results, we were also able to present an overall concept of missile defense. Our Green Pine radar, which could detect an enemy missile in flight and guide missiles to intercept the threat, captivated everyone’s attention. The principles of erecting an array of batteries and command and control junctions were new territ
ory for most participants and were also the subject of great interest. SDIO personnel traditionally hosted a lunch only for delegation heads. During the lunch in Britain I was seated next to the chief scientist of the British Defense Ministry, and an unconstrained and natural conversation developed between the two of us. He had not been aware of the progress we had made in defense technology and our work on missile defense systems both impressed him and piqued his curiosity. This led to a second meeting later in the conference during which I invited him to visit Israel. He agreed and said that all that remained was to set a date. It was clear that such a high-level visit would require government authorization, and I hoped that curiosity would help make it happen. Indeed, one year later a British delegation headed by the deputy chief scientist of the British Defense Ministry arrived in Israel. The delegation included experts from a variety of disciplines, and we went to great lengths to make their visit as impressive as possible.
The next step was to secure a reciprocal visit of an Israeli delegation to Britain. R&D Director Brigadier General (and subsequently Major General) Isaac Ben-Israel led a MAFAT team to Britain, creating a positive dynamic of communication and information exchange. We selected areas that would be of interest to both sides and began doing the groundwork for drafting a written agreement for British-Israeli cooperation in defense R&D.
Over the years we had learned that signed agreements have significant influence because they provide a framework that can easily be filled with content and can be changed from time to time when the need arises. The importance of formal agreements becomes particularly clear during periods of political tension, since such accords are typically only annulled after extremely serious crises. Agreements provide a means of ensuring that when a political storm subsides collaborative work can be easily resumed without starting over from scratch. In partnership with officials of the British Defense Ministry we succeeded in drafting an agreement that was meant to be signed by the British and Israeli defense ministers. At that crucial point in the process, defense officials and their legal advisors were asked for their comments on the agreement. From the perspective of MAFAT, the requested modifications in wording regarding information security and legal matters seemed minor and almost petty, but for the sake of smooth working relations at home they needed to be addressed. However, during the time it took for us to complete the revisions the political climate in Britain changed and British officialdom decided not to sign the agreement. We were now forced to wait for a more opportune moment and a change in the political climate, which finally occurred after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed the Wye River Memorandum in 1998. Although by this time I was already on sabbatical in Paris, I encouraged MAFAT to get to London as quickly as possible in order to sign the agreement — an agreement which is still in effect today and which provides an open framework for cooperative work on defense technology in the future as well.
Switzerland
Cooperation with Switzerland evolved through a process that had no precedent in the history of Israel’s foreign defense relations. Switzerland was and remains a unique country, with its policy of neutrality which entails maintain a substantial military force and a mandatory draft for a short period of compulsory military service followed by reserve duty. The Swiss defense concept called for an advanced air force, and an armored corps based on the acquisition of German Leopard tanks and a broad array of artillery. For many years, an Israeli military attaché was stationed at the embassy in the Swiss capital of Bern, but the result was limited to mutual visits out of formality and minimal Israeli acquisition of Swiss-produced weapons systems such as Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannons.
One day I was told that Yekutiel Federman wanted to speak with me. Federman was a known hotelier who had entered the world of defense industries as a partner in El-Op and also had business connections in Switzerland. I had already met Federman a few times, but we never had a close working relationship. Federman, a man of German extraction and European outlook, was short, energetic, and extremely enthusiastic...an whose brain was quicker than his ability to express himself in words. As a result, he always sounded as if he was stammering. When I picked up the phone, he lost no time in getting to the point: “Uzi,” he said excitedly, “you have to go to Switzerland! There’s an opportunity to start working with their army and defense ministry — now! Get a team together and go next week. I’ve spoken with people there. They’re waiting.”
I chose not to show my astonishment at the nature of the call. All I said was: “Yekutiel, things like that don’t happen immediately. I need to check out the situation, and if it is decided that we should go, we will still need to make the necessary arrangements for the meetings.”
Without missing a beat, another stream of intermingled words flowed loudly out of the telephone receiver. “No, no, no, no!!” he insisted “Everything is already prepared. I told the Swiss that we would conduct a seminar for them on the issue of technology! They’re interested in bringing over the senior leadership of the army and the defense ministry!”
Our military attaché in Bern was Arieh Alon, a red-haired, feisty, unconventional lieutenant colonel from the intelligence corps. I called him immediately and learned that something was actually coming together there, and that, by organizing a technological seminar, we now had a chance to meet directly with the senior echelon of the Swiss defense establishment.
The gauntlet had been thrown and I saw no reason not to pick it up. We decided to plan a seminar on electronic warfare...ubject that Alon insisted was at the top of the Swiss agenda. We obviously faced difficult questions while planning the seminar, such as the extent to which we could reveal sensitive and classified information to the Swiss. We did not doubt their ability to keep a secret, and we knew we could trust them. Nonetheless, we still felt uncomfortable. Our contact at the Swiss General Staff and the moving force behind the evolution of our relations was General Paul Rast, deputy CGS for planning and training. Before joining the General Staff, Rast had served as the Swiss defense attaché in Moscow. We arrived in the capital city of Bern for a two-day seminar and a third day of visits to Swiss military installations. When we arrived we learned that the seminar would be attended by the entire leadership of the Swiss army and defense ministry, including the CGS, who opened the event himself and hosted lunch on the first day of the event.
The Swiss participants listened attentively to the focused presentations delivered by personnel of MAFAT, the IDF’s communications and intelligence corps, and the Israeli air force. During the two-day seminar they asked a large number of questions that were clearly more than just polite questions posed for the sake of etiquette. Before the seminar ended Alon began quietly advocating the idea of holding a follow-up seminar. Indeed, when we returned to Israel we had a series of meetings to begin the process of selecting a suitable subject. It was decided to focus on issues related to command and control, and we succeeded in persuading Ehud Barak, who was then OC Central Command, to participate in the conference and to give a lecture on the overall conception of command and control systems on the modern battlefield. Federman was delighted and told us that we had made a marvelous impression on our Swiss counterparts and that the second seminar was a success as well. We were already familiar with the dynamics of such seminars and with the most effective ways to convey messages and emphasize specific points to the Swiss army officers. We learned about the Swiss defense establishment, and came to understand that although its civilian component was small, it nonetheless controlled decisions relating to acquisitions for the Swiss military.
Almost naturally, and as a result of the two seminars and the mutual benefit recognized by both sides, we successfully established a joint coordinating body. Israel’s aim was to help the Israeli defense industries market their products in Switzerland. Switzerland’s aim was to institutionalize its relationship with Israel and to institute oversight of all activity between the two defense industries. The Swiss team was headed by the Swi
ss deputy CGS for planning and training and included senior representatives of the purchasing apparatus of the Swiss defense ministry. We thought that the Israeli team should include the director of the Defense Export Assistance Branch, the director of MAFAT, the assistant chief of the Operations Branch as a representative of the IDF, and director of the defense ministry’s Foreign Contacts Unit. It was only logical that our team be headed by Export Assistance Branch Director Zvi Reuter, as our primary aim was to promote defense exports. Reuter unwilling to take this responsibility upon himself and asked me to head the Israeli team in his stead.
Our work with the Swiss taught us an interesting lesson in organizational culture. It taught us to respect and appreciate agreed upon schedules and to begin insisting that meetings begin on time. It was a new approach for us, as we were used to the casual improvisatory nature of Israeli organizational culture, which is perhaps best epitomized by the typically empty assurances “Don’t worry — it’ll be fine” and “trust me.” I identified naturally with this aspect of Swiss culture and worked hard to persuade my colleagues in the defense establishment to be precise and punctual when it comes to dates and time. The Swiss–Israeli cooperative work supported by the coordinating committee had impressive results, including the export of advanced Israeli systems to Switzerland. After learning the principles of the Swiss defense concept, it was easy for us to instruct our industries on how to provide solutions for the needs of the Swiss army. General Rast retired from the post of Swiss deputy CGS for planning and was replaced by General Paul Müeler who, although very different from his predecessor, nonetheless maintained the openness, trust, and enthusiasm for collaborative work that had come to pervade the Swiss military leadership.
