by Tom Bower
Dennis Roach blessed himself as unassailable. Judged on his personal wealth – even ‘Cockroach’s’ rivals spoke of an agent with over £10 million in the bank – no one within football appeared willing to offer serious evidence against him. The result was a rich man profiting by his wits and personal relationships. Since the club chairmen never formally complained about losing money, discovering the backgrounds to Roach’s deals was beyond Graham Bean until summer 2000.
Joe Royle, the manager of Manchester City, was negotiating with West Ham for the purchase of Paulo Wanchope, a Costa Rican striker, for £3.65 million. Wanchope’s reluctance to move north irritated Royle. ‘Get him fucking up here tomorrow,’ Royle told Wanchope’s agent, Dennis Roach. Eventually, Wanchope arrived and Royle, to his own irritation, agreed to pay Roach £250,000 for allowing the transfer on Roach’s assurance that he was receiving no other commission. Suspicious of Roach, and angry that the lengthy dispute had contributed to Manchester City’s relegation from the Premier League, Royle asked Wanchope whether his agent would receive a commission from the player. ‘£250,000,’ replied Wanchope. If Wanchope was correct, a double payment would be a clear breach of the FA’s rules and a breach of Roach’s agreement not to ask the player for payment. ‘The transfer of Wanchope was the first time I have ever dealt with Dennis Roach,’ said Royle. ‘Suffice to say it will be the last.’ Roach denied asking Wanchope for a payment. ‘It was a misunderstanding because of his poor English,’ explained the agent.
Graham Bean read Joe Royle’s complaint in a newspaper and opened an investigation to formally discipline Roach. That announcement provoked a second complaint against Roach.
Bobby Robson, the respected manager of Newcastle United, revealed that Roach had demanded a ‘sweetener’ of £760,000 to facilitate the transfer of Duncan Ferguson from Newcastle to Everton, a transfer which Ferguson desired. The compensation was payable, Roach had stipulated, because Ferguson’s sale to Everton was a premature breach of the player’s contract by Newcastle.
Twenty-nine-year-old Ferguson was an unexceptional striker, except that in 1995 he had been jailed for three months for an assault on a rival player. Despite his imprisonment, he had been bought by Newcastle in 1998 for £8 million and signed a five year contract to be paid £38,000 a week. Ferguson’s choice in 2000 was either to remain at Newcastle for a further three years, collecting £6 million in wages without playing again, or agreeing to his transfer to Everton. The player wanted to move but sought compensation for the lower fees Everton would pay. Newcastle refused to pay any compensation despite the breach of contract. ‘I won’t transfer unless they pay me the £700,000,’ stipulated Ferguson. Roach had asked Robson for £700,000 to ‘make the deal happen’ which included £60,000 for himself. ‘You’re getting nothing from us,’ replied Freddie Shepherd, the club’s chairman, ‘because you’re not acting for us.’ Under the FA’s rules, Roach should have asked for his fee from Ferguson rather than Newcastle, although many interpreted that distinction as unrealistic. Roach told Robson about the impasse. In the agent’s opinion, he was fulfilling his instructions to ‘screw Newcastle’.
In Bobby Robson’s opinion, Roach’s intervention was outrageous. Robson alleged that the agent knew Newcastle were negotiating to buy Peter Lovenkrands from a Danish club. That deal could only be completed once Ferguson had been sold to Everton. Robson waved a fax from Roach saying the deal would ‘not take place unless we have reached agreement on our outstanding problem – which I am sure we can do’. Robson’s concern was aggravated after hearing that David Murray, the chairman of Rangers and a friend of Roach’s, also wanted to buy Lovenkrands. It seemed that Roach was deliberately interfering both to help Murray and to earn an unreasonable commission on Ferguson’s departure. Ferguson’s continued intransigence stymied Robson’s plans. Lovenkrands signed for Rangers and Robson publicized his complaint against Roach after selling Ferguson to Everton for £6.3 million.
Graham Bean opened a second investigation into the agent. Bean became puzzled by the friendship between Roach and Walter Smith. Over the years, Walter Smith, the manager of Rangers, and his chairman, David Murray, appeared to favour Roach’s insertion of himself into transfers. In October 2000, Roach was unexpectedly allowed to broker the transfer of Raul Tamudo, a striker playing for Espanyol, to Rangers, while Tomas Duran, the player’s agent, was sidelined. During those same weeks Rangers was receiving offers from Jim Smith, the manager of Derby County, for Jonatan Johansson, a Swedish striker. Smith offered David Murray £2.75 million. To Smith’s surprise Roach telephoned to say that the transfer would be approved if Smith also paid the agent £250,000. Smith declined and increased his offer to £3 million. Again Roach telephoned to say that the sale would be approved but only if Smith paid Roach £250,000. Smith was puzzled because Roach was not Johansson’s agent (who was Gordon Smith) and he could not understand why Derby should pay Roach if he was acting on behalf of Rangers. In Jim Smith’s version, Roach claimed to be in charge of all transfers at Ibrox, although that was denied by David Murray: ‘That is simply not true.’ Smith increased his offer to £3.25 million and once again Roach insisted on his fee. ‘Roach wanted £250,000 for sending a fax,’ Smith complained. Eventually, Johansson was sold to Charlton. Roach denied Jim Smith’s version: ‘I wasn’t involved in any shape or form. I’m not Johansson’s agent.’
Dennis Roach’s relationship with Walter Smith continued after the manager moved from Rangers to Everton. Instead of conserving the club’s dwindling funds, Walter Smith had indulged in a spending spree, buying foreign players with Roach’s help. Among these players who proved to be disappointing was Ibrahim Bakayoko, a striker from the Ivory Coast, bought for £4.75 million from a French club and resold for £2.5 million. Without a complaint Bean could not investigate Roach’s relationship with Everton. He had not, however, anticipated the response to his investigation of the two other transfers.
Dennis Roach accused the FA of hypocrisy, arguing that they had ignored the secretly recorded boasts of Freddie Shepherd and Douglas Hall in a brothel in 1998. On the tape, recorded by the News of the World they had talked about their sexual conquests, describing Newcastle girls as ‘ugly dogs’, and boasting about their club’s sale of shirts to fans for £50 which cost £5 to manufacture. Those revelations had brought the game into real disrepute. Moreover, he argued, since he had never received a fee from Newcastle, his request and the alleged irregularity were redundant. Roach was bullish about it all. ‘I believe this is a Mr Crozier witch-hunt and I’m confident that he’ll fail with these charges,’ he said. ‘As chairman of the International Association of Football Agents, I have worked closely with FIFA and the FA to improve the reputation of agents. I would have thought I’m the last person to face charges but I’m quite happy to defend myself.’ Joe Royle and Freddie Shepherd began to reconsider their public criticism of Roach. They reasoned that perhaps irritating Roach was not the best plan. The chairmen of other Premier League clubs, rather than pledging unity against Roach, were searching for an advantage. Royle sought to withdraw his complaint. ‘Roach hasn’t done anything wrong,’ Royle told Bean. There had been, he explained, a misunderstanding, because ‘Wanchope only speaks 50 per cent English.’ Any recantation, however, was too late. ‘We’ll be the judge of all that,’ Bean replied, unmoved. ‘I think there’s a case.’
Spurred on by newspaper reports, in December 2000, Bean formally interviewed Roach at the FA’s headquarters on charges of acting on behalf of more than one party, taking money from people other than the principal, behaving unethically and bringing the game into disrepute. Accompanied by his lawyer, the agent met Bean, who, he carped, was ‘over-promoted as a constable’. During the recorded interview, Roach excitedly denied that the FA had jurisdiction over himself as he was registered by FIFA. Wagging his finger at Bean, he warned the official to ‘lay off’; while the FA’s lawyers scoffed at the agent and his defence. FIFA, said Nic Coward, had promised to send a letter declaring that the FA was e
mpowered to enforce the rules. Roach was unintimidated. He anticipated that Coward was certain to become lost in the labyrinth of FIFA’s machinations and Bean’s pursuit would begin to flag.
In March 2001 Roach’s self-confidence was emboldened by the unexpected opportunity for more wealth. Daniel Levy, the new chairman of Tottenham, dismissed George Graham and sought to hire Glenn Hoddle as the manager of his ‘spiritual home’. Roach welcomed the new blessing. Once again, he could perform as agent and father figure of his best friend.
In the previous months Hoddle’s managership of Southampton had not been profitable for Roach who was also a season ticket holder at the club. Every week, the agent telephoned Rupert Lowe, the chairman, whose fortune was earned developing retirement properties, with offers. This hustling, often preceded by newspaper reports that ‘Lowe should buy a player’, usually concerned foreign players. Southampton could not afford expensive English or west European players. Latvia, Ecuador and the former Yugoslavia were useful sources of players to compete with the Big Five’s escalating transfer fees. But those purchases were perilous. In November 2001, Lowe had spent £3.5 million buying Agustin Delgado, an Ecuadorian, from another agent, and the player remained unused. ‘We should buy on merit,’ cautioned Lowe, concerned by Hoddle’s partiality to treat Roach’s offers more seriously than other agents. Hoddle agreed but nevertheless suggested, on Roach’s initiative, a four year contract with Patrice Tano, a striker from the Ivory Coast. ‘He looks superb,’ said Hoddle. Tano returned to France, cast off without playing, blaming ‘passport complications’ as an excuse.
To lure Hoddle from Southampton, David Buchler, the new vice-chairman of Tottenham, approached Roach on the board’s behalf. The agent’s reputation was unknown to Buchler, an insolvency expert, whose previous football experience at Millwall, Swindon, Barnet and Oxford United had not exposed him to top agents. During the two days of negotiations to secure Hoddle’s employment, Buchler was particularly impressed by Roach’s concern over the manager’s interests. Smooth and affable, Roach presented himself as reasonable and reliable, speaking eloquently about his many contacts in Europe. ‘A digger,’ concluded Buchler, ‘cutely matching supply and demand.’
Buchler’s judgement was appreciated by Daniel Levy, the new 39-year-old chairman of Tottenham, who preferred avoiding the spotlight. Since leaving Cambridge, Levy had managed or owned ten businesses, trading in cutlery, shoes, health food and a low-cost clothing chain, Mister Byrite. In 1995, he joined ENIC, the English National Investment Company, an offshore company initially involved in textiles. ENIC was financed by Joe Lewis, a 58-year-old former restaurateur who is reported to have earned billions of pounds by currency speculation from his home in Lyford Cay in the Bahamas. Lewis employed Daniel Levy, a family friend, as an investment manager at ENIC. With access to huge wealth and attracted to football’s new fortunes, Levy persuaded Lewis that together, as partners, they should become substantial investors through ENIC in the business across Europe. The strategy was to build an international sports and entertainment group to profit from the media’s interest.
In January 1997, ENIC bought a 25 per cent stake in Glasgow Rangers for £40 million. ‘We were not just looking for a business growing at 10 per cent per annum,’ said Levy, ‘we were looking for something that was also exciting.’ The excitement was purely the gamble to earn millions. ‘There is no passion here,’ said Levy, admitting that neither Lewis nor himself was particularly keen on football. ‘This is purely financial.’ Football, he believed, was commercially under-exploited, particularly in television and merchandising. Rangers’ true value, he predicted, was £325 million, more than double the market price. ‘We chose football,’ Levy explained, ‘because it is the most popular sport on earth and the biggest money spinner.’ To enhance the dream of those potential profits, ENIC bought stakes in other European football clubs: Vicenza, FC Basel, Slavia Prague and AEK Athens. The strategy rapidly soured.
On 19 May 1998, to prevent match-fixing, UEFA barred clubs with common ownership entering the same European tournament. ENIC’s clubs were prevented from entering the lucrative competitions. ENIC’s shares fell 50 per cent. Levy’s woes increased. Corruption in Italian and Greek football, he discovered, was rampant and, two years after his original investment, the value of their investment in Rangers fell by a quarter to £30 million. Levy blamed David Murray for ignoring their agreement to limit borrowings and plunge the club into debts of £100 million. ‘You’re running Rangers as a huge loss-making entity,’ said Levy, aghast how a beloved chairman could ruin a club by ignoring any financial controls, an accusation that Murray vigorously disputed.
Enough confidence remained for Levy and Lewis to respond with interest to one major opportunity. In December 2000, Alan Sugar agreed to sell ENIC a 29.9 per cent controlling interest in Tottenham for £22 million. Sugar retained a 13 per cent stake. Levy was pleased with the deal. At 80 pence per share, he was paying 20 pence less than he had offered, and Sugar had rejected, one year earlier. Sugar’s timing was still judicious. His original £8 million investment in 1991 had quadrupled in value and, soon after the sale to ENIC, the share price halved to about 43 pence. Levy had bought a tired property. During Sugar’s chairmanship, Tottenham had won few trophies and its team had included few stars. The new chairman planned to invest over five years for the club’s recovery. Dennis Roach was happy to assist. To the agent’s advantage, Levy was ‘grateful’ that Roach had not ‘ruined the deal’ to lure Hoddle back to Tottenham. ‘Glenn’s heart is in the club,’ agreed Roach. ‘He understands the sport and the business,’ added Levy, searching for the agent’s agreement. Roach nodded eagerly. Levy, taciturn and unaggressive, was unlikely to challenge the agent’s established methods of business. Without concealing his anger, Rupert Lowe agreed that Hoddle could leave Southampton.
Glenn Hoddle had arrived at White Hart Lane pondering the purchase of Goran Bunjevcevic, a 29-year-old defender playing for Red Star Belgrade. The attraction to Levy was that Bunjevcevic would be available on a free transfer in June 2001, at the end of his four year contract. Levy heard that critical information from Phil Spencer, a registered agent searching for business.
Glenn Hoddle did not want Phil Spencer involved in the deal. The new coach suggested to Daniel Levy that Roach should be retained to negotiate Bunjevcevic’s transfer with Dragan Dzajic, the president of Red Star. Roach’s retainer was agreed at £200,000. On his return from Belgrade Roach reported to Levy that Bunjevcevic was not after all available on a free transfer. He had just signed a new five year contract. Levy was confused over whether Roach had mentioned that the new contract had been signed three or nine months earlier. Some suspected that on ‘the initiative of the Yugoslavs’ the contract had been signed only days after Tottenham expressed its interest. The consequence was unavoidable. To secure the player’s release from the contract, said Roach, the Yugoslavs were asking for £1.4 million. Notwithstanding the discrepancies, Daniel Levy agreed to deposit the money in a Moscow bank.
To finalize his own contract Bunjevcevic flew to London on 18 May 2001 and met John Alexander, Tottenham’s secretary. The footballer was accompanied by Dragan Ruvavac of Red Star and Peter Baines, a solicitor at Pictons in St Albans. For many years Baines had acted as Roach’s trusted representative. Bunjevcevic was using Baines at Roach’s suggestion. Sporadically, during the negotiations at White Hart Lane, Baines left the room to make a call on his mobile telephone. Alexander became puzzled. As a check, he telephoned Roach’s mobile telephone each time Baines left the room. The line was engaged. On Baines’s return Alexander telephoned Roach’s mobile telephone and it was no longer engaged. To seek an explanation, Alexander immediately telephoned Dragan Dzajic of Red Star. ‘Who is representing Red Star in this transaction?’ asked Alexander. ‘We’re represented by Roach,’ the Yugoslav replied. Twenty minutes later, Roach telephoned Alexander. ‘Why are you probing?’ he asked. ‘To fulfil FA rules,’ replied Alexander. One hour later, in a telephone cal
l from Belgrade, a Yugoslav secretary speaking on behalf of Dragan Dzajic told Alexander, ‘No one, including Dennis Roach, is representing us in this deal.’ Temporarily, Alexander suppressed his suspicions and completed the contract with Bunjevcevic, mentioning afterwards the peculiar circumstances to Daniel Levy. ‘Strange,’ agreed Levy on reflection. ‘But the deal’s OK, isn’t it?’ ‘Yes,’ replied Alexander. To ensure there was no breach of the FA’s rules, Levy telephoned Roach. ‘Have you represented two parties?’ he asked. ‘It’s just a coincidence,’ Roach told Levy, ‘that my lawyer was acting for the other side. I was just making sure that both parties came together.’ Like so many club chairmen in the same situation, Levy was pleased with the deal and preferred to ‘turn a blind eye’ to any doubts.
The circumstances of the disappearing ‘free transfer’ encouraged Roach’s enemies to publicize their suspicions. Their suggestion, Graham Bean heard, was that Red Star had completed a back-dated long contract to obtain a larger fee from Tottenham, to be used for various commissions.
Bean travelled across Europe to gather the evidence. The signed testimony of Gianluca Nani, the managing director of Brescia football team, on 29 November 2001 was incriminating. Before Roach’s journey to Belgrade, Nani revealed, he had been told by Ian Radford, an agent, that Bunjevcevic was available on a free transfer. Nani wanted to employ the player, but Brescia’s team coach had refused. ‘We were offered Bunjevcevic on a free transfer,’ insisted Nani, puzzled that Tottenham had shortly after paid £1.4 million.
