Meanwhile, the Indian government had watched the developments in Iran with a premonition of disaster. Linlithgow urged London to take a tough stance with Tehran. On 9 July, he wrote to Amery: ‘In our view positive policy to secure elimination of enemy centres in Iran is a matter of most vital importance.’ He staunchly opposed the sale of military aircraft to Iran, which could make that country ‘considerably better equipped in air than India herself which at present has no fighters at all’. A week later, the viceroy wrote again ‘to protest in strongest terms’ against London’s lassitude on Iran – ‘a country where we are most directly interested, and from which most dangerous threat to India’s security may well develop’. On 20 July, Linlithgow advocated the imposition of an economic blockade. The Iranians should be made ‘to understand that restoration of supplies depended solely on expulsion of German technicians and tourists’.51
More surprising was the stance taken by the new commander-in-chief of India. Wavell had recently swapped commands with Auchinleck. From his perch in New Delhi, the problem of the Persian Gulf now looked very different to Wavell – bearing out the dictum that where one stands depends on where one sits. Thus he wrote to the CIGS on 17 July:
The complaisant attitude it is proposed to adopt over Iran appears to me incomprehensible. It is essential to the defence of India that the Germans should be cleared out of Iran now, repeat now. Failure to do so will lead to a repetition of events which in Iraq were only just countered in time. It is essential we should join hands with Russia through Iran and if the present Government is not willing to facilitate this it must be made to give way to one which will.
India’s activism chimed with the prime minister’s desire for a firm policy towards Iran. But the cabinet was initially divided. Amery voiced India’s views in calling for a joint strategy with the Soviets to coerce Iran. If the threat of force failed to work, he argued, a joint military invasion of Iran should be considered. Eden felt, however, that the threat of force should be invoked only if ‘forces are available to give effect to that threat’. The perennial problem of insufficient troops once again presented itself, although the boot was now on the other foot. Churchill explained to Wavell that troops for a massive invasion of Iran could only come from Iraq and the latter would have to be replaced from the overburdened Middle East. Nevertheless, Eden informed the Soviet envoy in London that they might have to consider joint military action against Iran – if the shah refused to accede to their demands.52
Wavell promptly instructed General Quinan in Iraq to stand ready to secure the oil refinery at Abadan and to occupy the oilfields at Naft-i-Shah and Khuzestan in south-west Iran. Two days later, on 24 July 1941, the war cabinet approved the plan to exert Anglo-Soviet diplomatic pressure backed by a show of force. A joint communiqué would be presented to Iran on 12 August. In the meantime, Quinan would complete the preliminary concentration of a strike force near the Iranian border in the Basra area.
Bullard was unhappy with these developments. He felt the presence of Germans in Iran was not an adequate casus belli and that military action against Iran would violate all principles of neutrality. On 11 August, he cabled London that the Germans were now being watched very closely by the Iranians: ‘I do not think they could give serious trouble.’ Writing to Amery the next day, Linlithgow let fly. The Iranians seemed to ‘have Bullard in their pocket’. The viceroy hoped that ‘local complacency will not be permitted to divert H.M.G. from pressing home their demands on Persia’.53
He need not have worried. Opinion in the British government had turned in favour of intervention. Despite Eden’s misgivings, the Foreign Office felt that Britain’s principal objective was to prevent the Anglo-Iranian oilfields from falling to German forces, if the Russians lost control of the Caucasus. This would ‘not be accomplished simply by the removal of the Germans from Iran … it will at some stage be necessary for us to take over the protection of the oil fields’.54
The case for violating Iran’s neutrality became stronger owing to yet another development. With the Red Army on the ropes, the importance and urgency of supplying materiel to the Soviet Union was starkly clear to Britain and the United States. In late July 1941, President Roosevelt had sent his envoy, Harry Hopkins, to assure the Soviets of American readiness to help and to find out their requirements. On his way back, Hopkins informed Churchill that Stalin had suggested sending American supplies through Iran. This fit snugly with London’s evolving thinking on Iran. At this point, US assistance to the Soviet Union was not covered under the Lend-Lease Act. The Roosevelt administration was also keen to keep this under wraps owing to concerns about anti-Soviet sentiments in American public opinion. The materiel for Russia would, therefore, be delivered via Britain.55 Thus, British control of southern Iran became something of an imperative for the United States as well. Meeting Roosevelt on 11 August in Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland, Churchill informed him of the plan for intervention in Iran.
The presence of German nationals in Iran remained the pretext on which the intervention was undertaken. On 17 August, Bullard handed a missive to the Iranian government reiterating the demand for the expulsion of German nationals – by 31 August 1941. The Russians simultaneously gave a similar note to the Iranians. The next day, the Iranian foreign minister told Bullard that his government was acting on the demand – ‘but in accordance with our own programme’. On 21 August, Bullard received a formal reply, stating that the Iranian government was ‘ready to carry out any plan that they might consider necessary for safety of their country … but they could not accept any proposal which was contrary to their policy of neutrality, or to their rights of sovereignty’. On the morning of 25 August, the British and Russian envoys jointly presented notes to the Iranian premier stating that they were resorting to ‘other measures to safeguard their essential interests’. Soon, they were summoned for a meeting with the shah. ‘The Shah looked old and rather feeble’, noted Bullard. He politely asked ‘whether Great Britain and Russia were at war with Iran’.56 They were. Early that morning, the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran had begun.
The Russians moved in from the north-west with nearly 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks towards Kazvin. The British advanced from Iraq in two separate directions. In the south-west, the 8th Indian Division, led by Major General Charles Harvey, was tasked with capturing the oilfields of Khuzestan and dislodging the Iranian forces deployed near the Gulf. Harvey launched simultaneous operations on three axes. The 24th Indian Infantry Brigade crept up along the Gulf coast in a variety of vessels and captured the ports and towns of Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. The 18th Indian Infantry Brigade attacked the river town of Khurramshahr, while the 25th Indian Infantry Brigade took the fort at Qasr Shaikh. All these objectives were under the division’s control by the evening of 26 August.
Further north, the 21st Indian Infantry Brigade of the 10th Indian Division crossed the frontier near Khanakin and captured the oilfields near Naft-i-Shah. Apart from the brigade group, the force under Slim comprised two ostensibly mechanized formations: the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade and Habforce, now renamed the 9th Armoured Brigade. The 9th Armoured Brigade had in practice no armour: ‘it was made up of dismounted cavalry carried in 30-cwt. trucks’. And the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade had one regiment, 14/20th Hussars, with ‘gallant but decrepit and slightly ridiculous old Mark VII tanks, whose only armament was a single Vickers machine-gun apiece and whose armour almost anything could pierce’.57 Having taken the oilfields the force was to advance through the formidable Paitak Pass. Fortunately, it encountered little resistance. At 1000 hours on 28 August, the town of Kermanshah surrendered to Slim.
Later that day, the shah ordered all his troops to cease resistance. After parleying for terms with the British and the Russians, he succumbed and abdicated in favour of his pliant son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on 16 September 1941. The British operations conducted by the Indian divisions had lasted barely a hundred hours.
The Indian government’s official
account rightly observes that the ‘campaign in Iran cannot strictly be called a war or a military operation’.58 Indeed, it was more in the nature of an imperial expedition – the last one undertaken by the Raj in its own empire. With the invasion and occupation of Iran, India’s army had completed the task of securing its western flank.
7
Fox Hunting
On 11 January 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 22. It came in the wake of Italian debacles in North Africa and committed Germany to helping its ally by sending a small armoured ‘blocking force’. Speaking to the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe High Command in early February, Hitler observed that while Libya had no military significance, if the Italians were shovelled out of it Mussolini’s grip on power might be shaken. Moreover, British forces might then be freed up for operations against southern France or in the Balkans. In consequence, the 5th Light Division – put together from elements of the 3rd Panzer Division – would be sent to Italy and would subsequently be reinforced by another full Panzer Division. The Luftwaffe would operate from its bases in Sicily and secure safe passage for the German forces.1
Even as Hitler outlined his plan for an intervention, the Western Desert Force was nipping at the heels of the Italian army. After the defeat at Sidi Barrani, Marshal Graziani had begun a strategic withdrawal into Libya, based on the defensive strongholds of Bardia and Tobruk. The 6th Australian Division, which had replaced the 4th Indian Division, took Bardia on 5 January. Three days later, Tobruk had fallen and the retreating Italians were pursued along the coast of Libya by the Australians. Simultaneously, the 7th Armoured Division raced through the desert plateau from El Adem to Mechili, eventually cutting off the Italians at Beda Fomm on 7 February 1941. Over 130,000 Italians were taken prisoner, along with hundreds of tanks, guns and vehicles. The commander of the Western Desert Force, General O’Connor, signalled to Wavell: ‘Fox killed in the open.’ The road to Tripoli now beckoned.2
Wavell rightly refused to permit an advance beyond El Agheila on the coast. The Western Desert Force was already 900 miles ahead of its base in Egypt. Moving another 500 miles to Tripoli would have crippled its supply chain and made it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. The Italians retained numerical superiority in the air and at sea: the British forces were unable to use the port of Benghazi, never mind Tripoli. Moreover, Wavell was faced with a new front in Greece, which inevitably called on the resources of the Middle East Command. Churchill – never one to spurn a chance for a victory – agreed and allowed Wavell to halt O’Connor’s offensive on 11 February.3
The first German units of what would become the Deutsches Afrika Korps took up positions near El Agheila on 7 February 1941. The day after the British offensive was halted, the commander of the German force landed in Tripoli. General Erwin Rommel was Hitler’s own choice for commanding this theatre. An infantry officer with a reputation for drive and boldness from the Great War, Rommel had led Hitler’s bodyguard battalion. In February 1940, he was promoted to General and given command of the 7th Panzer Division – a formation that he led with great panache during the invasion of Western Europe and soon became the toast of Germany. Yet Rommel’s tactical acuity and audacity were not adequately tempered by a grasp of the strategic picture or by an appreciation of logistical constraints. All these qualities and limitations would be on full display in North Africa.
No sooner had Rommel reached Tripoli than he began contemplating an offensive. He did not regard the task of his force as merely blocking the British advance. Rather, he sought to bundle the enemy out of Egypt and set the stage for a German conquest of the Middle East. Hitler, however, turned down his request to launch an offensive into Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), insisting that he limit offensive operations to securing Tripolitania (western Libya). In the event, Rommel’s advance into Cyrenaica was triggered by intelligence reports of British withdrawal from El Agheila.
Wavell, on the other hand, received intelligence – including decoded intercepts from Bletchley Park (known as ‘Ultra intelligence’) – indicating that Rommel would not be in a position to go on the offensive before May 1941 at the earliest.4 So, in March 1941, he dismantled the Western Desert Force, sending the exhausted 7th Armoured Division for a full overhaul and the 6th Australian Division to Greece. These experienced divisions were replaced by the 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 2nd (British) Armoured Division and the 9th Australian Division. These newly arrived, poorly equipped and inadequately trained formations joined the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade in defending the gains in Cyrenaica. In the last week of March, these forces under Lieutenant General Philip Neame – previously commander of the 4th Indian Division and now of the Cyrenaica Command – were tasked with delaying an Axis advance, over the 150 miles from El Agheila to Benghazi, for a period of two months during which no reinforcements would be available. The armoured brigade was accordingly deployed north of El Agheila. A brigade of the 9th Australian Division stretched out to the east of Benghazi – the second brigade was stuck in Tobruk, while the third was yet to assemble in Libya. And the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade stood at El Adem, ready to move to Mechili.
The thinning of the British forces at El Agheila gave Rommel his opportunity. On 31 March, he struck. At this point, Rommel had only one Panzer regiment of the 5th Light Division at his disposal: the Italians refused to part with any motorized units. Not only did Rommel hurl these towards El Agheila, but he also latched on to an ambiguous message from the Führer and assumed de facto command of all forces on the front lines.5 Rommel’s opening punch landed on the 3rd Armoured Brigade. The retreating British tanks were outmanoeuvred and outgunned by the Panzers. By 2 April, the brigade was mangled and Rommel’s scanty armour assumed substantial superiority.
The same day, Wavell flew to the tactical headquarters of the Cyrenaica Command. The commander-in-chief wanted immediately to sack Neame for his poor tactical deployment of troops and to replace him with O’Connor. Although the latter arrived from Cairo the following day, he dissuaded Wavell from dismissing Neame and agreed to stay on as an adviser. As it turned out, Neame had a better instinct for the unfolding course of the Axis offensive. He wished to pull the remainder of the armoured forces to the east of the Benghazi road – a position from which they could support the Australian brigade as well as deny the desert routes to Rommel’s forces. Wavell was adamant that they should remain on the road – in order to defend Benghazi. But the defence of Benghazi was neither essential nor feasible. Eventually, it had to be evacuated on the night of 3 April. At O’Connor’s suggestion, the Australian units were moved across Jebel Akhdar to Derna and the remainder of the armoured brigade sent to Mechili. Together these forces would hold a line from Derna to Mechili.6
Meanwhile, Rommel had split his forces into four columns. The first, consisting mainly of a motorized Italian division, chased the British forces along the coast. The other three ripped through the desert plateau and converged at Mechili. Rommel had planned thereafter to drive towards the coast and cut off the British forces between Derna and Tobruk.
The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade moved from El Adem and reached Mechili on the afternoon of 4 April. The brigade was tasked with holding Mechili until the arrival of the remnants of 2nd Armoured Division – after which it would pass under the division’s command. The headquarters of the armoured division turned up on the night of 6 April, but there was no sign of its principal fighting formation, the 3rd Armoured Brigade. Nor were the Australians moving down from Derna towards Mechili. Neither of these units would reach Mechili. It transpired that the armoured brigade was out of petrol and hence diverted to Derna. The Australian units took a severe beating from the pursuing Axis column and eventually retired to Tobruk. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was thus isolated at Mechili.7
The brigade had been formed in India on 1 July 1940. It epitomized the problems faced by the expanding Indian army and highlighted its lack of preparation for modern warfare. The brigade was made up of three cavalry regiments: the 2nd Royal Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 11th Ca
valry (Frontier Force). But these units did not come together until the brigade was mobilized for overseas deployment in December 1940. As late as October 1940, two of its regiments, the 2nd and the 18th, were still undergoing conversion from horsed to mechanized cavalry. Having no tanks or armoured cars at all, they trained for mechanized warfare with Morris six-wheeler trucks. Even as the men made their acquaintance with these machines, the better trained among them were sent out to form new cavalry regiments and to serve as instructors at the new Indian cavalry training centre. The 11th Cavalry was slightly better placed. Being employed for frontier duties, it initially had some light tanks and two armoured cars. But this regiment, too, was ‘milked’ of men and material – an entire squadron being sent to Central India Horse. At the time of embarkation towards the end of January 1941, the 11th Cavalry had no tanks; only 3 anti-tank rifles (against a planned 126); few wireless sets and even fewer trained signallers.8
The brigade sailed from Bombay and berthed at Suez on 6 February 1941. Two days later it arrived at the camp in El Tahag and stayed there till the end of the month, trying to complete its basic training and assemble its equipment. On 8 March, the brigade moved to Mersa Matruh and started training for desert warfare. Only two days before the Axis offensive began, the brigade reached El Adem. In advancing to Mechili, it left behind the 18th Cavalry to protect the airfield at El Adem. Apart from the 2nd Lancers and 11th Cavalry, the brigade was bolstered by an Australian anti-tank regiment and a wireless link for calling in close air support. Such was the state of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, commanded by Brigadier E. W. D. Vaughan and tasked with delaying Rommel at Mechili.
As it waited for the armoured units and the Australians, the brigade took up all-round defence centred on the fort. Soon after, on the morning of 6 April, the advance elements of Rommel’s force reached Mechili and began shelling the fort’s defences. That evening, a German staff officer crossed no-man’s-land with a white flag and was taken to the brigade commander. The officer told Vaughan that Mechili was surrounded by German forces and further resistance was futile. He demanded an immediate capitulation. Vaughan flatly refused, sending the German back blindfolded. Over the next twenty-four hours, the Germans sent two more messengers, including one bearing a letter from Rommel himself, demanding surrender. Vaughan responded slowly, hoping to delay the inevitable German attack. In the meantime, attempts by the Australian anti-tank regiment to take on the German guns proved a failure. Vaughan had no more success with his requests for artillery reinforcements and air strikes.9
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