The stocking of the base depots as well as their ability to support the fighting formations was crucially dependent on the state of transport infrastructure: especially the ports and railways. Both of these were riddled with shortcomings and inefficiencies. Following the Japanese occupation of Burma, the Bay of Bengal was closed to shipping. Ports on the east coast – Calcutta, Chittagong, Vizag, Madras – were evacuated and seaborne traffic diverted to the western ports of Bombay, Karachi and Cochin. The magnitude of the dislocation can be gauged from the fact that Calcutta alone had handled an annual traffic of 8.25 million tons. Compounding the problem was the large influx of refugees from South-East Asia and the arrival of military reinforcements. In May 1942, Bombay handled over 220 ships a day, up from the pre-war daily average of 25.71
In November 1942, a joint Anglo-American shipping mission visited India and made a series of recommendations to improve the capacity of the western ports: the provision of additional lighterage and lighter frontage to receive the traffic; new equipment, especially cranes; and the construction of more berths. These recommendations were reinforced by an expert committee led by Guy Cooper, the chairman of Burmah-Shell in Bombay, which sought to improve the turnaround time of ocean tankers in the major ports. This led to a series of steps to enhance the capacity of the western ports, including the procurement under Lend-Lease of American mobile cranes. As the threat from the Japanese navy receded, the eastern ports recommenced their operations. From mid-1943, as operational requirements for Assam and Burma came to the fore, they bore the brunt of the shipping traffic. Calcutta was particularly prominent. In July 1943, it was handling just over 117,000 tons of imports. The next month it had to cope with 254,000 tons.72
The resultant problems in Calcutta port were a major source of friction between American and Indian authorities. The American logisticians believed that the inefficiency of the port stemmed from its management by the civilian Port Commission. They felt that the port must be under a military director to supervise and rationalize operations and that the dock labour must be militarized. Equally galling to them was the fact that they controlled nothing other than two African-American port companies and their equipment. As an American official complained, ‘the British were following a peace time routine which they were not particularly interested in disturbing to meet the American demand for speed’.73
The Indian government was unwilling to countenance the American recommendations. Placing the port under military control would, they feared, draw public ire and result in avoidable political tension. So the Americans had little choice but to adopt innovative practices to increase efficiency. They began to bypass the contractors and directly recruit local labour. These men were paid daily wages based not on the number of hours worked but on the amount of tonnage unloaded. American supervisors and their Indian ‘gangs’ also developed a degree of camaraderie that came in handy. Yet the congestion caused by British heavy-lift cargo continued to hamper American operations at the port.
Matters came to a head after a Japanese air raid on Calcutta on 5 December 1943. In the following days, almost two-thirds of the labour force failed to turn up at the port. The Americans were aghast. President Roosevelt wrote bluntly to Churchill in early 1944:
Congestions begin in Calcutta itself where many vessels are seriously delayed … I urge that all lines of communication, from Calcutta inclusive, into Assam be placed at once under full military control and that officers of outstanding competence who will tolerate neither failure nor delay be assigned to this work. The United States stands ready to assist in furnishing personnel should you desire this.74
Wavell was peeved at the pressure from the highest American quarters, but eventually agreed to appoint a British civilian as director of Calcutta port. The Americans inducted two experienced port battalions of four companies each – equipped with modern port and heavy-lift machinery such as automatic and floating cranes, tractors and forklifts. American equipment as well as techniques were adopted by the Indians to remarkable effect. By mid-1944, Calcutta became one of the most efficient Allied ports in the world. At the end of 1943, uncleared cargo lying in the port was 96,000 tons. By the end of June 1944 the figure was reduced to 32,000 tons and by the end of October to 11,000 tons. During the same ten-month period, Calcutta had handled 2.25 million tons of cargo.75
The efforts to improve the ports were, however, dealt a huge blow in April 1944. Just after 4 p.m. on 14 April, the city of Bombay was rocked by an enormous explosion. Within an hour came a second and even more devastating flast. The governor of Bombay reported ‘great columns of smoke in the air weaving patterns of incredible beauty … a dumb city watched from hilltop and terrace long sheets of angry flame’.76
The explosions had occurred on SS Fort Stikine in Victoria Dock, Bombay port. The ship was carrying nearly 1,400 tons of explosives and ammunition. Besides this, it was laden with other materials, mainly cotton and timber. A minor fire on board had touched off this combustible cargo with disastrous consequences. Some 900 people were killed or injured. Seventeen nearby ships were destroyed, with losses totalling 50,000 tons of shipping. Several other vessels sustained varying degrees of damage. The Victoria and adjacent docks were put out of action. In the resulting fire, over 36,000 tons of food-grains were also lost. A commission of inquiry constituted by the Indian government submitted a damning indictment of the port authorities and various official agencies. As the secretary of state for India observed, ‘its findings contain much material which will provide useful ammunition for critics of British administration in India’.77 The potential critics were, of course, not just the Indians but also the Americans.
The Indian government had, in fact, swung rapidly into action. Labour at the docks was cajoled to return to work within days of the explosions. The task of reconstruction was handed to the army. Working with the Port Trust, the army undertook a massive effort to clear wreckage and debris, reconstruct and repair the damaged docks, and restore and improve the rail network and water supply. By 1 October 1944, Bombay port was fully functional again.
Other Indian ports too witnessed an impressive expansion of capacity owing to new construction and equipment, procedures and drills. The management of the Vizag and Chittagong ports was also militarized along the lines suggested by the Americans. By the end of the war, the annual capacity of Indian ports rose to 25 million tons from the pre-war capacity of 19.75 million.78
The rail network linking the ports and reserve bases to the Burma front was initially unequal to the demands of the war. Built in 1902 to cater for the needs of local tea and jute cultivators, the Bengal & Assam Railway was a peculiar system. For one thing, over two-thirds of the 3,300-mile line was built on metre-gauge as opposed to the broad-gauge adopted in most other parts of India. This necessitated the unloading and reloading of materiel at stations to the west of the Brahmaputra River. For another, the railway crossed the enormous, un-bridged river by rail ferries. From the eastern bank of the river ran two branch lines: the northern to Assam and the southern to east Bengal. By 1942, however, many of the river steamers and barges that plied the waters of the Brahmaputra had been transferred to Iraq and Iran.79 In addition, the entire system operated on single track – there were few passing stations and loops to ply two-way traffic. And finally, the signal and telegraph systems were primitive and considerably slowed down the traffic. In May 1942, the northern line of the B&AR could carry only 600 tons of freight a day. The capacity dropped to 500 tons later in the year owing to both the rains and the disruptions caused by rebels during the Quit India campaign.80
In early 1943, the army needed 900 tons of supplies to be delivered daily at Dimapur, near the Assam–Burma border, both to sustain the 4th Corps units and to build up thirty days’ reserve stock. In consequence, two newly formed Indian army railway operating groups were deployed to augment the manpower of the B&AR. Steps were also taken to enhance the capacity of the rail lines and the ferry service. Twenty-nine new stations and fifty-si
x crossing loops were constructed to enable two-way traffic. The northern branch line was improved to the point where it could sustain a daily traffic of fourteen supply trains, each of fifty to sixty wagons – both ways. Trans-shipment facilities between the broad-gauge and metre-gauge systems were also improved to cope with 160 vehicles and 3,000 tons of stores and fuel every day.81
Nevertheless, these improvements continued to fall short of those required. First, the demands of men and materials for construction along the rail line reduced the amount of military supplies that could be transported. The trade-off between short-term and long-term considerations was not easy to achieve. Second, the logistical requirement proved to be a moving target. By the end of June 1943, the B&AR’s capacity had increased from 600 to 1,720 tons a day. Yet the Trident Conference, held the previous month, had approved a series of plans that increased the daily demand for Assam alone to 4,300 tons. Auchinleck estimated that by undertaking further improvements to the line and by curbing civilian requirements the capacity to Assam could be enhanced to 3,400 tons a day by early November 1943. Even this figure proved impossible to achieve – not least because the main railway lines servicing Calcutta were breached by a major flood of the Damodar River. In mid-August, ahead of the Quebec Conference, Auchinleck reported that the build up in Assam by March 1944 would fall short by 128,000 tons.82
The Americans tartly concluded that Auchinleck was
overwhelmed with the magnitude of his problem in moving the insignificant amount of 3,400 tons a day over the Assam L. of C. [Lines of Communication]. He listens too much to the no-can-do boys at G.H.Q. [India], particularly the QMG’s [Quarter-Master General’s] office, who are probably influenced by Indians who actually run the works.83
The Americans were particularly concerned because their promises of supplies to China over the Himalayan Hump were not being met. At Quebec, the American chiefs of staff offered some US Army railway units for use on the B&AR. In subsequent discussions, Auchinleck welcomed the offer provided the units worked under the existing central control of the Indian railways. Then too, owing to concerns about political repercussions, he wanted the Americans to come in only at the end of the 1943–44 operational season. When US General Brehon ‘Bill’ Somervell visited Delhi in October 1943, he was told that the Assam line was carrying only 3,200 tons per day: this could go up to 4,400 tons in October 1944. Somervell felt that unless the capacity were increased to 4,800 tons per day by April 1944, American promises to Chiang Kai-shek could not be kept. The Americans were also irritated by the India Command’s reluctance to accept their railway units. Eventually, they found an ally in the SEAC commander. Mountbatten insisted that the Indian government must accept the American offer, if only in a limited section of the B&AR line for starters. Auchinleck protested that American methods would not work in India, but eventually gave in.84
Towards the end of January 1944, the 705th Railway Grand Division – containing five operating battalions and one workshop battalion – arrived in India. Negotiations for the takeover of a crucial 800-mile section of the metre-gauge line were concluded the following month. Somervell insisted that ‘We cannot undertake to work under British management.’85 Consequently, an arrangement was worked out whereby the entire line remained under the general manager of the B&AR but complete operational autonomy was given to the Americans. From 1 March 1944, the American units began to work their section of the line.
The Americans brought with them a blast of energy as well as innovative operational methods. For instance, they found that the average tonnage carried in the 10-ton metre-gauge wagons was 7.3 tons. By contrast, the Americans resorted to the practice of ‘volume loading’ wagons. This ensured that the 10-ton cars could carry almost double their average load. The Americans also introduced an ‘economy scheme’ in which the length of freight trains was increased from a maximum of sixty wagons to a hundred – by using two engines if necessary. This not only increased the tonnage being carried but also reduced the density of traffic. The performance of the B&AR was also enhanced by reducing the number of stops and adhering strictly to train schedules – even at the cost of inconveniencing the local populace. The bottleneck at the rail ferries was broken by using two engines on each ferry: as one pulled cargo wagons off the ferry, the other pushed cargo heading in the other direction. Equally impressive were the changes introduced in the workshops that serviced the railway. American equipment as well as practices of shop-floor and inventory management drastically increased the efficiency of the workshops: twenty-five locomotives could be completely overhauled every month – up from the earlier record of seven. The upshot of the all this was a transformation of the logistical picture. By May 1944, the supply shortages in Assam and Bengal were brought under control. From the following month, despite the monsoon, the B&AR proved capable of moving more supplies than requested by British and American forces.86 This dramatic turnaround occurred not a day too soon. For the Japanese were already on the move.
Traffic on the Bengal & Assam Railway
Date Tons per Day Quebec Target
February 1944 3,443 3,400
March 1944 3,631 3,400
April 1944 4,697 3,400
May 1944 4,945 4,667
June 1944 4,973 4,667
July 1944 5,420 4,667
August 1944 6,296
September 1944 6,537
October 1944 6,766
Source: James M. Ehrman, ‘Ways of War and the American Experience in the China-Burma-India Theater, 1942–1945’, PhD thesis, Kansas State University, 2006, p. 285, Table 9.
17
Back to Burma
The Arakan offensive of early 1943 had forced the India Command to undertake far-reaching changes in organization, tactics and logistics. By the end of the year, these preparations were well under way. And Arakan was yet again chosen as the proving ground for the Commonwealth forces. For one thing, the planned amphibious operation to capture Akyab entailed operations in the Arakan. Although the amphibious component would be shelved in January 1944, the Fourteenth Army was prepared for a land attack. For another, the formations in Assam were not yet ready. Nor indeed was the larger strategic plan for Burma as yet clear. By default, then, SEAC went on the offensive in the Arakan.
As earlier, in the opening phase the plan was to capture the small port of Maungdaw. Thereafter, the Japanese defences along the 10-mile road connecting Maungdaw with Buthidaung – held by the experienced 55th Division – would be attacked. The operation would be carried out by the 15th Indian Corps, made up of three battle-hardened divisions of the Indian army: the 5th and the 7th, with the 26th in reserve. These troops were supported by a massive, unprecedented quantity of medium artillery, Lee-Grant tanks and other supporting units. RAF fighters and dive-bombers were earmarked as close air support for the ground offensive.
The 15th Corps had begun to be inducted into the Arakan from the late summer of 1943. This gave the troops adequate time to get acquainted with the jungle as well as each other. Units and formations kept up with a gruelling regime of realistic training. As Slim noted, ‘Our training grew more ambitious until we were staging inter-divisional exercises over wide ranges of country under tough conditions. Units lived for weeks on end in the jungle and learnt its ways. We hoped we had finally dispelled the fatal idea that the Japanese had something we had not.’1
Following Slim’s promotion to Fourteenth Army commander, Lieutenant General Philip Christison took command of the 15th Corps on 1 November 1943. Thereafter, the forward units began creeping south towards the string of Japanese outposts. By mid-November contact was made with the Japanese, but the 7th Division came up against stern resistance. The Japanese defences were organized in bunkers sited atop razor-back ridges. Set-piece attacks on such positions rapidly came unstuck – even when supported by RAF dive-bombers. The divisional commander, Frank Messervy, swiftly switched tactics. He ordered his units to eschew frontal attacks and instead resort to infiltration, bypassing and envelopment th
rough the gaps between the Japanese positions. When his troops were behind the Japanese positions, these could be systematically ground down. ‘We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British-Japs-British’, he observed, ‘but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands, it will soon be transformed to British-British-Jap.’2
On the night of 30 November, the 15th Corps began a major offensive against the Japanese defences along the Mayu Ridge. Although the going was rough, the emphasis on infiltration and encirclement proved timely. In several tactical actions, Indian and British units managed to surprise the Japanese. Two weeks on, the 7th Division stood athwart the main Japanese defences screening Buthidaung. Meanwhile, the 5th Division was advancing along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw. Here too Japanese bunkers proved a tough target for conventional assaults. Patrols of the division began to infiltrate the gaps between these defended localities, forestalling mutual support and reinforcements by the Japanese. While costly frontal attacks could not always be avoided, the new tactics usually compelled the Japanese to pull back without a fight. As a newsletter of the 5th Division noted, ‘The only way to deal with the Jap def posns [defensive positions] is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def [defensive] tactics.’3
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