by Paul Preston
Schlayer, accompanied by Henny and Pérez Quesada, had been to Torrejón where they found recently disturbed ground from which protruded arms and legs.81 An initial report on the first murders sent by Ogilvie-Forbes was minuted by Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office: ‘This is a ghastly tale of ghastly gangsters in whose hands the so-called “government” … is a bad joke. I suppose the other side will do as horribly in their turn.’82 In fact, British diplomats rarely acknowledged atrocities on the rebel side and never saw the differences between what happened in each zone. While the rebel authorities actively sanctioned atrocities throughout the war and after, it was precisely the Republican government’s opposition to them that limited them to the first five months of the war. In this context, it is worth noting the comment of the New Zealand journalist Geoffrey Cox: ‘The spotlight of publicity which has been turned on these unauthorised executions is, ironically enough, itself a reflection of the antagonism of the Spanish Government towards such deeds. For much of the information has become available only because of the freedom with which the Government has discussed the problem with foreign authorities and with visiting delegations.’83
After the mass sacas of 7 and 8 November, there was a brief interlude thanks to the anarchist Melchor Rodríguez and Mariano Sánchez Roca, the under-secretary at the Ministry of Justice. Those sacas had occurred in the absence of the Minister of Justice, García Oliver, and his Director General of Prisons, Juan Antonio Carnero, who had gone to Valencia with the rest of the government. Appalled by what was happening, the president of the Supreme Court, Mariano Gómez, and the secretary general of the Bar Association, Luis Zubillaga, sent a telegram requesting García Oliver once more to put Melchor Rodríguez in charge of the prisons in Madrid. Sánchez Roca, a labour lawyer who had represented various CNT militants including Melchor Rodríguez, managed to persuade García Oliver to name Melchor Special Inspector of Prisons. Surprisingly, García Oliver agreed. It is not known whether this had anything to do with the diplomatic protests although, as will be seen, other members of the government had heard about, and were appalled by, the sacas. On 9 November, before his appointment was officially announced, Melchor took up the post. By the time his appointment was made official five days later, he would already have resigned.84
When Melchor Rodríguez unofficially assumed the post of Inspector General of Prisons, his exact powers were imprecise, not to say debatable. Nevertheless, his first initiative on the night of 9 November was decisive. Melchor’s friend, Juan Batista, the administrator of the Cárcel Modelo, had told him that a saca of four hundred prisoners was planned. In response, he went to the prison at midnight and ordered that all sacas cease and that the militiamen who had been freely moving within the prison remain outside. He forbade the release of any prisoners between 6 p.m. and 8 a.m., to prevent them being shot. He also insisted on accompanying any prisoners being transferred to other prisons. In consequence there were no sacas between 10 and 17 November. His next objective was to get the militiamen out and the professional prison functionaries back.85 He explained his intentions to Schlayer and Henny. On behalf of the diplomatic corps, Schlayer wrote to Melchor Rodríguez to confirm what had been promised:
That you consider the detainees to be prisoners of war and that you are determined to prevent them being assassinated, except as a result of a judicial sentence; that you are going to implement the division of the prisoners into three categories, in the first those who are considered to be dangerous enemies and whom you intend to transfer to other prisons, such as Alcalá, Chinchilla and Valencia; in the second the doubtful ones, those who have been judged by the courts; and in the third, the remainder who should be released immediately.86
Melchor Rodríguez still had people hidden in the Palacio de Viana, where he had established his headquarters. This fact, plus Melchor’s decisive action in the prisons, was provoking tension with the Defence Committee of the CNT, which was heavily implicated in the murders of the prisoners. One of the more hostile anarchist leaders was Amor Nuño, who had made the deal with the Public Order Council for the evacuation and elimination of prisoners. García Oliver and Carnero appeared unexpectedly in Madrid on 13 November. In a discordant meeting, García Oliver informed Melchor that he had received reports from the Defence Committee and others about his activities. He made it clear that he did not approve of initiatives to stop the murder of prisoners. Far from being conciliatory, Melchor responded by demanding that those responsible for the killings be punished. When García Oliver told him to be reasonable, Melchor threw his appointment letter at him. Melchor’s nomination had been sent to the official Gaceta on 12 November but was not published until after the confrontation with García Oliver. After Melchor Rodríguez’s resignation, the sacas started again.87 Until he was re-appointed in early December, Melchor Rodríguez worked on his own in an effort to stop executions being carried out by the anarchist militias still operating out of the Checa del Cine Europa in defiance of Carrillo’s decree of 9 November.88
Meanwhile, on 10 November, Manuel Irujo, the Basque Catholic who was Minister without Portfolio in the government of Largo Caballero, heard from his representative in Madrid, Jesus de Galíndez, about both the murders of the previous days and Melchor Rodríguez’s initiatives. From Barcelona, where he had gone to see President Azaña, Irujo sent a teletype to General Miaja’s office:
I have received news of lamentable events in the prisons as a result of which a large number of prisoners have been shot, having been taken by militiamen using transfer orders emanating from the Dirección General de Seguridad, and I would like to know the number of victims, the prisons from which they were taken, the names of those who authorized these seizures, and the measures that have been taken by the Junta in response to these events. I need this information to inform the Head of State.
Miaja’s ADC replied that he had no knowledge of these events. The following day, 11 November, Irujo and José Giral, who was also a Minister without Portfolio, demanded explanations from the Minister of the Interior, Ángel Galarza. His vague response showed that he knew that prisoners were being removed from the prisons, although he attributed the deaths to the fury of the families of victims of bombing raids.89
After speaking to Irujo about the situation, Azaña jotted down in his notebook: ‘cabinet tit-bits from Irujo: García Oliver’s hard-line stance that the war must be harsh. Shooting of 80 officers after inviting them to serve the Republic. “I’m not sorry for what has been done,” exclaims García Oliver according to Irujo … That an Inspector of Prisons from the FAI had prevented the handing over of more prisoners.’90 This was a reference to Melchor Rodríguez.
In the light of the fact that Azaña, Irujo, Giral and Galarza knew about the sacas, a speech made on 12 November by Santiago Carrillo assumes greater significance. Speaking from the microphones of Unión Radio, he made an admission regarding the measures being taken against the prisoners:
it is guaranteed that there will be no resistance to the Junta de Defensa from within. No such resistance will emerge because absolutely every possible measure has been taken to prevent any conflict or alteration of order in Madrid that could favour the enemy’s plans. The ‘Fifth Column’ is on the way to being crushed. Its last remnants in the depths of Madrid are being hunted down and cornered according to the law, but above all with the energy necessary to ensure that this ‘Fifth Column’ cannot interfere with the plans of the legitimate government and the Junta de Defensa.91
Two days after Carrillo’s broadcast, the Junta de Defensa issued a statement under the title ‘To counteract a vile campaign’:
News has reached the Junta de Defensa de Madrid that enemy radio has broadcast information taken from foreign newspapers regarding the mistreatment of rebel prisoners. In the light of the attempt to start a campaign, the Councillors find themselves obliged to declare before Spain and the foreign nations that what has been said about this matter is totally untrue. The prisoners are
not the victims of mistreatment nor need they fear for their lives. They will all be judged within the law appertaining in each case. The Junta de Defensa does not need to take any further measures and will not only prevent anyone else doing so, but also ensure that those who intervene or have intervened in these cases will do so within the established order and norms.92
After the sacas began again on 18 November, Schlayer, Núñez Morgado and Henry Helfant (the Romanian commercial attaché) pressed the government to reappoint Melchor, as did Luis Zubillaga of the Bar Association and Mariano Gómez. Finally, on 25 November, García Oliver telephoned Melchor and asked him to come to Valencia. En route three days later, his car was ambushed by a group from the FAI. Nevertheless, he reached his appointment with García Oliver, who offered to make him Delegate for Prisons for Madrid and Alcalá de Henares. Melchor’s two conditions for accepting were that men on whom he could rely be made directors of prisons and that those guilty of atrocities be punished. Some days later, Melchor had an interview with the Minister of the Interior, Ángel Galarza, who agreed to support his nomination which was made public on 1 December. On his return to Madrid, Melchor again put a stop to the sacas, forced the militia groups out of the prisons and replaced them with Assault Guards. In some cases, he arrested men accused of murder, extortion and blackmail. He was fortunate in being able to count on the full support of the under-secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Mariano Sánchez Roca.93
On 1 December 1936, the Junta de Defensa was renamed the Junta Delegada de Defensa de Madrid by order of Largo Caballero. Having led the government to Valencia, the Prime Minister was deeply resentful of the aureole of heroism that had accumulated around Miaja as he led the capital’s population in resisting Franco’s siege. Thus Largo Caballero wished to restrain what he considered the Junta’s excessive independence. In the rearranged body, Amor Nuño moved to the post of Councillor for Transport.94 Serrano Poncela had already left the Public Order Delegation at some point in early December. He was still there when, on 4 December, he supervised an assault on the Finnish Legation to flush out fifth columnists. Shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were taken over by José Cazorla.
At the end of the war, Serrano Poncela gave Jesús de Galíndez an implausible account of why he had left the Public Order Delegation. He claimed that he had had no idea that the phrases ‘transfer to Chinchilla’ or ‘place in liberty’ on the orders that he signed were code meaning execution. The use of such code could have been the way in which those responsible covered their guilt, as agreed at the meeting on the evening of 7 November. Serrano Poncela told Galíndez that the orders were passed to him by Santiago Carrillo and that all he did was sign them. If this were true it would not mean that he was ignorant of what was happening, given his presence in the Cárcel Modelo to supervise the saca of 7–8 November. He told Galíndez that, as soon he realized what was happening, he resigned from his post and not long afterwards left the Communist Party.95 This was not entirely true since he held the important post of JSU propaganda secretary until well into 1938. In an extraordinary letter to the PCE Central Committee, written in March 1939, Serrano Poncela claimed that he had resigned from the Party only once he was in France in February 1939, implying that previously he had feared for his life. He referred to the disgust he felt about his past in the Communist Party. He also claimed that the PCE prevented his emigration to Mexico because he knew too much.96
Subsequently, and in reprisal for Serrano Poncela’s rejection of the Party, Carrillo denounced him. In an interview with Ian Gibson, Carrillo claimed that he had nothing to do with the activities of the Public Order Delegation and blamed everything on Serrano Poncela. He alleged that ‘my only involvement was, after about a fortnight, I got the impression that Serrano Poncela was doing bad things and so I sacked him’. Allegedly, Carrillo had discovered in late November that ‘outrages were being committed and this man was a thief’. He claimed that Serrano Poncela had in his possession jewels stolen from those arrested and that consideration had been given to having Serrano Poncela shot.97 Serrano Poncela’s continued pre-eminence in the JSU belies this.
The claim that he personally had nothing to do with the killings was repeated by Carrillo in his memoirs of 1993. He alleged that the classification and evacuation of prisoners was left entirely to the Public Order Delegation under Serrano Poncela. Carrillo went on to assert that the Delegation did not decide on death sentences but merely selected those who would be sent to Tribunales Populares and those who would be freed. His account is brief, vague and misleading, making no mention of executions and implying that the worst that happened to those judged to be dangerous was to be sent to work battalions building fortifications. The only unequivocal statement in Carrillo’s account is a declaration that he took part in none of the Public Order Delegation’s meetings.98 However, if Manuel Irujo and José Giral in Valencia knew about the killings and if, in Madrid, Melchor Rodríguez, the Chargé d’Affaires of Argentina, the Chargé d’Affaires of the United Kingdom and Felix Schlayer knew about them, it is inconceivable that Carrillo, as the principal authority in the area of public order, could not know. After all, despite these later claims, he received daily reports from Serrano Poncela.99
Cazorla’s assumption of the role of Director General of Security for Madrid raises the question of what he had been doing since 6 November 1936 when he was first named Carrillo’s deputy in the Council for Public Order. In the Causa General file on Cazorla, it is claimed that he had played both an operational and a supervisory role in the sacas from the various prisons. It is alleged that, along with Arturo García de la Rosa, he ran a checa in the Calle Zurbano. It is further claimed that he sent instructions to the Public Order Delegation’s representatives in each police station ordering the execution of suspect prisoners. Under interrogation, Cazorla admitted that he was fully aware of the sacas and the subsequent killings, ‘with fictitious orders for transfers or release being signed by Serrano Poncela or Bruno Carreras whose job it was’. As Serrano Poncela’s deputy, Carreras had chosen as his own assistant the anarchist Benigno Mancebo, who had previously run the Checa de Fomento.100
One of the first things that Cazorla did as Director General of Security was to replace Carreras as Inspector General of the Madrid Police. His own nominee was David Vázquez Baldominos, who up to that moment had been running the Brigada Especial with Grigulevich. The substitution of Serrano Poncela by Cazorla coincided with the reappointment of Melchor Rodríguez as Delegate for Prisons and the ending of the sacas. Cazorla told his interrogators that, when he took over, the Dirección General de Seguridad was in chaos and the various militia groups involved in policing were more likely to obey their party than the Junta de Defensa. Accordingly, Cazorla started to implement fully the measures taken by Carrillo against the checas. The investigation and punishment of suspected fifth columnists was tightened up. The large-scale sacas stopped and the repression became much more narrowly targeted. Melchor Rodríguez told his interrogators that the previous sacas had been ordered by the Dirección General de Seguridad – which would point to Serrano Poncela. Another detainee interrogated by the Causa General, Eloy de la Figuera González, reported that he had heard the anarchist Manuel Rascón who ran the investigation sub-section of the Dirección General de Seguridad ranting furiously about the obstacles placed by Melchor Rodríguez in the way of the sacas.101
The more precise targeting of fifth columnists was apparent in Galíndez’s description of the functioning of the Tribunales Populares. They were presided over by a judge and the jury consisted of two members of each of the Popular Front parties. The accused were given a public defender and allowed to call witnesses on their own behalf. These people’s courts were principally for trying those accused not simply of being right-wingers but of active hostility to the Republic (desafección al regimen). The maximum sentence was five years in prison. Membership of the Falange got three years; members of Acción Popular were usually fined unless guilty of spreading defeatism
or of black marketeering. Those involved in hard-core fifth-column activities like espionage or sabotage would be tried by the Tribunal for Treachery and Espionage or by military courts.102 On 22 December, the government created work camps for those found guilty of sedition, rebellion and disloyalty.103 This last was a category that would be used substantially by Cazorla.
Serrano Poncela’s last public intervention as Director General of Security was the incident at the Finnish Legation on 4 December, which was provoked by an abuse of the right of asylum. Finland’s Ambassador, George Arvid Winckelman, was accredited to both Lisbon and Madrid and understandably preferred to stay in Portugal. In his absence, a Spanish employee of the Embassy, Francisco Cachero, had appointed himself Chargé d’Affaires. He had rented several houses and, for a price, gave refuge to large numbers of fifth columnists. At the 14 November meeting of the Junta de Defensa, it was claimed that these premises housed 2,500 fascists armed with pistols and machine-guns. On 19 November, the Junta ordered the Finnish premises to be put under surveillance.
