To be sure, the emergence of a true peer competitor would probably impose greater discipline over U.S. foreign policy, force the establishment to set clearer priorities, and make it easier to dismiss dangerous or wasteful schemes. If China continues to rise and challenge the U.S. position, the foreign policy establishment might even begin to hold more people more accountable for failures and put a greater premium on effective performance in office.
It is hard to be enthusiastic about this “solution” either, however, because a new great power rivalry entails its own costs and risks.43 In an ideal world, a future peer competitor would be just worrisome enough to encourage meaningful reform yet not too strong for the United States to handle. Alas, there is no guarantee that this convenient “sweet spot” will be realized or that U.S. leaders would make the right choices in response. The tragedy of 9/11 was as loud a wake-up call as a nation ever gets, but the foreign policy establishment responded in ways that made the problem worse.
Given America’s abundant security and the elite consensus behind liberal hegemony, external pressures are unlikely to produce meaningful reform by themselves. Bureaucratic interests are notoriously resistant to change, and far-reaching policy shifts do not occur unless there is strong and sustained political pressure behind them. Absent sustained political action at home, debates on foreign policy will continue to occur within the same familiar echo chamber and stay between the forty-eight-yard lines. And instead of considering alternatives to liberal hegemony, its acolytes will just redouble their efforts to persuade the rest of the country to let them keep searching for a way to make it work.
HOW TO BEAT THE BLOB
What is needed, therefore, is a fairer fight within the existing political system, so that liberal hegemony no longer enjoys pride of place and rival approaches are not confined to the margins of political discourse or a few isolated ramparts inside the Beltway. Defenders of the status quo are already well represented in government, academia, the media, and the intertwined world of think tanks and lobbies, thereby tilting discussion heavily in their favor. The only way to broaden public debate on these topics, therefore, is to create a countervailing set of organizations and institutions that can do battle in the marketplace of ideas.
In particular, those who favor offshore balancing or other more restrained approaches must build a broader political movement and organize a countervailing set of institutions that can actively work to influence public perceptions and bring pressure to bear on politicians and officials who continue to favor policies that simply don’t work. Such a movement would build upon the handful of groups that already favor a different grand strategy, such as the libertarian CATO Institute, the realist Center for the National Interest, or the left-leaning Center for International Policy. At the same time, it would strive to build bridges and form coalitions with other groups whose agendas are compatible.
Needless to say, this effort will require significant financial resources drawn from Americans who worry that continuing to pursue liberal hegemony will do serious long-term damage to the United States.44 In addition to supporting policy-relevant research on critical foreign policy issues, this network should employ the same tactics that proponents of liberal hegemony have used to build influence in Washington. In particular, supporters of offshore balancing should conduct academic research on key issues related to a more restrained U.S. grand strategy, organize conferences designed to refine and disseminate their ideas, lobby politicians and policymakers directly, and engage in a broad array of public outreach activities. It will be especially important to recruit, mentor, and support a cadre of like-minded younger experts and provide them with sustainable career paths so that aspiring foreign policy wonks do not have to embrace the current consensus in order to have successful careers.
Indeed, a movement of the sort just described is probably a necessary condition for significant strategic change. In War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy, the political scientists Matthew Baum and Philip Potter argue that “two basic conditions must be present for citizens of mass democracies to hold their leaders accountable. First, there must be independent and politically potent opposition partisans that can alert the public when a leader missteps … Second, media and communication institutions must be both in place and accessible sufficiently to transmit messages from these opposition elites to the public.”45
The United States has numerous media outlets and robust laws protecting free speech; the problem has been the absence of a “politically potent” opposition to the reigning doctrine of liberal hegemony. As a result, when mainstream media organizations cover foreign policy topics, they do so within the boundaries of the existing consensus. The sources on which they rely typically include government officials or policy experts who are committed to liberal hegemony, as indeed are most prominent members of mainstream media organizations. Given that marriage of minds, it is hardly surprising that major news organizations such as The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The New York Times feel little pressure to offer genuinely alternative views to the readers, except on an intermittent basis.
But if advocates of a different grand strategy can establish enduring institutions and achieve critical mass, major media organizations will take notice and provide more space for their views. Over time, debates on key foreign policy topics would feature a wider range of opinion and Americans would be more aware of the deficiencies of their present grand strategy and the virtues of alternative approaches. Should this movement gain momentum, news organizations such as the Times or the Post might even conclude that it was time to add an advocate of greater foreign policy restraint to their current roster of crusading commentators.46
SELLING A SENSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY
It remains to be seen whether a politically potent movement in favor of a more restrained policy can be built and sustained over time. If such a movement were established, how might it gain broad public support? What is the best way to sell a more sensible foreign policy?
EMPHASIZE PATRIOTISM
Although offshore balancers—including this author—are often critical of many past U.S. policies, the strategy itself is deeply patriotic and should always be portrayed in this light. As emphasized throughout this book, it assumes that the primary task of U.S. foreign policy is to protect and promote the interests of the American people and to help them remain secure, prosperous, and free. In other words, offshore balancers are far from “anti-American.” On the contrary, they believe the American people deserve a better foreign policy than the one they have been given over the past two decades.
RESPECT THE MILITARY
Offshore balancers are wary of military intervention—except when necessary to preserve balances of power in key regions—but they are neither pacifists nor hostile to the armed services. The strategy assumes that military power is still necessary and that protecting U.S. interests sometimes requires the use of force. And though offshore balancers are mindful that the foreign policy establishment and the so-called military-industrial complex routinely inflate threats for bureaucratic or budgetary reasons, they respect the sacrifices military personnel make on behalf of the nation. They believe that proponents of liberal hegemony have used America’s armed forces carelessly and with insufficient regard for the human sacrifices involved; by contrast, offshore balancers oppose risking soldiers’ lives for trivial or ill-considered reasons.
Indeed, offshore balancing strives to minimize the burdens borne by men and women in uniform. Instead of viewing the American military as an obedient tool that can be used to pursue unrealistic goals, offshore balancers believe that soldiers, sailors, and pilots should be sent in harm’s way only when vital interests are at stake. In particular, offshore balancers believe that the American military should never be sent to fight wars they are destined to lose, whether because vital interests were not engaged or because the stated mission—such as trying to grow new democracies on unfertile ground—is one that military
force cannot accomplish.
NO MORE “UNCLE SUCKER”
Advocates of offshore balancing can enhance its appeal by stressing the need for other states to contribute their fair share to collective security efforts instead of free-riding on Uncle Sam. The foreign policy elite may relish the stature and prestige that “global leadership” gives them, but ordinary Americans rightly resent subsidizing wealthy allies, protecting states that will not or cannot contribute to U.S. security, and tolerating the reckless behavior that some U.S. allies indulge in under the mantle of American protection.
Connecting adventures abroad with conditions at home will strengthen the case for offshore balancing even more. Although the United States is still remarkably well off, the time, resources, and attention devoted to foolish adventures abroad inevitably affect the quality of life back home. It is important to explain to Americans the connection between our foreign and defense policies and the quality of life at home, the level of taxes we are asked to pay, the number of wounded veterans for whom we must care, the intrusiveness of U.S. security agencies, and the state of the federal budget and the overall economy. The more bases we garrison around the world, the fewer roads, bridges, subways, parks, museums, hospitals, schools, fiber-optic cables, and WiFi networks will be available for U.S. citizens, diminishing the quality of life for everyone. Making these connections clearer to more people is critical to winning their support for a smarter strategy.
DEFEND THE MORAL HIGH GROUND
Offshore balancing is a self-interested strategy, but it is not indifferent to moral considerations. Because the United States remains a deeply liberal society, its citizens are unlikely to embrace for long a grand strategy they believe is unethical or indifferent to morality. Accordingly, proponents of offshore balancing must also stress its positive moral qualities and its consistency with core U.S. values.47
In particular, offshore balancing does not preclude using American power to try to prevent wars, halt genocides, or persuade other countries to improve their human rights performance, but it does set a high bar for the use of force. In particular, offshore balancers would willingly endorse disaster relief and other purely humanitarian actions and would even countenance using force to halt mass killings when (1) the danger was imminent, (2) the anticipated costs to the United States were modest, (3) the ratio of foreign lives saved to U.S. lives risked was high, and (4) it was clear that intervention would not make things worse or lead to an open-ended commitment.
Offshore balancing is also more likely to protect these values here at home. As the Founding Fathers understood well, no nation can remain at war for long periods without compromising civil liberties and other liberal institutions. Warfare, after all, is a quintessentially illiberal activity: it is violent, coercive, and hierarchical, and it privileges secrecy and command over transparency and freedom.
In fact, offshore balancers have a powerful moral case in favor of their preferred strategy, and they should not hesitate to make it. Offshore balancing would cause less conflict and human suffering than liberal hegemony has, and the United States is more likely to promote progressive change if it presents an attractive model to others and if it promotes liberal values through patient diplomacy and moral suasion rather than by coercion or military action. Above all, they need not cede the moral high ground to their liberal or neoconservative opponents, especially in light of the considerable human suffering that the latter’s policies have produced.
MIND THE MESSENGER
Last but not least, offshore balancing needs able advocates to make the case for it. In recent years, unfortunately, the public figures whose views on foreign policy most closely approximate the strategy of offshore balancing have been Ron and Rand Paul, Pat Buchanan, and back in 2016, Donald Trump. Although these men have all said some sensible things about the failures of U.S. foreign policy, they also carry considerable negative baggage and hold other beliefs that are foolish, ignorant, or offensive.
In a sense, their mistakes are not surprising. It takes a degree of iconoclasm to see through the clouds of rhetoric and conventional wisdom underpinning liberal hegemony—such as the constant invocation of American “exceptionalism” or the claim that U.S. leadership is the only barrier between civilization and the abyss. It is no accident, therefore, that offshore balancing’s most visible proponents have been outliers within the American political establishment. For it to reemerge as America’s default grand strategy, therefore, it will need champions who are smart, sophisticated, well-informed, articulate, patriotic, and free of embarrassing skeletons.
If such a figure does emerge, however, he or she will find a ready audience. Americans remain willing to bear certain burdens abroad for the sake of their own safety and prosperity, and in some cases to help others. But they are less and less willing to undertake the same quixotic missions that have failed in the past and are doomed to fail in the future, and intelligent politicians who promise not to repeat these errors would almost certainly attract considerable popular support.
FINAL THOUGHTS
“There is a great deal of ruin in a nation,” wrote Adam Smith—all the more so when a country has as many enduring advantages as the United States still enjoys. Good fortune has allowed the country to survive its haphazard, cavalier, and, in recent years, unrealistic approach to foreign policy. For all its recent mistakes, America is still a remarkably lucky country, confirming Bismarck’s alleged quip that “there seems to be a special providence that looks after drunkards, fools, and the United States of America.”
The real danger we face, therefore, is not a well-organized and powerful array of foreign adversaries whose clever strategems will snatch our security, prosperity, and way of life away from us. On the contrary, the problems the United States has faced abroad are mostly of its own making. As the political cartoonist Walt Kelly observed many years ago, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”
At what point might America’s good fortune run out? It is by no means clear that the reform movement outlined here will take root, grow and flourish, and eventually help correct some of the follies that have led the United States astray at considerable cost to ourselves and even greater cost to others. It is entirely possible that the United States will continue on its present stumbling course no matter who resides in the White House, who occupies key positions in the executive branch, or which party controls the House or Senate.
As a nation, therefore, we stand at a crossroads. Down one road lies more of the same, with similar disheartening results. Repeating past follies may be endurable but is hardly desirable, and it will pose graver risks as the “unipolar moment” recedes further into the past. Down another road lies a more realistic strategy that has served the country well in the past and would do so again if adopted. It is not the foreign policy that the current occupant of the Oval Office can deliver successfully, but it is the foreign policy most Americans want and deserve. The only question is: How long will it take before they get it?
NOTES
Please note that some of the links referenced throughout this work may no longer be active.
INTRODUCTION
1. See John Hudson, “Inside Hillary Clinton’s Massive Foreign Policy Brain Trust,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2016; and Stephen M. Walt, “The Donald vs. the Blob,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2016, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/the-donald-vs-the-blob-hillary-clinton-election/.
2. See “Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders,” March 2, 2016, at http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/open-letter-on-donald-trump-from-gop-national-security-leaders/; and “A Letter from GOP National Security Officials Opposing Donald Trump,” The New York Times, August 8, 2016, at www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/08/us/politics/national-security-letter-trump.html?_r=0.
3. See “Transcript: Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” The New York Times, March 26, 2016, at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html; and “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO
, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World,” July 21, 2016, at www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html.
4. When announcing his presidential bid in 2015, Trump claimed that Mexico was sending to the United States “people that have lots of problems … They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” See “Full Text: Trump Announces a Presidential Bid,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2015. And in his first major foreign policy speech in April 2016, Trump said, “There are scores of recent migrants inside our borders charged with terrorism … We must stop importing extremism through senseless immigration policies.” Ryan Teague Beckwith, “Read Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Speech,” Time, April 27, 2016, at http://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/.
5. See Juliet Eilperin, “Obama Lays Out His Foreign Policy Doctrine: Singles, Doubles, and the Occasional Home Run,” The Washington Post, April 28, 2014, at www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-lays-out-his-foreign-policy-doctrine-singles-doubles-and-the-occasional-home-run/2014/04/28/e34ec058-ceb5-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html.
6. See David Law and Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the U.S. Constitution,” New York University Law Review 87, no. 3 (June 2012).
7. See Beckwith, “Read Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Speech.”
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