(Signed) Air Commodore D.A. Bradshaw
Comments by C of S
a. Good effort on P-Bowyer’s part, specifically, and a good show by forces involved.
b. Without a doubt, we must make increasing use of air recce. (Signed) Air Vice Marshal F.W. Mussell
Comments by Commander
Noted and I concur with all the remarks. With the increased deployment we must press for exploitation of every possible opportunity. We have accepted increased flying effort so let us make full use of air recce. Good show all round.
(Signed) Air Marshal M.J. McLaren
Although this was a very small action compared to those to come, important issues were raised in the Air Strike Report. Firstly Harold Griffiths, supported by Peter Cooke, had added weight to calls by others and myself for a force that Griff refers to as ‘Prompt Force’. This, together with the Air HQ decision to put more aircraft in the field, led to the establishment of Fire Force shortly thereafter when the Army made RLI Commandos permanently available to an increasing number of deployed helicopters.
The delayed attacks that Harold Griffiths and Peter Cooke referred to were bases in Mozambique found by Mike Litson. Unfortunately this pilot was lost to 4 Squadron on posting to helicopters just when he was becoming a useful recce pilot. Brian Murdoch was not really cut out for the job, leaving Chris Weinmann and myself as the only functioning recce pilots who could seldom be spared for ops at the same time; so the greater use of recce expounded by everybody was fine in theory but impossible to implement. Hamie Dax was the only other recce pilot we could rely on but, being a busy farmer, his services were somewhat curtailed.
Selous Scouts
AT ABOUT THIS TIME I met Major Ron Reid-Daly at JOC Hurricane HQ in Bindura. He was on his way to visit his top secret Selous Scouts ‘safe house’ base and invited me to accompany him. I knew very little about Ron’s operation, still believing he was running a specialist tracker school.
We drove along a dirt road running along a rising valley south of Bindura. As we bumped along the old mine road Ron told me his work was very much an undercover operation which would rely heavily on Air Force support; hence his preparedness to expose me to what was going on at the temporary base we were visiting. The road led us to a previously abandoned mine house on a ridge way off the beaten track. Two marquee tents provided soldiers’ accommodation and an array of radio aerials rose from the ops room inside the old house.
Ron parked his car under the shade of a huge tree at the rear of the house where he was met by the scruffiest, most heavily bearded men I had ever seen off cinema screen. They seemed so out of place in the presence of their immaculately dressed CO. One of the men came over to me and greeted me in a manner that suggested he knew me well. Ron was amused by my puzzled look and helped me out by saying, “You remember Basil Moss don’t you?” Basil had lived only seven houses away from mine in the Married Quarters at Thornhill but I had not seen him for many months. It needed a closer look before I recognised the face behind the beard.
Flight Lieutenant Basil Moss, a fluent Shona linguist, had become bored with commanding the Thornhill’s General Service Unit. The GSU, mostly black servicemen commanded by white officers, provided airfield security services at Thornhill and New Sarum. Basil, a strong fit man of about forty years, needed something more challenging when there was so much action out in the countryside, but he could find no way of getting to the ‘sharp end’. Then an advertisement for Shona linguists led him to Special Branch HQ and thence to the pseudo operators, André Rabie and Stretch Franklin. The unfortunate loss of André had occurred about three months earlier.
Ron walked around the temporary Selous Scouts base with Stretch Franklin, Basil Moss and me in tow. Black men lay about in the marquee tents dressed in scruffy garb with flthy-looking hair. They each listened to portable radios that were all tuned to different channels and blasted out at maximum volume. Waving his hand across these men, Ron asked me if I could differentiate between the RAR soldiers and ‘turned terrorists’. I could not for they all looked the same. Nevertheless, I was astounded having never heard the term ‘turned terrorist’ before.
From the very beginning the Selous Scouts recognised the importance of having ‘turned ters’ within their pseudo groups. In so doing it was easier to gain the confidence of tribesmen who had known particular CTs before their capture. However, to gain maximum advantage, the period between capturing a genuine CT and having him in the field as a Selous Scout had to be very short—a week was considered too long. The Scouts found ‘turning’ CTs very easy. There was no need to bash heads or use threatening tactics. By nature black Rhodesians were gentle people until subjected to political misdirection as occurred with ZANLA cadre. By comparing the teachings of political commissars with reality and having being made aware that their lives were being risked for greedy politicians rather than for the people, captured CT opinions changed. Being cared for by the Scouts, rather than being shot out of hand as had been taught, made the transition from enemy to friend quick and easy.
The atmosphere, one of excitement, was very infectious. So closely had the successes of early pseudos operations been kept secret that it was wonderful to be taken into confidence and brought up to speed on what had happened and what was being planned. There was no doubt in my mind that Selous Scouts would soon be pre-empting action rather than us continuing to respond to terrorist activities or having to rely on visual recce and OP sightings. Tribesmen were the keys to CT successes, so they had also to become the key to countering them.
Expanded pseudo operations had come at a critical time considering the rate at which ZANLA’s influence was spreading south and eastwards with ever-increasing numbers of CTs and LTTs. We were gaining in our successes but not sufficiently to contain, let alone reduce, ZANLA numbers.
The American military contended that in Viet Nam it was essential to have ten fighting soldiers to counter every insurgent in the field. For us this was a joke. We felt that a ratio of five to one would be adequate but this would soon be impossible considering Rhodesia’s financial and manpower constraints. At the height of our bush war a two-to-one ratio existed within the country whereas, outside of Rhodesia, we were always greatly outnumbered and 30:1 odds against us was not unusual.
The Army’s attempts to increase force levels by forming a second RAR battalion was disallowed by right-wing politicians who refused to accept black soldiers in numbers exceeding those of white regular and territorial soldiers combined. Any idea of using armed militiamen to protect tribesmen was also discounted for the same reason. So we were stuck with existing regular force levels and placed heavy reliance on the Territorial Army for effective levels in the field. Inevitably this placed formidable burdens on commerce and industry. However, manpower alone could not provide the successes we needed in a spreading bush war against an elusive enemy fighting for personal gains carelessly promised them by uncaring, greedy politicians; but these were promises in which they truly believed. Intelligence had to be the key to getting to grips with ZANLA. Reliance on historical facts gleaned from captured CTs had to be replaced by up-to-the-minute intelligence that could only be acquired by Selous Scouts pseudo operators. That intelligence was not long in coming.
By April 1974 Selous Scouts were coming to grips with ZANLA groups but too many of their successes were wasted because so many follow-up operations were mishandled; usually the consequence of inappropriate force levels to contain CT groups that bomb-shelled outwards to escape through large gaps between thinly spread troops.
It was only in June that helicopters became regularly grouped in sufficient numbers with the RLI Commandos who soon learned how to conduct the ‘vertical envelopment’ (surrounding) operations that capitalised on Selous Scout calls. As already mentioned, the combined reaction force became known as a Fire Force. This subject is covered later.
Cordon Sanitaire
DURING 1973 A VERY EXPENSIVE undertaking codenamed ‘Operation Overload’ was put into
effect in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. This was to place over 60,000 tribesmen in Protected Villages. The PVs system equated to the Portuguese aldeamentos that we had considered such a joke in earlier times. However thinking had changed, because Chiweshe TTL was perfectly situated as a base area from which to launch attacks against white farmers. This was because the TTL happened to be long, narrow and totally surrounded by the European farming areas of Centenary, Mt Darwin, Bindura, Glendale and Umvukwes. Tribesmen were placed in the fortified villages where they were protected and fed with the intention of denying terrorists access to food and people comforts. At the same time, an even more expensive undertaking was ongoing along the northeastern border.
In an endeavour to stem incursions across the border, a cordon sanitaire was built. It comprised a narrow minefield bounded by a double fence-line. Starting at Mukumbura, this arrangement extended eastwards along the borderline for about 400 kilometres. The cordon sanitaire concept, copied from Israel, was not only enormously expensive it was a complete ‘waste of rations’. The non-operational people who had promoted it as an effective defensive barrier were deeply criticised, and with good reason.
Every soldier knew that no military obstacle is worth a damn unless its entire length can be covered by effective fire. Some 3,000 men in 1,500 towers would have been needed to meet the need but, because this was impossible, electronic warning devices were used to compensate for the lack of manpower. But these warning systems were seldom successful because wild animals and the elements triggered too many alarm signals. When genuine CT-induced alarms were received, mostly at night, they invariably came from positions that were too far for forces to reach before the CTs had moved away into the safety of the bush.
CTs soon found a way through the Cordon Sanitaire. They simple dug a trench under the first fence then crawled along a line taken by a lead man who probed and lifted anti-personnel mines as he moved cautiously forward. A second trench under the next fence got everyone safely through the barrier. No electronic warnings occurred when this was done so a whole group of CTs could easily transit the Cordon Sanitaire before first light and be far away by the time a daylight patrol detected the breach. Many groups crossed the Cordon Sanitaire in this way both coming in and going out. No trench was used twice for fear of Rhodesian booby traps. Some crossings failed and one of these sticks in my mind.
A CT had his leg blown off just below the knee by an anti-personnel mine during an attempted crossing from Mozambique into Rhodesia. His companions, ignoring his pleas for help, high-tailed back into Mozambique leaving the stricken man to his fate. The fellow lay in the minefield all night and was only found by a routine patrol at about 10 o’clock next morning. A helicopter was called for, but it was impossible in the meanwhile for the Territorial soldiers to enter the minefield to administer first aid.
In spite of enormous blood loss, severe shock and a long cold lonely night, the CT was still conscious and able to communicate with the soldiers whilst awaiting rescue. There was then considerable danger for the Air Force technician who was lowered to the injured man by hoist, but he was placed in the small crater made by the mine that had blown the CT’s leg away. Without moving his feet the technician secured the CT, then both were lifted into the safety of the helicopter cabin and flown straight to the Selous Scouts ‘fort’ at Mtoko.
In the small hospital within the fort, the attending doctor put the CT on blood and saline drips then attended to the stump of his shattered leg. He expressed amazement that the CT had survived so long but had no doubt he would regain strength quickly. I was at Mtoko at the time and was taken into the fort to see this CT during his first evening in hospital. He was propped up in bed with blood and saline lines to both arms. His colour was a pasty grey, his face was drawn and his eyes half-closed.
I saw him again the following evening and could not believe this was the same man. Although still on drips he was sitting up in bed shirtless because the weather was hot. The man’s shiny black skin enhanced his muscular upper body. The grey was gone and his face was full of smiles. Few, if any, white men could have survived such an ordeal, let alone recovered so rapidly.
The CT had already been ‘turned’ in this short time but, because of ZANLA’s propaganda, he had some doubts for his safety in Selous Scouts hands. So he offered to take the Scouts to the base in Mozambique from which he and his group had come. When asked how he would do this he said he was fit enough to hop all the way.
Odds and sods
IN SOME AVIATION MAGAZINE I read of someone using a fixed-wing aircraft to rescue a man from the ground whilst airborne. I was intrigued by the technique described and attempted to do it myself. The idea was to let out a long length of rope from the rear cabin (about 500 feet of rope), with a suitable dead weight at its end, then turn steeply towards the rope’s end in the manner of a dog chasing its own tail. By holding the turn, the majority of the rope was supposed to descend with its end section hanging vertically downwards. With correct handling of turn and height it was reported that the weighted end of the rope could be positioned over any selected spot. This allowed a man on the ground to take hold of a slip harness, fit it under his shoulders, remove the weight and await uplift.
Once the man was secure in the harness, the pilot simply had to increase power, still in the turn, to lift him clear of the ground before rolling out into straight and level flight. Thereafter the man at the end of the rope could be placed back on the ground in another location in similar manner to his uplift. Alternatively, he could be hauled up into the aircraft.
My trial might have succeeded had the Trojan been able to sustain a very tight turn but this proved impossible because of that aircraft’s power limitation, so the experiment was dropped.
In one of the Hunters hangars at Thornhill a tractor used for towing aircraft to and from the flight lines refused to start one very cold morning. One of the technicians decided he had the solution. He placed a ‘little bit’ of Avpin in the carburettor to get the engine running. When subjected to pressure, Avpin combusted spontaneously giving off the high volumes of gas that powered the Hunter’s Avpin starter-motor turbines. But Avpin was certainly not suited to containment because its gas generating potential was awesome. It took just one turn of the tractor’s starter motor for the ‘little bit’ of Avpin to blow the tractor engine’s head clean off the engine block and through the high roof of the hangar.
In the self-same hangar another hole was made in the roof, but in this incident the circumstances where far from amusing. Armourer Mike Ongers was standing on the Hunter ejector seat he was servicing when the ejector cartridge fired. The seat itself went through the roof but Mike impacted the roof and was thrown back through overhead lights before dropping onto the concrete floor of the hangar. His injuries committed him to a wheelchair for life.
On 4 Squadron the technicians were getting very upset with my Squadron Warrant Officer, Spike Owens. They complained that their WO was nicking their costly tools thereby forcing them to take special precaution whenever Spike was around.
Spike Owens had come to Rhodesia from the RAF many years before and was well known for his huge collection of vehicle parts and home appliances which he claimed he had bought at bargain prices with the intention of re-selling them for profit. His collection included every tool imaginable. Where he got all these things from I cannot say but Spike was always able to produce spare parts and items that were hard to find.
I was very fond of Spike. He was always bright and helpful and I was especially thankful for his resourcefulness when it came to keeping our aircraft flying. Any suggestion that he might have ‘inadvertently’ picked up so and so’s tools was met with vehement denial. I could not pin him down but remained pretty sceptical. Nevertheless the unfortunate nickname given him by Henry Jarvie stuck. ‘WOBOTOC’ stood for Warrant Officer Bill Owens Thieving Old C.…
FAC errors and successes
CHRIS WEINMANN COMMENCED VISUAL RECCE in Mozambique on his own on 16 February
1974. Two days later he called for jet action on a large camp he had found just north of the River Daque fairly close to the Rhodesian border. This base had definitely not existed ten days earlier when Chris, Brian and I had been together on recce training. He chose to fly to Salisbury to brief Canberra and Hunter crews for a strike that for some reason or other did not involve FAC marking. Bill Buckle provided photographs taken for mapping purposes during the dry conditions of winter and, on these, Chris marked the extremities of the area to be struck from the target picture he had in his mind. The target of approximately 700 metres in length and 600 metres wide appeared to be a combined FRELIMO and ZANLA base.
An attack plan was formulated in which four Canberras, flown by Squadron Leader Randy Du Rand, Ian Donaldson, Mike Delport and Prop Geldenhuys would employ ‘lead-bomb technique’ to deliver two loads of nine 500-pound bombs and two loads of ninety-six 28-pound fragmentation bombs. The Canberras would be followed by four Hunters, flown by Don Northcroft, Ginger Baldwin, Rick Culpan and Jim Stagman firing 30mm cannon on the periphery of the target with re-strikes to fill in any obvious gaps that appeared within the Canberra bomb patterns.
Lead-bomb technique involved the lead bomber passing to his No 2 an aiming correction if his first bomb was not spot-on its intended strike point. I strongly opposed this method of bombing live terrorist camps because the delay between each stick of bombs gave terrorists way too much time to run clear of target. Lead-bomb technique was only suited to fixed targets such as ammunition dumps, fuel storage farms and buildings.
Winds of Destruction Page 51
