c. Flt Lt McGregor, together with Air Lt Maasdorp, contributed towards the professional control of operations. De-brief of the crews also highlighted the excellent work done by 2nd Lt Nigel Theron of 2 Commando RLI, whose personal leadership and courage led to more than half of the kills. Any Army recommendation for an award to this officer would be strongly supported.
Squadron Leader Harold Griffiths as OC of the helicopter squadron wrote:
I agree with FAF Cdr’s comments re the splendid effort of all forces concerned in this highly successful operation. It is very pleasing to see that such methods as aerial tracking, leapfrogging, positioning of forward stops and dummy drops were used and obviously contributing to the overall successes. A well-written report which is easy to follow.
Griff’s remarks about the employment of techniques used in the past but now almost forgotten are valid. However, in this case, the follow-up on terrorists moving through very rugged unpopulated terrain lent itself to the re-employment of methods used in the days before CTs lived and operated amongst the population.
Tol Janeke was a taskmaster who demanded the best of the men under his command. He was not too popular and some individuals were even frightened of him. One such individual was Flying Officer George Sole who, though a bit of a dandy, was a very nice guy.
When one day the Fireforce callout siren sounded at FAF 4, George rushed to his helicopter, which was already occupied by the soldiers he was to carry into action. Relating to what was to follow, George said, “As I moved onto the step to get into my seat, I let off a friendly fart but shat myself instead!”
George apologised to his gunner and the troops and ran off for a shower and a change of clothing. Tol, seeing one helicopter still on the ground after the others had flown off, enquired loudly, “What the hell is going on?” The gunner said, “The pilot has gone back for a shower and clothing change because he had a bit of an accident.” Tol went through the roof and ran off to find George Sole. George received a telling-off that left him in no doubt that Tol had no sympathy for his situation. “A Fireforce call out takes priority over all things. I don’t care if you are uncomfortable and that everyone will be subjected to your foul stench. You fly the mission and only clean up when it is over!”
A couple of days later George rushed out when the Fireforce siren sounded. In his hurry he tripped over a tent peg and fractured his ankle. Though in absolute agony, he dared not complain and flew the long Fireforce action before seeking medical attention.
The first airstrike by a Lynx was made on 25 March. It so happened that Air Lieutenant Bill (Starry) Stevens was on his first-ever operational deployment and this was his first operational strike. He did well when the K-Car, flown by Flight Lieutenant Dick Paxton, ran out of ammunition due to a runaway 20mm cannon. Sergeant Brian Warren handled his cannon’s misbehaviour coolly and still had CTs visual. Bill Stevens, having watched the K-Car’s strikes, knew the exact location of the CTs and though he could not actually see them was able to kill the lot with Sneb rockets.
On 27 March Selous Scouts controller callsign 69B was visual with CTs two kilometres south of his elevated position within the Mtoko Tribal Trust Land. He called for the Mount Darwin Fireforce, then operating out of Mudzi. Air Lieutenant Childs was flying the K-Car with Major Mike Ainslie of A Company 1RAR as the airborne Army commander, and Sergeant du Preez, as his gunner. Childs and du Preez were both Op Polo men. Air Lieutenant Mike Borlace, with Flight Sergeant Mike Upton as his MAG gunner, led three G-Cars of Amber formation.
Amber lead (Borlace) spotted the terrorists immediately upon arrival over the point the Scouts had given and Mike Upton opened fire. Childs had turned the K-Car away at that moment in an attempt to re-establish communications with c/s 69B. For some time Mike Borlace could not interrupt the K-Car radio transmissions to let Childs and Ainslie know he had the CTs visual. When he did, the K-Car moved to him, picked up the scattering CTs, and opened fire with the 20mm cannon. Heavy fire was being directed at both aircraft as they pursued visual targets.
It was in the second orbit when rounds narrowly missed the K-Car gunner, mortally wounding Major Ainslie and hitting the pilot’s left leg. Air Lieutenant Childs calmly broadcast his situation and instructed Amber 2 to follow him. He landed some way off next to an already deployed stop group to transfer the unconscious major to Amber 2 for casevac to Mtoko. Whilst this was being done Borlace took hits that knocked out the hydraulic servo-system, which operates the cyclic and collective controls.
Mike Borlace, now on very heavy manual control and still carrying troops, refused to disengage the CTs until the K-Car returned. He was still orbiting over the CTs with Mike Upton firing burst upon burst when the gearbox warning light came on. Then, to add to their problems, the machine-gun ceased firing because a CT round had severed the ammunition belt. Undaunted, Mike Upton took an MAG from one of the Army soldiers and continued firing free-hand at visual CTs. Borlace said Mike Upton’s fire continued to be very accurate.
Though wounded, Air Lieutenant Childs returned to resume command of air and ground forces, allowing Mike Borlace to break contact and make a forced landing next to the stop group at whose location Major Ainslie had been transferred. Together with the stop group and the stick that had been on board, the two airmen armed with their personal weapons, took up positions that strengthened the original stop group and provided protection for the downed chopper. The troops that had been in Mike’s helicopter were immensely relieved to be on terra firma. Though used to being at the receiving end of enemy fire, these soldiers had been absolutely terrified by the ground fire whilst totally exposed in the air with nowhere to hide.
FAF commanders such as Tol Janeke and Peter Cooke always highlighted jobs well done by aircrew personnel. In Contact Reports submitted to Army HQ, Army field commanders often praised their own men and the aircrews who supported them. But Air Force officers were generally less forthcoming. So it was good to see the following signal to Air HQ from John Digby who was OC FAF 5 at Mtoko:
1. For atten D Ops.
2. This signal supplements the Air Strike Report submitted by Air Lt Childs on the contact that occurred in this area on 27 March 1976 .
3. Very shortly after the commencement of the contact Maj. Ainslie the Fireforce Commander was seriously wounded and died almost immediately and Air Lt Childs received minor wound near his left knee. Air Lt Childs arranged for the Major’s casevac and then took control of the air and ground forces involved in the contact. He continued this control for approximately one hour until his ammunition was finished and he had to leave the area to refuel and re-arm. FAF 5 and FAF 4 were able to listen in on his transmissions throughout this period.
4. Air Lt Childs’ control of the air and ground forces was outstanding and equal to or better than any within the operational experience of the OCs of FAF 4 and FAF 5. He maintained a clear picture of the situation at all times, showed remarkable qualities of personal control and leadership, and very aggressively progressed the contact until he had to leave to refuel and re-arm. On handing over he gave a very clear and complete briefing to the relieving K-Car.
5. After receiving medical attention, refuelling and re-arming, he returned and resumed his duties with Lt Col Heppenstall as Fireforce Commander. By this time no contacts were in progress and he assisted the Fireforce Commander by advising on the position of ambushes.
6. It is recommended that consideration be given to the award of an appropriate honour to Air Lt Childs in the near future.
ZANLA’s ability to hit our aircraft had improved significantly, indicating that, again no thanks to the Vorster imposed ceasefire, a great deal of effort had been given to antiaircraft training prior to the CTs return to Rhodesia. Almost all engagements hereafter resulted in hits on aircraft, sometimes killing or injuring aircrew and soldiers. The centrally mounted fuel tanks of the Alouettes presented a relatively large surface area and over time they suffered many hits. Fortunately Avtur fuel does not ignite easily and a self-sea
ling compound wrapped around the tanks prevented fuel loss.
Seven days after his forced landing, Mike Borlace took hits once more. Flying Amber lead, again with Mike Upton, Borlace was asked to put down his troops. As he approached to land, his aircraft took strikes. He received a hit on his right hand, limiting him to the use of index finger and thumb. A hit on his left inner-thigh was superficial but another bullet went through the arm of one of the soldiers on board. Mike pulled away, saw five terrorists and immediately engaged them. Only when K-Car came across, taking on three surviving CTs, did Borlace drop off his stick, less the one that was bleeding badly from his wound. He returned to Mtoko and was out of action for the rest of that day.
Air Lieutenant Troup and his gunner Sergeant Knouwds, both Op Polo men, had proven themselves to be an excellent K-Car crew on a number of occasions. They led Fireforce to a contact with a group of CTs just 3,000 metres to the southeast of the position at which Major Ainslie had been mortally wounded two weeks earlier.
During this typical Fireforce action in which one helicopter had already taken hits, Flight Lieutenant Russell Broadbent, a medical doctor who had joined us from the RNZAF, was flying his third operation on Lynx when he was called upon to make strikes. Acting on GAC directions from an Army callsign of the Fireforce he fired Sneb rockets, which was fine. The callsign then required another position to be attacked, this time with Frantan. Russell took hits during this delivery causing him to include the following paragraph in his ASR:
It seems to me that the Frantan Profile attack on the Lynx is suicidal as there is no covering fire, making the Lynx a sitting duck. I recommend that a combined SNEB/FRANTAN attack be made SOP until guns are fitted to this aircraft. I also think that priority should be given to some form of protection for the pilots.
Before the arrival of the Lynx, only Provosts had made Frantan deliveries and few hits were received because .303 Browning machine-guns were fired all the way down the delivery run to the point of Frantan release. This is the ‘covering fire’ Russell Broadbent referred to. His suggestion that Frantan attacks should include Sneb rocket fire during the delivery run was fair enough but it presented a very real danger. Sneb rockets sent a shower of shrapnel into the air through which the Lynx would have to transit after a low-level Frantan release; too dangerous to contemplate. There was only one solution and that was to fit machine-guns to the Lynx. The operational pilots had not forced this matter on Air HQ. Design work had been on the go for some time with two options in mind. The first was to produce wing-mounted gun-pods because the mainplane structures disallowed internally mounted wing-guns. The second option was to mount two .303 Brownings above the cabin roof.
The first option was thrown out because of unacceptable weight and aerodynamic drag penalties whereas the drag generated by light fairings over guns mounted above the cabin was negligible. One Lynx was taken off-line for prototype fitment and firing trials. The prototype fit was subjected to many tests and alterations before Squadron Leader Dag Jones, who was then OC 4 Squadron, finally accepted it. Thereafter all metal components, fibreglass fairings and wiring looms were made ready before Lynx were pulled off-line for modification.
This photograph shows the twin .303 gun-mountings above Air Lieutenant Kidson when he was presented the dubious Boo Boo Shield for mis-selection of armament switches. The 4 Squadron shield was presented each month to the pilot who made the biggest cock-up during that month.
Patchen explorer
FOR A LONG TIME I had been interested in building a tandem-seat aircraft specifically designed for visual reconnaissance. I considered that an ideal recce aircraft had to be very quiet and almost impossible to see when flying at 5,000 feet against a clear-sky background.
Matt black was the best colour and a shielded up-turned muffled exhaust system for a motor driving a slow-revving paddle propeller would be very quiet at cruise power. Of greatest importance was the need for all-round visual freedom of ground. This meant having large, sliding side-panels reaching to floor level.
It was impossible to gain any support to build the machine I had designed in detail. It was based on proven glider technology with wooden frames under fibreglass cladding. The Air Staff considered this was beyond Rhodesia’s capability and, anyway, financial constraints ruled against such a project. I was not totally ignored however and was sent to South Africa’s CSIR to explore possibilities.
The South Africans showed considerable interest in my design and their interest was not limited to military reconnaissance. The concept seemed ideal for police surveillance work as well. I was shown a gyrocopter that had been built with the express intention of testing CSIR’s developmental work in carbon-fibre rotor blades. The gyrocopter had an ideal cabin with good visual freedom and, if fitted with a paddle-bladed propeller and muffled exhausts, it seemed to be the answer to my dreams. However, this machine was not ready for flight-testing because the prototype rotor blades were not yet completed. Because the gyrocopter would not be ready for many months, I was invited to look through Jane’s Book of Aircraft to see if there was any machine in it that might fit the bill.
I went right through the book and pointed out a Canadian experimental aircraft called Patchen Explorer. I thought nothing more of this until the one and only Patchen Explorer was purchased by South Africa. SAAF Captains Dean and Rawston flew this machine, bearing South African registration ZG-UGF, to Rhodesia for me to assess. Being a slow aircraft, it took them five hours to fly from Pretoria to Salisbury. They then continued on to Centenary to meet up with me.
My first trial flight was made with Captain Dean. It was immediately obvious that the side-by-side seating arrangement was not ideal but, otherwise, the visual freedom was really good. The real problem with the Patchen Explorer, apart from being very noisy, was the amount of physical effort required to handle it. After two hours I was quite exhausted and happy to get back on the ground.
The next day I flew with Captain Rawston and asked him to do the handling whilst I concentrated on the visual aspects. From this I concluded that, with servo-assisted controls and modifications to quieten the power unit, the Patchen Explorer had real possibilities.
We landed at Everton Farm for lunch with Hamie Dax and his wife Petal. Hamie continued to be very successful with his recce work in spite of the severe visual restrictions imposed on him by his low-wing Comanche; hence my reason for dropping in to show him the Patchen Explorer.
After its return to Pretoria I heard no more until I learned that it now resides in the SAAF Museum at Swartkops, Pretoria.
War spreads and hots up
BY APRIL 1976, FIVE FIREFORCES were permanently deployed. Two of these continued to operate out of Mount Darwin and Mtoko, as before. Two had been established in the new Op Thrasher area, operating from Grand Reef (FAF 8) near Umtali and Chipinga (FAF 6) near the southern end of the eastern mountain range. The fifth force was based at Buffalo Range (FAF 7) serving newly established Op Repulse in the southeast. Some time later, FAF 9 was established at Rutenga when another Fireforce came into being. Whereas the Hurricane and Repulse forces comprised a K-Car and four G-Cars each, Thrasher had been allocated two K-Cars but only four troopers for use as OC Air Detachment Thrasher deemed fit. Consequently the Grand Reef and Chipinga Fireforces were two troopers below strength, except on those occasions when the two forces came together.
Wing Commander Roy Morris commanded Air Detachment Thrasher initially and was relieved by Squadron Leader Cyril White, after he relinquished command of 4 Squadron to Squadron Leader Dag Jones. Wing Commander Rob Gaunt had been the first commander of Air Detachment Repulse but was replaced by Wing Commander Tol Janeke in August. Tol’s proven successes during his time at Mount Darwin were needed in what was considered to be the most critical of all the operational areas. This was because Rhodesia’s road and rail lifelines to South Africa, running through the Op Repulse area, were known to be ZANLA’s top priority targets.
Op Hurricane Fireforces were being employed on a d
aily basis, whereas within the Thrasher and Repulse areas the forces were used less frequently in the first half of 1976. This was partly due to the terrain and more so because the CT groups were still trying to establish themselves amongst the local population. Consequently, almost all of the early contacts in Thrasher and Repulse occurred along the border with Mozambique and, initially, succeeded in severely hampering ZANLA planning.
At that time ZIPRA’s long-term intentions were not known. It was clear, however, that it was preparing a large conventional army and only committing small irregular units into the Op Tangent and Splinter areas to keep the Frontline States happy. It was presumed that ZIPRA’s long-term objectives were to let ZANLA take a beating whilst wearing down the RSF. It would then launch massive effort against Rhodesia, and probably more so against ZANLA. Whatever ZIPRA’s true intentions, Rhodesia would have been stretched beyond limit had ZIPRA come over in strength at the same time as ZANLA, because ZANLA alone was tying up most of our air and ground effort. No 7 Squadron faced many difficulties in providing helicopters and crews to the Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse areas. There were also others needed to support lower-intensity operations against ZIPRA in the Op Splinter (Kariba Lake), Op Tangent (western border and western Zambezi River) plus Op Grapple (Midlands area).
Harold Griffiths commanded a squadron that was four times larger than a standard squadron. Although it was an Air HQ task to decide on the actual allocation of helicopters, Griff, his flight commanders and squadron warrant officer had to continuously juggle aircraft and crews to meet these allocations whilst also being committed to increased levels in major and minor servicing schedules and the repairing of battle damaged aircraft. At the same time they had to train new crews and maintain standards amongst the operational pilots and technicians who moved in and out daily. The very nature of operational flying invariably involved harsh handling which made it necessary to re-hone pilot and technician skills every time they returned to base.
Winds of Destruction Page 64
