Although I should have foreseen the problem earlier, I was certain that the correct combination of delivery height and speed would prevent further failures, no matter the nature of surface. So we immediately set about finding a test location close to Salisbury where sufficient clay, hard ground and water existed in close proximity to each other. The place we selected was a small dam at Inkomo Range. We used concrete Alpha bomblets, knowing that live ones would perform better.
Randy du Rand and Terry Bennett flew the same attack profile they used on the failed attack and dropped a cluster of fifty concrete Alpha bombs. They were bang on target and those that struck dry ground recovered into flight normally. All the bomblets that landed on water and most that landed on sand-covered clay disappeared below the surface. Those few that struck sand over clay yet found their way up to the surface were coated with a thick layer of gluey black muck.
The next delivery was made from 400 feet at a ground release speed of 300 knots, giving marginally improved results. Delivery height was then stepped down to 300 feet, again at 300 knots. Most of the bomblets bounced back into flight from mud and water, though some of the units that landed in mud were so thickly coated that their recovery was way too low and sluggish. Three runs were then made at 300 feet at 350 knots. All bombs bounced into flight though the ones from clay did not rise as high as from water and normal ground.
From then on 300 feet was the preferred attack height at an attack speed of 350 knots, which still provided adequate separation between detonating bomblets and the aircraft. However, the increased attack speed presented a major problem in terms of airframe fatigue factoring. Fortunately the Canberra could accelerate from 280 knots to 350 knots very rapidly, which minimised the time spent at attack speed. Nevertheless the high fatigue factor applied for this speed converted three minutes to something in the order of one hour of expended airframe life.
Inevitably with so many bomblets being dropped, there were some unexploded units (UXBs). A total failure rate of around 3% was either caused by technical problems or by bomblets passing through vegetation that progressively decelerated them to such an extent that they failed to realise the 100G-impact force needed to activate pistols. All bomblets were painted red to simplify UXB collection and soldiers had been advised that they were perfectly safe to handle and transport. So it was with some alarm that they learned of a UXB that had killed two African children and wounded another.
I immediately went to the scene of the tragedy and noticed that the bomblet in question had exploded on a solid flat section of granite with large boulders around it. Near the point of explosion, I saw red paint marks at different places on the flat rock and came to the conclusion that the children had been throwing the bomblet from the boulders above.
The surviving little boy in hospital confirmed this. He was lucky because, being fearful of his friends’ attempts to break the ‘ball’ open, he had watched from a distance as the others climbed small boulders to throw the bomblet onto the flat rock. His friends could not crack the unit open so they went up onto the highest rock. The bomblet pistol received the necessary G load and bang went their lives.
Yellow Submarine
SELOUS SCOUTS WERE COMMITTED TO using noisy vehicles and experienced a variety of difficulties in their attempts to render the rail line from Maputo to the border town of Malvernia inoperable. Then, whilst they were working on this difficult task, they noticed that a yellow Alouette III came up the rail line from Maputo and turned northwards along the Cabora Bassa power-line. Radio intercepts on FRELIMO’s radio network soon established that this was a regular run for a Maputo-based engineer to inspect a section of the power-lines running from Cabora Bassa to South Africa. Intercepted messages also showed that all FRELIMO posts were told not to shoot at the yellow Alouette. Ron Reid-Daly approached Norman Walsh to see if Air HQ would consider painting one of our own Alouettes canary yellow so that rail and train destruction parties and recce teams could fly unchallenged directly to their selected targets. Norman sorted this out without delay and John Blythe-Wood flew the aircraft, nicknamed ‘Yellow Submarine’, from its secret covers at New Sarum for a night flight to the Selous Scouts forward HQ. The rail wreckers enjoyed a trouble-free period until FRELIMO finally tumbled to what was happening.
Schulie
CAPTAIN CHRIS SCHULENBURG, KNOWN AS Schulie, served with the RLI and SAS until he returned to his native South Africa when his contract with the Army expired. He was later invited by Ron Reid-Daly to re-join the Rhodesian forces for service with the Selous Scouts to exploit his special talent in ground reconnaissance conducted in the manner Schulie considered essential.
Arising from his specialist recce work with the SAS, Schulie had been awarded the Silver Cross of Rhodesia for valour—but he could not buckle down to SAS four-man recce principles. Schulie wanted to conduct recce on his own, believing this to be safer and more efficient. Ron Reid-Daly was more amenable to this view than the SAS; though Ron insisted that one man, of Schulie’s own choosing, must always accompany him. Somewhat reluctantly Schulie agreed and conducted a number of successful two-man recce patrols. Initially he used a white soldier as his partner until he came to the conclusion that a black soldier was a more sensible option. The reconnaissance forays worked well enough and neither man suffered undue stress until things went badly wrong early in November 1976.
Two recce teams were tasked to provide early warning of FRELIMO and CT movements for a Selous Scouts vehicleborne force. At an appropriate time these teams were to harass FRELIMO—a diversionary tactic. One team worked north of the Scouts force while Schulie and his partner worked to the south. Schulie and his black companion (Steven was the name I heard the helicopter crews use) had descended into Mozambique by HALO entry. They were in position when the vehicle-borne force was moving in to attack the ZANLA staging base at Jorge do Limpopo on the Maputo rail line to Rhodesia. When he judged the time was right, Schulie deliberately made his presence known to FRELIMO but, in so doing, he attracted much greater reaction than he expected. Using Claymore and other anti-personnel devices, Schulie inflicted serious casualties on his pursuers who became so angry that they re-doubled their efforts and force levels in a determined attempt to take out the troublesome Rhodesians running through the bush ahead of them.
Schulie and Steven became separated during their running retreat under fire. Thanks to superb strength and fitness, Schulie managed to evade the large force that had no difficulty following his tracks in the soft dry sand of the region. By nightfall FRELIMO slowed to a crawl but no radio contact could be made with Schulie and Steven so Selous Scouts approached Air HQ for assistance. Late at night Schulie was barely able to give his position to the high-flying Canberra sent to find him because his radio batteries were almost flat. It was only then that Selous Scouts learned that Steven, who did not have a radio, was missing.
I heard the story of Schulie’s hot extraction from the helicopter crew who rescued him. Although I cannot remember who they were, their story remains clear in my memory.
The pick-up at first light occurred when the FRELIMO follow-up force was dangerously close to the open pan where Schulie said he would be waiting. Heavy fire was directed at the helicopter during entry and exit from the pick-up point. Once clear the pilot flew low over bush heading for the railway line. On reaching it he flew just far enough away to keep the railway in sight. Schulie was not too happy about this but the pilot refused to move away, which turned out to be very fortunate. Some distance on a man on the line was seen to be jumping up and down waving a white object over his head. When close enough, Schulie realised this was Steven. He was many miles from where Schulie had last seen him, yet there he was waving his map madly.
The pilot said that Schulie was so overcome with relief and joy that he leapt out of the aircraft before touch-down and ran up to Steven to give him a powerful hug that lifted the lighterbuilt man clean off his feet. Once inside the helicopter, Schulie unceremoniously commandeered the aircrew wate
r bottle and poured it down his companion’s parched throat. Thereafter the two Scouts looked at each other laughing and occasionally patting each other in expressions of immeasurable friendship and relief. This was the same team that was called upon to mark a major ZANLA target for an Alpha bomb night attack by a formation of Canberras.
Madula Pan
RADIO INTERCEPTS GAVE WARNING OF a large group of ZANLA CTs in transit to Rhodesia. It was established that they would be at Madula Pan on the night of 11/12 January 1977. This pan lay close to and south of the main Maputo rail line and air reconnaissance photos confirmed the location as having been used by previous groups. It was no more than a transit point without shelters of any kind but it covered a large expanse of bush at the southeastern edge of the almost dry Madula Pan.
The dark patch at the top right-hand end of the pan was the only water for miles around, hence the ZANLA base position extending on the lines marked for the attack by Green leader and his two wingmen. The Inner Marker Rams was sited at the base of the tree at the top end of the white sand bank marked +. The outer marker was under the middle tree of the cluster of five largish trees to the right of the end of the pan’s phallic-like projection.
The size of the Madula Pan target required a formation attack by three Canberras to cover the entire rest-up area. Randy du Rand was keen to conduct the attack at night to ensure maximum surprise at a time when all CTs could be expected to be in their base. So Schulie and Captain Rob Warraker met with 5 Squadron, Norman Walsh and me to discuss and plan the strike. Schulie’s role was twofold; to confirm ZANLA was resident in the expected position and to position RAMS and outer marker flares for the Canberra strike.
A large tree on the southern edge of the pan was selected for the RAMS inner flare. This looked like a good site in terms of distance from target and bush cover to shield the bright light when the flare ignited shortly before strike. Selecting a position for the outer flare, which Schulie would ignite manually, was no easy matter. The density of bush and trees on a back-bearing from the inner marker was fairly even, which would make identification of a specific position very difficult. Eventually a particular group of trees was chosen which Schulie felt he should be able to find in the forecast weather condition of halfmoon and a clear sky.
A first-light follow-up attack was to be made at 05:00 by an RLI Fireforce with paratroopers. This meant the airstrike needed to be made as late as possible. But since it was known that CTs tended to rise at 04:00 and disperse for fear of dawn attacks, 04:00 was the time chosen to strike. A delay of one hour between airstrike and ground follow-up was not ideal but it was considered acceptable. An extra Canberra with a full Alpha load, two pairs of Hunters and two Lynx were to be on airborne standby to assist Fireforce.
Because there was time to do so, it was decided that a realistic rehearsal should be conducted at 04:00 on 6 January in similar terrain inside Rhodesia. This was to familiarise Schulie with the handling and positioning the flares and to allow Randy to practise the low-level formation attack. Following their flight from New Sarum to the NDB at Chiredzi, the Canberra formation planned to descend to its IP at 2,000 feet above ground. From the IP, the formation would accelerate to 350 knots during a second descent to their attack height where Randy would be at 300 feet above ground with his two wingmen stepped up 100 and 200 feet above him and spaced 100 metres to his left and right. Schulie, acting alone, made a HALO descent during the evening before the practice strike into an area that was known to contain CTs near the selected target. He laid the flares and the Canberras strike went in as planned.
Rob Warraker flew with me to Boli airstrip in a Cessna 185 where we were collected by the G-Car that took us the short distance to meet up with Schulie and twenty RLI paratroopers who had been dropped at 05:00. Just before landing at Boli, Rob and I had seen the Dakota that had dropped the RLI paratroopers passing us on its way back to Buffalo Range.
We inspected the Alpha strike from the air and on the ground and saw that all bomblets had landed on target. Schulie was satisfied with his side of the exercise but said that, although he had received Randy loud and clear on his radio when the Canberra formation was approaching at high altitude, there had been difficulty in hearing Randy’s instruction to light the outer flare during the low-level run toward the target. We decided that this would not be a problem for Madula Pan because the fourth Canberra could act as a radio relay back-up between Randy and Schulie. This extra Canberra could also light the inner marker RAMS if Randy was unable to do so.
From the practice site, Schulie accompanied Rob and me for the short helicopter ride back to my Cessna at Boli. Both Rob and Schulie were huge men and Schulie also had his parachute and heavy Bergen. My aircraft was carrying a high fuel load because we had planned to fly directly to New Sarum for a debriefing with 5 Squadron. But even the nippy little Cessna struggled to make take-off speed with so much weight on board and I had a few anxious moments skimming very low over trees with the speed failing to build up in the very hot conditions that prevailed. A gentle fall of ground helped us slip off the ‘drag step’ and we were soon climbing comfortably on course for Salisbury.
When I checked in with FAF 7 to say we were climbing out, I was asked if I had heard or seen the Dakota, then three hours overdue. We diverted to Buffalo Range immediately to participate in the air search that was being mounted. I had just reached the airfield when we were told that a survivor had just reached a working party in the sugar-cane fields and reported that the Dakota had crashed on the banks of a large river; presumably the Lundi.
I dropped Rob and Schulie off at the Selous Scouts Fort at Buffalo Range and turned back immediately to search the Lundi River. It did not take long to find the Dakota on the south bank. The aircraft was broken in two with the cockpit smashed to bits and its rear fuselage lying under a large tree.
Lundi crash.
On recall from his civilian job for ‘retread’ duties, Squadron Leader Peter Barnett, the previous OC of 3 Squadron, had been second ‘dickey’ to Flight Lieutenant Dave Mallet who had joined our Air Force from the RAF. According to survivors, Peter had objected when Dave descended to fly lowlevel just above the surface of the Lundi. Whatever the verbal exchanges, heavy electrical power-lines running across the river from unseen pylons amongst trees on both high banks, sliced through the cockpit windscreen and decapitated both pilots.
Two bulkheads immediately behind the pilots’ seats arrested the cables. This saved the life of the flight engineer who was standing behind the pilots. The aircraft decelerated down to stalling speed before the power-lines on the starboard side sheared, causing the aircraft to be dragged left by the binding cable into trees above the riverbank. Fortunately there was no fire, but Army Corporal A. Bradley was killed in the ensuing crash. Four men survived with relatively minor injuries due to the fact that the aircraft had cleared the riverbank itself and had been subject to sufficient bush-drag to soften deceleration.
Peter (right) is seen here with 3 Squadron Commanders, Mike Gedye (left), George Alexander and Bill Smith. In the middle is AVM Harold Hawkins who had just presented the squadron’s Colours to George Alexander—the current OC.
Madula Pan attack
ON THE NIGHT OF 10 JANUARY, Schulie and Steven did a HALO descent well to the south of Madula Pan and made their initial approach to target before dawn. They lay in hiding for the day then, under cover of darkness before moonrise, made a final approach for Steven to crawl right up to the edge of the base to ensure that ZANLA was in residence. Having listened to many noisy conversations, all spoken in Shona, Steven moved back to Schulie who passed the word back to Scouts HQ.
Schulie positioned the RAMS flare without difculty. Around about 03:00 he was close to calling for a postponement of the strike because he could not find the selected clump of trees for the second flare. With little time to spare he eventually identified the spot and set up.
Captain Chris Schulenburg, as he was best known, in his recce gear.
Fly
ing his Canberra at about 30,000 feet, Flight Lieutenant Ian Donaldson with the callsign Green 4, made radio contact with Schulie at 03:45 and received confirmation that all systems were ‘go’. Flying with Don were his navigator, Dave Hawkes, and Captain Rob Warraker the Selous Scouts operations co-ordinator. Ian had taken off from Buffalo Range where he was currently part of the local Fireforce. Green Leader with Green 2 and 3 had taken off from New Sarum and were flying 20,000 feet lower than Ian.
Randy du Rand was leading with Mike Ronnie, No 2 was Al Bruce with Doug Pasea and No 3 was Ted Brent with Jim Russell. Randy’s ASR reads:
FLOT DETAILS: Two Selous Scouts more than 2,000 metres away.
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS: c/s 55 on channel 21.
WEATHER: Wisps of stratus at about 1,500 feet AGL. Half moon fairly high in the sky giving good visibility.
NARRATIVE:
1. Four Canberras each carrying 300 x Mk 2 FRAGS (Alpha bombs) were briefed for this strike. The first three were to run in on a first run attack at low-level using marker flares correctly placed on the ground to indicate target and direction of attack. The attack was planned for night time using low level offset bombing technique. The fourth aircraft was positioned at high level to ensure communications with the ground force and act as top cover for the helicopter assault due to occur at first light. This aircraft was based at Buffalo Range.
Winds of Destruction Page 70
