By late afternoon the demolition teams were running low on explosives and the defending troops needed more mortar bombs to hold off troublesome ZANLA and FRELIMO forces that were firing at them from beyond the town’s outskirts. The Dakota landed for the third time that day, but this was shortly before sunset. Instead of offloading and taking off immediately, the aircraft was held up when the skipper agreed to a Scouts request to wait a while to load more captured equipment. In this case aircrew willingness to assist the Army turned out to be a very bad mistake because two hours elapsed between landing and the Dakota commencing its take-off run.
Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott.
Enemy forces using the cover of darkness had been given plenty of time to establish themselves close to the centre of the runway. The hail of bullets and RPG rockets that followed the Dakota, just as it lifted off, gave it no hope of survival. Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott in the co-pilot’s seat died instantly, the starboard engine was knocked out and leaking fuel ignited.
Skipper Jerry Lynch had no option but to close down the port engine and land straight ahead. He did an amazing job to bring the crippled aircraft to a controlled halt, allowing survivors to escape from the aircraft. His attempts to get Bruce out of his seat nearly cost Jerry his life before being forced to abandon the attempt due to the blazing inferno around him. Bruce Collocott, with his ever-ready wit was a great loss to the Air Force. So too was the loss of the very first Dakota ever owned by the Southern Rhodesian Air Force. By instruction of Prime Minister Jan Smuts, South Africa had sold it to Rhodesia in 1947 at a ridiculously low price.
Flechettes
THE FRENCH PRODUCED AN ANTI-PERSONNEL warhead for 68mm Sneb rockets that incorporated thousands of tiny darts known as ‘flechettes’. When the rockets were fired they flew for just under one second before explosive charges burst warhead casings to release the flechettes into very high-speed free flight. A salvo of flechette-carrying Snebs resulted in a dense cloud of lethal darts covering a large area of ground.
For reasons I never understood, flechette rockets were forbidden by international law because the darts, upon impact with a human body, had the habit of tumbling and making nasty exit wounds. Yet ordinary rifle bullets, which caused more damage and were just as lethal, were considered acceptable. This has never made sense to me.
From as early as 1964 I had been interested in the possibility of using clusters of free-flying darts as a lethal weapon system. This had nothing to do with very lightweight rocket-borne flechettes that relied on very high velocity to make them lethal. I was thinking of large quantities of heavy darts flying in dense formation to produce an instant effect on the ground that could only be achieved by hundreds of machine-guns firing simultaneously.
At the time I was preparing Kutanga Range for the weapons demonstration in 1964, I loaded two teargas carriers with as many six-inch nails as they would accommodate. Flying a Provost, I delivered these from low level at 240 knots. The test was unofficial and was only known to the Kutanga Range staff. The standard flat head of the nails did not give all the nails stability, but those that struck nose-first embedded quite deeply into the trunks of hardwood trees. The test was sufficient to show that the use of six-inch nail shafts incorporating flight stabilisers would be lethal if delivered fast enough. In 1976 I was in a position to extend my explorations officially.
I arranged for an unserviceable Vampire long-range fuel tank to be modified to incorporate a downward opening trapdoor that was activated by the bomb-release button on the control column. Station Workshop at Thornhill produced 2,000 darts from six-inch nails whose flat heads had been removed and substituted by three small in-line fins.
A single-drop trial at 350 knots proved the accuracy, density and lethality of the darts. So, as soon as the Golf bomb project allowed, I turned attention to the matter and a file marked Project Hotel was opened. The project’s aim was to produce many thousands of ‘six-inch flechettes’ for carriage by faster-flying Hunters in large releasable under-wing dispensers.
My visit to the Bulawayo factory that manufactured six-inch nails resulted in an emphatic “technically impossible” response when I asked for nails with no heads, but then an equally emphatic “Yes we can produce them”, when I explained their purpose. My next visit was to a plastic-moulding company in Salisbury that produced the moulds for the plastic fin design that I had sketched in the MD’s personal diary. The fins were pressure-moulded from recycled plastic and force-fitted over the blunt ends of the six-inch shafts to turn them into flechettes.
Bev designed and produced a purpose-made flechette dispenser that looked just like a streamlined bomb. It incorporated four radiused panels that, together, formed the main cylindrical body enclosing and bearing the heavy charge of 4,500 flechettes. Each of the four panels was secured at its front end to an explosive nose cone and was hinged at its rear into the forward ring of the flight stabiliser cone.
Upon release from its carrier a loaded dispenser dropped free for half a second before the nose cone’s explosive charge fired. This released the front anchors of the four panels that rotated outwards and rearward in the air-stream to release 4,500 flechettes into free flight. 50% of the load was packed facing backwards to ensure maximum content but this enhanced lateral distribution at the expense of inconsequential retardation.
This flechette failed to go right through the ultrahard mopani branch having suffered excessive retardation—but even the slowest of these projectiles was lethal.
This Hunter DFGA 9 armament layout excludes air-to-air missiles and Rhodesian-made Frantans. Back line from left: 130-pound (white) Practice bomb (local), 1000-pound GP Bomb (imported), 50-gallon Frantan (imported), 450kg Golf bomb (local), 4 x 30mm Aden cannon gun-pack. Middle line: 250-pound GP bomb (imported), 68mm Matra rocket pod, Flechette Dispenser (local), Foreground: 30mm cannon shells and 68mm Matra rockets.
Tests conducted from Hunters, off a standard front-gun attack proved that the new weapon was accurate and highly effective. Released in pairs at speeds in excess of 450 knots resulted in an immensely dense cloud of 9,000 flechettes flying a shallow trajectory, which made survival of exposed people impossible within in the 900-metre-long by seventy-metre-wide strike area.
To give some idea of a flechette strike from a single Hunter—it would require no less than four hundred and fifty .303 Browning machine-guns firing in unison to match the projectile density in the single second it took for all flechettes, first to last, to reach ground.
The flechette-dispensing system was cheap; it did not involve foreign currency expenditure and, unlike exploding weapons, was totally safe to the delivering aircraft. The system was demonstrated to Air Staff and immediately cleared for operational use, though the question of how our very large stable flechettes might be affected by the international ruling against small flechettes was never resolved. Because there was some doubt, we restricted their employment to strikes inside the country.
Having proved the flechette system for Hunters, I wondered if they could be useful for Canberra night-strikes. Being a silent weapon, I imagined what psychological effects they might have on CT morale if the silent death darts swarmed into ZANLA’s external bases when the CTs were up and about during the night when they felt safest. Using a long delay to cater for the free flight time, we tested one flechette dispenser dropped by a Canberra flying 20,000 feet above target. We needed to know the distribution pattern created by such a drop and a water target was best suited for the purpose.
We chose Sebakwe Dam where a bright orange floating target was anchored 200 metres from the shoreline on which my party of observers and photographers was positioned. Ted Brent and his bomb-aimer, Doug Pasea, released the unit and confirmed, “bomb falling”. On the ground we focused on the floating target and were aware of the Canberra passing over our position, but nothing happened out on the water for another few seconds. We had just started to comment on the possibility of aiming error when a sound like leaking, high-pressure air
surrounded us just before 4,500 darts ruffled the water surface right up to our position. Had we placed the target any closer our ground party would undoubtedly have suffered casualties. The potential for flechette strikes at night was proven to be a possibility but we never used it offensively, because of the international ruling.
‘Know your enemy’
SOME TIME AROUND MID-1977 I learned that a Mr Tony Dalton of the ‘Shepherd Group’ was looking for me. I had no clue who Dalton was or what his business was about. When Tony found me at Mtoko he introduced himself and asked if I was willing to let him pick my brain on a subject that concerned him deeply.
He told me that the Shepherd Group, including himself, comprised of three top-level commercial salesmen. Ian Shepherd had set up the small team to consider what should be done to rectify a transparent failing in Rhodesia’s handling of tribesmen who were being subjected to intense ZANLA propaganda with no obvious Rhodesian counter-action. I was immediately interested because this was a ‘hearts and minds’ issue that I thought should have been COMOPS’ highest priority.
Tony outlined the Shepherd Group’s thinking and asked for my comments. I cannot recall details, but remember offering a number of opinions that Tony considered important. I found him to be a thoroughly likeable man who understood the fundamental differences between ZANLA and RSF handling of the local people far better than the politicians, Internal Affairs or the military. In a nutshell, ZANLA expended 95% of its efforts on politicising the people and 5% against the Rhodesian establishment. The RSF, on the other hand, was forced to expend 95% of its effort in response to ZANLA activity with a mere 5% given to badly misdirected psychological action.
Whereas the Shepherd Group eventually broke up because of the lack of interest shown by the authorities, Tony felt so strongly about the need to lead and direct psychological operations that he gave up his successful civilian job to join the regular Army. For his efforts he received little more than lip service from COMOPS who, I say again, should have been leading the action in the first place.
One issue that really troubled Tony Dalton and me was how little we knew about our enemies. Though CIO and SB knew much, Rhodesian secrecy phobias blocked important information from flowing through to the fighting men. So, with Ron Reid-Daly’s active support and participation, Tony arranged a presentation entitled ‘Know your enemy’. Surprisingly few high-ranking officers took the trouble to attend this presentation, which was held in the RLI hall.
Those of us who were there were treated to an eye-opening intelligence briefing on ZANLA and ZIPRA command and field structures and were exposed to first-hand experiences given by two ex-CTs serving with Selous Scouts. One was a recently captured ZANLA detachment commander who told us simple things we should have known, but didn’t. The other was from ZIPRA. As with so many other issues that begged attention, Tony’s theories and plans were initially ignored then rushed into ineffective action when it was too late to gain any worthwhile benefits.
Salisbury recce
IN AUGUST 1977, ZANLA LAUNCHED an ineffective long-range mortar attack against New Sarum Air Base. It was so badly conducted that the nearest bomb fell more than 500 metres short of the base. Nevertheless, this was the closest action to Salisbury city and confirmed suspicions that CTs had moved into the Chimanda Tribal Trust Land on the northern side of the capital. The question arose as to whether or not CTs were based in the Seki Reserve south of New Sarum or at any location within or around Salisbury itself.
I was asked to have a look around and was surprised to find many locations that looked similar to CT bases. There were also many other places that attracted my attention and all were plotted and passed to the SB and Salisbury Police who systematically checked them out. Instead of finding terrorists, the Police made numerous arrests because I had put them onto places where illegal activities were taking place. These included stolen vehicle strip-down joints, temporary hiding-places for stolen goods and illicit liquor-producing stills.
First employment of flechettes
ON 26 OCTOBER 1977, JOHN BLYTHE-WOOD, who had been posted to Hunters, together with ‘Spook’ Geraty responded to an Army callsign who reported a large female feeding-party attending CTs in a section of riverine bush between two hill features. The target description fitted the grid-reference given and first strikes went in. But then the ground callsign told the pilots they had struck the wrong point. By the time John realised that the ground callsign had misread his map and switched his attack across to the correct target, a parallel river between two hills 700 metres away, the birds had flown.
Two days later, a Selous Scouts’ observation team on a high feature spotted this group again. The Scouts radioed that they could see 150 CTs moving northwest along the Pesu River, ten kilometres from the South African border. The Repulse Fireforce manned by the SAS responded. The K-Car, piloted by Ken Newman with OC SAS, Brian Robinson as airborne commander, called for Hunter airstrike. John Blythe-Wood and his wingman Air Lieutenant Lowrie were scrambled with Lowrie’s aircraft carrying a pair of flechette dispensers.
Ken Newman’s ASR is given in his rather unusual style. It reads:
The call-out was initiated by c/s 72B (chl 22). The sequence of events was as follows:
1. FF (1 K-Car + 4 Gs + E4) airborne from Malapati arrange for c/s A5 (Canberra) to bomb grid reference passed by c/s 72A and 72B at 30:10:02B. FF to arrive overhead at 10:03B. A5 does not identify target and does not bomb.
2. K-Car overhead area ‘A’ sees ters and opens fire. Pink Section (G-Cars) told to drop sticks to surround area ‘A’. Heavy ground fire directed at K-Car.
3. Lynx c/s E4 (Flt Lt Mienie) does 2 x Frantan/.303 attacks West to East in area ‘A’. A5 does two bomb runs on area ‘A’. K-Car calls for Hunters. Pink returns to Malapati for more troops.
4. Heavy fire still directed at K-Car now hit several times. Second Canberra (C5) on airborne standby bombs area ‘B’.
5. Hunters strafe area ‘A’ along both sides of river. 4 more stops arrive. Para-Dak (F3) arrives from FAF 8 and drops Eagle callsigns in area shown. CTs return fire and K-Car hit several times. Cannon jams. K-Car pulls back H4 attacks W.
6. Second pair of Hunters on standby. Heavy fire directed at K-Car. At no time did K-Car/K-Car commander see 150 ters. Presume advance group of 30-40 contacted in immediate area.
7. Stop 2 tells K-Car heavy fire coming from open area to his (stop 2) north. Does not seem likely area but K-Car investigates. H4 (A/S/L Hatfield) relieves E4. 2nd pair Hunters arrive. F3 positions more troops at Groot Vlei (UL 180415).
8. K-Car is talked onto area by Stop 2 (area ‘B’). Opens fire on a few (old abandoned) huts. No results. Still heavy fire at K-Car. Then K-Car sees approx. 6 ters in area ‘B’, opens fire. Ters E. 1 Frantan/.303 on target. (There were actually 11 ters in area ‘B’).
9. Hunters[1] attack target. K-Car cannon fixed. K-Car opens fire— cannon jams.
10. Pink Section troop in extra troops (now total of 16 stops). Pink 1 fired at by smallarms overshoots LZ. (Fire came from area ‘B’ prior to air attack.)
11. K-Car clears area. Eagle c/s 3 has contact with 3 ters. 3 ters killed (area ‘C’). H4 drops 1 frantan/.303 N-S.
12. 2 more ters killed in subsequent follow up. Other 120 or so ters presumably legging it to Mozambique.
This was the first use of flechettes; so OC SAS was present for yet another Air Force ‘first’.
Preparing to attack external bases
BEFORE HIS POSTING TO COMOPS, Group Captain Norman Walsh had been Director Operations in Air Staff. Never one to sit and wait for action, Norman left his office as often as possible to seek out all available intelligence. During late November 1976 through to February 77 he and Peter McLurg always seemed to be in an awful hurry as they rushed between Air HQ, JSPIS at New Sarum and SAS HQ at Kabrit. During this time, Norman came to me regularly to keep abreast of weapons developments in which he was profoundly interested.
On one of these visits in January 1977,
he and Peter laid a large-scale photograph across my desk. It was of ZANLA’s main base and headquarters in Mozambique. Peter explained the layout of Chimoio Base and gave me a run-down on all available intelligence relating to it. Well over 6,000 ZANLA were known to be in residence with more trained personnel arriving daily from Tanzania and other countries. Norman warned that this was top-secret information and that my involvement was purely to assist him select the best weapons for a possible attack on the base. At that time Alpha bomb stocks were mounting but Golf bombs were not yet in production.
When he was posted to COMOPS two months later, Norman asked me to visit him regularly to keep him informed about weapons availability and run him through current project work. By that time Golf bombs were available and had already been integrated into his airstrike plans. Norman knew about the flechette dispenser system and the startling effects that could be expected from this weapon, so I suggested he consider them for use against large concentrations of exposed enemy forces, such as mass parades seen on some aerial photographs.
By June 1977, intelligence had established that there were 8,000 ZANLA in Chimoio Base and photographic evidence confirmed that the base was growing rapidly. Many miles to the north of Chimoio, inside the Tete Province, a second ZANLA base for about 4,000 CTs was also being monitored. Norman and his SAS colleagues linked this base, Tembue, with their attack plans for Chimoio. Realising that the threat from such large concentrations of trained CTs was overwhelming; they sought COMOPS authority to execute their plan.
Winds of Destruction Page 74
