The mainstay of our force undoubtedly lay with our technical men. As their OC on 4 Squadron, Henry Jarvie, the loveable clown, and Ian Flemming, the quiet good-natured armourer, had been two vitally important individuals. Following their transfer to helicopters, their personalities and talents benefited 7 Squadron greatly. But, that these two superb young men should die in the same Fireforce action was impossible to comprehend or accept. 12 January had been a very Black Friday for the Air Force.
Mini-golf bombs
I WAS SO AFFECTED BY THE loss of Henry and Flamo that I flew to Mtoko to talk to all the Fireforce participants. The problems they revealed were not new ones. Theirs had been the ongoing rainy season issue of not being able to see CTs, even when they had a fair idea of the general source of ground fire. I flew with Francois du Toit to view the contact area and whilst he was giving me a running commentary of the events, I came up with an idea that I guessed would turn similar situations to our advantage.
Had a pair of Hunters been immediately available to deliver four Golf bombs along the line of bush in which the CTs were known to be, the shock effect on survivors would undoubtedly have been significant. However, considering the time needed to bring in the jets from Thornhill, the casualties would already have occurred and the location of the stop groups would have disallowed the use of Golf bombs anyway.
The bush density in this photograph is relatively low yet the trunks of trees plus limited overhead foliage could easily hide many men from aerial view.
John Mussell’s Lynx flying in support of the Fireforce action had been of little value even though he was immediately available all the time. This made me wonder if my project team could produce a weapon for the Lynx that would, in similar circumstances, provide severe shock effects with meaningful lethal range against CTs whose precise positions were not known.
By the time I reached Salisbury, I had decided what was needed and a new project was born to exploit existing Golf-bomb technology. My intention was to provide Lynx with a sizeable punch in the form of a ‘mini-Golf bomb’.
As always, the project team engineers and Ron Dyer responded enthusiastically, and the requirement was discussed at length before we launched into Project Juliet. At the conclusion of this project, the weapon we produced was not nicknamed the Juliet bomb but became known by the term I had first used—the ‘Mini-golf’ bomb.
The Mini-golf took a great deal of time to develop because of numerous safety features that had to be built into the design to cater for low level release from the relatively slow-flying Lynx. It turned out to be an ugly tail-less beast that was designed for release at the end of a standard front-guns attack. The ANFO charge was contained in a thin-skinned steel cylinder surrounded by thousands of steel slugs entrapped by a 6mm steel outer-casing. Upon release, the bomb deployed a large parachute from its rear. The parachute’s function was to retard the bomb sharply and pitch it to the vertical before it reached ground.
Simultaneous with the parachute deployment, an electric-switch device, housed in the sphere of an Alpha bomb outer casing, was released from its anchors in the nose cone. We named this device ‘the seeker’. Para-retardation on the bomb forced the seeker to fly forward of the bomb, drawing out a five-metre electric cable. When this cable was fully extended, batteries were brought into alignment to complete a link between the electrical switch in the seeker and the bomb’s detonator.
Early trials from 150 feet were frustrating because the speed and trajectory of the seeker was faster, and therefore shallower, than that of the retarding bomb until the electric cable was fully extended. This had the effect of bringing the seeker level with the bomb, until the bomb itself was facing vertically downwards. Only then did the seeker start to move forward of the bomb. This problem was overcome by simply increasing the release height to 300 feet to allow time for the seeker to reach its correct position before it contacted ground. On impact with the ground, the seeker’s circuit closed to fire the bomb five metres above it.
The Mini-golf’s high airburst was necessary to cater for CTs lying in ground depressions, dongas and riverbeds. To ensure the fullest possible effects of over-pressure, and to make certain that all shrapnel was directed laterally and downwards, the initiating Pentolite booster was installed at the rear of the ANFO charge. This forced propagation of the explosive wave in a shallow downward facing cone. The system worked well and gave effective over-pressure with dense shrapnel cover to thirty-five metres radius with random spike effects that extend as far as fifty metres.
Flight Lieutenant Spook Geraty used the first Mini-golf in action on 18 June. Two days later Cocky Benecke used four in a single action that accounted for seven CTs dead. Thereafter Mini-golfs were used frequently.
After one of the earliest Mini-golf deliveries into a bush area from which ground fire had come, but no CTs had been seen, troops located four dead terrorists and one who, though only slightly wounded by shrapnel, was found lying unconscious. He revived when an RAR soldier shook his shoulder. This particular CT was at the edge of the Mini-golf’s effective range and had been well screened by trees standing between him and the point of detonation. When questioned by SB, the CT said he did not hear the bomb explode but was “suddenly overcome by a need to sleep”. The ground troops who were more than 100 metres from the Mini-golf explosion reported being totally taken aback by the huge blast and shock wave.
This shock effect paid off in many actions according to KCar pilot ASRs that reported two advantages accruing from Mini-golfs. One was that surviving CTs tended to remain where they were making it easier for ground forces to account for them and, more importantly, firing at aircraft either ceased or was substantially reduced.
Mini-golf was particularly useful against large enemy forces pursuing troops engaged on over border operations. In the first such action, east of the border village of Nyamapanda, Cocky Benecke (Hornet 20) was the pilot.
Ian Smith, Cocky Benecke, Dave Rowe and Brian Penton.
Cocky’s ASR reads:
Hornet 20 was tasked to assist c/s 75 (4 man RLI callsign) who was being chased by over 50 CTs and called for assistance. On arrival overhead c/s 75, s position c/s 75A who was on an OP (about 5 kms to the West of c/s 75) informed me that the terrs were still chasing c/s 75. I identified c/s 75 and fired a few rockets into bushy areas immediately behind him. After a short while of orbiting around c/s 75 I was fired on by terrs using RPG 7, RPD and AK.
Using RPG 7 dust as an indicator I dropped a Mini-golf on that position. Mini-golf landed approx. 15 yds from RPG position. This had a major effect on those ters who survived and allowed c/s 75 to make good their escape. No more fire was directed at the aircraft and no movement was seen from that immediate area after the bomb went off.
I continued to orbit the area and c/s 75A informed me that I was being fired on from another position 500 yards away but only from small arms. I could not see where the firing was coming from so did not attack. I then married 75 with 75A in an LZ and provided top cover until Black section arrived below Hornet 4 to uplift the c/s back to Kotwa.
Shown in this picture of Lynx armament layout are: (Left rear to forward centre) Frantans, Mini-golf with proboscis, grenade launcher, 37mm Sneb rockets, .303 ammo belts, Light-series bomb carrier with four 28-pound fragmentation bombs and white-bodied practice bombs. Twin Browning machine-guns above wing ahead of and either side of rear engine air intake.
The Mini-golfs had been in use for some time when, for safety reasons, it was decided to substitute the electrical seeker arrangement for a steel proboscis and accept a small reduction in killing range. Warrant Officer Bill Brown was one armourer who dreaded having to attend to early-model UXB Mini-golfs in the field. With live batteries and an electrical cable enmeshed in bush it was safest to simply rig up a delay charges to destroy such bombs.
ZANLA’s changing tactics
ROBERT MUGABE IN TYPICAL COMMUNIST style, declared 1978 to be ‘The Year of the People’. A few female CTs were with some groups en
tering the country and in the Op Repulse area there were clear indications that FRELIMO had become ever more involved.
Rhodesia saw a major change in government on 3 March 1978 following an internal political settlement signed by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Senator Chief Chirau and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (previously the leader of ZANU and ZANLA). The name of the country changed to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and, incredibly, the white people calmly accepted this first move towards black majority government. For one year an interim government ran the country with ministerial portfolios shared by experienced white ministers and black co-ministers who were learning the ropes. This would end when blacks and whites cast their votes for the first majority government. Mugabe and Nkomo wanted no part in this arrangement and branded the black participants as sellouts—so the war raged on.
Now, as in many preceding months, ZANLA relied on mujibas (LTTs and local youth spies) to provide them with early warning on RSF positions and the movement of Fireforces. Mujibas, often posing as common cattle herdsmen, drove cattle through likely RSF positions. Their abnormal practice of driving cattle over high features clearly identified active mujibas who we counted as CTs. When caught in the act they were either captured or killed.
In most ZANLA affected areas high features abounded. Mujibas used these to establish an early-warning system in which whistled messages were passed from one high point to the next along the line of Fireforce and troop movements. At one stage mujibas started denuding high features of all natural vegetation in an attempt to deny RSF hidden OPs (observation points) but the practice was dropped when they realised they needed the same cover for themselves.
ZANLA’s mujiba-warning system covered most of their operating areas other than half of the Op Repulse area where an extensive region of flat ground extended southwards from the Lundi River. Though crude, the warning system was very effective. A Fireforce flying at ninety knots could not hope to outpace the whistled warnings that passed ahead of their flight line at the speed of sound.
So troublesome was this warning system that selected troops moved into high points at night to kill mujibas when they took up positions at dawn. Visual recce from the air could not assist in these counter-mujiba operations because it was impossible to differentiate between RSF Op and mujiba path patterns. In spite of the mujibas, ZANLA continued to suffer greatly at the hands of the Selous Scouts pseudo teams who had learned to keep abreast of CT identification procedures. They knew what could and could not be eaten to fool the locals into believing they were bona fide ZANLA. Because of this the CTs were forced to find other ways of exposing Selous Scouts groups.
Individual CT leaders adopted a variety of short-duration identification methods. Sometimes this was to the detriment of genuine CT groups passing through or operating in adjacent areas. But, for a while, the Selous Scouts experienced setbacks. I recall one Scouts group being blown because the locals noticed that their weapons did not have barely visible scarlet thread tied to weapons’ trigger guards. Another group was blown because its members had not changed boot or shoelaces to the black ones the CTs had adopted. Switching cigarette brands was another of many ploys.
Norah Seear
DURING MARCH 1978 I WAS tasked to recce Chiweshe, Madziwa, Masembura, Msana and Chinamora Tribal Trust Lands extending in reverse order northward from Salisbury. I was pleased to do this as a break from my project work and more so because I was not encumbered with recce instruction. Whatever I located was passed on to JOC Hurricane at Bindura, but I only called for Fireforce once. On that occasion I had Norah Seear with me.
Norah was an excellent photo-interpreter with JSPIS (Joint Services Photographic Interpretation Services) based at New Sarum under command of Flight Lieutenant Bill Buckle. Two of Bill’s male interpreters as well as Norah (a grandmother) and three younger women interpreters had on occasions sought my opinion on terrorist bases they were analysing.
Visiting JSPIS was always enjoyable and I found Norah’s enthusiasm and open personality most appealing. She was especially keen to learn about visual recce. Not satisfied with all that I had told her, she asked if she could attend one of the many lectures I was called upon to give to Army personnel undertaking Air Orientation courses at New Sarum. Regrettably Norah pitched up at a particular presentation when I happened to be feeling really ill with a bad dose of flu. When the faces of the Army guys, who had been on a drinking spree in town the previous evening, showed that they were more interested in personal survival than in African toilet-path systems, I abbreviated my talk and left the room early, thereby disappointing Norah Seear. I still experience embarrassment when I recall the occasion.
Norah had obviously not been put off by my failure to teach her something new because she asked if she could accompany me on a recce of Chinamora Tribal Trust Land. I said I was more than happy to have her along for the ride but warned that the flight would be long and cold with no facility to relieve her bladder in flight. She assured me this was no problem because she had “the constitution of a camel”.
Nora’s presence in the aircraft was refreshing because of her never-ending questions which only dried up when I called Fireforce onto a group of CTs I found in a small base camp. The action that followed with RAR troops under command of Major André Dennison was very messy. (More about this officer shortly.) Nevertheless the Fireforce action had come at the end of our normal recce period so our airborne time was greatly extended by the action. At New Sarum, Norah showed she was not much of a ‘long range’ camel by making a headlong rush for the nearest loo.
This was the CT base Norah watched Fireforce react to during her flight with PB. Two feeding paths from four villages can be seen running toward the base from the main pathway running left to right under the only visible village. Two thin paths running toward the bottom of the photograph led to sentry outpost positions under trees. The base for twenty-five CTs is easily identified amongst trees at centre.
RAR Fireforces
WHEN FIREFORCES FIRST CAME INTO being they were manned exclusively by RLI. Throughout the war they were undoubtedly the finest of all Fireforce soldiers. Following the spread of the war and an increase in helicopter availability, RAR and Territorial Army units also became involved, but seldom did they perform as aggressively and efficiently as RLI. Certain of the Territorial Army units did well and the same could be said of RAR companies when commanded by the right officers and, even more so, when controlled by K-Car pilots.
From my own observations and the opinions expressed by other pilots, it was clear that the black soldiers of the RAR were good fighters who were too often severely encumbered by language difficulties between the white airborne commander and men on the ground. Most RAR soldiers spoke one or other of the Shona dialects and there were a few N’debele soldiers too.
Whereas they all had a fair understanding of English, the official language in battle, it was seldom sufficient for them to absorb fast-spoken instructions coming to them over crackling radios with the near-continuous presence of noisy helicopters during high-stress actions. It was noticeable that some white officers gained a great deal more from their RAR troops than others. These were ones who spoke calmly, clearly, slowly and used the barest minimum of simple words. Above all they remained cool-headed and never lost their temper nor showed any sign of irritation if asked to repeat instructions.
Officers who failed to get the best out of their black troops exhibited common characteristics. They were short–tempered and pompous. In the air they would instruct their men too quickly in sentences containing too many words. When these instructions were misinterpreted or there were requests for a repeat of instructions, the man on the ground received a verbal blast with accusations of ignorance and incompetence.
There was an occasion when one K-Car pilot was so annoyed by an RAR officer’s inability to handle his men correctly that he surreptitiously muted the Army commander’s radio link and took over control of the RAR men on the ground. Most K-Car pilots were every bit as good as th
e best of our airborne Army commanders, usually having seen more Fireforce actions. In this case the pilot directed the callsigns in ‘Chilapalapa’ that these particular RAR soldiers understood well.
The Shona word Chilapalapa is the name of a language developed on the gold mines of South Africa where it is known as ‘Fanagalo’. This simple language continues to facilitate easy communication between mine management and thousands of mine workers coming from many African countries and language groups. Most Chilapalapa words come from Zulu, cautionary and swear words from Afrikaans and, simple words like left and right from English.
André Dennison.
Anyway, the K-Car pilot directed the willing troops with ease and led them to success. Initially the Army commander frantically checked his radio leads for a fault he had no hope of finding. He gave this up when the air-gunner leaned across and shouted to let him know that the pilot and soldiers were managing fine and that the “headset failure” could only be rectified when they returned to base.
One RAR officer I got to know quite well at Mtoko was André Dennison, commanding ‘A’ Company of 1 RAR. He was an ex-British Army officer who performed with considerable courage in many ground actions with a weapon in his hands. As a combat leader on the ground he was first-class but his troops performed abysmally under his airborne control, even though they had done really well under previous airborne commanders. The reasons for this were very plain to many pilots, but André took no notice of the advice offered to solve his soldiers’ “outright stupidity and inability to understand plain English”. It was through officers like André that the RAR came to be regarded by many as second-rate soldiers. Those of us who knew how well they could perform thought otherwise.
Winds of Destruction Page 78
