ZANLA infiltration continued unabated and many CT groups were operating in depth in southern Matabeleland and the central Midlands. In one particular follow-up close to Ian Smith’s farm at Gwenora, there was a contact with CT’s that led to a serious air accident.
Flight Lieutenant Ray Bolton had been conducting helicopter conversions for non-Air Force pilots with a view to establishing if this was a viable way of bolstering operational helicopter pilot numbers. One of Ray’s students was game-ranger Kerry Fynn who had been trained by the Air Force some years earlier. Ray and Kerry were at Thornhill when news of the contact came through and both flew troops to the scene and placed them down under direction of the unseen callsign on the ground.
Ray then saw the callsign but he could not see any CTs. Feeling certain that game-ranger Kerry stood a better chance of spotting them, he called Kerry over to look around. It so happened that the ground callsign then started giving a helicopter direction to turn ‘right’ to position over the terrorist group, but each pilot thought the direction was for him and both responded. Almost immediately Kerry spotted terrorists, rolled sharply to port to bring his gunner Corporal Turner into position to open fire, but collided with Ray’s helicopter, which was crossing his path.
Both helicopters were crippled and crashed. Kerry and his technician died instantly, as did Corporal Cutmore, who was flying with Ray. Miraculously Ray survived the inverted crash because of the protection given his head and body by his armoured seat.
It was at about this time that we received a visitation in COMOPS from ex-RLI Major Alan Lindner, long-serving intelligence officer to Selous Scouts and now attached to Military Intelligence. He came to make a preliminary presentation of a detailed study he had undertaken. Alan made this presentation to General Barnard, Brian Robinson, Peter Burford, Terence Murphy, the COMOPS SB representative Chief Superintendent Mike Edden and me. Quite a bit of what he had to say involved the same matters Terence and I had considered in formulating our Auxiliaries plan. However, Alan’s presentation went much deeper and moved through many steps before unfolding into a clearly defined strategy.
On his own and drawing from his experience with Selous Scouts, Alan had worked out the very military strategy that COMOPS should have produced many months earlier. His maps with well-defined overlays built up a picture that, because of its un-embroidered simplicity, unscrambled the multiplicity of problems facing us. It specifically revealed the most fundamental flaw in COMOPS operational management. Put simply, it showed that, in attempting to secure all internal ground and conducting external operations, our forces had been spread too thinly to prevent the cancer of CT encroachment into economically important areas that Alan called ‘The Vital Ground’.
Vital Ground encompassed all commercial areas including white farms, isolated mines, main roads and rail routes. From those areas in which the CTs were strongest, the tribal areas, Alan’s plan advocated almost total withdrawal of forces to make them fully available for external operations and to secure the Vital Ground in strength. Only then would Selous Scouts and high-density operations be mounted to progressively reoccupy adjoining TTLs with the odd probe into hot spots to keep abreast of developments and, more especially, to take out key CT groups.
External operations would obviously have to be stepped up and sustained to ensure that the CT presence in the semiabandoned areas, some of which ZANLA had already claimed to be ‘liberated areas’, did not become too strong. Robert Mugabe had named 1979 Gore re Gukurahundi (Year of the Peoples’ Storm) because his intention was to push in as many trained CTs as possible. We knew ZANLA had more men than they had weapons to arm them with but, at that time, we were unaware of just how serious this problem was.
Alan Lindner’s plan was so convincing to those of us who heard it that an instruction was issued to all main players to attend a repeat presentation to the National JOC where Alan’s proposals were accepted and put into immediate effect.
The virtual abandonment of the Tribal Trust Lands by the security forces did not affect the Sub-JOC locations as all of these lay in Vital Ground. However, many police stations remained in the unattended areas because, to its credit, PGHQ was determined to retain every single one of its many stations, no matter the dangers. This placed a few stations, particularly those close to the Mozambican border, in a very hostile environment often necessitating Dakotas to run the gauntlet to para-drop critical provisions to hard-pressed policemen and, occasionally, helicopters to change over personnel and undertake the evacuation of casualties. Nyamapanda, right on the border with Mozambique next to the main road to Malawi, was the most harassed and dangerous of all the police positions.
Protective villages continued to be manned by Guard Force with Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries in the consolidated villages. They could call upon Fireforce during daylight hours. Inevitably, however, ZANLA’s many relatively ineffective stand-off attacks occurred at night.
One huge problem in leaving many hapless tribesmen to their own devices was that it caused streams of refugees to move out of the countryside to the safety of cities and towns. In consequence, shantytowns sprang up in untidy knots around many built-up areas.
Mozambican National Resistance
PRIOR TO HIS POSTING TO COMOPS, former Commander of SAS Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Robinson had been attached to an establishment specifically created to handle Special Operations. This Special Operations HQ had been under OCC control until COMOPS took over and brought special operations under its wing. Initially Brian was horrified at the prospect of working with Bert Barnard but he was able to conduct most of his work with Group Captain Norman Walsh with whom he had a good personal working relationship, as witnessed before and during Operation Dingo.
Although Brian enjoyed initial planning and tasking work, all of which was conducted in an operations room expressly reserved for top-secret operations, he sorely missed the nittygritty planning that SAS and Selous Scouts did back in their respective headquarters. Consequently, Brian spent much of his day prowling the corridors of COMOPS like a caged lion.
Having been so involved with Norman Walsh, Brian had a very high regard for Air Force opinion in all aspects of SAS and other specialist ground-force work. Having also been involved with me in earlier times, and whenever Norman had asked me to join in on special ops planning, Brian came to me first whenever he needed to bounce ideas off someone in COMOPS. We got on well, and were privy to every aspect of Special Forces operations other than Selous Scouts and CIO external undercover work. Whenever such detail as we needed was given, we kept it strictly to ourselves. One such undercover operation was revealed when the SAS and Air Force had to become directly involved in its development.
In late December 1978, I visited an isolated farm in the Odzi farming area east of Umtali. Here, at a top-secret Central Intelligence Organisation base, training was being conducted for a resistance movement that was intent on ousting FRELIMO from power. This organisation was variously known as MRM (Mozambican Resistance Movement), MNR (Mozambican National Resistance) and RENAMO. MNR was the term we preferred.
Milling around the helicopter I had flown myself on this visit was a scruffy but happy group of Mozambicans with huge smiles. A fair-sized force of these men was already operating in Mozambique and scoring spectacular successes against FRELIMO.
SAS were about to deploy with the resistance force to give them the training and direction that only the SAS could provide. Air Force would be needed for resupply and other supporting roles. Surprisingly, when the time came for the first para-supply by Dakotas, it was to deliver maize and vegetable seeds with only small amounts of ammunition and troop comforts included. The reason for this was that the MNR had little need for weapons or ammunition because they were capturing most of what they required from FRELIMO.
The willing support being given MNR by the local people bore testimony to the tribesmen’s utter dislike of FRELIMO. However, willing as they were, these poor folk could not hope to provide all the food needs of th
e fast-growing resistance force. So, in response to SAS direction, MNR needed seed to grow its own crops for self-sufficiency within its safe havens in the forests and valleys surrounding Gorongoza mountain.
FRELIMO had antagonised the rural people in so many ways. They had kicked out Mozambique’s white Portuguese and, in doing so, had brought about the destruction of the income base upon which rural families depended. Without the Portuguese, earnings by previous commercial, industrial and domestic workers had dried up. None of FRELIMO’s preindependence promises had materialised so the peasants, who had been forced into failed communal farming activities, were much worse off than at any time during their relatively stressfree existence under Portuguese rule.
The peoples’ trust in MNR to return them to situations of ‘the good old days’ was reinforced by well-orchestrated radio broadcasts beamed from Rhodesia by Portuguese-speaking presenters. ‘The Voice of Free Africa’ services, whilst boosting the MNR image, incensed FRELIMO by emphasising the impotence of its leadership and slating communist ideologies that were failing to fill stomachs or keep people warm and children educated. The Mozambican peasants liked what they were hearing and MNR’s popularity soared and spread.
The MNR might have substantially altered the course of our war had funds been available when they were needed back in 1976. This was another of many situations to which the ‘toolittle-too-late’ tag might be pinned because, from the outset, MNR was very pro-white, pro-Rhodesia and violently anticommunist. This they demonstrated by providing us with some important intelligence on ZANLA’s activities and locations. Of greater importance to Rhodesia was the fact that MNR activities were so troublesome to FRELIMO that earlier plans to pour more FRELIMO troops into the Op Repulse area were shelved. In fact many FRELIMO earmarked for Rhodesia were withdrawn to combat the MNR ‘bandits’.
Whereas there had been no question of using the MNR to fight ZANLA CTs in Mozambique, FRELIMO sought ZANLA’s assistance to combat the MNR. Had such a situation arisen two years earlier, combined Rhodesian and MNR action would have permitted our own forces to operate in depth against ZANLA and FRELIMO for as long as we chose, unencumbered by aircraft shortages and servicing cycles. Furthermore, with the MNR seeking as much credit as possible for anti-FRELIMO activities, the destruction of Mozambique’s communications networks would have been made easy and would almost certainly have resulted in ZANLA’s eviction from Mozambique.
The SAS enjoyed leading MNR and witnessed some very hairy fighting. They held back from each action to avoid compromising themselves and watched aghast when the first MNR leader, André, initiated ambushes and attacks by leaping to his feet, fully exposing himself with gun above head to shout the MNR slogan that triggered each action.
True or not, I cannot say, but I heard that FRELIMO soldiers were petrified of MNR. The story goes that MNR sometimes removed the heads of their victims and scattered them around to make matching them to bodies difficult. Every FRELIMO soldier hearing of this was worried that, should this happen to him, his spirit would remain trapped in his body if someone else’s head was buried with it.
The SAS personnel operating with MNR were changed over regularly without difficulties until their operations spread southward to a new sector in the region of Chipinga. Here the MNR group resisted an SAS changeover fearing that they were about to be abandoned. At Gorongoza it was normal practice for the four SAS men assigned to the MNR to move miles clear of the base area to meet the team changeover helicopter. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the replacement team, the MNR remained inside their safe haven totally surrounded by loyal tribesmen. However, even having gained the confidence and open support of the locals for miles around, the relatively small MNR group camping in hills east of Chipinga only felt safe with SAS in their midst. In consequence, we at COMOPS were faced with an unusual problem when we learned that these MNR men were holding their SAS colleagues hostage to prevent them from moving off for a changeover the MNR leader feared might not take place.
At the cost of unnecessary flying hours, the situation was resolved by deploying the four-man replacement team miles from the MNR base for a long walk to effect changeover in the presence of MNR. But then, with eight SAS men making him feel doubly safe, the MNR leader attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade the first team to stay on.
Luso Boma
IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND Angola, South African forces were involved in a war against SWAPO (SWA Peoples’ Organisation) and to a lesser extent SAANC. As a result of their intelligence, we learned in late January 1979 that a large concentration of ZIPRA men were undergoing training under Russian and Cuban instructors at Luso Boma in Angola.
Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the site of the large base in central-east Angola, and a preliminary feasibility study was conducted to establish if we could undertake an air attack against it. Clearly the target lay at too great a range for Hunters with under-wing stores. For the Canberras it was possible but the range left no reserve of fuel for possible Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone weather problems on the day. Initially it was decided to postpone the attack until weather conditions improved in May. However when the second Viscount was shot down by ZIPRA on 12 February 1979 it created a need for another high-profile retaliatory action and Luso was the best target we had at the time.
OC 5 Squadron, Squadron Leader Chris Dixon (Green Leader), was brought in to discuss the matter. He immediately said his squadron could meet the task and advocated operating out of Victoria Falls Airport for a normal climb to 30,000 feet.
The disused Portuguese aldeamento and ZIPRA barracks (top) surrounded by anti-aircraft gun positions, half of which are seen here (and ringed). The ZIPRA and SAANC barrack lines are barely visible at the top of the photograph with white fields on either side. Below the barracks are the various buildings that served as headquarters, classrooms and accommodation for Russians and Cubans.
One engine would then be closed down for the cruise to target. Both engines would be used for the descent, attack and return to height where, once again, one engine would be closed down for the return to Victoria Falls.
This was all very well, but Luso Boma base was too large to be covered by the formation of only four Canberras we could be certain of having on the day, when in fact six Canberras were needed to cover the whole target. An approach was made to the South Africans who had a vested interest in the same target because some SAANC were also training at Luso Boma. If we did not attack the base, the South African Air Force would probably do the job anyway. But, since we wanted to smack ZIPRA ourselves, an opportunity existed to undertake a combined formation strike. Air Commodore Norman Walsh was in favour of using an extra Canberra to drop 1000-pound bombs with variously set time-delay fuses to confuse and delay the enemy’s post-strike mopping up operations. In consequence, seven Canberras were used.
Ted Brent.
To launch aircraft from South West Africa and Rhodesia for link up in Angola was feasible but unwise in view of the need for joint planning and briefing of crews. So three SAAF Canberra B9s positioned at remote Fylde Air Base to keep their presence secret. After briefing, our four Canberras positioned at Victoria Falls. The SAAF aircraft, with modern engines and higher fuel capacity, had no problems with the longer range they had to fly from Fylde. Rudie Kritsinger, Roley Jones and Willie Meyer captained these bombers. Although Hunters had been discounted from the strike itself they were to be on station at height armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to counter interference from the Zambian Air Force or, less likely, Cuban-operated MiG 19s and MiG 21s based at Henrique de Carvalho in Angola.
When the time came for start-up on 26 February 1979, Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie in the lead aircraft of Green Formation could not get one engine started. Chris immediately handed the lead to Ted Brent and Jim Russell who, as was standard practice, were fully prepared for such an eventuality. The other two Canberras were crewed by Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan and Kevin Peinke with, I think, J.J. Strydom.
The Rhodesian f
ormation was still climbing and had the SAAF formation visual when Chris Dixon reported being airborne five minutes behind. Ted continued with the formation of six until he was well inside Zambia. Near Mongu he went into a shallow orbit to await Chris. At this point our radiointercepting service picked up a call from Mongu reporting the presence of ‘enemy aircraft’ to the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa.
When Chris caught up, he instructed Ted to retain the lead and the formation continued on its way. The Non-Directional Beacon at Luso Airfield was expected to assist the formation but, typical for Africa, it was on the blink. Nevertheless the formation navigators all map-read whenever there were gaps in near continuous strata-cumulus cover along a weaving route between cumulonimbus storm clouds. Fortunately the low cloud cover ended before Luso.
When Ted spotted the airfield at Luso, he instructed the Rhodesian pilots to fire up their cold engines as he commenced a fast descent for a wide port turn to pass low over the airfield on heading for the base which was close by. A huge storm stretched right across the run-up path to target but the Canberras had come too far to be put off by this difficulty. Three Rhodesian and three SAAF bombers moved into formation for the lowlevel attack. The fourth Rhodesian Canberra levelled off at 1,500 feet above and behind the main force.
With six aircraft correctly stationed in their wide flat Vic positions, the formation entered heavy rain at full attack speed with all pilots holding heading and height on instruments.
When he judged the moment was right, Ted called “Bomb doors, go.” Almost immediately the formation burst through the rain and there, dead on the planned strike-line, lay the target. The formation swept through, releasing 1,800 Alpha bombs onto a target sodden by the very storm through which it had just come. Immediately the formation was through, the seventh Canberra unloaded tightly grouped 1,000-pound delay bombs into the main CT barracks.
Winds of Destruction Page 84
