Unbeknown to the helicopter crews, things had not gone according to plan at NSO. Some of the explosive charges intended to blow access holes through the outer security wall had failed to function causing delay in the assault on buildings. All resistance had been overcome by the time the assault force commander, Captain Martin Pearse, threw in a delayed-action bunker bomb to blow down a wall to gain access to the guard room. He had moved around the corner of the building, where he should have been completely safe from the explosion, but the quality of the building was so poor that the wall behind which Martin was sheltering collapsed on him. The death of this truly superb and much revered officer stunned everyone, though it did not prevent them from continuing to work with typical SAS efficiency.
Upon their recall to target, the helicopter crews were greeted with the sight of flattened buildings and huge piles of bags filled with NSO paperwork. These bags and all the men they had brought to Lusaka were quickly loaded together with one protesting prisoner who claimed to be an innocent local visiting a friend.
Because of the early-morning delay, fuel remained a problem but there was just sufficient to get all the machines back to Rhodesian soil. A reserve Cheetah waiting at Makuti brought forward a whole load of drummed fuel to link up with the formation that waited on the ground close to the south bank of the Zambezi River. Once refuelled the force returned to base.
The nine participating pilots. From left: Brian Gordon, Justin Varkivisser, Guy Dixon, Siggy Seegmuller, Dave Bourhill, Steve Kesby, Vic Wightman (OC 1 Squadron), Ginger Baldwin, Tony Oakley.
Hunter formation passing over Thornhill Air Base upon its return to base.
The helicopters were still refuelling near the Zambezi when nine Hunters made a formation fly-past over the parade that marked the opening of Parliament for the first black Government. We had not yet received replacement Hunters and had only nine, four of which had been seen over Lusaka that morning.
The precision flypast was widely publicised with supporting photographs which, when added to reports of the morning strikes in Zambia, caused quite a stir since it was thought that we might have more Hunters in service than the nine the West had on record. Outsiders could not guess that 100% serviceability was possible in a fighter squadron lambasted by sanctions. This is because they had no idea of the astounding capabilities and dedication of Rhodesian Air Force technicians.
The SAS failed to capture any of the ZIPRA men they had hoped to find because none was present at NSO. Following the attack on Nkomo’s house, all had taken the precaution of sleeping elsewhere. I will deal with Dumiso Dabengwa’s account of this matter later. In the meanwhile, Elliott Sibanda blew the cover of the prisoner, who continued to claim he had been a local visitor. He was in fact a high-ranking Russian-trained ZIPRA intelligence officer by the name of Alex Vusa. His capture substantially reduced SAS disappointment at missing the three big fish because Vusa’s information led them straight into their next big hit.
The SAS were also disappointed that, because of the lateness of their arrival at target and the poor building standards, they had been unable to locate a bunker in which ZIPRA was reported to hold its most important files and a safe containing a large quantity of American dollars. But, because of the rubble from destroyed walls, discovery of the bunker’s entrance coincided with Lieutenant-Colonel Barrett’s order to withdraw. Fortunately, however, a master index of files amongst the recovered documents showed that the SAS had collected all but a handful of NSO’s material.
The information gleaned from the captured documents not only confirmed all of Elliott Sibanda’s facts, it expanded on them. Of importance too were lists of names of individuals and a host of overseas organisations supplying ZIPRA with intelligence on Rhodesian affairs. Details of this information were not immediately made known to COMOPS staff because other agencies would be following up on them. Alex Vusa’s verbal information was our priority concern!
Xai Xai
UNRELATED TO VUSA’S INFORMATION, A very real opportunity to kill both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe presented itself when we learned that these two leaders and their party hierarchy would be meeting in the Chongoene Hotel in the coastal village of Xai Xai.
On 22 June Maputo sent this message to Xai Xai: “Do all the preparations in Chongoene Hotel in order to receive the participants to the conference of the five Patriotic Front and representatives of ZANU foreseen for next July.” Three days later, Zambian Air Force HQ informed Lusaka International Airport that, “ZAF transport to route Lusaka-Beira (refuel)— Maputo to stop over for seven days—return Lusaka. Aircraft to convey Nkomo plus party of ten leaving Lusaka 280400 June 1979.”
Rhodesian operations against ZIPRA in Zambia may have prompted this meeting. Additionally, or alternatively, the new British Government or Frontline presidents may have insisted on ZANU and ZAPU coming together. Whatever the case we recognised that, potentially, we had a great opportunity target on our hands, though there were important issues to take into account.
The meeting at Chongoene Hotel was likely to commence on Saturday 30 June or 1 July but because ZANU and ZAPU seldom saw eye to eye, there was always the possibility that one party would walk out on the other. With six days apparently set aside for the meeting, Sunday 1 July was selected as the best time to strike.
Hurriedly we took aerial photographs of the hotel and managed to get detailed plans of its two-storeyed layout and construction. Six Hunters dropping Golf bombs and four Canberras each delivering four 1,000-pound high-explosive bombs from relatively low level were considered more than sufficient to destroy the entire hotel and everyone in it. The big question on our minds was, “Who is everyone?” Who besides ZAPU and ZANU might be at the conference?
The heads of state for Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania seemed likely participants as they all had a vested interest in seeing ZAPU and ZANU settle their differences so their operations might at last be co-ordinated to mutual advantage.
We did not think the death of Samora Machel would rock the political boat too much. But the death of Kenneth Kaunda or Julius Nyerere, heads of British Commonwealth countries, by an overt Rhodesian Air Force strike would seriously upset Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party when there seemed to be an improvement in attitude towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The intelligence people made every effort to establish what these leaders were planning for 1 July, and to pick up on any clues concerning members of the OAU. The only positive information gleaned showed that President Seretse Khama of Botswana was to open a two-day conference in Arusha for Front-line States’ foreign ministers and overseas development representatives of major donor nations.
Nyerere should have been attending a mini-summit in Khartoum during 24 and 25 June to discuss Western Sahara issues, after which he was to meet with the Nigerian leader, Olesgun Obasanjo—probably in Nigeria. At short notice, he cancelled this trip and sent a representative instead. No reason for this change of plan could be established, but the timing was suspiciously close to the Xai Xai meeting and Kaunda’s movements could not be established at all; so, we had no alternative but to turn away from the opportunity.
Nevertheless, plans to assassinate Mugabe and Nkomo remained COMOPS priorities.
Attempts to assassinate Robert Mugabe
WE KNEW THE LOCATION OF Robert Mugabe’s home on Avenida Dona Maria Segunda in the once-plush suburb of Maputo and a CIO undercover agent had been watching this house for some time, studying Mugabe’s movements and habits. Unlike Nkomo, Mugabe’s routines were easy to monitor and were highly predictable. So a small SAS team was assigned to take on the task of assassinating the ZANU President.
Opting for a sea approach to a beach that had been well known to holidaymakers during Portuguese times, the SAS used inflatable rubber dinghies, powered by silent motors to avoid having to move through populated areas. Twice the team arrived at Mugabe’s house around midnight but on both occasions it was vacant, despite the fact that the agent had watched Mugabe arrive home a few hou
rs earlier. This made it blatantly clear that someone ‘in the know’ in Salisbury had tipped off Robert Mugabe in time for him to get away to safety.
Both times the disappointed SAS team left the house untouched and returned silently to their hidden dinghies. The next day ZANLA and FRELIMO security personnel were observed to check out the rooms and garden before Mugabe himself returned home.
Though substantially annoyed by this, the SAS and COMOPS staff could not help being impressed by the fact that, unlike Nkomo, Mugabe had taken the trouble to get his entire household and security personnel to safety. We were also impressed by the fact that FRELIMO had not been called to ambush the house, obviously to safeguard their mole in Salisbury.
Having established modus operandi, thought was given to paying a third visit; this time to plant high explosives in the roof of Mugabe’s house that apparently had not previously been checked by security guards. The existence of these explosives would be withheld from CIO until the agent advised that Mugabe had re-entered his home when they would be activated by a highflying Canberra. This might have worked, had other priorities not overtaken SAS.
ZIPRA loses war holdings
ALEX VUSA, THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER from ZIPRA’s NSO, told of a large build-up of arms and equipment at a location west of Lusaka. He had not been to this location himself but during his regular visits to JZ training camp he had noticed many large ZIPRA vehicles, all heavily laden, moving westward past JZ camp. He believed there had to be a storage site in the countryside close by because, after a short time, specific laden vehicles that had passed him earlier were seen to be heading back towards Lusaka empty.
We already knew that flights were coming in from Angola at night to deliver large amounts of ZIPRA equipment—but why at night? Why was ZIPRA not using Zambia’s National Stores in accordance with Zambian Government instructions? Putting two and two together, it became obvious that Nkomo was not only intent on hiding his build-up from us; he was also hiding it from the Zambian Government.
The location of JZ camp was known, so a Canberra recce was flown over the area that Vusa had indicated. Photographs showing multiple tracks covering a huge area in which plies of equipment lay stacked under bush cover immediately confirmed Vusa’s story. There could be no doubt that these were ZIPRA’s main stores for its invasion plan.
There was urgent need to get troops to this location as the possibility existed that ZIPRA might move everything to a new site, particularly with NSO records and Alex Vusa in Rhodesian hands. Again the task fell to the SAS. At the very time that we had planned for the now-abandoned strike against the Chongoene Hotel in Xai Xai, Operation Chicory was launched.
Cheetahs carrying men and demolition equipment.
On 1 July five Cheetahs, carrying a force of fifty men laden with demolition equipment, lifted off from Bumi Hills.
Being a Sunday, ZIPRA’s defending force was expected to be pretty relaxed and probably reduced in strength. Religion had little to do with this. In southern Africa it was almost standard practice for Sunday to be a time for visiting, resting and drinking. Nevertheless, we decided that an opening airstrike was essential to soften defences and create distraction whilst Cheetahs landed the SAS force.
Considering there was so much high explosive on the ground, I remember being somewhat concerned for the safety of the Canberras if Air HQ chose to make a low-level attack with Alpha bombs. With Norman Walsh overseeing the air plan this was simply not something to be worrying about and the strikes went in without problems. Five Cheetahs landed the troops during Hunter re-strikes then turned back for Bumi.
The shortest day of the year had only just passed so nightfall was quick in coming; not that this limited the SAS. By the time the Cheetahs came in to collect them in fading light, everything had either been destroyed or was rigged for destruction.
The ground force had enjoyed an exciting time with rockets zooming out of large fires with huge bangs and pressure waves emanating from ground through which the fast-moving line had passed. The destruction of weapons, explosives, vehicles, tents, bulk fuel, boats and so on was right up SAS’s street. As they flew back towards Kariba, they were able to look back with satisfaction as timed charges continued to set off massive explosions that lit up the clouds and bush for miles around.
This was another very bad day for ZIPRA—their invasion plan was doomed. They had not only lost all they had been hiding from the Zambian authorities, they were red-faced by Rhodesia’s exposure of their underhandedness.
Political turmoil
IT WAS VERY FRUSTRATING TO be tied to COMOPS where I lost close contact with the goings-on in Air HQ, the messes, the squadrons and FAFs. Air Strike Reports were seldom seen; not that these were withheld in any way. I could have gone up to Air HQ to read them but the tempo of work in COMOPS prevented me from doing so.
By now almost all young pilots and technicians were unknown to me. I knew they were out there performing fantastic work, but reading daily Sitreps (Situation Reports) from the JOCs failed to put names and faces to actions and incidents. Planning, reviewing, listening to operational debriefs and tasking new ones was all very well, even exciting, but one always saw the same people attending planning and debriefing sessions. All were familiar personalities from happier days in the field though few were blue jobs. This really niggled me giving emphasis to a grim sense of being separated from my own force.
Being mid-winter, the Fireforces were rattling up great successes against ZANLA which, when added to the mayhem being meted out to ZIPRA, should have put smiles on our faces; but political issues tended to darken the long hours and weekends in COMOPS.
In early June, US President Jimmy Carter, contrary to British Government’s perceived intentions, ruled against the lifting of sanctions by the USA. Then in early August, Margaret Thatcher dashed all hopes of granting Zimbabwe-Rhodesia recognition when, at the Commonwealth conference held in the Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, she reneged on her earlier promises. She moved instead for an all-party conference to be held in London.
What was particularly galling to Rhodesians was the fact that Maggie had been pressurised into this by the Australian prime minister who, considering his own country’s record in dealing with ethnic folk, had absolutely no right to go against our wish to retain responsible government. Rhodesia’s constitution sought to bring the black folk into government in a controlled and progressive manner. There was certainly nothing racist as with Australia’s approach to colour. One only needs to consider that component of the Australian Constitution, which reads, “… make laws for people of any race for whom it is necessary to make special laws”.
This was another overt move to push Rhodesians towards the communist take-over we were still thoroughly determined to prevent. Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement in his dealings with Hitler was forgotten after Winston Churchill returned British political drive back to one of strength. However, once Churchill and the British Empire had gone, Britain became embroiled in misguided guilt for her colonial past thereby weakening her ability to counter fascism and communism. Retaining favour with Africa’s corrupt and ineffective dictators had become more important to British politicians than supporting a country intent on holding to a western-styled democratic government, without sacrificing efficiency and self-sufficiency.
To add to these concerns, Sithole was not acting in unison with Government and James Chikerema withdrew his support from Muzorewa’s ruling party. It was not as if we did not expect to see infighting and incompetence in the new government order because all along we knew that relinquishing control too early would not work; but circumstances had made this the only option to attracting Western approval and circumvention of the Marxist alternative.
By now the title appended to the increasing exodus of whites seeking safer pastures changed from ‘chicken run’ to ‘owl run’ because many considered it the wise thing to do. Yet, for most white Rhodesians, the desire to remain in God’s own country remained strong. Like eve
ryone else in COMOPS I had one aim in mind. This was to support the government in power, weak though it was, and work flat-out to destroy the enemies that sought to remove it.
The saying that every dark cloud has a silver lining was applicable to these times. South Africa was embroiled in what became known as ‘The Information Scandal’. I do not remember the details but know that it forced a change in national leadership. Vorster was out of the driving seat and P.W. Botha took the wheel. With this change came a marked improvement in political attitudes towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the inflow of goods returned to normal.
Operation Uric
FOR THE MOMENT ZIPRA WAS hobbled but ZANLA, with ever-mounting assistance from FRELIMO, was increasingly active in the south. Terrorist numbers in the Op Repulse area had grown to the point where over 50% of ZANLA’s deployed force, estimated at 11,000, was in that area in early August 1979. In a show of support to the Muzorewa Government, South Africa committed a Fireforce comprising Puma helicopters, Dakotas and troops to the south of the country. Fielding as many fighting troops as all of our Fireforces put together, there were great hopes that this force would make great inroads against ZANLA and FRELIMO, but it was not to be. As we had come to know only too well, the flat lands of the region rendered intelligence of the type needed to bring Fireforces into contact almost impossible.
Winds of Destruction Page 88
