Unbeknown to the Rhodesians, a large conventionally trained and highly disciplined ZIPRA force, dug in on the ridges and pan area, awaited them. All command posts were linked by landline telephones that allowed the progress of the two SAS patrols to be relayed by those who could see them to others who could not. Not a sound could be heard by the SAS as they climbed the steep-sided ends of the ridge.
As they were nearing the top, the southern group came under unexpected intense and accurate fire from a host of weapon types. The group was pinned down and could not move in any direction without attracting angry attention. Jet support was called for.
Trevor Jew and Bob MacKenzie immediately got airborne from Kariba in a Lynx. They aimed to establish the position of the pinned-down group as well as the ZIPRA elements containing them. They arrived ahead of the jets and picked up the flash and dust of a ZIPRA recoilless-rifle firing at the trapped soldiers. In an attempt to relieve the hard-pressed soldiers, Trevor turned in with the intention of neutralising the enemy position with Frantans. Showing great discipline, the enemy had patiently withheld their fire against aircraft the previous day; but now they opened up with a vengeance the moment Trevor commenced his attack dive.
The weight of fire was too great to continue the attack and, as the Lynx pulled up and turned, it took critical strikes which forced Trevor to turn for home. On the way his damaged front engine quit and at Kariba he was forced to make a relatively high-speed belly landing because severed hydraulic lines had disabled undercarriage and flaps functions.
In the meanwhile Hunters drew all enemy attention to themselves when they put in attacks on the pan area. This allowed the southern patrol sufficient breathing space to make a hurried withdrawal. Both patrols were then recovered to Kariba, but not before the northern group had a short contact near their helicopter pick-up point. Three ZIPRA were killed and one was captured. Miraculously, as had happened before, the captured man turned out to be a key figure. He was the logistics officer for the base.
From this important man a number of issues came to the fore. The base contained part of a battalion of ZIPRA’s 1st Brigade from Mulungushi comprising over 200 conventionally trained men with another 100 men expected to arrive soon. This particular base had been established recently as the forward element for an intended invasion of Rhodesia across the Kariba dam wall. The logistics officer said the present force would definitely not abandon its position even knowing an attack was coming. Whilst plans were being made for this, the commander of the southern SAS patrol was redeployed with a smaller callsign to keep an eye on ZIPRA developments from an OP on a prominent hill feature.
Operation Tepid
WE HAD STUMBLED UPON THIS forward base at a time when disturbing intelligence was reaching COMOPS. It concerned the movement of large numbers of ZIPRA’s conventional forces from Luso Boma in Angola and from Mulungushi in Zambia. Most appeared destined for CGT 2 base, which was obviously another forward launch-point for the impending invasion. In addition, large quantities of arms and equipment, including MiG 21 fighters, were reported to be arriving in Zambia.
Joshua Nkomo was obviously pulling out all the stops to get his large invasion force into Rhodesia before the Lancaster House talks progressed to a point where this might no longer be possible. Those forces he had in the country were small and ineffectual whilst the forces of his rival, Robert Mugabe, already dominated all of the Shona tribal areas and large sections of his own Matabeleland. Considering the imminent possibility of a ceasefire agreement to be followed by all-party elections, this was not a happy situation.
There was also the probability that, following a ceasefire, Kenneth Kaunda would prevent Nkomo from expatriating his weapons and equipment—particularly after having been caught out for hiding the war materials that the SAS destroyed in July.
After the war was over, we learned that Joshua believed his only hope was to launch all his forces immediately with a view to overrunning Salisbury in two fast-moving drives. If successful, he hoped to secure Rhodesian forces to his cause so that, together, the RSF and ZIPRA could destroy the common enemy ZANU. Thereafter, an interim government would be established to prepare the country for all-party elections that excluded ZANU.
At COMOPS we obviously knew nothing of this. All we knew was that we had to stem the flow of ZIPRA men and equipment to the border areas, and secure the three permanent bridges at Victoria Falls, Kariba and Chirundu. But first the troublesome base near Kariba had to be taken out in an operation codenamed ‘Tepid’.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Bate.
The RLI and SAS were assigned to Op Tepid. Since the RLI outnumbered the SAS, command of daytime operations from a high-flying Lynx was given to OC the RLI, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Bate. Command at night vested with OC the SAS, Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett.
The basic plan was for two RLI assault groups, both moving from the north, to drive the enemy off both ridges. Once these were secured, an SAS assault force would move, also from the north, through the main base below the ridges with RLI giving supporting fire from their elevated positions.
The assault forces were choppered in at dawn on 20 October. Once they had moved forward to their start positions, SAS and RLI mortar teams were brought in to the west of the western ridge. There were tense moments when the helicopters came in to land within sight of the enemy. ZIPRA had made an excellent appraisal of likely helicopter LZs and had prepared their long-range mortars for the very positions the helicopters landed. The enemy must have enjoyed the sight of Cheetahs making a hurried departure and the mortar teams scurrying for cover.
No attempt was made to prevent ZIPRA breaking out to the south because the whole aim of the operation was to drive ZIPRA from its base and, hopefully, to force the abandonment of heavy equipment. In the event, the RLI force on the eastern ridge only reached the centre of the feature at its highest point when it was stopped dead in its tracks. Troops became pinned down by accurate fire from both their own ridge and from the western ridge. Before long, the western assault force was also bogged down through intense fire from both ridges.
The distance between the two assault forces was almost two kilometres but the enemy gun positions responsible for holding them up were less than 200 metres from each force. In consequence the use of Golf bombs was impossible, yet only Golf bombs would have been effective against the entrenched enemy who had good overhead protection.
The Rhodesians were at a distinct disadvantage. They were exposed and only had light infantry weapons, whereas ZIPRA were dug in with vastly superior heavy weapons. It was just like Mapai all over again, and a situation of stalemate existed. Yet, even though the Rhodesians were out-gunned and could not move forward, ZIPRA preferred to remain in their defensive positions, fearing to expose themselves to the jet-strikes we could not have made so close to our own forces.
Attempts to outflank enemy gun positions on the eastern ridge resulted in a number of RLI soldiers being wounded. On the western ridge, an RLI trooper had been killed. Hunters, limited to 30mm cannons and 68mm Matra rockets, were employed on numerous occasions, but no strike was really successful. ZIPRA simply dived under cover when a Hunter turned in, accepted the explosions above them and immediately emerged to continue firing at anything that moved. By sunset nothing seemed to have been achieved and the RLI was ordered to make a tactical withdrawal, under cover of darkness, to regroup.
When Garth Barrett took command that evening, nothing suggested that ZIPRA had been rattled. Everything pointed to the Rhodesians having to reorganise, bring in extra troops with heavier weapons and make another push next day. Garth realised that, even though ZIPRA seemed too strong to even consider moving out, he should position a force for this eventuality and ordered the positioning of ambushes on the vehicle track south of the base.
Between nightfall and midnight the area was quiet, but then ZIPRA unleashed a full-scale mortar bombardment on likely Rhodesian positions and even fired two 122mm rockets to add to the noise and excitement. At th
e time the Rhodesians had no idea that this was a cover-up to an orderly withdrawal of the entire ZIPRA force. During its move southwards, the enemy force was allowed free passage by one of the RLI’s southern ambushes because the unit commander realised his force of twenty men was too weak to take on nearly 200 closely grouped ZIPRA. For this he was strongly criticised!
After the war I learned from ZIPRA that the reason for the withdrawal was that their positions had become known to the Air Force and that the Rhodesian ground forces were known to have moved some distance away. This being so, the ZIPRA commander felt certain all his positions would be annihilated by the Air Force the next day using their ‘silent bombs’. This was the name given to Golf bombs because men who had been just beyond their lethal range claimed they had not heard the bombs go off. They had only experienced high over-pressure and suffered temporary deafness.
Follow-up operations got under way at first light, but only limited kills were scored against the ZIPRA force, which had taken the precaution of splitting into small groups. Nevertheless the aim of driving ZIPRA from its base had been achieved.
Operation Dice
LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS HAD BEEN on the go for six weeks when Op Tepid wrapped up, and General Peter Walls had been called to London. Before his departure, the general listened to his COMOPS planning team’s ideas on how best to counter a ZIPRA invasion. We specifically argued against ambush and harassment tasks in Zambia because this would have limited effect in stemming any large-scale flow and would almost certainly lead to clashes with Zambian forces. Yet to await ZIPRA’s move and deal with each crossing-point on the Zambezi River, from Rhodesian soil, was obviously ridiculous. Not only would ZIPRA make its crossings at night to minimise interference from the Rhodesian Air Force, their powerful Soviet-supplied equipment would easily drive off any protection force during the critical stages of establishing a bridgehead on Rhodesian soil. Thereafter we would be forced to destroy some of our own bridges to hold up the enemy for Air Force attention in daylight.
Only the destruction of Zambia’s road bridges and culverts on all routes to our border made sense because this would prevent any large-scale movement. Our plans to cut the Great East Road from Lusaka to Malawi, the southern route from Lusaka to Chirundu, and the southwestern route from Lusaka to Livingstone were already complete.
General Walls needed no persuading. He realised only too well that Rhodesia’s David could only beat ZIPRA’s Goliath in this way. However, he was at pains to make us understand that the destruction of a Commonwealth member’s bridges would wreck any hope of the British Government showing any sympathy to the Muzorewa Government’s cause.
Whilst, from his understanding of the goings-on at Lancaster House, he doubted that any such empathy existed, we could not rock the boat just yet. General Walls said he would be in a better position to judge all issues once he got to London. In the meanwhile the SAS, Selous Scouts and RLI were to get on with the job of harassing ZIPRA movements. In consequence, Operation Dice started out with ambushing tasks to make access to Victoria Falls, Kariba and Chirundu difficult.
Masses of bridge demolition gear prepared for Op Manacle in Mozambique lay begging to be used when it was all too obvious to the frustrated SAS that only the destruction of bridges could meet our Zambian objectives. So, even though they had been told Op Dice only called for harassing work, SAS moved all the demolition gear to Kariba; just in case. It is just as well these explosives were immediately available. Without any forewarning during the night of 15 November, a signal from General Walls to COMOPS ordered the immediate implementation of our plans to destroy Zambian bridges.
Ian Smith had returned home from the Lancaster House talks on 11 November. On his arrival at the airport he told reporters that the British had manoeuvred the Muzorewa Government into accepting a bad agreement. He said there was now no alternative but to make the best of a bad deal. Without actually saying so, he implied (in my mind) that the British Conservative chairman of the conference, that poisonous snake Lord Carrington, had deliberately set the stage for a communist party take-over.
Lancaster House talks, 11 November 1979.
Thirteen times Rhodesians had celebrated Rhodesia’s Independence Day on 11 November but this was now a thing of the past—there was no longer anything to celebrate. This is why, even if General Wall’s ‘green light’ on the bridges seemed at odds with what Ian Smith had said four days earlier, we were delighted that Rhodesians were not going to take things lying down.
Whilst lawyers in London settled down to preparing written agreement for all parties’ signatures at some time in December, the SAS moved in on the bridges with RLI troops in support. We all knew they had to act fast before any political change in direction occurred. In four days, nine primary road bridges and one rail bridge were dumped. The SAS demolition teams had become so expert in their tasks that bridges were downed even before their Cheetah transport had reached their refuelling points back in Rhodesia. This not only resulted in the ground teams having an unnecessarily long wait for recovery, it put our COMOPS planners back to work revising methods, movement plans and time-scales for the destruction of Mozambican bridges in Op Manacle.
Eight of the Zambian bridges had been specifically selected to curb ZIPRA’s movements to the border. Another two across the Mubulashi River were not. Whereas we were disallowed from taking any action against railway bridges on the line from Lusaka to South Africa, the rail bridge on the Tanzam rail line and an adjacent road bridge over the Mubulashi River were taken out. This was to complement the downing of the Chambeshi bridges on the same line five weeks earlier and to deliberately pressurise the Zambia Government. If this over-stressed Kenneth Kaunda’s economy, it was nothing compared to what was planned next. The same SAS commander who had taken out the fuel refinery at Beira in Mozambique was about to launch a purely SAS raid to destroy Zambia’s large fuel refinery at Ndola. Simultaneous with this, Op Manacle was to go ahead on the Mozambican bridges. This was all very exciting stuff but it came to an abrupt end on 22 November when General Walls signalled COMOPS instructing that all external offensive operations were to cease forthwith. The war in Zambia and Mozambique was over. ZIPRA was out of the game, but General Walls instructed that internal operations against ZANLA were to be intensified until the expected ceasefire came into effect. He said this might occur before Christmas.
Chapter 10
Ceasefire
A TOTAL CEASEFIRE WAS TO come into immediate effect when all parties to the Lancaster House agreement signed the enacting document. As soon as this happened, the warring forces would cease hostilities and all BSA policemen were to revert to normal policing duties. The RSF were to return to barracks whilst ZIPRA and ZANLA forces were to move into sixteen (later increased to seventeen) assigned Assembly Points (APs) inside Rhodesia. The APs were to be under the control and protection of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF). Nothing was said of the Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries though, ultimately, they also remained in their bases.
In addition to his main duties, the Commanding General of CMF was to head a Ceasefire Committee. This committee of eight, comprising two officers each from the British Army, the RSF, ZIPRA and ZANLA, was to facilitate inter-force co-operation and deal with any ceasefire violations that might occur.
When Lieutenant-General Walls returned to COMOPS from London, he called me to his office to tell me that, when the time came, I was to be his personal representative on the Ceasefire Committee. He said, “I refuse to sit with those bloody Brits and communists or give them any sense of equal rank with myself or any of the service commanders.” Because I held the rank group captain (Army equivalent colonel) he decided to lend weight of rank to RSF representation by recalling Major-General Bert Barnard from retirement, but only to attend committee meetings. All executive functions were to be handled by me. My lack of faith in Bert Barnard caused me some concern but, in the event, we got on fine.
In addition to Ceasefire Committee work, it would be my respon
sibility to act as the liaison officer between ZIPRA, ZANLA and COMOPS. This meant I had to establish a close personal relationship with the top commanders with a view to providing General Walls feedback on all relevant matters. In addition, I was to do whatever I could to ensure that the senior men were adequately cared for and give them whatever assistance I considered reasonable. No funds or other guidelines were given.
It was such an anticlimax returning to routine operations, though my time was taken up to some extent in preparing for the early arrival of CMF military contingents. From early December, RAF C130 transporters arrived daily at Salisbury Airport and New Sarum ferrying in tons of equipment and Commonwealth soldiers from UK, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. Puma helicopters and large trucks came in by USAF C5 (Galaxy) heavy transporters.
On 12 December 1979, the British Governor and his wife, Lord and Lady Soames, arrived to strains of ‘God Save the Queen’. This all seemed so unreal to us who were once such ardent royalists. Rhodesians did not leap to attention as in times before UDI but simply looked on in stunned silence. The long years of sanctions were over, but it was impossible to fully comprehend that the country was now effectively in British Government hands, for the first time in history.
After the Governor’s arrival came two senior ZANLA commanders, Rex Nhongo (deputy commander) and Josiah Tungamirai (chief political commissar) who landed at Salisbury Airport to rapturous applause from thousands of black folk who had been forcibly ‘bussed in’ to welcome them. Later, at the same airport, the arrival of Joshua Nkomo with ZIPRA’s commanders, Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa turned out to be a low-key affair.
I first met the CMF Commander, Major-General John Acland, at a cocktail party given by him to introduce his staff officers to General Walls, his staff officers and their wives. Being a purely military affair with no political overtones, it was a surprisingly easy-going occasion. One of the officers we met was married to a lady whose name was to become well known. He was Lieutenant-Colonel Parker-Bowles.
Winds of Destruction Page 92
