by Roy Jackson
Beyond Good and Evil, 295
Dionysus is both life-affirming and satisfies the metaphysical need; a need Nietzsche acknowledges and which is something that modernity cannot offer. All modernity can offer is scepticism, relativism and nihilism.
On Buddhism
Much of Nietzsche’s comments on religion were levelled at Christianity, but, as we have seen, Nietzsche was also interested in Islam and its culture. Another religion that attracted his curiosity was Buddhism. As with Islam, Nietzsche is much kinder to Buddhism than he is to Christianity, for it lacks what is at the core of Christianity: ressentiment.
It should not come as too much of a surprise that Nietzsche talks about Buddhism, as his early enthusiasm for Schopenhauer would have made him aware of the influence of Eastern religions on Schopenhauer’s philosophy, particularly the emphasis on the eradication of suffering and the world as nothing but illusion. But, like his knowledge of Islam, Nietzsche had a very narrow understanding of Buddhism, which he saw through the eyes of a select number of German scholars rather than through first-hand experience or reading the works of Buddhist thinkers from the Eastern tradition. However, no doubt one appeal of Buddhism for Nietzsche is that there is no omnipotent God with the accompanying doctrines on redemption, sin, grace, a separate world and so on. Consequently, there is no need for prayer or public displays of faith, no need for richly decorated churches and an elitist priestly class:
‘Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic than Christianity – it has the heritage of a cool and objective posing of problems in its composition, it arrives after a philosophical movement lasting hundreds of years; the concept “God” is already abolished by the time it arrives. Buddhism is the only really positivistic religion history has to show us, even in its epistemology (a strict phenomenalism), it no longer speaks of “the struggle against sin” but, quite in accordance with actuality, “the struggle against suffering”.’
The Anti-Christ, 20
For Nietzsche, Buddhism is ‘positivistic’ in that it is more scientific and more in accordance with ‘reality’. Rather than emphasize sin, Buddhism focuses on suffering, which, again, appealed to Nietzsche, for suffering seemed more immediately to be a condition of human nature than sin. As Buddhists do not have the guilt of sin, they are beyond the hatred and envy that is ressentiment. Instead, they talk of moderation and benevolence. In addition, because Buddhism has arisen ‘after a philosophical movement lasting hundreds of years’, Nietzsche considers it to be a more mature, more philosophical religion.
However, Nietzsche still regards Buddhism as a ‘decadent’ religion and, therefore, no more than one step on the path of nihilism. One key topic that Nietzsche disagreed with is the Buddhist view that suffering stems from desire, and so the only way we can get rid of suffering is through a regimen of mental and physical activities, to get rid of desire. While Nietzsche agrees that suffering is central to human nature and that it is caused by desire, he does not agree that we should therefore get rid of desire, for to do so would be to turn us into inhuman, robot-like, passionless people. What makes us human is our suffering. To eliminate desire would not only be wrong and inhuman, but in actual fact impossible if humans are to continue to exist at all.
Key ideas
Modernity: a period in history represented by intellectual, cultural and economic movements such as industrialization, secularization and the nation-state; a complex and multifaceted phenomenon
Secularization: the transformation of a society away from an identification with religious values towards non-religious values and institutions
Things to remember
• It is inaccurate to describe Nietzsche as an atheist, at least in the sense of being entirely irreligious. In many respects, he was a very spiritual person who appreciated the importance and value of religious belief.
• Nietzsche’s criticism is of a particular form of religion, specifically Christianity as it existed at the time.
• For Nietzsche, it is not important whether religion is true or not, but whether or not it is life-enhancing.
• Nietzsche is often highly complimentary of Islam, although more with the intention of contrasting it with Christianity than with praising its beliefs per se.
• A key theme in all of Nietzsche’s writings is his criticism of modernity.
• He recognized the importance of religion within the state, provided it is the ‘right kind’ of religion.
• He was also more praising of Buddhism than he was of Christianity – he saw the former as more philosophical and not so subject to such symptoms as ressentiment.
Fact-check
1 Of which Greek god did Nietzsche declare himself to be a devotee?
a Zeus
b Aphrodite
c Dionysus
d Hermes
2 Which of the following intellectual movements was Nietzsche especially critical of?
a Dadaism
b Communism
c The Reformation
d Modernism
3 To which religion does Nietzsche make over a hundred references in his writings?
a Islam
b Hinduism
c Sikhism
d Scientology
4 Why was Nietzsche more positive towards Buddhism than he was towards Christianity?
a Because it lacks ressentiment
b Because he liked to meditate
c Because the Buddha was an example of Nietzsche’s Übermensch
d Because Nietzsche had travelled to many Buddhist countries
5 Who described Nietzsche as ‘that passionate seeker after God and the last German philosopher’?
a Wagner
b Hegel
c Heidegger
d Freud
6 Which Sufi poet did Nietzsche admire?
a Hafiz
b Rumi
c Jami
d Nurbakhsh
7 Why was Nietzsche so interested in Islam?
a He had lived and travelled in many Islamic countries
b Some of his best friends were Muslims
c He saw it as a contrast to Western culture
d He had considered converting to Islam
8 Which particular Islamic group did Nietzsche admire?
a The Wahhabis
b The Assassins
c The Shi’a
d The Ismailis
Dig deeper
Giles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002)
Lucy Huskinson, The SPCK Introduction to Nietzsche: His Religious Thought (London: SPCK, 2009)
Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam (London: Routledge, 2007)
Alistair Kee, Nietzsche against the Crucified (Norwich: SCM Press, 2009)
Robert Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities (Oxford: OUP, 1999)
10
Nietzsche and politics
In this chapter you will learn:
• about Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy
• what it means to call Nietzsche an ‘immoralist’
• about his views on slavery
• about his views on women
• whether Nietzsche actually has any firm political views in his writings.
While one important modern debate in academic circles among Nietzschean scholars is whether or not he can be considered an ethical naturalist, another fascinating clash of views is on whether or not Nietzsche subscribes to any political views and, if so, what they are. Some scholars have argued that Nietzsche has no political ideals in his writings whatsoever and so to devote a whole chapter to Nietzsche’s political views could be construed as way off the mark. However, many other scholars do argue for a political Nietzsche.
This chapter discusses Nietzsche’s views on society and politics, outlining his arguments for a hierarchical society and his critical view of democracy, which he saw as a hindrance to culture. For him, an elite would benefit society as a whole, and the top
of the pyramid would be his philosophers of the future, his oligarchs of the spirit.
On democracy
’I am not a man I am dynamite… Only after me will there be grand politics on earth.’
Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am Destiny’, 1
While Nietzsche is a great admirer of Athenian culture, the same cannot be said of that other great Athenian invention: democracy. Rather than support the view held by some – that Athenian culture was a result of democracy – Nietzsche praises the flourishing of the arts in Athens despite its democracy, seeing it as more of a hindrance to culture than a benefactor. In fact, it seems that Nietzsche’s dislike for democracy goes back a long way: he resigned from a student fraternity because he disapproved of what he regarded as a democratic admissions policy. Already, in his student years, he was a man displaying elitist tendencies even before he had developed any strong philosophical views.
One point that needs to be borne in mind was that at the time Nietzsche was writing, democracy was something of a ‘new idea’, despite its origins – though in a rather different form than we know it today – in ancient Greece. Much of Europe at the time was fundamentally aristocratic, and so the view of democracy would have been very different from what, today, is largely taken for granted and considered by many as the best form of government. Having said that, more egalitarian views were certainly being bandied around during his time, not least from his friend Wagner, who argued for the abolition of the state and the introduction of radical egalitarianism. In addition, Meysenbug was also a campaigner for democracy and was exiled because of it.
The Birth of Tragedy was originally intended to involve a discussion of politics and it does seem odd that Nietzsche omitted this. What was to be part of the book became a separate essay called ‘The Greek State’. This interesting essay is often ignored by scholars, which is a shame as it shows quite clearly that Nietzsche not only had an interest in politics but was also quite familiar with political theory – perhaps not surprisingly, given the company he kept. The crux of Nietzsche’s argument against democracy (as well as feminism, socialism and anarchism) is that it is merely a continuation of Christianity: an ethics of equality that weakens the strong and preserves the failures. He believed that, in such a political climate, culture would find it difficult to flourish.
‘The Greek State’ is a work of cultural criticism, particularly aimed at the contemporary phenomenon of modernity (see previous chapter) with its atomized individualism and such egalitarian themes as the dignity of man and the dignity of labour.
The ancient Greeks, on the other hand, recognized that a life devoted to labour makes it impossible to create great art. Wagner argued that Greek culture could not be revived because it deserved to perish. Why? Because it was founded upon slavery and so any culturally fulfilled society of the future must exist without slavery, including wage slavery, which, of course, was characteristic of the capitalism that was emerging at the time. Nietzsche, however, in his typically contentious manner, argues that slavery is an essential feature of any society that wishes to attain high culture. Slavery is the essence of culture:
‘If culture really rested upon the will of the people, if here inexorable powers did not rule, powers which are law and barrier to the individual, then the contempt for culture, the glorification of poorness in spirit, the iconoclastic annihilation of artistic claims would be more than an insurrection of the suppressed masses against drone-like individuals; it would be the cry of compassion tearing down the walls of culture; the desire for justice, for the equalization of suffering, would swamp all other ideas.’
‘The Greek State’, p. 7
Here Nietzsche is presenting us with a choice: you can have democracy with its smorgasbord of lifestyle options that have no evaluative ranking, thus producing a mood of confusion and cynicism, or you can have aristocracy with its higher states of being, its Supermen.
Comparisons can be reasonably made between Plato’s conception of the state and Nietzsche’s. The key difference between Nietzsche and Plato is that for the latter the philosopher-king is one who has access to universal truth, who discovers the truth, whereas for Nietzsche he is fundamentally, in his early writings anyway, an artist who invents the truth. For Nietzsche, it is necessary to recognize that, in the modern age, belief in unconditional authority and absolute truth is on the wane. What is distinctive of the modern age is the secularization of political authority:
’In the sphere of higher culture there will always have to be sovereign authority, to be sure – but this sovereign authority will hereafter lie in the hands of the oligarchs of the spirit.’
Human, All Too Human, 261
What is needed to cure social ills ‘is not forcible redistribution of property but a gradual transformation of mind: the sense of justice must grow greater in everyone and the instinct for violence weaker’ (HAH, 452).
The capacity to build a new future depends on an ability to see continuity with the strength of past traditions. An important passage in Human, All Too Human, called ‘Religion and Government’, notes that the importance of religion in the life of a culture is that it consoles the hearts of individuals in times of loss, deprivation and fear – that is, in times when a government is powerless to alleviate the sufferings of people during such tragedies as famine and war. However, the increase in democracy has seen a parallel decline in the importance of religion and a greater emphasis on the ego. This, Nietzsche stresses, is not ‘individualism’ or ‘existentialism’.
It is a mistake to interpret Nietzsche, as some scholars such as Derrida do, as someone unconcerned with society or politics, but rather only centred on the asocial, isolated individual. Nietzsche is deeply committed to the promotion of high culture and sees the role of the individual in an ancient Greek sense as a citizen, as part of a community. His attack on modernity is an attack on liberal democracy with its atomistic individuals lost at sea with no values or meaning. In this sense, Nietzsche is very much a traditionalist.
With the decline in political absolutism sanctioned by divine law, there is the possibility that the state, too, will break apart as reverence for political authority is lost. Nietzsche hopes that the increase in the secular will lead to a new period of toleration, pluralism and wisdom if chaos and anarchy are to be avoided. Nietzsche, it should be stressed, is not anti-democratic so long as it leaves space for the rare, the unique and the noble. Democracy does not necessarily lead to the death of high culture and noble values, provided that culture and politics can give each other space. Nietzsche believes that democracy is the political form of the modern world which is most able to offer the best protection of culture – that is, of art, of religion, of all creativity. In his letters, he says he is ‘speaking of democracy as something yet to come’ and favours a social order which ‘keeps open all the paths to the accumulation of moderate wealth through work’, while preventing ‘the sudden or unearned acquisition of riches’.
Nietzsche wishes to preserve a private/public distinction, whereas modern liberal society – although its ideology of the privatization of politics allows individuals a great degree of private freedom – undermines notions of culture and citizenship. Nietzsche’s criticisms are levelled against the prevailing democracy of his time, remembering that most of Europe was still autocratic, but was not against a democracy ‘yet to come’. This raises interesting debates, occurring in our current time, as to what forms of democracy are possible and a growing awareness that there is not a one-fits-all political system, as has been demonstrated when attempts have been made to impose Western forms of democracy on non-Western states, with devastating consequences. Democratic politics, Nietzsche acknowledges, can promote and further culture and, in the recognition that with modernity comes the absence of any possibility of ethical universality, the best hope for the future is that there exists a culture. What kind of culture this would be is uncertain. Would we all agree that Nietzsche’s conception of culture, of high culture, is one we would accept?
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Nietzsche’s nihilism is his contempt for what he regards as negative or destructive values, such as democracy, feminism, socialism and other features of the modern world. Nietzsche sees these modern ideas as lacking in a positive ethos: they are slave values and as such the products of ressentiment (see Chapter 4). But it is wrong to accuse Nietzsche of being a nihilist, for a nihilist is only negative and puts nothing forward in its place, whereas Nietzsche is greatly concerned – in fact, you could consider it his primary mission throughout much of his life – with a need to present new values (even if those new values are a return to ancient values), not simply to get rid of the present ones and put nothing in their place.
As stated above, Nietzsche does resemble Plato in some respects regarding his political views. In fact, Beyond Good and Evil contains passages that are remarkably similar, with their descriptions of three classes: first, the spiritual leaders; second, those who aspire to be leaders and for whom future rulers may arise; and third, ‘the vast majority who exist to serve and be generally useful and must exist only to that end’ (Section 61). Like Plato, mention is not specifically made of the ‘fourth class’, the slaves, but it seems to be a given that slavery would be required ‘in one sense or another’ (Section 257). Must we then admit that Nietzsche is an advocate of slavery?
We saw how Nietzsche was later critical of his The Birth of Tragedy, which he considered a naive and immature work, and so it may well be that we could forgive his remarks on slavery in ‘The Greek State’ – written at the same time – as the product of a naive young mind. This cannot be defended, however, as his views remained consistent and he sticks to his guns in his much more mature work Beyond Good and Evil. However, it may well be argued that we should not be out to defend or attack Nietzsche, for what he was doing was merely pointing out that culture is, historically speaking, built upon a foundation of cruelty and oppression. If we choose to create a society that is egalitarian and compassionate, we can say goodbye to high culture and hello to reality TV and celebrity chefs. The debate then centres around whether or not it is the case that liberal society does in fact lead to a recognition that all things have value and, therefore, nothing has value. Is twentieth-first-century Western democracy any less cultural than an aristocratic society would be?
