Now for you113 who are rightly fond of Plato and eager to examine his philosophical doctrines in preference to those of anyone else, I have considered it necessary to sketch the nature of his discourses, the classification of his dialogues, and the method of his argument by induction, in as elementary a way as possible and in summary form, in order that the information I have gathered about his life may not be found to omit his doctrines. For it would be like carrying owls to Athens,114 as the saying goes, were I to provide you with a highly detailed account.
48 It is said that Zeno of Elea115 was the first to write dialogues. But Aristotle, in the first book of his work On Poets, declares that Alexamenus116 of Styra (or of Teos, as Favorinus says in his Reminiscences) was the first. It seems to me, however, that Plato, who perfected the form, ought in fairness to be awarded the prize for its discovery as well as for its elaboration. A dialogue is a conversation consisting of questions and answers on some philosophical or political topic, with careful attention to the characters of the persons introduced and their way of speaking. Dialectic is the art of discourse by which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of the interlocutors’ questions and answers.
49 Of the Platonic dialogues there are two principal types, one adapted for instruction, the other for inquiry. The instructional type is itself divided into two types, the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical is divided into the physical and logical, the practical into the ethical and political. The type concerned with inquiry is also divided into two types, one fostering dialectical skill, the other skill in debate. The type concerned with skill in dialectic has two subdivisions, one maieutic,117 the other peirastic.118 And the type concerned with skill in debate can also be divided into two types, the probative and the refutative.
50,51 We are not unaware that some writers classify the dialogues differently; for they say that some are dramatic, others narrative, and still others a combination of the two. But they classify the dialogues in a manner more appropriate for tragedy than for philosophy. Physics is covered in the Timaeus, logic in the Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides, and the Sophist; ethics in the Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and the Symposium, as well as in the Menexenus, Clitophon, Letters, Philebus, Hipparchus,119 and the Rivals in Love; and politics in the Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, and Atlantis.120 The maieutic category includes Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, and Laches; the peirastic category, Euthyphro, Meno, Ion, Charmides, and Theaetetus; the probative, Protagoras, and the refutative, Euthydemus, Gorgias, and the two dialogues entitled Hippias.
Since there is considerable disagreement between those who claim that Plato lays down positive views and those who disagree, let me make a determination concerning this question. A dogmatist lays down dogmas just as a legislator lays down laws; and “dogma” has two meanings, namely the thing that is opined, and the opinion itself.
52 The former of these is a proposition, the latter a conception. Now, where he comprehends the subject matter, Plato declares his own view and refutes the false one; but when discoursing about what is unclear he holds back. He presents his own views through four characters: Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian stranger, and the Elean stranger. The strangers are not, as some assume, Plato and Parmenides, but anonymous fictional characters; and even when Socrates and Timaeus are speaking, it is Plato’s views that are being laid down. And to indicate which views are false, he introduces characters who are refuted, such as Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, and Protagoras, as well as Hippias, Euthydemus, and the like.
53,54,55 In constructing his proofs he primarily uses induction, not always in the same way, but in two forms. For induction is an argument that, by means of certain true propositions, properly infers the truth of a proposition that resembles them. There are two methods of induction: one proceeds by contradiction, the other by agreement. In the kind that proceeds by contradiction, the answer offered to every question will be the opposite of the interlocutor’s position, as for example, “My father is either other than or the same as your father.121 So if your father is other than my father, then, being other, he would not be my father. But if he is the same as my father, then, being the same, he would be my father.” And again: “If man is not an animal, he would either be a stone or a stick. But he is not a stone or a stick; for he is animate and self-moving; hence he is an animal. But if he is an animal, and if a dog or an ox is also an animal, then man, by being an animal, would also be a dog or an ox.”122 This is an instance of induction by contradiction and opposition, which Plato used not for laying down positive views, but for refutation. Induction by agreement has two forms; one proves the particular proposition under investigation from a particular, the other proves the universal {from a particular}. The former is employed in rhetoric, the latter in dialectic. For example, under the first form one seeks to know whether So-and-so has committed a murder. The proof is that at the time of the murder the man was found to be covered with blood. This is the rhetorical form of induction, since rhetoric is concerned with particulars and not universals. For it does not investigate justice in the abstract, but particular instances of justice. The other form, where the universal is first established by reference to particulars, is dialectical. For example, the question is asked whether the soul is immortal and whether the living come back from the dead. This is proved in the dialogue On the Soul123 by means of a certain general proposition, namely that opposites come from opposites. But the universal proposition itself is established from particular instances: for example, that sleep comes from waking and vice versa, and the greater from the smaller and vice versa. This is the form of induction that Plato used to establish his own views.
Logic (or Philosophy), by Luca della Robbia, c. 1437. Georgio Vasari identified the figures as Plato and Aristotle. Philosophy is represented here solely by the activity of its protagonists: the philosophical discourse.
56 Just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was at first the only actor, and later Thespis devised a single actor in order to let the chorus catch its breath, and Aeschylus a second, and Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was perfected, so too with philosophy. For at first its discourse concerned one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added ethics, and Plato dialectics, and so brought philosophy to its perfection. Thrasyllus says that Plato, like the tragic poets, published his dialogues in tetralogies. The tragic poets competed with four dramas at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea, and the festival of the Chytri.124 Of the four plays, the last was a satire. And the four dramas were called a tetralogy.125
57,58,59,60,61 Accordingly, says Thrasyllus, there are fifty-six genuine dialogues, provided that the Republic is divided into ten (though Favorinus, in the second book of his Miscellaneous History, says that almost the entire Republic was found in Protagoras’s Disputations) and the Laws into twelve. This makes nine tetralogies, if the Republic counts as a single book, and the Laws as another. He gives the dialogues of the first tetralogy a common subject. For he wishes to describe what the life of the philosopher should be. He gives each book a two-part title, the first part taken from the name of the interlocutor, the second from the subject.126 The first tetralogy begins with Euthyphro or On Piety, a peirastic dialogue; the second is the Apology of Socrates, an ethical dialogue; the third is Crito or On What Is to Be Done, ethical; the fourth is Phaedo or On the Soul, ethical. The second tetralogy begins with Cratylus or On Correctness of Names, a logical dialogue, which is followed by Theaetetus or On Knowledge, a peirastic dialogue, the Sophist or On Being, a logical dialogue, and the Statesman or On Monarchy, also logical. The third begins with Parmenides or On Ideas, logical, which is followed by Philebus or On Pleasure, ethical, the Symposium or On the Good, ethical, and Phaedrus or On Love, ethical. The fourth begins with Alcibiades127 or On the Nature of Man, a maieutic dialogue, which is followed by a second Alcibiades128 or On Prayer, also maieutic, Hipparchus or The Lover of Gain, ethical,
and the Rivals in Love or On Philosophy, ethical. The fifth begins with Theages or On Philosophy, maieutic, which is followed by Charmides or On Temperance, a peirastic dialogue, Laches or On Courage; maieutic, and Lysis or On Friendship, maieutic. The sixth begins with Euthydemus or the Eristic, refutative, which is followed by Protagoras or the Sophists, probative, Gorgias or On Rhetoric, refutative, and Meno or On Virtue, a peirastic dialogue. The seventh begins with two dialogues entitled Hippias—the first On Beauty,129 the second On Falsehood130—both refutative, which are followed by Ion or On the Iliad, peirastic, and Menexenus or The Funeral Oration, ethical. The eighth begins with Clitophon or Hortatory, ethical, which is followed by the Republic or On Justice, political, Timaeus or On Nature, physical, and Critias or The Story of Atlantis, ethical. The ninth begins with Minos or On Law, political, which is followed by the Laws or On Legislation, political, Epinomis or Night Meeting or Philosopher, political, and finally the thirteen letters131 (ethical), in which he uses the salutation “Fare well,” as Epicurus used “Live well,” and Cleon132 “Be of good cheer.” There is one letter to Aristodemus,133 two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one each to Leodamas, Dion, and Perdiccas, and two to Dion’s friends. This is how Thrasyllus and some others classify Plato’s works.
62 Some, however, including Aristophanes the grammarian,134 group the dialogues in trilogies. In the first they place the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman, and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos, and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro, and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo, and the Letters. The rest are single works in no particular order. Some writers, as has been mentioned, put the Republic first, others start with the Greater Alcibiades; others with Theages; some with Euthyphro; others with Clitophon; some with Timaeus; some with Phaedrus; others with Theaetetus; many put the Apology first. By common consent, the following dialogues are considered spurious: Midon or Horsebreeder, the Eryxias or Erasistratus, Alcyon, the Acephali or Sisyphus, Axiochus, the Phaeacians, Demodocus, Chelidon, the Seventh Day, and Epimenides. Of these the Alcyon is thought to be the work of a certain Leon, as Favorinus says in the fifth book of his Reminiscences.
63 He has used a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the ignorant. He considers wisdom, in its most specific sense, to be the knowledge of those things that are intelligible and that truly exist, the science which, he declares, is concerned with god and the soul when separated from the body. In a particular sense, he also calls wisdom “philosophy,” which is a longing for divine wisdom. And in a general sense, “wisdom” is used by him to refer to any form of skill, as when he calls an artisan wise. And he uses the same words in a number of different senses. At any rate, he uses the word phaulos135 in the sense of haplous,136 as does Euripides in Licymnius when referring to Heracles in the following passage:
Simple, rude, perfectly honest,
Reserving all his wisdom for action,
Unskilled in speech.
64 Sometimes Plato uses the same word to mean “bad” and at other times “small.” He often uses different words to express the same thing. He calls the idea “form,” “species,” “model,” “principle,” and “cause.” He also uses contrary expressions for the same thing. At any rate, he calls the sensible object “that which is and is not”: “that which is” because it comes into being, and “that which is not” because it is constantly changing. And he says that the idea is neither in motion nor at rest; that the selfsame thing is both one and many. And it is his habit to do this in many instances.
The Tablet of Cebes (or The Journey of Human Life), anonymous, 1573. An allegorical representation of life as a passage through concentric rings to the temple of happiness on a mountain in the middle, based on a dialogue attributed to Cebes of Thebes (c. 430–350 BC), a follower of Socrates. Cebes is one of the speakers in Plato’s Phaedo and is also mentioned in the Crito and the Thirteenth Letter.
65 The interpretation of his dialogues includes three things. First, one must explain the meaning of what is being said in each case; then, one must determine its purpose, whether it is making an indispensable point or merely serving as an illustration, and whether it is establishing doctrines or refuting the interlocutor; and third, one must consider whether what has been said is correct.
66 Since various critical marks are found in his works, let us say something about them here. A chi (Χ)137 is understood to indicate expressions, figures of speech, and, in general, any idiom of Platonic usage. The diple (>) indicates Plato’s doctrines and opinions. The dotted chi () draws attention to quotations and elegancies of style. The dotted diple () indicates the corrections of certain editors; the dotted obelus (÷), passages suspected for no good reason; the dotted reversed sigma (), repetitions and possible transpositions; the ceraunium (T),138 passages requiring philosophical clarification; the asterisk (*), an agreement of doctrine; and the obelus (–), a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his works. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his work On Zeno, when the edited works were first published, anyone who wished to read them had to pay a fee to their owners.
67 These were his approved doctrines. He held that the soul is immortal, that it clothes itself in a succession of different bodies,139 and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the body’s first principle is geometrical.140 He defined soul as a form of breath diffused in all directions, and held that it is self-moving and tripartite. Its rational part is seated in the region of the head, the spirited part in the region of the heart, while the appetitive part is constructed in the region of the navel and the liver.141
68 The soul encloses the body on all sides, from the center outward, in a circle, and is composed of elements. Divided at harmonic intervals, it forms two circles that meet each other at two points; and the inner circle, being slit six times, makes seven circles in all. The inner circle moves on a diagonal to the left, the outer to the right. And because it is single, the outer circle dominates; for the inner circle has been divided. The outer is the circle of the Same, the inner ones those of the Other, by which he means that the motion of the soul is that of the universe together with the revolutions of the planets.142
69,70 Divided in this way and harmonized from the center to the extremities, the soul recognizes the realities and harmonizes them because its own elements are harmoniously proportioned. When the circle of the Other revolves correctly, the result is opinion, whereas when the circle of the Same does so the result is knowledge. Plato posits two universal principles, god and matter, and he calls god mind and cause. He held that matter is formless and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it.143 He says that though it once moved in a disorderly manner, it was brought together in one place by god, since he preferred order to disorder.144 This substance was converted into the four elements: fire, water, air, and earth; and from these the universe itself and all it contains are generated. He says that earth is the only unchangeable element, and holds that this is due to the peculiarity of its constituent shapes. For he says that the shapes that constitute the others are of the same kind (all are made of identical scalene triangles), whereas the shape that constitutes earth is peculiar. The element of fire is a pyramid, of air an octahedron, of water an icosahedron, of earth a cube; hence earth is not converted into any of them, nor are they converted into earth.
Terra Platónica, by Francisco Tropa, 2013. Murano colored glass plates, Macacauba wood unique, 60 × 60 × 60 cm.
71 The elements are not separated, each into its own region, because the motion of the universe, which exerts pressure on them and draws them toward the center, aggregates the small particles and separates the large. Hence as they change their shapes, the elements also change their positions.145
72 There exists one universe, created,146 since it is perceptible, which has been made by god. It is animate because what is animate is better than what is inanimate.147 And this piece of workmansh
ip is assumed to have come from the best of causes.148 It was made one and not unlimited because the model from which god made it was one. It is spherical because such is the shape of its creator. For that creator encompasses the other living things, and this universe the shapes of them all.149 It is smooth and has no surrounding organ because it has no need of organs. Furthermore, the universe remains indestructible because it is not dissolved into the deity.150 The creation as a whole is caused by god because the good is by nature beneficent,151 and the creation of the universe has the good as its cause. For the most beautiful of created things has the best of intelligible causes.152 Accordingly, since god is of this nature, and the universe, being supremely beautiful, resembles the best, it would resemble god rather than any of the created things.
73 The universe is composed of fire, water, air, and earth: of fire, that it may be visible; of earth, that it may be solid; of water and air, that it may be proportional.153 For the solids are found to be proportionate with the aid of two means, so that the whole may constitute a unity. And the universe was made up of all the elements so that it would be complete and indestructible.
Time is an image of eternity. And while eternity remains always at rest, time is a function of the motion of the universe. For night, day, month, and all such intervals are parts of time. Hence time does not exist apart from the nature of the universe. But as soon as the universe exists, so does time.154
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Page 20
