possible to appeal to the egalitarian instincts of the masses over the heads of established elites and on the basis of such issues as restrictions on peasant access to forests and the burden of usury. Bonapartism in these limited contexts might be seen as a democratising movement, a means of reducing the power of the ‘bigwigs’
( gros) over the ‘little people’ ( petits). However, the key factor in winning and retaining support for the regime in most rural areas, and for all social groups, was to be the establishment of strong and stable government and the greater prosperity which appeared to follow. Even if most of the rural population continued to take little interest in politics they were grateful for this, and also aware of the dependence of the regime on their vote. Napoléon III was ‘their Emperor’.
Although the Emperor and officials at all levels frequently expressed sympathy for industrial workers, their limited efforts to alleviate working and living conditions had little practical impact, while the constant efforts to repress workers’
organisations and strikes in order to safeguard the ‘freedom’ of economic activity were clearly favourable to employers. Even so, and although republican
historiography has attempted to minimise its significance, many workers were also attracted by the regime, especially in the Nord, Rouen area and Alsace. In part, this was due to the Bonapartist legend and mass propaganda presenting Napoléon III as the ‘poor man’s friend’. Relative prosperity, in spite of some difficult years, lent weight to this, as did the efforts of the administration to alleviate the effects of poor harvests, rising food prices and unemployment between 1853 and 1857. It also reflected clerical influence in some of the declining textile centres in the south, or else paternalistic pressures, as among the employees of the textile entrepreneur Seydoux at Le Cateau (Nord) and those of the ironmasters Schneider at Le Creusot (Saône-et Loire) and de Wendel at Hayange (Moselle). The many workers
employed in rural manufacture tended to share the views of the peasants among whom they lived. In addition, the waging of successful war was to be an important source of prestige for the regime. Even in such major centres of opposition as Paris and Lyons, events like the Emperor’s departure for Italy with the army in 1859
appealed to a bellicose popular nationalism.
Foreign policy
Napoléon’s foreign policy was that of the republican left of the time. It involved rejection of the treaties imposed on France in 1815 following the defeat of the first Empire and, even more ambitiously, a recasting of the map of Europe based on the 32
principle of nationality, to involve in particular some sort of reconstitution of Poland, Italy and Germany as well as the territorial aggrandisement of France itself. As far as possible, these objectives were to be achieved through congresses of the powers but, if necessary, through engagement in limited war. The Crimean war in 1854 represented a first step, an alliance with Britain against Russia, the most reactionary of European states. Eventual military success considerably increased French prestige, although the Congress of Paris in 1856 did not result in revision of the treaties. War with the old rival Austria in 1859 brought further military successes at Magenta and Solferino in Northern Italy and a hastily concluded peace which united Lombardy to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Savoy and
could not prevent Italian nationalists from seizing power in the duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena and in the Papal Romagna. As a reward, the territories of Savoy and Nice lost in 1815 were, following plebiscites of their inhabitants, triumphantly restored to France. Popular images and songs celebrated this renewal of national glory. The return of the Imperial Guard and other military units to Paris from the Crimea on 29 December 1855 and from Italy on 14 August 1859, still in their battle-torn uniforms, carrying their tattered flags, with gaps in their ranks left by the dead , attracted enormous emotional crowds. The Emperor’s birthday on 15 August,
celebrated as a national holiday, provided another opportunity for military parades in every garrison town in France. Patriotic enthusiasm there undoubtedly was, but reports from both prefects and state prosecutors ( procureurs-généraux) also suggest that there were always substantial public misgivings about military adventure. The actual outbreak of war might be greeted with resigned acceptance, turning towards general support. However, as the Crimean war was prolonged, criticism revived and with it demands for a negotiated settlement. Similarly, during the Italian campaign, reports from the provinces following the victories at Magenta and Solferino reveal both a pride in French successes and widespread support for an immediate peace. Only committed republicans favoured the complete defeat of Austria. The government’s constant concern with the state of public opinion and particular anxiety about alienating normal supporters among the elites, business circles and the rural population, ensured that these reports were taken into account in official discussions of foreign policy, although their impact on decisions is difficult to establish. The despatch of an expeditionary force to Mexico in December 1861 – 30, 000 men by the end of 1862 – in pursuit of the dream of creating a French sphere of influence in the Americas at a time when the USA was fully absorbed with civil war, would prove to be beyond the public’s
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comprehension. It perfectly illustrated the danger, for a regime so constantly concerned with public opinion, of policy decisions which were difficult to justify as serving the nation’s vital interests. Not surprisingly, just as foreign policy initiatives judged by the public to be successful considerably enhanced the regime’s prestige, so failures could be extremely damaging.
Signs of dissent
During its first decade, the Second Empire enjoyed a broader consensus of support than its predecessors. Election results suggest that this reached its apogee in 1857
when official candidates obtained 89 per cent of the votes cast although, due to large-scale abstention, this represented only 60 per cent of registered voters. Even at this stage, however, prefects were increasingly anxious, especially about the cities in which supervision of the electorate was always so difficult. Much of the support for the regime, particularly from the elites, had always been conditional and far from wholehearted. It declined as the threat of a revolutionary upheaval diminished. The state prosecutor at Aix-en-Provence reported with regret, as early as 16 June 1855, that ‘if the government has few really dangerous enemies, the number of genuinely serious adherents upon whom it could count in a critical situation appears extremely restrained’. With order apparently restored, social elites would gradually, and initially with great restraint, increase their pressure for greater influence over political decision-making and for the re-establishment of a representative, parliamentary regime, both on principle and as a means of
protecting their special interests. The growing number of critics ranged from those who had initially welcomed the coup but who no longer saw the practical need for authoritarian government, to republicans who, for the most part, rejected the Empire and all its works.
In the first category were diverse ‘liberals’, the socially conservative
proponents of parliamentary government and of greater liberty for the press and local government. They expressed restrained criticism in newspapers like the Journal des Débats (circulation 12, 800 in 1861) or the Revue des Deux Mondes (circulation 12, 400). They were also well represented among the official deputies elected to the Corps législatif. Although established political personalities like Thiers or Rémusat continued to play influential roles, at local level informal liberal leadership frequently appears to have been undergoing renewal. This was due to the withdrawal from public life of those who had been disillusioned by the
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experience of the Second Republic, to the rallying of many, especially former Orleanists, to the imperial regime and because of the emergence of younger men especially from those excluded from office by the system of official candidature –
a new generation of ‘outs’. The liberal revival of the 1860s was being prepared.
Initially, the lead was given by Legitimists. Their criticism was frequently tolerated by the regime because as obvious conservatives they were not a threat to social order. Typically, theirs was an elite ‘party’ based upon personal relationships and voluntary associations rather than specific forms of political organisation.
Although instructed by the Comte de Chambord, the Legitimist pretender, to
abstain from politics, they were often too determined to take full advantage of their influence in local and national elections to adopt this purist stance. This was true both of landed elites in the west and south and, in an industrial department like the Nord, of notables like the textile entrepreneur Kolb-Bernard, the Vicomte Anatole de Melun and the Comte de Caulaincourt who presided over the charitable work of the major Catholic lay organisation, the Société de Saint-Vincent de Paul. The activities of this Société throughout France caused growing concern to the administration. It brought together regularly members of the Legitimist elite and provided them with the means of exercising a wider influence over both fellow members and the recipients of charitable assistance. Moreover, many of these Legitimist sympathisers continued to hold important public offices, again ignoring Chambord’s instructions to resign because this would have affected their incomes, reduced them to a tedious idleness and resulted in a significant loss of influence. In practice, although they might in private pour scorn on the bad taste of the imperial court and might fail to attend receptions at the prefecture, they generally cooperated with the government, justifying this at least initially by their common concern with the defence of order. Increasingly, though, the basis of this opposition from the right – potential rather than real – was changing. In place of dynastic loyalty, greater emphasis was placed upon defence of the interests of religion and the values of a traditional, hierarchical, rural society, against the destructive and demoralising tendencies of modern urban-industrial civilisation. Until 1859, however, the Roman Catholic Church remained on good terms with the regime,
limiting the Legitimists’ ability to use the clergy as a means of appealing for mass support. Only the Emperor’s military intervention in Italy and an outcome which was unfavourable to the interests of the Papacy and offensive to the ultramontane instincts of most of the clergy, revived the traditional clerico-legitimist alliance.
Even then, the results in terms of popular support were to be disappointing. Most practising Catholics failed to appreciate the need to protect the Pope’s temporal 35
power, partly because of the declining influence of the clergy, but mainly due to the competing attractions of the regime and, to a lesser degree, of an increasingly anti-clerical republican opposition.
This Republican opposition remained weak throughout the 1850s and beyond.
The process of politicisation undergone during the Second Republic had not lasted long enough in most regions to establish a permanent mass commitment to the republic. The intensification of repression, moreover, had led to the disappearance of republican newspapers and organisations. The context for political activity, so fundamentally altered in February 1848, once again had drastically changed. The general atmosphere, especially in areas in which insurrections had occurred in December 1851, was described by one senior official as of ‘humble and universal submission to the regime’. Many former activists, knowing themselves to be
marked men, chose prudent inactivity. Between 1852 and at least 1857,
administrative reports from the provinces reveal a sentiment of security, in great contrast with their extremely alarmist nature prior to the coup d’état. Nevertheless, even in these dark days, republican militants continued, cautiously, to meet. Using the camouflage provided by a multiplicity of voluntary and leisure associations which recruited through co-option, gatherings in work places, bars and private homes continued to provide cover for political activity. Individual protest occurred through seditious shouts and placards, while funerals supplied an occasional opportunity for the public demonstration of local support. Even in the years of relative political quiescence, prefects and state prosecutors continued to make reports, usually quite unsubstantiated, concerning the existence of republican secret societies. In March 1853, for example, the existence of a network with 19, 000 members in southern France was posited; more real, but still not posing a very substantial threat, was la Marianne, an organisation discovered in March 1855
with members in working-class districts of Paris and its suburbs and in diverse departments including the Nièvre, Loire-et-Cher and Maine-et-Loire. The most radical activists, according to the scanty evidence of underground activity, from such diverse milieu as Lille, Limoges, Toulouse and Draguignon (Var), appear to have been generally workers who resented bitterly the timidity, pretensions and social conservatism of the usually bourgeois local leadership. Pamphlets by exiles like Felix Pyat and most notably Victor Hugo (whose Napoléon le petit, Histoire d’un crime and Châtiments set the tone for generations of republican historians) were smuggled across the frontiers without too much difficulty. Bianchi’s The Industrial Worker in a Religious and Conservative Society (1855) was read avidly by workers in Lille, a city in which, as in Paris or Lyon, an old-established 36
republican tradition was able to resist the blandishments of the new regime and the de-politicisation which occurred elsewhere. Generally, however, it appears as if during the inevitable and frequently rancorous post-mortem and reappraisal of objectives and tactics which took place in these years, most republican militants determined to avoid further recourse to violence.
In spite of continued repression, it seems likely that the number of committed republicans remained more numerous than before 1848. Embittered by failure and repression, they began the long process of restoring links with sympathisers and of combating the often very genuine attractions of the imperial regime. Little is known about who these militants were, although according to a police list of republican activists in Lille in 1855 41 per cent were artisans, shopkeepers and small merchants, 10 per cent were middle bourgeois small manufacturers, and the rest mainly textile workers (Ménager 1979: 404). By 1858, it seems that members of the liberal professions were also returning to political opposition. In small provincial towns landowners, professional men, tradesmen and artisans began again to use their personal influence to win over the masses. The republican movement remained socially diverse, although in comparison with the Second
Republic peasant support had declined markedly. Nevertheless, the cadres
necessary for the eventual re-emergence of the republican party had frequently remained in existence or were being reconstituted gradually. In July 1853, the police chief in a previously agitated town like Cuers (Var) complained that the démoc-socs had established a sort of counter-society which patronised its own cafés, shops and doctors. Occasionally, it would demonstrate its strength in local elections. This was even the case in some of the areas in which insurrections had occurred and in which repression had been especially intense, particularly since most of the militants who had been arrested benefited from a succession of
amnesties. However, it was still sensible to be cautious. A harsh reminder of this and of the repressive capacity of the regime was provided by the general security law ( loi de sûreté générale) hurriedly introduced on 27 February 1858 following the attempt on 14 January 1858 by the Italian nationalist Orsini to assassinate the Emperor. Under its terms, 2, 883 republican suspects selected from the lists kept in every department were detained without trial, and some 350–400 deported to
Algeria (Wright 1969: 416). However, the republican revival was interrupted only briefly by these measures which were followed indeed by a general amnesty on 16
August 1859. This act of clemency revealed that the government itself appreciated that exceptional measures of repression had become unacceptable to the general public, at least in the absence of a credible threat of revolution.
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As an electoral force, the republican pa
rty had almost disappeared. In the 1852
elections committed republicans generally either voted for non-official
conservative candidates or abstained. In Paris, the moderate republicans General Cavaignac and Hippolyte Carnot were elected and, in Lyons, Jacques Hénon. All three refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Emperor and were unseated.
However, for other activists repeated elections at local, departmental and national levels proved to be too much of a temptation. Although in most areas the
combination of administrative repression and the organisational problems faced by opposition groups ensured that successes were limited, electoral activity
contributed to the gradual process of revival. In spite of the fact that in most departments organised electoral committees were not re-introduced before 1863 or even 1868, the signs of republican resurgence were evident much sooner. In the 1857 general elections, 100 candidates presented themselves (in 261
constituencies as a result of multiple candidacies), five were successful in Paris (Carnot, Goudchaux, Cavaignac, Ollivier and Darimon) and one in Lyons (Hénon).
The refusal of Carnot to take the oath of allegiance and the death of Cavaignac, were followed by renewed victories in the ensuing by-elections, with the election of Jules Favre and Ernest Picard. Substantial support for the republican cause was also evident in other large cities, in spite of the restrictions placed upon opposition electioneering. For the urban classes populaires, the republic clearly remained the ideal form of government. However, these successes also revealed the continued strength of divisions within the republican movement. There was clearly a gulf between the more intransigent who claimed that abstention was the only principled policy and those, frequently representatives of the younger generation, like Ollivier and Darimon who were less rigid in their attitudes. Equally evident was the division which had caused so much strife in 1848 between the moderates, including all the elected deputies who were essentially democratic liberals committed to political change, and the radical and socialist advocates of social reform.
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